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JANUARY 1961
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Africa's Year
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THE WORLD TODAY

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THE WORLD TODAY

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Note of the Month

Africa's Year

On 1 December 1955 only four African States had achieved membership of the United Nations—Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Union of South Africa. In aggregate, their Governments were responsible for one-quarter of the people and for one-eighth of the area of the continent. All the rest formed part, either of the Spanish, Portuguese, or Belgian overseas territories, or of the French Union, or of the colonies or protectorates under the authority of the British Colonial Office, or were under U.N. mandate to Britain, France, or Italy. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, marked down for independence on 1 January 1956, was an exceptional case. Perhaps it was the pre-arranged date for termination of the Italian mandate in Somalia that hastened the process of 'de-colonization' and made 1960 'Africa's year'. On 1 December 1960, the French Union had vanished, and its successor, the '*communauté*', had proved as protean in character as the Commonwealth; the Belgian African Empire had come to an end and the Congo was in chaos; the Commonwealth was exposed to severe tension over the problems of multi-racial Rhodesia. By this date there were twenty-two African members of the United Nations (including Madagascar), and a twenty-third State, Mauritania, had applied for admission.

In spite of statesmanlike attempts to retain groupings which would be economically viable, all the territories in the French Union eventually chose independence so as to acquire the international status of Guinée, which had seceded from the *communauté*, or of the ex-British territories, Ghana and Nigeria. The maintenance of the French *présence* in ex-French Africa is a major problem for the future and it is worsened by the troubles in the 'settler-state' of Algeria; just as the maintenance of the Commonwealth *présence* in ex-British Africa is complicated by the problems of the 'settler-state' in Rhodesia. The colonial Powers will study the lessons of the Congo; the African nationalists the lessons of Ghana and Guinée.

At the time these words are written only the Portuguese African Empire seems unmoved by the Wind of Change.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations

ALMOST all plans for an international organization to keep the peace, from those of the Anglo-American Quaker William Penn, the French Catholic Abbé de Saint-Pierre, and the German philosopher Immanuel Kant onwards, have been based on the expectation that the anarchy of international society can be ended if those methods of enforcing law and justice which work in national affairs could be applied internationally. The United Nations, like the League, has the familiar separation of constitutional powers which we find in national Governments. With obvious limitations the General Assembly, and to a lesser extent the three Council correspond to national legislative organs; the Secretary-Gener and the Secretariat perform executive functions; the Internation Court constitutes the judiciary. But since there is no continuu focus of leadership in the policy-making bodies of the Unit Nations, no cohesive organ corresponding to a national cabinet, t Secretary-General is given rights and duties going beyond tho which are exercised by the head of a national civil service.

EVOLUTION OF THE DIPLOMATIC ROLE

These rights and duties are given legal expression in the Charte Article 97 describes the Secretary-General as 'the chief admini trative officer of the Organization', and Article 98 makes it cle that the Secretary-General should service the policy-making bodi and 'perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by the organs'. These are normal duties of civil servants. Article 99, hov ever, gives the Secretary-General responsibilities for which the is no equivalent in a national constitutional system. By empoweri him to 'bring to the attention of the Security Council any matt which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of internation peace and security', the Charter puts him in this respect on a p with Governments. It is assumed that the Secretary-General h access to information which enables him to judge when wor peace is threatened and, on the basis of that information ar judgment, he is authorized to set in motion the Organization machinery for preserving or restoring peace. It is implied Articles 97-9, and explicit in Articles 100 and 101, that t Secretary-General should be independent, impartial, and 'excl

sively international', and must neither seek nor receive instructions from any Government or other external authority. He acts on his own initiative and his own responsibility when he draws the attention of the Security Council to a threat to peace, and in order to discharge this particular responsibility effectively he heads an international equivalent of a national diplomatic service.

The diplomatic role of the Secretary-General has assumed greater importance than the founding fathers had anticipated. The Security Council was supposed to exercise 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security', but had, between 1945 and 1950, become relatively ineffective on major issues because of the lack of unanimity among the permanent members. It was able to act in the Korean case because of the accidental absence of the Soviet representative. The 'uniting for peace' resolution of 3 November 1950 was an attempt to by-pass the veto by enabling the Security Council to call an emergency session of the General Assembly on twenty-four hours' notice, by the vote of any seven members. This procedure has been invoked on four occasions: in 1956 over Suez and Hungary, in 1958 over the complaints by Lebanon and Jordan of intervention by the United Arab Republic, and in 1960 over the Congo.

When the 'uniting for peace' procedure was devised, the West could depend on securing a two-thirds vote in the Assembly on an important issue. With the admission since 1950 of more than thirty States from Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, and with the trend towards neutralism on the part of some of the States which were pro-Western in 1950, it has become much more difficult to mobilize a two-thirds vote in the Assembly in support of 'Western' policies. This does not mean that there is an anti-Western bloc able to command a two-thirds vote; but it has meant that, on certain crucial questions, it has been impossible to secure a two-thirds vote in the Assembly for *any* resolution of substance.

This has no doubt been very frustrating for Western Governments, but it has had three important, and in some respects beneficial, consequences First, it has brought home to some Governments the fact that the purpose of the United Nations is not to pass resolutions but to solve problems. Secondly, it has increased the importance of the uncommitted countries far beyond what their physical power would warrant, since no resolution on an important question can pass in the Assembly unless some of them can be persuaded to support it. Thirdly, it has increased the diplomatic role

of the Secretary-General. If the Security Council cannot act because the permanent members do not agree, and if no decision of substance can secure a two-thirds vote in the Assembly, it is possible to refer the problem to the Secretary-General. In some cases, the request may indicate in reasonably precise terms what the policy-making organ wishes him to do, but occasionally a resolution has been in such general terms as to allow the Secretary-General considerable tactical freedom.

The diplomatic role of the Secretary-General, which derives from his responsibilities under the Charter, and sometimes also from specific decisions of policy-making organs, has been most successful in connection with those issues in which the interests of the Soviet Union and the West are involved only indirectly.

MR HAMMARSKJÖLD'S APPROACH

Mr Hammarskjold bases his diplomatic work on the Charter. For him, as for the Members of the Organization, the Charter is the law; he is a servant of its principles, and its aims ultimately determine for him what is right and wrong. When a policy-making organ of the United Nations asks the Secretary-General to undertake a particular assignment, this neither detracts from nor adds to his responsibilities under the Charter.

The Charter is not easily amended, but much flexibility of practice is possible within its framework.[1] Mr Hammarskjold has repeatedly demonstrated a pragmatic approach, a distaste for theoretical preconceptions. As he has said, 'We're living in a fluid world, history is fluid, and to have preconceived ideas in any direction I think is just to sacrifice that flexibility which is a matter of course in diplomacy generally.'[2] When asked in 1958 whether the U.N Peace Observation Commission could be useful in the Lebanese crisis, Mr Hammarskjöld replied: 'Maybe. But, you see, that is a typical case of something created—I would not say according to a theoretical pattern but in anticipation of developments which . . . always turns out a little bit different from what anybody expected beforehand.'[3] Five days later, when asked if a U.N. Emergency Force would help in Lebanon, he replied: '. . . UNEF

[1] There has, by general consent, been one *de facto* amendment to the Charter Article 27(3), relating to voting in the Security Council, has been interpreted in such a way that an abstention by a permanent member on a substantive question is not regarded as a veto

[2] Press conference, Stockholm, 23 December 1954. (Subsequent press conferences referred to took place in New York.)

[3] Press conference, 12 June 1958.

is an operation which is based on a series of rather peculiar circumstances, and I would warn against any light-hearted and somewhat frivolous thinking in terms that it can just be copied everywhere else.'[1] In March 1960, a few months before the eruption of the crisis in the Congo, the Secretary-General was asked about the desirability of trying to organize a standing international force. Mr Hammarskjold's reply again emphasized the need to work pragmatically: '. . . everything in our past history had shown that each single situation required its own approach, its own composition, its own organization. For that reason, it seemed much better to have a state of preparedness such that this kind of arrangement could be adjusted to the concrete needs.'[2]

It has been characteristic of Mr Hammarskjold's approach to international problems to separate the different elements and to tackle first the more technical and less controversial aspects. In questions arising from modern weapons technology, he has given personal attention to those international activities which might lessen the harmful effects of, or put an end to, the arms race—co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the work of the U.N. committee on the effects of atomic radiation, negotiations on the ending of nuclear weapons tests, discussion of measures to guard against surprise attack, and efforts to ensure that outer space is used only for peaceful and beneficial purposes.

Similarly, Mr Hammarskjold has urged in general terms, as well as in specific cases, that full use be made of juridical methods of dealing with disputes or aspects of disputes. This is a matter which he has raised in the introduction to his annual report every other year.

The same attitude has been evident in his emphasis on international action to remove the economic causes of political unrest.

> . . . I believe very much in the possibility of straightening out and stabilizing political conditions by sound economic action . . . a good springboard, a necessary basis in fact, for every political action is a sound approach to the economic problems.[3]

When, for the first time, he invoked Article 99 of the Charter and drew the attention of the Security Council to the threat to international peace and security which existed in the Congo, he sought to take the sting out of a serious political crisis by emphasizing the basic and largely non-political causes of trouble. He told the

[1] Press conference, 17 June 1958. [2] Press conference, 3 March 1960.
[3] Press conference, 21 April 1960.

Security Council that the only sound and lasting solution to the problem which had arisen in the Congo lay in the field of technical assistance. His report to the Council was naturally concerned with the immediate security situation and with the action which the Council might wish to take, but he emphasized that such action related to a transitional period, pending satisfactory results by means of technical assistance. Similarly, in his moving statement to the General Assembly on 17 October, Mr Hammarskjold drew special attention to the forgotten element of the Congo situation: the needs of the Congolese people In the Laotian case, Mr Hammarskjold has consistently sought to direct attention to the role which the United Nations family of agencies might play in furthering economic growth and stability.

On many occasions in connection with Middle Eastern problems, Mr Hammarskjold has directed attention to the fundamental causes of instability. In his proposals in 1959 for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees, he dealt first with the economic aspect because he considered that this would establish a framework within which the political and psychological aspects could be viewed more constructively. When the General Assembly met in emergency special session in August 1958 to consider the complaints by Lebanon and Jordan of intervention in their internal affairs by the United Arab Republic, Mr Hammarskjold made a statement at the first meeting of the session on some of the basic needs for action in the region which seemed to him to require urgent attention It was notable that most of the needs which he outlined were technical in character—the importance of regional co-operation in the development of oil and water resources, for example, and the need for development capital. The unusual intervention of the Secretary-General was fully justified when, as the climax to a summer of acute tension arising primarily from differences within the Arab world, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution, in line with the Secretary-General's statement, sponsored by all the Arab Member States of the United Nations.

Mr Hammarskjöld has stressed the role of the United Nations in filling any vacuum which might become a source of conflict between the blocs. In such cases, the United Nations enters the picture on the principle of non-commitment to any power bloc. This principle has been the basis for the United Nations operation in the Congo, and it also guided Mr Hammarskjold in his offer in

1954 to assist the countries of the Middle East to engage in negotiations, as well as in his handling of the Laos crisis in 1959.

One of the most interesting examples of Mr Hammarskjöld's determination to use all the resources of his office to prevent a vacuum from becoming a serious cause of conflict was in relation to Lebanon in 1958 It will be recalled that Lebanon had complained to the Security Council of intervention in her internal affairs by the United Arab Republic. The Council, acting on a proposal by Sweden, decided on 11 June to send an observation group to Lebanon to ensure that there was no illegal infiltration across the Lebanese borders On 15 July, the Lebanese Government requested the United States to send forces to help to preserve the country's integrity and independence, and the United States complied with the request.

The difficult situation that had arisen was considered by the Security Council between 15 and 23 July. A Soviet proposal calling for the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon (as well as British troops from Jordan) was defeated by eight votes to one, with Japan and Sweden abstaining. A Swedish proposal to suspend the activities of the U.N. Observation Group was defeated by nine votes to two, the Soviet Union voting with Sweden. A U.S. proposal that Mr Hammarskjöld should make additional arrangements to ensure the independence and integrity of Lebanon was blocked by a Soviet veto, Sweden abstaining. In this confused and grave situation, Japan submitted what was intended to be a compromise proposal, expressed in the most general terms. This asked the Secretary-General to make arrangements forthwith for such measures as he might consider necessary with a view to ensuring the integrity and independence of Lebanon, thus making possible the withdrawal of U.S. forces from that country. This received ten affirmative votes, but the negative Soviet vote constituted a veto.

Here was a vacuum *par excellence*, and Mr Hammarskjold had no hesitation in acting. His statement to the Security Council on that difficult occasion conveys most vividly his sense of responsibility.

> The Security Council has just failed to take additional action in the grave emergency facing us. However, the responsibility of the United Nations to make all efforts to live up to the purposes and principles of the Charter remains. . .
>
> In a statement before this Council on 31 October 1956, I said that the discretion and impartiality imposed on the Secretary-General by the character of his immediate task must not degenerate into a policy of expediency. On a later occasion—it was 26 September 1957—I said in

a statement before the General Assembly that I believed it to be the duty of the Secretary-General 'to use his office and, indeed, the machinery of the Organization to its utmost capacity and to the full extent permitted at each stage by practical circumstances'. I added that I believed that it is in keeping with the philosophy of the Charter that the Secretary-General also should be expected to act without any guidance from the Assembly or the Security Council should this appear to him necessary towards helping to fill any vacuum that may appear in the systems which the Charter and traditional diplomacy provide for the safeguarding of peace and security...

I am sure that I will be acting in accordance with the wishes of the members of the Council if I, therefore, use all opportunities offered to the Secretary-General, within the limits set by the Charter and towards developing the United Nations effort, so as to help to prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East...

First of all ... this will mean the further development of the Observation Group [in Lebanon]...

The Council will excuse me for not being able to spell out at this moment what it may mean beyond that...[1]

Mr Hammarskjöld's courageous stand on this occasion achieved the result which the contending Powers had claimed to desire. The civil war in Lebanon soon came to an end, United States forces were withdrawn, the Lebanese Government asked the Security Council to delete its complaint against the United Arab Republic from the list of matters before the Council, and by the end of the year the U.N. Observation Group had been disbanded.

This was an example of action by the Secretary-General on his own initiative when the normal processes of diplomacy, both within and outside the framework of the United Nations, had failed. It represented what Mr Hammarskjold has called 'preventive diplomacy'.

Another type of diplomacy by the Secretary-General has arisen when the prestige and resources of his office, and his personal skill in negotiation, are explicitly invoked in an effort to secure compliance with a resolution of a policy-making organ of the United Nations Examples of this include his mission to Peking in 1954 in an effort to secure the release of captured personnel of the United Nations Command; his efforts since 1956 to ensure enforcement of the general armistice agreements in the Middle East; the tasks entrusted to him in 1956 at the time of the Hungarian revolt; his action in 1956–7 to facilitate the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt; and the requests to him in connection with South West Africa in 1957 and South Africa in 1960.

[1] Security Council Official Records, 13th year, 837th meeting, paras. 10–16.

In diplomacy of this kind, the Secretary-General must act on the ssumption of goodwill and good faith on the part of Member tates. He does not dispose of means of physical coercion. He has o military force to compel submission. His method is persuasion; is authority, the Charter and relevant decisions of organs of the Jnited Nations.

THE RIGHT TO ADVISE

Bagehot's comment that a constitutional monarch has the right) be consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn may e applied to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. These ghts are, however, best exercised in private. Mr Hammarskjöld oubtless has deep personal convictions on many of the issues of vorld affairs, but to express these convictions in public might amage the diplomacy of reconciliation which he has practised vith such skill and patience. Mr Hammarskjold's attachment to he methods and spirit of quiet diplomacy may be illustrated by eference to his role at the time of the Security Council's delibera- ions following the nationalization of the Suez Canal. In October 956 the Security Council held closed meetings on the Suez Canal uestion, and at the same time informal exploratory conversa- ions were also held by the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, France, nd the United Kingdom in the office of the Secretary-General. As result of these conversations, the Council approved six principles egarding the Suez Canal[1] Mr Hammarskjold has commented on his experience in the following terms:

> I am confident that such private diplomacy, within the framework of he Security Council, can be usefully employed on other issues and, if so mployed, could contribute in new directions to the importance of the ole the Charter intended the Council to play in the task of peace- naking.[2]

There may be occasions when the Secretary-General must take ı public stand on an issue about which he feels deeply. He has, for xample, emphasized the need for proper co-ordination of those nternational activities which fall within the purview of the Jnited Nations and the related agencies. He has accepted the fact hat some international activities, because of regional or other pecial characteristics, will take place outside the United Nations ramework; and he has emphasized the importance, in such cases,

[1] There is reason to think that the six principles were drafted by the Secretary- General

[2] Address at Ohio University, 5 February 1958.

of proper consultation and co-ordination. He has welcom
arrangements, in other cases, where the United Nations has act
as host or provided services for an international meeting or co
ference But he has expressed the view that developments outsi
the organizational framework of the United Nations, but inside
sphere of interest, may weaken the position of the Organizati
and reduce its influence and effectiveness, he has suggested th
such developments, with only slight adjustments, could often
fitted into the United Nations framework; and he has drawn atte
tion to the serious constitutional difficulties that can arise
agencies, administratively and politically independent of t
United Nations, are created to perform tasks which fall within t
Organization's competence.

Sometimes he has gone beyond expressing such gener
opinions On 8 April 1958, for example, he publicly welcomed t
suspension of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union (adding that
favoured proper inspection of the cessation of tests and the sto
ping of production of nuclear weapons), and three weeks lat
(29 April) he welcomed the initiative of the United States in pr
posing measures to guard against surprise attack. Reminded
these statements two years later and asked whether the time w
approaching when he would want to say something about t
negotiations on nuclear tests, Mr Hammarskjöld replied:

> It may very well come. You know I am rather cautious with that ki
> of approach. . I do not use that possibility unless I think it may be hel
> ful in the specific situation prevailing. If a situation would develop in t
> case of the tests talks where an open public stand by the Secretar
> General could in any way be of use, I would feel that I would certain
> be remiss if I did not use that opportunity.[1]

DIFFUSING RESPONSIBILITY

One of the greatest difficulties in the diplomatic work of t
Secretary-General has been to achieve some diffusion of respons
bility. Mr Hammarskjold has himself emphasized, in the intr
duction to his most recent annual report, a weakness in t
organization of the Secretariat. There is not enough of a dipl
matic tradition and there are not enough highly qualified seni
officials for all the tasks that now have to be met.

The other aspect of this is to ensure that Member States share
reaching some of those operational decisions which, by the
nature, must be taken both quickly and quietly. In a number

[1] Press conference, 24 March 1960.

cases in which special tasks have been given to the Secretary-General, advisory committees consisting of a representative group of Member States have been created. These committees meet in private under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General. No vote is taken; the Secretary-General sums up his conclusions, and any member is free to place on the record any objection to the summary. This has proved a most useful method of consultation, and protects the Secretary-General from accusations of partiality.

There is, of course, a limit beyond which it would be disastrous to diffuse responsibility. It remains to be seen how seriously the Soviet Union will press its recent proposal that the post of Secretary-General be abolished and replaced by a *troika*. The effect of this would be to prevent the Secretariat from providing that impartial and independent leadership which has been of such vital importance. It would bring the administration of the Organization into the political arena. The proposal would require an amendment of the Charter, and this can be achieved only by a vote of two-thirds of the Members of the Organization, including the five permanent members of the Security Council.

The fact that policy-making organs have, explicitly and implicitly, entrusted major diplomatic and administrative responsibilities to the Secretary-General accords with both the letter and the spirit of the Charter. The United Nations cannot eliminate the differences among its Members; but it can provide, and with Mr Hammarskjöld's leadership has often provided, a means to prevent those differences from getting out of control.

Mr Hammarskjold has sought to give life and reality to the provisions of the Charter and the purposes and principles of the Organization. He has used his office in a prophylactic sense; he has sought to prevent tension by removing its causes, to calm the atmosphere by keeping calm himself, to evoke goodwill by showing it. Governments may differ from him on matters of principle or matters of procedure: that is their right. But an objective study of the facts should not lead them to question his integrity, his independence, or his determination to uphold the Charter and all that it stands for.

SYDNEY D. BAILEY

Finland: A Survey, 1957–60

POLITICAL EVENTS

In order to understand the great complications of internal policy in post-war Finland it is important to remember that the country's political life is based on a multi-party system. The Agrarians, the Social Democrats, and the Communist-front organization—the People's Democrats—each hold some 25 per cent of the 200 seats in Parliament. The remaining 25 per cent is divided between the Conservatives, the Swedish Party, and the Finnish People's Party. The programmes and views of these three smaller parties are fairly similar. The Swedish Party is a moderate right-wing party and represents the Swedish-speaking section of the population, today numbering some 8 per cent of the total.

For years it has not been possible to find willingness to co-operate among the three biggest parties. The People's Democrats have been deliberately excluded from the various coalitions, and have not been represented in the Government since 1948. All the other parties have been unanimous on this point, but it has been very difficult to form a Government from among them. Nevertheless, with a few exceptions, the many Cabinets formed between 1948 and 1956 were majority Governments based on an Agrarian–Social Democratic coalition and strengthened by the inclusion of the Swedes and the Finnish People's Party But these coalitions were formed only after protracted negotiations on the conditions of co-operation. The interests of the two biggest parties, the Agrarians and the Social Democrats, are completely different and in economic matters diametrically opposed; thus the coalitions achieved were inevitably based on compromise, and attempts to satisfy the interests of both factions proved costly to the country. Public expenditure continued to rise and a serious Treasury crisis and other economic difficulties ensued, to which reference is made below.

The extravagant economic policy of the big parties resulted in a deadlock,[1] and in May 1957 the Fagerholm Government resigned But despite the need for a broadly based Government to tackle the economic situation, it proved impossible to find a common platform for all the main parties. Mr V. J. Sukselainen (who is today again Prime Minister) had to form a minority Government, initially including representatives of the Swedish Party and the

[1] For an account of the preceding situation see 'Finland Today', in *The World Today*, March 1957.

Finnish People's Party. By the summer, however, it was clear that Parliament did not support some of the Government's economic measures, and the Swedes left the Cabinet.

The failure to form a broadly based Government had resulted in the realization of the stabilization programme being left to the Sukselainen minority Government. During the autumn of 1957 the rift between the Social Democratic Party and the Agrarians deepened still further. One reason was that when the Government was reshuffled representatives of the Social Democratic Opposition (known as the 'Skog' wing) were included in it. This party was a splinter group within the Social Democratic Party. It had only three members and could not be considered to represent any sort of power in Parliament. Nevertheless, as will be shown later, the existence of this group has interfered with the stabilization of political life in Finland.

The Sukselainen Government finally fell in November 1957 and efforts to form a parliamentary government proved unsuccessful. Mr Rainer von Fieandt, Governor of the Bank of Finland, was therefore given the task of forming a caretaker Cabinet. None of the members of his Government belonged to Parliament, but it seemed initially to enjoy, at least in practice, the confidence of the Agrarians and the right-wing parties. Many regarded a Government of this kind—a so-called President's Cabinet—to be a sign of the immaturity and weakness of Finnish parliamentarism, which it doubtless was.

When he assumed office Mr von Fieandt appeared also to enjoy respect outside the actual political parties and it was generally considered desirable that he should be given a chance to work in peace until the General Elections due in the following summer. But this was denied him. In January 1958 the left-wing parties of Parliament jointly nullified a Government motion for the reduction of State expenditure, and at the beginning of February certain economic and labour unions rejected the Government's proposal for an economic truce until the elections. The Government thus failed to keep control either of Parliament or of the powerful lobbies outside. Reproachful voices began to be heard from quarters which had originally shown confidence in the new Cabinet. The deadlock came in April when the Agrarian Party defeated the Government.

The new Government formed under the Agrarian Mr Reino Kuuskoski was technically a caretaker Government since it did not have the backing of the parliamentary groups, but in fact it was a

semi-political Government composed of Agrarians and the So
Democratic Opposition. The participation of the latter gro
against the decision of the Social Democratic parliament gro
served to intensify the conflicts within the party, and those who l
accepted portfolios without permission were eventually expel
from the parliamentary group and the party.

Thus the General Elections of summer 1958 were held in rat
an unhappy atmosphere: the economic depression was at its wo
unemployment was alarming, and the conflicts between the polit
parties seemed insurmountable It was to be feared that only
extreme Left would benefit from such conditions since this gro
was making baseless promises to arouse hope in dissatisfied circ
The results of the elections appear in the table below, which
cludes for comparison the results of the previous elections in 19

	1954	*1958*
Social Democrats	54	48
Agrarian Party	53	48
People's Democrats	43	50
Conservative Party	24	29
Swedish Party	13	14
Finnish People's Party	13	8
Social Democratic Opposition	—	3
	200	200

A striking feature is the victory of the People's Democr
which now became the biggest party in Parliament. Detai
analysis of the popular poll shows, however, that the Conservat
Party made the biggest gains (of 45,000 votes), while the Peop
Democrats increased their total vote by only 15,000. The Agrar
Party sustained a clear defeat. Apart from its failure to make go
while in power, its losses were obviously due also to the fact t
many of its earlier supporters could not accept its flirtation with
radical Social Democratic Opposition or its tolerance of
People's Democrats.

Protracted negotiations for the formation of a new Governm
followed. The Communist gains had evidently provided a heal
lesson for the other parties, and the formation of a broadly ba
majority Government was now deliberated seriously for the f
time for many years. The result was the Cabinet of Mr K.
Fagerholm in which all parties except the People's Democrats a
the Social Democratic Opposition participated. An interest
feature was the participation of the Conservatives for the first ti
since the war.

But reasons of foreign policy soon proved a stumbling block for he new Cabinet. By November it had become clear that the U S.S.R. did not regard with favour the change of government in Finland. The Soviet Ambassador was called home and trade negotiations between Finland and the U.S.S.R. were postponed. The Agrarian members resigned from the Government on the plea that it was unable to manage the important problem of relations with the Eastern neighbour, and this precipitated the resignation of the Government as a whole.

Since the failure of this experiment to achieve a majority Government the country has been governed by an Agrarian minority Government headed by Mr Sukselainen. Despite its weakness in Parliament it has succeeded in remaining in power for nearly two years, the second-longest-lived of Finland's post-war Governments. As the country's economy has become stabilized, largely as a result of the improvement in international markets, public finance has also been restored to a healthier condition, and the Government has not been faced with problems so serious as to make its work impossible without strong parliamentary support. On the other hand, the other parties, aware that for many reasons it would be difficult to form a new Government, have also refrained from bringing it down. A rapprochement with the Social Democratic Party, a condition for parliamentary co-operation, is not likely to be achieved, so great is the mistrust and even bitterness between it and the Agrarian Party. The fact that the sympathies of the Agrarian Party still seem to lie with the Social Democratic Opposition does nothing to help the situation This was apparent, for example, in connection with the negotiations last spring when the parties discussed a broadening of the Government basis. The Agrarian Party's plan was to bar the Social Democratic Party itself from office but to accept the collaboration of the party's Opposition (Skog) group. But some of the other parties opposed this solution and the negotiations came to nothing.

The split in the Social Democratic Party has come to constitute a very serious problem for Finland's political life. Although the dissident group won only three seats in Parliament, its membership increased immediately after the elections when ten members of the Social Democratic Party left to join the rebels. They were expelled from the party, thus reducing its parliamentary strength from forty-eight to thirty-eight. Curiously enough, it has been difficult to define the original reason for the split. Some claim that it really

arose from purely personal differences between the leading me
the party Opposition seems to have been concentrated agains
party's outstanding leaders, Mr Vaino Tanner, who must be
garded as the 'grand old man' of Finland's labour movement,
Mr Vaino Leskinen. It is interesting to note that both these
have for long been the target of especially heavy attacks by Mos
which has endeavoured to stamp them as unreliable from the st
point of good neighbourly relations The representatives of
Social Democratic Opposition, on the other hand, have elic
sympathy from the same source As regards hopes for the
unification of the Social Democratic Party, the re-election of
Tanner as chairman of the party was obviously a negative fa
and the same can perhaps be said of this choice in its influenc
the chances of reaching an understanding with the Agrarians.

The Social Democratic split has spread to the trade union m
ment with the result that several trade unions resigned from
central organization, SAK (Federation of Finnish Trade Unic
after its leaders declared for adherence to the Social Democ
Opposition These unions have now founded a new central or
ization with a membership of 40,000 Although the new orgar
tion represents a more moderate Social Democratic line,
situation cannot be considered propitious for peace in the lal
market, since the existence of two competing labour organizat
is hardly likely to promote stability.

Although all parties except the Agrarians and the Commu
have proposed that the present parliamentary crisis be endec
dissolving Parliament and calling new General Elections, it se
probable that Mr Kekkonen will not consent to exercise
prerogative of the President of the Republic. It would be difficu
prophesy what the outcome of such elections would be, but in v
of the slowness with which the Finns react to political events
their consequent habit of voting roughly in the old way, it ma
assumed that the party strengths in Parliament would not chang
any appreciable extent Judging by the local elections held in
autumn of 1960, it may perhaps be predicted that if changes t
place the parties to benefit would again be those of the extr
Right and Left The Social Democratic Party would prob
also be successful against its dissidents. It is difficult to see no
what extent such an outcome would resolve the complicated si
tion. At present it is thought probable that the next Gen
Elections will take place at the normal time, in the summer of 1

fter the presidential elections scheduled for the previous winter. As egards the latter, it should be mentioned that the Agrarian Party as been the first to nominate its candidate for the Presidency—ie present President of the Republic, Mr Kekkonen. No other arties have as yet chosen their candidates.

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

The economic and financial outlook for Finland was very gloomy t the beginning of the period under review, not least because of the ftermath of the General Strike of March 1956. By the beginning of 957 the cost-of-living index had risen so high as to entitle the trade nions, under the agreement concluded in settlement of the strike, o ask for a fresh wage increase This threat was, however, averted i the early spring, partly because of growing unemployment By Iarch the number of jobless had risen to nearly 90,000 Placing the nemployed in relief work naturally meant a further load on the eriously strained Treasury. It was probably the dilemma facing ublic finance that helped to make the political parties alive to the ecessity of an economic stabilization programme The end of the 'abinet crises of February/March 1957 brought agreement on this.

The importance of the 39 per cent devaluation of the Finnmark, hich followed in September 1957, can hardly be exaggerated. The eed for devaluation had long been common knowledge. The competitiveness of the export industry had deteriorated steadily because f the overvaluation of the Finnmark, and prices on the domestic iarket had reached a level where imports could only be controlled y strict quantitative restrictions The devaluation was important lso for reasons of trade policy—Finland was saved from having o continue along a course divergent from that of the majority of Vest European countries, where the liberalization of foreign trade ad made good progress.

The abolition of import controls was a logical consequence of the evaluation, and the multilateral system was introduced in trade nd payments with most West European countries. At the end of ie year import controls were further modified and a 'free list' was dopted The goods included in this list were freed in their entirety om licensing formalities. Importation was eased further in 1958–o, and from the dollar area as well, and the liberalization percentage oday is about 85.

Viewed in retrospect, the devaluation and decontrol of imports ave proved fairly successful measures. The branches of the export

industry which had begun to suffer from the high cost level cou
once again engage in equal competition in the world market. Tl
proved of very great importance a little later, in 1958, when t
international market for Finland's most important export produc
weakened considerably. The liberalization of imports served
stimulate healthy competition in the domestic market and to che
the inflation of costs that readily results from import controls. It
worth noting, too, that, thanks to multilateral trade, competiti
between *foreign* producers was also stimulated.

The international recession of 1957 did not have any appreciab
immediate effect on the Finnish economy. However, by the end
the year demand was slackening in the chemical pulp and pap
markets and the production of some important export qualities h
to be cut by joint agreement between the mills. The number of u
employed was exceptionally great in the early autumn of 1957 Tl
strict monetary policy pursued by the Central Bank, with the lau
able object of checking inflation, contributed in part to the sha
downturn of the business cycle

The rise in unemployment proved an extremely difficult proble
in 1958 The total of unemployed in March was around 80,000, b
the most alarming feature was that unemployment persist
throughout the whole year. In Finland it is the duty of the State a
the local authorities to find work for the jobless. Thus in bad tim
State unemployment expenditure reaches a high level. It was part
because of this that the Treasury cash position remained tight a
the State was unable to engage in the expansive budgetary poli
that was required during the falling trend.

Although international demand for Finland's most importa
export goods remained slack throughout 1958, the development
foreign trade revealed some bright features Thanks to their in
proved competitiveness because of the devaluation, Finnish e
porters were able to recapture in part markets they had lost in tl
previous years This was the case with sawn goods exports
Britain, a very important item for Finland's sterling earnings Tl
total export volume showed a decrease of around 2 per cent, but
imports fell concurrently by a good 10 per cent from the 1957 leve
the trade balance showed—contrary to the preceding years—a co
siderable export surplus. The balance of payments as a whole al
showed a good surplus, and for this reason Finland was also ab
to introduce external convertibility of the Finnmark early in 195
following the example of other West European countries.

The most important stimulus in the first half of 1959 was the growth of consumer demand and the building-up of stocks. The increase in the international demand for export goods also contributed notably. The growing confidence in the continuance of good economic conditions and the easing money market encouraged investment activity, which soon came to be the principal force boosting the economy.

The development of foreign trade was also favourable even though, as a result of the fall in export prices, the total value of exports was only some 7 per cent above the 1958 level despite the 15 per cent increase in export volume. The increased demand for mechanical woodworking industry exports—sawn goods and plywood—was an especially favourable factor.

The long-term loan of $37 million received from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was a very welcome help for the capital market. This credit is for the expansion of Finland's chemical pulp and paper mills, the most important investment project of the present time. The production of chemical pulp and paper will increase very considerably in a couple of years, thanks to these investments.

One of the most important tasks facing the country's economy is the provision of sufficient working opportunities for the large age groups (born in 1945–9) which will soon enter the labour market. Foreign credits are indispensable for a country suffering from chronic shortage of capital, indeed, it is impossible to speak of a capital market in Finland in the real sense of the term.

Finland is a country that lives by its foreign trade, as witness the fact that exports represent one-fifth of the gross domestic product. In view of the plentiful natural resources available for the principal branch, the woodworking industry, the future appears to be ensured, especially as foreign demand for the products of the paper industry will obviously increase steadily over the long term. On the other hand, the country's dependence on exports and the relatively narrow range of its export goods constitute a weakness, for a falling market in the buyer countries has directly negative repercussions on the Finnish economy. The good business conditions of the current year have created a sound basis for the further strengthening of the country's economy. The export volume, for example, is expected to rise by about 12 per cent.

Expansion has also continued in spheres other than the export industry, and it is estimated that the volume of industrial production

will surpass the 1959 level by some 14 per cent. A typical phen non of boom conditions is vigorous housebuilding activity, wh expected to be at least 10 per cent greater than in 1958 The siderable growth in imports can probably also be associated wit boom. It seems that the trade balance will show a pronou deficit This will of course affect the foreign currency reser though, thanks to invisible items, the deficit will probably be down to 10,000 million Finnmarks. The vigorous growth of s already achieved and the tightening of the money market sl help to check the growth of imports in the last quarter of 19

Employment has been good in the current year It was po to close the unemployment registers completely as early as The labour market organizations agreed in October on a ge recommendation for collective labour contracts. The grati feature of this recommendation is that it covers a two-year pe 1961–2 The wage increases in these years will be 3 5 and 3 per

The money market has tightened considerably in the cou the current year although deposit activity has continued at a good level The demand for credit has increased with the expa of general economic activity and especially investments, the gr of imports, and the replenishment of stocks.

It has already been mentioned that Finland is a country deper largely on its foreign trade It is thus no wonder that in th few years she has followed closely the birth and developme economic associations in Europe. They could certainly influ decisively the trading prospects of the countries remaining ou

Since Finland became a member of the Nordic Council in she took an active part in the preparatory work for the creati a Nordic customs union Talks to this end continued betwee Governments concerned up to 1959, but just when the de stage was approaching, in July 1959, negotiations on the init of the United Kingdom to establish the European Free Trade (EFTA) had advanced so far that interest in a Nordic customs u died out almost completely in Sweden, Denmark, and No Finland was then the only country still supporting the original

Finnish exports to the area of the European Economic C munity and the EFTA are quite sizeable. In 1959, the EFTA t little over 30 per cent of the country's total exports and the E about 26 per cent. In view of the openly political character c E.E.C., further emphasized by the supranational nature c organs, it is self-evident that Finland has never considerec

proaching the E.E.C. countries with a view to safeguarding her economic interests Another reason for this decision is that Finland's main competitors, Sweden, Norway, and Austria, do not enjoy in the Common Market countries advantages not granted to Finland. But the very fact that these competitors belong to the EFTA makes Finland's relations with this group a matter of the greatest importance. Suffice it to mention that one EFTA member, Britain, is traditionally the greatest buyer of Finland's export goods.

These facts resulted in lively debate of the question in 1959. Parliament, after discussing the matter, in November urged the Government to explore the possibilities of Finland's becoming a party to the benefits offered by EFTA and the conditions on which this could be achieved The Government accordingly set up a delegation to negotiate with the EFTA countries. No information has been published on the results of the negotiations, but as far as can be made out the worst problems were solved successfully. In June 1960 Prime Minister Sukselainen let it be understood that the EFTA countries had shown an understanding attitude towards Finland's proposals and mentioned at the same time that the Eastern neighbour was also conscious of the importance of the question for Finland But it was not until the beginning of September, when President Kekkonen celebrated his sixtieth birthday and Mr Khrushchev visited Helsinki to congratulate him, that the Soviet Government gave a clear indication of its willingness to negotiate on the interpretation of the most-favoured-nation clause between Finland and the U.S S.R., which constituted a problem if Finland were to become a member of the EFTA and grant special customs preference to its member countries.

It must be admitted that the question of the most-favoured-nation clause in the trade between Finland and the U S.S.R. is not easy to solve The agreement was made at a time when there was no talk in the West European countries of customs unions and free-trade areas, and it does not contain any provisos for the birth of groups of this type. Since, moreover, the U.S.S.R. is not a party to the GATT, Finland cannot simply on the ground of her membership of this organization interpret the concept of the most-favoured-nation clause on the basis of the GATT. Nor would it be in Finland's interests to interpret the most-favoured-nation clause unilaterally and jeopardize her political and commercial relations with the U.S.S.R. She must consequently endeavour to arrive at an

agreement which satisfies both the parties concerned and EFTA countries as well.

Negotiations on the subject were opened in Moscow in Oct and were continued at the end of November in connection witl State visit of President Kekkonen to the Soviet Union. Or return home the President was able to report that the talks hac to a favourable result. Although at the time of writing the e wording of the agreement was not known, it was generally beli that the Soviet authorities had given their consent to a limita of the interpretation of the existing most-favoured-nation t ment clause The Finnish Government hoped that this arra ment would be accepted by other members of EFTA and was th fore entering into negotiations with them with a view to clearin way for Finland to enter EFTA before the end of the year.

FOREIGN POLICY

President Paasikivi used to say that the origin of wisdom is acknowledgement of facts as they really are, and with this prin in mind the Government has tried to manage both the EFTA i and other matters affecting relations with the big neighbour to East. An inherent feature of the 'Paasikivi line', which has alr become a concept of foreign policy, is that Finland's independ is to be safeguarded by establishing friendly relations with U S.S R and by gaining its confidence in the sincerity of this po

The visit of Mr Khrushchev and Marshal Bulganin to Finlar the summer of 1957 served to strengthen the view that relation tween the two countries had continued to develop in a favour direction. This made the events of 1958 all the more surprisin large sections of the public, indicating as they did that all was n it should be. Even before the elections in the summer it had l noted that the Soviet press was carrying articles attacking the C servative and Social Democratic parties and alleging that there circles in Finland that wished to change her foreign policy. W President Kekkonen visited the U.S.S.R in May 1958 Mr Khr chev called attention to some phenomena unfriendly to the U.S. which he claimed to have observed in Finland. He made esp mention in this connection of some memoirs and of some n paper articles and cartoons which he considered to be aimed a U.S.S.R.

The reaction of the Soviet Government to the formation of Fagerholm's majority Government in 1958 was unexpect

strong. The summoning home of the Ambassador and the deterioration of trade relations were serious matters which could have only one interpretation. Through its cold passivity, but without interfering openly in Finland's internal affairs, the Soviet Government showed that it lacked confidence in the Finnish Government, though the latter had given no cause for any suspicion through its actions. The crisis ended with the Government's resignation and President Kekkonen's visit to Leningrad, where he met Mr Khrushchev in January 1959. On this occasion Mr Khrushchev gave it to be understood that there had been hostile forces—principally Mr Tanner—which had given cause for suspicions. The new Soviet Ambassador came to Finland in February and the trade negotiations were brought to a conclusion in March, after which relations could be considered to have returned to normal after the 'night frosts' of the previous months.

The improvement in relations was of course greeted with satisfaction, for the Finnish nation is unanimous concerning the basic principle adopted since the war, that it cannot afford to live in discord with its powerful neighbour. On the other hand, the solution of the crisis left a mood of gloom, for it showed the extreme delicacy of Finland's position even on matters of a purely internal character. It is difficult to say whether Soviet suspicions are of the Social Democratic Party as a whole or merely of some of its leaders. In any case, the attacks against the party, which have continued, seem to indicate that Moscow does not regard the participation of Socialists in the Government as desirable. The smear campaign on these lines conducted by the Communists and the Social Democratic Opposition, and aimed at discrediting the Social Democratic Party, has naturally tended to aggravate the situation.

An interesting event in 1960 was the visit of Mr Khrushchev to Finland in September to participate in President Kekkonen's sixtieth birthday celebrations. The visit is proof of the confidence President Kekkonen is considered to enjoy with the Soviet Government, and satisfaction was also caused by the fact that Mr Khrushchev seemed to assume an understanding attitude to the problems facing Finland over the EFTA. The public in festival attire probably did not listen with equally unreserved delight to those passages in the Soviet Premier's speech which attacked the policy of some States maintaining friendly relations with Finland.

President Kekkonen's visit to Moscow at the end of November was followed with keen interest since it was known that Finland's

problems in relation to EFTA had been put on the agenda. The results of the visit in this respect have been discussed earlier in this article As to other topics raised during the visit, the joint Finno-Russian communiqué stated that the Russians were prepared to lease to Finland the Saima Canal, a seaway connecting the lake district of East Finland with the Gulf of Finland This Canal was cut off in 1944 when Finland, according to the terms of the Armistice Treaty, had to cede a part of her territory to the Soviet Union In estimating the importance of the above concession it should be borne in mind that the Saima Canal cannot be used without extensive repairs and that at the moment Finland has not got suitable ships to be used in the Canal Moreover, use of the Canal is restricted during the winter, when the seaway is frozen for several months

In any case, it is generally considered that the results of Mr Kekkonen's visit signify an important personal success for hir This is not least due to the fact that the solution of the EFTA prol lem is now at last in sight Also, the negotiations with the Sovi leaders tend to strengthen the impression that Mr Khrushchev ar his colleagues have confidence in Mr Kekkonen and in his foreiş policy and, perhaps having some long-range speculations, want show their sympathies openly

The recent darkening of the international situation and tl aggravation of the conflicts between the great Powers cause growir worries to small countries. This is the case with Finland, who ardent wish is for a speedy improvement in the international politic climate Finland's object is to keep outside the conflicts between tl great Powers and to avoid arousing suspicions in any quarter, lea of all in the East.

X. Y. Z

Spain and the Future

WHAT will happen when Franco dies? This is the sixty-four-thou sand-dollar question in Spain today. The Generalissimo has jus celebrated his sixty-eighth birthday and, despite occasional rumour to the contrary, appears to be in excellent health. Although the prob lem is not a new one and has in fact preoccupied Franco, as well a others, for several years past, it naturally increases in urgency as th

ears go on. There are those who regard the situation with relative quanimity and believe that the transition to a monarchy under the egis of the Army would be swift and untroubled, but there are thers who think that, once Franco's firm hand is removed from the eins, the team that he has driven for so long may show signs of vishing to bolt. In a country where every breath of opposition is ystematically stifled, any assessment of the situation is bound to be argely guesswork; but when that country is as complex and full of aradoxes as is Spain it is rash indeed to hazard a prophecy.

Franco has laid careful plans to ensure the continuance of his re-gime with as little change as possible after his death. The 1947 Law of Succession provides for a Regency Council to take charge. This Council consists of the President of the Cortes, the highest prelate of he Church, and the highest ranking Army officer. Procedure is aid down by which the Regency Council may ask a Spaniard of oyal blood to become Chief of State if it considers him suitable. It vas originally Franco's intention that Juan Carlos, the twenty-hree-year-old son of the pretender to the throne, Don Juan, should e trained as his successor and should become king at the age of hirty It now seems possible that Franco may have reached an greement with Don Juan, when he met him last March, that it hould be he who will come to the throne in certain circumstances. Various factors may have contributed to his change of plan, includ-ng the son's loyalty to his father in refusing to accept the throne vhile Don Juan is still alive, and doubts that arose in Franco's mind s to whether Juan Carlos was entirely suitable for the responsible osition he would have to occupy, after a fatal accident to his rother a few years ago had proved a severe shock to the young rince But the educational plans agreed between Franco and Don uan for a wide and varied training for Juan Carlos in Spain have ontinued, with a view to his eventual succession to the throne. The eason why Franco has not hitherto been prepared to accept Don uan is that he fears that he would wish to introduce too liberal neasures on his return to Spain. The point of contention between hem has been Don Juan's reluctance to tie his hands by agreement n advance to uphold the principles of the present regime. There is a ival claimant to the Spanish throne from the Carlist branch of the oyal family, Xavier of Bourbon-Parma. Although some Carlists ow acknowledge Don Juan to be the rightful claimant, a small roup still supports Xavier. Franco has on occasion found it useful o keep this weapon in reserve.

The Monarchy appears to have gained a wider measure of acce
ance than was the case some years ago Opposition by the Falaı
has hitherto ostensibly been one of the chief obstacles to Don Jua
return, but José Solis Ruiz, Minister Secretary-General of
Falange, accompanied Franco in March when he met Don Ju
Some think that this Falangist, seeing the way the wind is blowi
is intent on securing a niche in any future monarchist Governme
Support for the monarchy ranges from the extreme Right, who
in it a means of preserving their privileges, to the radical Left, w
hope that it will provide a stepping-stone to the sort of Governm
they wish to see in power. Political groupings in Spain, as in La
America, are generally based on personalities. The extreme Righ
represented by the Marqués de Luca de Tena, proprietor of
newspaper *ABC*, who is the wealthy owner of extensive propert
and as such views even moderate reforms with alarm. He would l
to see Don Juan collaborate with Franco now so as to minimize
chances of disruption when the Generalissimo dies. The Marq
de Luca de Tena is said to be 'close' to the Opus Dei. This lay ord
approved by the late Pope, has rapidly increased its influence
Spain during the last few years. It has already achieved a measure
success in its aim to gain control in intellectual circles, particula
the universities, and to penetrate every profession and aspect of
life of the country, including the Government. Opus Dei has be
called a freemasonry of the Church, since its membership is larg
secret Although it is claimed that members of the order have co
plete freedom of choice in political matters, those who are known
belong to it show a unanimity of view in their support for
monarchy Perez Embid, who has held office in the Ministry of I
formation and once edited the periodical *Arbor*, appears to have
placed Calvo Serer as the principal mouthpiece of the order He is
close touch with Don Juan, whose immediate return to Spain wo
be welcomed, since it is thought likely to prove a stabilizing fact
The importance of Opus Dei's support for the monarchy lies in
fact that its views clearly carry weight with Franco, as is reflec
by its strength in the present Government.[1] It has recently ha
further success in obtaining the appointment of a member of
order to be Franco's nominee as tutor to Juan Carlos.

Martín Artajo, who formerly held office as Minister of Forei
Affairs, is an advocate of collaboration with Franco. Both he and

[1] See 'An Authoritarian Monarchy for Spain?', in *The World Today*, July 19
p. 274

Bishop of Málaga, Angel Herrera, represent Acción Catolica, which is associated with the newspaper *Ya*. Although the Bishop has initiated social schemes and has in the past been known to criticize the censorship, he is no supporter of democracy for Spain. José María Gil Robles, whose name was formerly associated with Acción Catolica, now leads a group called the Christian Democrats. He is in close touch with Don Juan but is against his collaboration with Franco, fearing that by associating himself with the present regime he will prejudice his chances for the future. Also in the Christian Democrat group but to the left of Gil Robles is Manuel Gimenez Fernandez. Unión Española, which first received publicity in January 1959 after a particular luncheon attended by a number of well-known figures in Madrid, is led by Joaquín Satrústegui. Associated with this group but to the left of it is Unión Nacional, led by Enrique Tierno Galván. Dionisio Ridruejo, the outspoken ex-Falangist, heads the group known as Democratic Social Action which has plans for radical reforms, while the Socialists are a small group linked to the party in exile. Some of these groups—and there are others, for example the Popular Liberation Front of Julio Cerón, the diplomat, who is now in prison—though very dubious of the role the monarchy is likely to play, are prepared to countenance it as a step in their direction. The Communists play a lone hand, since no group wishes to be associated with them, but they, too, would no doubt be prepared to accept the monarchy if they thought that it would further their ends.[1]

On previous visits to Spain the impression gained was of extreme disunity in the ranks of the opposition; indeed, so individualistic are Spaniards that no two seem to think alike. Now a subtle change appears to have taken place and the groups which oppose Franco have drawn closer together, with the exception, of course, of the Communists. Possibly this may be one of the reasons for the decree of 21 September 1960,[2] which by confirming and tightening up earlier legislation served notice on the opposition that even the mildest form of protest would not be tolerated. To reinforce such draconian measures, which allow the police to arrest anyone at any time and which treat as 'military rebellion', to be tried before military courts, anything—even attendance at a lecture—that the authorities choose to construe as opposition, would seem to indi-

[1] The Communist strength is not known but they are thought to have gained ground in recent years.

[2] Text in *Boletín Oficial*, 23 September 1960.

cate a deepening sense of insecurity on Franco's part. The regime appears jittery and undignified when it feels obliged to suspend a professor from his university chair, as happened in October to Enrique Tierno Galván because in the course of his lectures on constitutional law at Salamanca University he referred to the democratic Constitutions of some Western Powers And yet on the surface Franco seems more secure than ever.

But there are signs that under the surface the currents of opposition are gaining in intensity By not allowing any outlet for opposition activities, other than a verbal blowing off of steam, Franco is forcing his opponents into more extreme channels Probably few people who have spent their holidays in Spain are aware of the strength of feeling against the regime or the extent of the measures to suppress the opposition. They are impressed by the carefree way Spaniards criticize the Government in cafés and other public places but might be shocked were they aware that an attempt to start a political party rather on the lines of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* in France was treated as a serious crime, and that two people recently received sentences of twenty years for having attended a Communist Congress in Prague. Last May more than 300 Basque priests sent a letter to their bishops protesting against police brutality to political prisoners and the violation of civil rights In the same month, in Catalonia, following the singing at a concert of a forbidden Catalan anthem, there were protests from the Abbot of Monserrat and the professional body of Catalan lawyers at the way in which some young Catalan Catholics had been beaten up by the police At a recent trial the accused themselves started to complain of the treatment they had received while in prison but were quickly silenced by the judge. The sentences at these political trials are not infrequently dictated to the judges concerned, having been decided by Franco himself, and much depends on whether the accused knows someone in the right quarter who is able to bring influence to bear on his behalf

A feature of political trials in recent years has been the fact that many of those taking part in opposition activities have been connected with well-known figures, for example the nephew of the well-known monarchist General Kindelan. Franco has so far on the whole treated fairly leniently any opposition which has come from the upper crust of intellectuals but has hit hard when it has come from the working class. In view of this, the surprising thing about strikes, which are forbidden, is not that they are relatively few but

that there are in fact so many The extensive emigration, estimated at 25,000 over the past months, has meant that news from outside is being sent back home, with the result that among workers in Spain a far greater knowledge now exists of the higher standard of living of those abroad than was the case even a few years ago. The intellectuals show a cheerful courage in being prepared to face heavier punishment if necessary, in order to achieve some improvement in the situation There is a burning indignation among them at the swaddling clothes that the regime has imposed on them, both in the political and in the literary spheres. Only last November more than 200 of them sent the Government a protest on the censorship.

But perhaps the most important factor in the situation is the way the younger generation is thinking some of them will, after all, be the rulers of tomorrow, and here it is worth remembering that in the daughter countries of Latin America university students have played a key role in politics. In December 1955 by a curious aberration of the regime a poll was allowed to be taken among university students, the results of which quickly became known but were never made public Four hundred students in a dozen different faculties were consulted, and the result showed that 70 per cent of them did not agree with the present social and economic structure of Spain. Probably only a small proportion of students are in fact interested in politics, but among these Castro's revolution in Cuba seems to have had a very great impact It is of little use drawing attention to the lack of freedom of the press and other shortcomings of Castro's regime These are brushed aside and his agrarian reform programme (so much needed in Spain), his nationalization of the means of production (the thinking seemed to be Marxist but definitely not 'Ulbricht' Communist), the youthfulness of his Government, and, last but not least, his anti-Americanism provide an enchantment to which distance no doubt makes its contribution.

This admiration for Castro is by no means confined only to students. It is startlingly widespread and turns up in some surprising quarters. Its common denominator appears to be its anti-Americanism. Now the United States has taken infinite pains to avoid offence to Spanish national pride and to make its presence in Spain inconspicuous. By the terms of the 1953 U.S.–Spanish agreement, the Spanish flag flies over U.S. bases in Spain and U.S. personnel may not wear uniform outside the bases. Other precautions were taken such as careful selection and training of the

U S. personnel sent over, particularly the first to arrive. Whil relations at top level between the Services of both nations have bee excellent, an overwhelming impression is that the Americans ar universally disliked The reason for this is not so much thei presence in the country but the feeling that it is U.S. support that i keeping Franco in power [1] Ambassador Lodge probably has littl idea of the damage that he does to U.S.–Spanish relations ever time, and it is often, that his words in public give support to th Franco regime Yet the lesson of Ambassador Gardner, who wa Batista's friend in Cuba, should serve as a warning Presiden Eisenhower, too, might have remembered the effect of the U.S medal pinned on the breast of Venezuela's ousted dictator, Pere Jimenez, when in December 1959, on the occasion of the President' visit to Madrid, he clasped Franco in an embrace that did not pas unnoticed.

This raises the thorny question of how to conduct relations with a dictatorship It is traditionally the Ambassador's business to establish good relations with the regime to which he is appointed, but by now there are object lessons enough, of which Cuba is the most recent, of how it should not be done. If long-term considerations are to be taken into account it is essential that contact be established with opposition groups and particularly with the youth of the country While it is easy enough to recommend this course of action, it is far from easy to suggest how in the circumstances it should be done

Meanwhile, the solution perhaps lies nearer home. As a recent leader in *The Times* said in another connection, 'Shoring up regimes simply because, by being rigid, they can declare themselves anti-Communist has separated the regimes from the peoples and made explosions inevitable.'[2] This raises an echo from the letter, mentioned earlier, from the Basque priests to their bishops: 'day after day, an abyss is opening between us and the souls entrusted to our care and guidance.'[3] There are those who believe that because Franco has held down the lid for so long, a Castro may some day well arise in Spain. The Generalissimo will undoubtedly be remembered for having succeeded in imposing peace over a long period. But apart from the methods he employed to achieve this it may well be held against him, both that he made no effort to heal

[1] There seems to be little evidence for this assumption, since Franco maintained himself in power until 1953 without U.S aid.

[2] *The Times*, 29 November 1960. [3] *New York Times*, 14 June 1960

the terrible rift that divided his people after the civil war that he himself led,[1] and that by failing to educate Spaniards to govern themselves he has left as legacy an impossible task.

The foregoing may sound unduly pessimistic at a time when it seems possible that Spain may have turned the corner economically,[2] but if recent history is any guide, economic prosperity may have little influence where political and psychological factors dictate otherwise This has proved to be the case in Venezuela and the Congo, to mention only two instances. This is not to suggest that there is likely to be an immediate upheaval in Spain, and certainly not while Franco is in control The two chief factors making for stability, apart from Franco himself, while he lives, are the Army and the Church. The Army holds the key role in Spain and is likely to continue to do so. Discipline in the lower ranks is very strict and rebellion in present circumstances is ruled out. It is interesting to note that in the student poll of 1956, which was mentioned earlier, 90 per cent accused the military hierarchy of incompetence, ignorance, and a bureaucratic attitude. The Church in Spain, by and large, stands condemned for its association with the regime. This is not to say that there are not clergy, like the Basque priests, who share the feelings of their parishioners, but they are heavily frowned on by the Church hierarchy, as the reaction to the Basque priests shows. The Opus Dei probably includes in its membership a wide range of thought, but unless it develops a dynamic policy of social reform its general effect is bound to be conservative. Should it continue to expand and entrench itself at its present rate, it will not only be a factor to be reckoned with but may, by delaying any basic reform, accentuate the violence of any change when it eventually comes.

Don Juan finds himself in a dilemma: he is like a circus artiste trying to ride two horses at once As we have seen, some of his supporters want him to return now and collaborate with Franco, while others do not wish him to do so at any cost. If and when Don Juan comes to the throne he will be dependent on the Army and those conservative forces which are bound to oppose the reforms that Spain needs and some of which Don Juan might be prepared to make were he in a position to follow his own inclinations. He has been very careful not to show his hand or commit himself to any definite policies, but in the past some of the statements that he made

[1] A feature of the opposition is its constructive approach to this question and determination to forget the past

[2] For the economic situation see 'The Economic Background of the Spanish Situation', in *The World Today*, September 1960

gave the impression that he had liberal intentions. There are mar who believe that by negotiating with Franco he has missed h chance of rallying the forces opposed to the regime. It seems like that in due course he will return to the throne under either Franco aegis or that of the Army. But once the Generalissimo is gone it possible that the disparate forces that have been held so severely i check may burst their bonds In any case Spain is overdue fc basic reforms that no conservative Government would be willing t carry out. If Britain, in association with the United States, persis for reasons of defence in a policy of trying to introduce Franco Spai into the 'Western club', she may one day—and it is not suggeste that it will necessarily be soon—find herself in much the sam position as the United States *vis-à-vis* Cuba.

DAPHNE KIRKPATRICK

Lebanon Since the Crisis of 1958

WERE the events of 1958 in Lebanon[1] a revolution? The answer t this question should provide an important clue for an understandin of the present situation in that country, but it is not an easy questio to answer.

Those who were rebels against the established regime in 195 maintain that their movement was a revolution, in the full and bes sense of the term They insist that it was essentially an intern movement (albeit with some outside help) directed against the cor ruption and tyranny of the regime of President Chamoun and hi Prime Minister, Sami es-Solh, and especially against its foreig policy, which seriously diverged from the principles of Ara nationalism. The former 'rebels' strongly reject suggestions tha their rising was confessional in colour, although they often hint a discrepancies in the Lebanese sectarian balance which the 'revolution' sought to remedy. They also deny, at least at the offici level, any connection between their rising in Lebanon and the ex pansionist policy of the U.A.R., maintaining that any help the received from that source was in disinterested support of a rightfu cause against oppression.

[1] See 'The Lebanese Crisis in Perspective', in *The World Today*, Septembe 1958

While the former 'rebels' describe their movement as a revolution, stressing its internal aspect and denying its confessional and outside connections, the former 'loyalists' who supported the Chamoun–Solh regime take the legalistic attitude. According to them, the events or 'troubles' of 1958 were no revolution, but merely an insurrection—an armed rebellion inspired by anti-Lebanese forces from Syria, and enjoying the full moral and material support of the U.A.R. It was not any tyranny or corruption on the part of the Chamoun regime which provoked this rebellion, but only the insistence of the regime on Lebanon's full sovereignty in matters of internal and foreign policy—a sovereignty on which the U.A.R., newly formed in 1958, was determined to trespass. The anti-Lebanese intentions of the U.A.R , the former 'loyalists' maintain, found sympathy with a group of Lebanese politicians who were out of office at the time, and who took the opportunity to use the help of the U.A.R. for a political come-back

To an outside observer, it would seem at the first glance that the truth about the Lebanese insurrection must lie somewhere between these two opposed points of view, perhaps at approximately midway But the search for this truth is not as easy as the midway compromise ('No Victor, No Vanquished') by which the crisis was resolved In fact, it is almost impossible to get at the real truth about the Lebanese crisis of 1958. The search for it would require a thorough investigation of the events of that year—an investigation which would involve the study not only of masses of documents in the State archives of several countries, but also of secret interviews and more secret personal intentions.

Former 'rebels' and 'loyalists' in Lebanon will continue for many years to argue about what happened in 1958 and why, until one day they weary of the subject and it will gradually be dropped. Without becoming involved in their debate, the present article will instead try to understand the events of 1958 in another way, by finding out what things there were in Lebanon before the crisis that are no longer there today, and what things there are today which were not there before the crisis. By so doing it may be possible to find out whether or not the events of 1958 were a revolution, and so to get our clue to the present situation.

Before 1958 political power in Lebanon was in the hands of those who managed to control a certain number of interest groups (merchant, ecclesiastical, or feudal) and who at the same time succeeded in giving no offence to any of the more important religious

communities. Through the interest groups, and through the religious communities, power could ultimately be derived from the backing of outside countries, resulting at times in bouts of embassy rule. The President of the Republic was the man who held real as well as legal power, the Prime Minister and the members of his Government being either the President's clients or powerful individuals whom he wished to win over or appease. In order to retain power the President had to manage his oligarchy and to isolate his opponents and rivals, and this he did by the use of the classic techniques known in city-states and merchant republics since antiquity. Normally, the clients and opponents of the President were also well versed in these techniques, using them often to the intense embarrassment of the Chief of State. In fact, the politics of Lebanon before 1958 were a rare surviving specimen of these classic politics; and indeed Lebanon provided an ideal ground: a merchant republic, small enough to pass for a city-state, and composite enough in population to allow the development of a number of groups with special interests to fill the political State. To run his country the Lebanese President had first to know these groups.

TRADITIONAL GROUPINGS

First to be considered were the various churches and religious institutions and the communities which they commanded—*le Panthéon libanais*, as they were called by the French High Commissioner Gabriel Puaux None of these groups was in any way to be offended—a difficult task indeed where any statement or action is likely to be interpreted as an offence. On the other hand each group, and the leaders of each group, had special interests to be catered for in return for their loyalty.

Most important were the Maronites (Christian, and uniate Catholics) to whom the President belonged. By far the largest single community in Lebanon, the Maronites had acquired over the years a number of distinguished privileges in keeping with their strength. By a special unwritten agreement between various community leaders in 1943, Maronites were to hold the key positions of the Presidency, the Command of the Army, and the Directorate of of the Sûreté Générale During the period of the Mandate, newly arrived French High Commissioners paid their first official visits to the Maronite patriarch, thereby recognizing him as the first gentleman of Lebanon; and by so doing the High Commissioners set the precedent for similar ceremonial visits by the newly elected

Lebanese Presidents and the newly appointed Prime Ministers and their Cabinets. Indeed, the Maronite patriarch, as an individual, enjoys the strongest personal position in Lebanon: he represents the largest religious community, enjoys a high traditional prestige, and owes no obligation or responsibility to any force inside the country, official or popular. Once appointed to office, by local ecclesiastical election or by Papal appointment, the patriarch becomes irremovable from his see except by Papal action; and for this there has been no precedent. No wonder he can brandish his authority with so little fear of consequence.

Less powerful, but still of the first importance, were the leading ecclesiastics of the other major Christian communities, the Greek Orthodox and the Greek Catholic. To these two communities, composed mostly of townsmen, belonged the leading bankers, financiers, and merchants of Lebanon, and therefore many of the leading men-behind-the-scenes. In the palace halls of these merchant princes of East Beirut were entertained the young Maronite lawyers who were promising candidates for the Presidency and other high offices of State; and in those same halls were learnt the techniques for which Lebanese statesmanship became well known. Indeed, the making and the unmaking of Lebanese statesmen was, certainly before 1958, almost a prerogative of the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic upper class—a class which was itself barred from the highest political offices.

Second in numbers to the Maronites were the Sunni Muslims, followed by the Shi'i Muslims. Between these two communities there is a world of difference in social, political, and cultural attitudes; but they shared one important characteristic: before 1958 they were the least politically experienced of the major Lebanese communities. During the Ottoman period the districts in which they formed the majority were either under the control of Christian or Druze emirs or sheikhs, or under direct Ottoman administration. Thus, in the Lebanon of the Mandate and of early Independence, it was mostly their large numbers that made their influence felt in the country's politics; and their leaders were usually willing to barter the special interests of their communities for Christian political backing while in office. The Sunni Muslims, being by far the more advanced group because they are mostly town-dwellers, enjoyed far more power and prestige than the mainly rural and tribal Shi'ites. While the Sunni held the important position of the Premiership, which was not always the Presidential rubber stamp,

the Shi'ites had to be content with the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies—a position of great dignity but little real power.

The Druzes ranked, numerically, sixth or seventh among the Lebanese communities; but the political prestige they enjoyed was certainly out of all proportion to their numbers This prestige derived from the eminent role they had played in Lebanon's history, from their well-earned reputation as excellent warriors, and from the studied unpredictability of their political behaviour, which left the other Lebanese groups in constant wonder as to which side they were going to be on. Had the Druzes been one solid group, their political influence would certainly have been more strongly felt But as it was, they were divided into two rival factions, the Yazbakis and the Janbalatis, as they had been from the mid-eighteenth century. As the Lebanese Presidents changed, the Yazbakis managed every time to veer round to the side in power, while the Janbalatis invariably managed to veer round into opposition, even when the President in power had been their candidate only the day before This Yazbaki–Janbalati division of the Druzes may have developed from the traditional Druze tactic of dividing themselves between the contestants for power in times of crisis, so that there would always be Druzes on the winning side; and the tremendous solidarity which Druzes of both factions show when their community is directly threatened certainly indicates that. In another way the Yazbaki–Janbalati division of the Druzes brought out the two sides to the Druze political character: the Yazbakis representing its facility for adaptation to circumstances, and the Janbalatis its marvellous tenacity, which made the community survive unchanged through centuries of vicissitude.

It is possible that the Druzes might have played a more decisive role in the pre-1958 politics of Lebanon, considering the prestige which they enjoyed; but their inability to outgrow their medieval tactics proved to be the major obstacle. While Maronites and Sunnis, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics, were producing men of politics who tried to keep up with the changing circumstances, and while even the Shi'ites were showing some signs of political awakening, the Druzes continued to produce their medieval array of Yazbaki and Janbalati leaders—colourful figures, of course, but no match for the political representatives of the other communities.

It would be futile to enumerate the multitude of high commercial and financial interests which were involved (and which are

till involved) in Lebanese politics. But it might be of interest to eview the major feudal and loyalty groups (the *maḥsūbiyya* groups, s they are known) which were of great political importance. The Druze Yazbakis and Janbalatis (the latter disguised in the last lecade as the Progressive Socialist Party) are of this type of group. But other communities also had their feudal and loyalty groups.

The Sunni Muslims of Beirut were grouped around the Yafi, Solh, and Salam families, each of which favoured a group of clients or *mahsūbs*) who furthered its interests. In Tripoli the most important group of *mahsūbs* were the clients of the Karami family, and n Sidon there were the clients of the Solh and the Bizri families.

The Sunni *mahsūbiyyas* were grouped around families of town notables, men of wealth, or former high Ottoman officials; but the Shi'i *mahsūbiyyas* were different—their leaders were the great andowners of the Baalbek, Sidon, and Tyre regions. The most mportant groups in the Baalbek region were led by the Hamadeh and Haydar families; while in southern Lebanon there were the As'ad, Osseiran, Zein, and Khalil clans. Much like these Shi'i *nahsūbiyyas* were the Sunni political groupings of the 'Akkar egion, in northern Lebanon—groupings around powerful individuals who were also great landowners.

This primitive type of political loyalty group was certainly less common among the Christians of Lebanon. But even here the pattern persisted, albeit at a more advanced level. The political blocs' of Emile Eddeh and Bechara el-Khoury, known respectively as the Watani (National) and Dusturi (Constitutional) blocs, were developments of *mahsūbiyya* groups, based on loyalties to individuals and families, and certainly not the political parties they pretended o be. The Watani bloc represented the popular group loyal to the Eddeh family, supported by the Greek Orthodox merchant princes of East Beirut and the Greek Orthodox Church of Beirut. The Eddeh were, of course, Maronites, and also had their popular Maronite backing, especially in northern Lebanon. The Dusturi bloc represented the popular group loyal to the Khoury family, backed by the Greek Catholic Pharaon and the Greek Orthodox Chiha, both banking families. In the Mandatory and early Independence periods when the Christian leadership in Lebanon was not seriously contested, the various loyalty and interest groups in the country rallied around these two blocs, which continued for a time as the major political fronts in Lebanon.

POLITICAL PARTIES

This was the traditional Lebanon. But side by side with these groupings went a number of young political parties, based on political programmes and ideologies, and heralding a new Lebanon Until 1958 these parties were of definitely minor importance in Lebanese politics; and during that year of troubles there were only two deputies representing such political parties in a Parliament of sixty-six members. But the political parties of Lebanon, unlike political parties elsewhere, differed from each other not on points of national policy but on a point far more crucial: whether or not Lebanon should maintain her sovereignty for ever. For, while pretending to be radical departures from the traditional Lebanon, the political parties were essentially a development of that tradition, almost conforming to the sectarian divisions of the country.

While the older Maronite generation tried to decide its preference between the Eddeh and the Khoury clans, and later between the Khoury and Chamoun, younger Maronites eagerly joined the Kataeb, the Fascist-inspired Phalangist youth party of Pierre Gemayel. These Kataeb, with their motto 'Lebanon First', were the largest of the parties, and they stood for the unconditional sovereignty of Lebanon The Kataeb movement started in 1937.

Soon after the formation of the Kataeb party, ardent young Muslims in Beirut organized themselves to confront it with the Najjada party. This party never grew to the size or organization of the Kataeb party, and, unlike the Kataeb, they never had a representative in Parliament before the troubles. But the Najjada, no less ardent than the Kataeb, stood uncompromisingly for Arab unity and for the early liquidation of Lebanon's special sovereignty. By the end of the pre-Insurrection period the party was bringing under its control such predominantly Muslim workers' unions as those of the dockers and the street cleaners, and through these unions was making its influence felt.

Far better organized than either the Kataeb or the Najjada was the authoritarian Syrian Social Nationalist Party, better known by its French initials as the P.P.S. (Parti Populaire Syrien). Founded by a Greek Orthodox teacher, Antun Saadeh, in the early 'thirties, and modelled after the authoritarian parties then fashionable in Europe, the P.P.S. was led by a small group of young intellectuals, mostly Greek Orthodox and Protestant, with a small but tough following composed mainly of Greek Orthodox Christians and of Druzes and Shi'ites. In its composition, the P.P.S. represented the Lebanese

ious groups in the middle, which felt politically underprivileged
country where the lion's share was divided between the Maron-
and the Sunni Muslims. This, indeed, is reflected in the two
inant principles of the party: its anti-sectarianism and insis-
e on a lay State, and its insistence on the ultimate unity of the
an nation—a compromise between the Maronites' emphasis on
anese sovereignty and that of the Sunni Muslims on full Arab
y. Since the Syrian nation of the P.P.S. was supposed to include
, the P.P.S. naturally supported Iraq in her struggle with
pt, and thus came to be persecuted in Syria (and therefore
ed to Lebanon) after the fall of the Shishakly regime there.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

his, roughly, was the political set-up before the troubles of
3 How much of this old Lebanon remains today?
fficially, the sectarian balance of Lebanon remains the same.
Maronites still hold the Presidency of the Republic, the Army
mand, and the command of the Sûreté Générale. The Sunni
slims still provide the State with its Prime Ministers, and a
ite still presides over the Chamber of Deputies. The deputies
nselves are still elected in the ratio of six Christians to five
slims and Druzes—a formula agreed upon in 1943, which makes
number of Lebanese deputies always a multiple of eleven. This
nce of the sects has not changed in form; but a great change has
e upon it nevertheless.
he Maronite Presidency of the Republic in Lebanon remains as
erful today as it was before 1958, but in a different way. The
tige enjoyed by President Chehab today, which gives him the
eme power, is based not on his management of an oligarchy but
is being the only leader to whom all Lebanese factions can be
l He wields his authority not through adept statesmanship but
tly through being disinterested in the professional use of power,
anxious to be conciliatory. President Chehab happens to be the
t man for the job; but it would seem that future Maronite
idents will have to follow in his footsteps, for it is unlikely that
onite Presidents of the Eddeh, Khoury, and Chamoun school
ld be able to hold power in the new Lebanon for long. Such
idents ruled the Lebanese. President Chehab arbitrates be-
en them; and his successors are likely to do the same.
he executive power of the President is now truly shared by the
ni Muslim Prime Minister, who seems to have emerged from

the 1958 troubles with a definitely enhanced prestige Karami and Salam, who followed each other in that position after the troubles can in no way be called Presidential rubber stamps. So far they have had almost a free hand in the choice of their Cabinets, have expressed themselves clearly on a number of issues, and have seen their will done in most cases Gone are the days when the President would fire his Prime Minister at a word, or have a minister removed from the Cabinet. The Sunni Muslim Prime Minister, in his full powers, seems to have come to stay.

As the Maronite Presidency of the Republic tended to become confessionally neutralized, the Maronite Army Command gained political importance and prominence, and came to be looked upon as a leading centre of power. The fact that President Chehab had been the commanding general before his election as President, and the non-committed stand of the Army during the troubles of 1958 gave a new prestige to the military power—a prestige further enhanced by the considerable development of the Army after the Insurrection, and especially of its intelligence staff Before 1958 the Army was looked upon as a somewhat decorative body, entirely disinterested in politics, the use of which was limited to the maintenance of order in times of serious disturbance. Descended from the Troupes Spéciales of the French Mandate, which were not attached to the indigenous Lebanese Government, the Lebanese armed forces continued to be a body apart in the Lebanese State, with its own commander-in-chief—a body apart which could neither influence nor be used by the Lebanese Presidents and Governments. But today the situation has changed. The one-time commander-in-chief of the Army is himself the President; and the Army that was once a body apart has been integrated in the State—integrated as the partner, not the handmaid, of the civilian authority

While the Lebanese Army Command is held by a Maronite, it is wrong to think of the new power to which it has attained as representing a sectarian interest. The Army General Staff includes non-Maronites, and also non-Christians. And while some may begrudge the military power its new political influence and find it unsuited to their taste, it must be borne in mind that the Army is perhaps the only power in Lebanon today which is genuinely Lebanese in spirit without representing a sectarian interest. And, considering the general situation in Lebanon, it is likely that its power will never get out of hand, as it did in other Middle Eastern countries.

The events of 1958 seem to have spelt the end of the old type of

nahsūbiyya group which had prevailed before, or at least their definite decline. The rise of Nasser in Egypt and the formation of the U.A.R. gave the Sunni Muslim politics of Lebanon a decidedly new orientation. As Nasser's bid for the leadership of Arab Islam became more consistently and generally recognized, the attention of Lebanon's Sunni Muslims was turned away from the petty *mahsūbiyya* leaderships that had governed their politics since Mandatory times, and was focused on the figure of Nasser. The *maḥsūbiyya* leaders reacted to this phenomenon in two different ways: some, like Solh, were disturbed by it and tried to resist it; others, like Salam, found in it an opportunity for advancement and tried to use it. The former type of Sunni leader is now a retired politician. The latter remains; but he does so as a representative of Nasserist Arab nationalism, and not as a *mahsūbiyya* leader in his own right.

Unlike the Sunni *mahsūbiyyas*, the Shi'ite feudal leaderships remain unchanged in character; but they have definitely weakened. The troubles of 1958 appear to have had a beneficial political effect on the Shi'ites, by awakening them out of their medieval torpor. Today new leaderships are arising in the community which cannot as yet be fully appreciated, but which may show promise.

In the case of the Druzes the troubles did not change the old patterns. The Yazbaki and Janbalati factions still flourish, in fact more than ever before; but the colourful Janbalati stand during the Insurrection has given that faction a decided advantage over the other in current Druze politics The Yazbaki leaders who sit in the Parliament today won their seats by largely Christian votes.

Finally, one last change that has come about in Lebanese politics since 1958 should be mentioned. As the *maḥsūbiyya*-type leaderships weakened, the once unimportant political parties stepped in as the custodians of sectarian interests. The Sunni Najjada party, once completely overshadowed by the Solh, Yafi, and Salam *mahsūbiyyas*, now claims a seat in Parliament, and speaks with the authority of legal representation. The Maronite Kataeb, once loftily dismissed as the Christian '*ghulmān*', or youngsters, now occupy six parliamentary seats and hold two portfolios. They also lead a substantial parliamentary bloc. The Eddeh brothers and their National bloc, on the other hand, have lost much of their old prestige, along with the parliamentary seat of the younger Eddeh; and it is only the conservatism of the Christian middle class of Beirut and of the Maronite mountain peasantry that keeps them in a position of respectable rivalry to the Kataeb. Khuri's Dusturi bloc has long

been inert, and all attempts to inject it with new life have failed. But rivalries between other Christian groups, along with some non-Christian support, brought five former members of the bloc to the present Chamber. It is mostly the appreciation of Chamoun as the resistance hero of 1958 that holds together the members and supporters of the National Liberal Party (Parti National Liberal, or P.N.L.)—a thoroughly disorganized group to which the term party, in the accepted sense, can scarcely be applied. But the National Liberal Party, generally regarded as out of favour with the present regime, may develop into a serious opposition force; and it certainly leads that section of Lebanese opinion which abhors the radicalism of the parties and opposes the growing influence of the military power.

Lebanon in 1960 is certainly not like the Lebanon of 1949 or 1954. The Insurrection of 1958 seems to have marked the beginning of a radical change. The fundamental sectarian issues, without which political Lebanon will cease to be recognizable, are still there; and are likely to remain. But the way things are done is no longer the same. In this respect the events of 1958 ushered in a true revolution.

In a way, the revolution (which still goes on today) was bound to take place. It was not that there was a corruption in Lebanese politics before 1958 which is at present being properly checked, or that there was a tyranny in the rule of Lebanon under the former regime which has since been remedied. But the old political order in Lebanon, which was understood and appreciated by the statesmen of King Farouk's Egypt and of Quwatli's Syria, had gone completely out of step with the changing pattern of Middle Eastern politics. It was hopeless to expect a Nasser to understand a Sami es-Solh, or a Sarraj to understand a Chamoun. And, as Lebanon had to survive in the Middle East, she had to adapt herself to the new circumstances. In this manner, the political Lebanon of today may be regarded as the Lebanon giving the least possible offence to Nasser, while maintaining the most possible of her original character. It is perhaps here that the clue to the present situation in Lebanon lies.

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Notes of the Month

Strikes in Belgium

ON 21 December M. André Renard, Walloon Assistant Secretary-General of the *Fédération Générale du Travail Belge* (F.G.T.B.), ordered a general strike of Government and Communal employees, including transport workers, as a protest against the Bill for national economies, known as the *Loi Unique*. The loss of the Congo had brought the financial crisis to a head, and thus made necessary the promulgation of the Bill at this particular moment. But the Budget estimates have for a long time required a supplementary credit at the end of the year to cover drains on the national economy in the form of subsidies for education, both Catholic and lay, health insurance, unemployment insurance, grants to cover deficits on the railways, and, worst of all, huge expenditures on the uneconomic coal-mines. The Belgian economy has, in fact, been in a parlous state for some time, and the *Loi Unique* proposes drastic economies and fresh taxation.

Transport was paralysed for about two weeks by the strike, and essential services such as electricity, postal services, refuse collection, etc. were drastically curtailed. But most services were almost back to normal by 11 January, although the strike did not end till 23 January. A fair amount of violence was reported; there were clashes with police and gendarmerie; one striker was shot dead by a passer-by in Brussels, and another died after a gun-shot wound in Liége. Most of the violence was confined to Mons, Charleroi, and Liége, where, after damage to the railway station on 7 January, meetings of more than five persons were prohibited.

For a week only Catholic schools were open, but when the Government ordered the teachers to return to work or be suspended, they resumed at once. Communal employees were also ordered to return by 16 January, and again there was a large response. The 700,500 members of the Christian trade unions did not join the strike, and they outnumber the F.G.T.B. membership by about 100,000; but many were prevented from working by strike pickets.

M. Renard had threatened to withdraw the essential services, which would result in the flooding of mines and damping down the

blast furnaces; but if this were done it would further harm Wall
The Government was taking no chances on this issue, however,
Belgian soldiers were transferred from West Germany, not on
guard bridges, railway stations, and other public buildings but
to take over the pumps and avert sabotage of mines and steel w
should M. Renard's followers withdraw from maintenance.

By 10 January the Socialists began to condemn violence, as it
getting out of hand and losing them the sympathy of the mass o
people. M. van Acker, a former Socialist Prime Minister, trie
find a compromise to end the strike, but his action was criticize
M. Renard, and he seems to have lost interest; for on 13 Januar
the Socialist Deputies voted against the *Loi Unique*. Meanwhil
Christian trade unions have won concessions from the Govern
regarding clauses in the Bill, in particular the means test prop
for unemployment insurance after a limited period, and the rai
of the pensionable age.

To understand the real reason for the strike one must look
to the closing of the coal mines in Wallonia, which has always
opposed by the F.G.T.B. Many of these mines are uneconomic
have since the war only been kept open by large subsidies f
Marshall Aid, the Government, and the Coal and Steel C
munity. Efforts at strikes on this issue have failed, and M. Re
found the *Loi Unique* a better wicket, as hardly a Belgian appr
of all its clauses. To cure the economic difficulties of Wallon
now advocates autonomy, and the Government's delaying of
linguistic census has provided him with ammunition. He also ho
to frighten the Government and people of Belgium, and to s
that the F.G.T.B. were the country's real masters. In this he
failed; but it is doubtful if the *Loi Unique*, when it comes into fo
will provide the money, either in economies or in taxation, whi
needed to balance the Budget.

Moreover, economic morale in Belgium is low. As Mons
Théo Lefèvre, President of the Christian Social Party, said a
annual conference on 19 December, 'We Belgians lack a civic
science. We have lived too long in the golden atmosphere of
liberation. We have lost the Congo and we have become very sn
Finally, we are despised by the United Nations.' Belgian Gov
ments since the war have allowed public pressure to deflect t
from economic measures which they have known to be requ
and this strike will help neither Wallonia nor Belgium to ad
themselves to the competition of the Common Market.

East and West Germany Compete in Africa

A STRIKING feature of the second half of the 1950s has been the growing interest in Africa in both East and West Germany. From 1956 onwards 'Africa bureaux' and 'African Institutes' suddenly began to sprout all over the German Democratic Republic. African students, lured by handsome scholarships, flocked in large numbers to East German universities and technical institutes. At the same time, trade and cultural delegations from the G.D.R. began to descend on the newly emancipated countries of Africa. The coming to independence of each new State was watched closely by the Pankow Government and preparations were made well in advance of each such event to make the most, politically as well as commercially, of the new opportunity.

The Germans, regardless of whether they hail from the Western or the Eastern part of Germany (and many Africans are unaware of this division), seem to be popular in Africa; having lost their own colonies more than forty years ago, they are regarded as the one important branch of the white race untainted by colonialism. Even in those territories such as Tanganyika and Togo, where memories of German imperialism still linger, the Africans tend to remember the blessings of efficient administration and good education rather than the evils of colonial exploitation and repression. An article by the German author Peter Grubbe entitled 'Deutsche Legende in Afrika' (*Die Welt*, Hamburg, 11 March 1960) makes it clear that German prestige in Africa is high, though the author comes to the conclusion that this reputation is based on myth rather than on any particularly concrete benefits which Germany has in the past conferred on Africa.

The East Germans have undoubtedly profited greatly from this reputation. They have a number of distinct advantages over their Western competitors in suing for African interests. For one thing, they are able to offer better terms for two-way trade. Invariably, as soon as a new African State has become independent, the East German Government's first move is to send a trade mission there, and while it can offer much the same kind of technical assistance as would be available from Western Germany—plant installations, heavy machinery, consulting engineers, etc.—it is in a much better position for barter arrangements than the Federal Republic. Eastern Germany, which is constantly beset by food scarcities and where all trade is handled by Government agencies, has no qualms about contracting for large deliveries of agricultural produce. In

propaganda, too, the East Germans are in a favourable positi
By pointing to N.A.T.O. they can link the Bonn Government to t
'imperialist' Powers. For instance, in the spring of 1960 they circ
lated throughout northern and central Africa the unproved alleg
tion that Western Germany had helped France to manufacture t
'Sahara bomb'.

Western Germany, and in particular the Trade Union Fede
tion or D.G.B. (*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*), has now decided
meet the challenge of East Germany and her trade union counterp
the F.D.G.B. (*Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*) in the field
African interests. Trade unionism is in most of the newly indepe
dent African States the most fruitful field for foreign influence.
August 1960 the D.G.B. was requested by the International Co
federation of Free Trade Unions, whose headquarters is in Brusse
to open a large-scale campaign in Africa to counteract East Germ
influence. Under the slogan 'We are helping' and the symbol o
black and white hand interlocked, the D.G.B. has initiated a pr
gramme of invitations to African trade unionists to visit the Fede
Republic, of trade union delegations to Africa, and plans for t
establishment of business training colleges in the new Afric
States. The West Germans are trying to counter the East Germa
offensive by pointing to the evils of Communism. This often prov
a blunt weapon, however, for Communism means little or nothi
to most Africans, who have not experienced it and who in any ca
think much more in terms of food and clothing than of ideolog
and political freedom.

Both sides in the German duel for Africa are doing their utmost
draw the budding intelligentsia of the new African States into th
camp. The would-be African student can choose practically a
university in either East or West Germany or in East or We
Berlin and obtain all he wants free for the asking. In lavishing th
hospitality on black students, the G.D.R. seems to have stolen
march on the Federal Republic. There the drive for African stude
enrolment at the already crowded universities was only getti
under way during 1960, while Leipzig, Dresden, Jena, Rostock, a
other East German universities have had a large number of bla
students for the past five or six years. A writer in *Die Welt* (
August 1960), commenting on interviews with some of these Afric
students, was startled by their political naïveté and their thorou
indoctrination after only a short stay in Eastern Germany.

A full-fledged 'Africa Institute' was opened in the early autum

of 1960 at the University of Leipzig. Its primary purpose is to train East German diplomats and trade representatives for service in Africa. The faculty of the Institute is soon to be expanded to include twenty historians, twenty-four economists, ten jurists, four art historians, and two philosophers. A new State-owned publishing house 'VEB Edition Leipzig' was also opened early in September 1960 for the specific purpose of producing books aimed at the African States. Also in Leipzig there is an F.D.G.B. institute aimed to attract African trade union leaders, which provides them with a 'primer on socialism', printed in English and French and distributed free of charge. It is making available 300 scholarships for Africans up to 1963. Within less than a month of the announcement of independence for the Congo sixteen Congolese trade unionists had arrived at the Leipzig trade union school.

In East Berlin a 'Committee for Solidarity with the Nations of Africa' was set up on 23 July 1960. According to East German press reports, delegates from fourteen African countries attended the inaugural ceremonies in which some fifty prominent East German personalities also took part; it was disclosed at this first meeting that twenty African delegations had been the guests of the F.D.G.B. during the first half of 1960. Broadcasting is also an integral part of the propaganda campaign and an East Berlin transmitter has recently begun short-wave broadcasts in French and English for African consumption.

The Federal Republic is now beginning to make a big effort to attract some of the African intelligentsia away from the Soviet bloc. In 1956 the Deutsche Afrika-Gesellschaft was set up under the chairmanship of Dr Eugen Gerstenmaier, president of the Bundestag, to act as a centre for all the political, economic, cultural, and social interests linking West Germany and Africa. According to an article in the *Financial Times* (28 March 1960) by its director, Dr G. Altenburg, more than 150 million of the 2,300 million Deutschmarks invested abroad by West Germany since 1952 had gone into Africa. An 'Afro-Asian Institute' has also recently been opened in Vienna.[1]

At the end of October a series of 'Africa Weeks' took place in Bonn and other towns of the Federal Republic; these were attended by a large number of African politicians, journalists, trade unionists, and social workers. During these Africa weeks Professor Erhard, the Minister of Economics, informed twenty-four African delega-

tions that within the next few months 'extensive discussions' o German technical aid for their countries would be opened. I August aid to the extent of 4 million DM. was announced for th Cameroun, by the end of October an agreement had been complete for technical aid to Libya, aid was promised for Kenya, in Novembe an agreement was drawn up for aid to Togo, and an investmer programme amounting to a credit of £150 million agreed betwee the Ghana Government and a Consortium of leading Germa firms. Early in July 1960 a group of prominent Ministers and official from the newly emancipated States of the French Communit visited Bonn and the Ruhr and was promised technical and finan cial assistance for development. During 1960 a number of Wes German officials and parliamentarians visited Africa; they include Dr Gerstenmaier, C.D.U. deputy Heinrich Gewandt, S.P.D deputy Wischnewski, and the Prime Minister of Schleswig Holstein. On 23 January 1961 Mr Nyerere, the Chief Minister o Tanganyika, and two of his Ministers arrived on a five-day visi to the Federal Republic for economic and commercial discussions

All this activity and interest in Africa on the part of East and Wes Germany is in addition to the well-known and spectacular flirtin with both sides which has been indulged in by Ghana and Guinea

CORRIGENDUM

In the article on 'The Republic of Cyprus' in *The World Today* December 1960, at p. 539, lines 9–10, the words 'and the Dhekeli electric power station' should be deleted: this station is *not* a retained site.

General de Gaulle and Algeria

LOOKING back over the two and a half years since General de Gaulle returned to power, it now seems obvious that his approach to the Algerian problem has been all along entirely consistent, even if it has not always been clear what his ultimate goal was, or even whether he had one. It may be, as many Frenchmen who should know maintain, that, right from the start, General de Gaulle was convinced of the impossibility of keeping Algeria French, but that he had to prepare French opinion before he could openly admit his belief that Algeria should be Algerian. It may be that, at first, he had no predetermined final solution in mind, but was prepared to move, pragmatically, a step at a time, taking advantage of any chink in the rampart of intransigence that confronted him in 1958.

It is perhaps worth while recalling at this stage exactly how complex and extensive the problem was in 1958. A fourfold deadlock had paralysed and, directly or indirectly, defeated three previous Governments, before it finally brought about the collapse of the regime. There was, first, the military deadlock. Neither side could win a decisive victory, yet neither could agree to negotiations, except on terms that, to the other, were equivalent to unconditional surrender. The F.L.N. could not abandon its claim that France must recognize Algeria's right to independence; while the French army, as well as almost all political tendencies in France, could not admit of any solution that failed to maintain 'indissoluble links' between France and Algeria. M. Lacoste's 'last quarter of an hour' thus failed to materialize, and the military deadlock led to a no less complete political deadlock. Deadlock in Algeria because the Government could not negotiate with the F.L.N. unless and until the F.L.N.'s claim to represent the whole of Muslim opinion had been proved in free elections, and the holding of free elections was impossible while fighting and terrorism continued; M. Mollet's triptych—cease-fire, elections, negotiations—was, therefore, a non-starter. Deadlock in France because moderate Right and moderate Left, though prepared to accept differing degrees of administrative decentralization in Algeria, or of 'recognition of the Algerian personality', falling short of independence, could produce no majority for any policy that offered a hope of being applicable. It took a year and the defeat of M. Bourgès-Maunoury's Government before Parliament could agree on a *loi-cadre* for Algeria, which, by then, had

There was deadlock, too, in foreign policy. More and more France's military resources were tied up in Algeria; more and mc of her energies were devoted to avoiding any internationalization the problem, either by a hostile vote in the United Nations Assemb or even by the acceptance of the 'good offices' of Morocco a Tunisia in the attempt to find some possible starting-point i negotiations. General de Gaulle's phrase, on 29 January 1960, th 'Algeria blocks all roads' (*l'Algérie bouche tout*) was no less true 1958, and had been true for some time.

If it was still true in January 1960, when he had been in power i eighteen months, this was because his first task had been the neg tive one of removing blocks wherever possible, of reducing t number of impossibles. He is reported to have said: 'The difficul is that there *is* no solution to the Algerian problem. And yet solution has got to be found.'

This first stage, the attempt to reduce intransigence on all sid —what has been called 'la dépolitisation intérieure'—involv preparation for action in at least three fields. The President had fi to consolidate his own authority as head of the State. Under tl Fourth Republic the Government's authority had weakened to tl point at which it could no longer count on obedience to orders giv to the army, to a number of civilian officials, and to the securi police. Whatever was to be the policy determined on for Algeria, was bound to alienate large sections of opinion in both France ar Algeria, since General de Gaulle was supported by political te dencies that were diametrically opposed on that question. Durin the period in which he was consolidating his authority, his so-call 'ambiguity' and the public's uncertainty regarding his own i tentions were valuable assets to the President, enabling him maintain the fiction (always dear to him) that he was leader of united France. He then proceeded, during his first fifteen months office, to improve France's relations with Morocco and Tunisia, build up relations of friendly co-operation with the leaders of tl African States of the Community, to present a picture to the wor of a stable France, with a balanced Budget, a people solidly behir the President, a united Government, and a leader who knew his ow mind and was prepared to speak it. And so we had the succession visits to and from the heads of allied States, of Presidential tours the French provinces, of Presidential press conferences, in whic General de Gaulle spoke not only as head of the State but also as he were head of the Government, and the assertions of 'the Frenc

personality' in N.A.T.O., in particular in the field of atomic policy. All these provided visible evidence of leadership, valuable at home even if sometimes irritating abroad.

Less obvious, but equally essential, were the steps taken in this period to restore the authority of the Government over the police, over officials, particularly in Algeria, and over the army. An unobtrusive but extensive purge of senior officers was carried out and, in Algeria, also of more junior officers likely to be sympathetic to the insurrectionary elements; the organizations set up in Algeria in May 1958 by leaders of insurrectionary movements were rapidly dissolved, and from December 1958 onwards authority was gradually restored to civilian officials, under the leadership of M. Delouvrier, appointed for that purpose by the President.

Thirdly, the President had to make a bid for Muslim confidence. He began with the advantage of his wartime experience in Algeria, when he had extended the Muslim franchise. The tone of his appeal for peace (*la paix des braves*) in the course of the 1958 electoral campaign was conciliatory. The Constantine Plan, announced in October, was presented as the immediate implementation of the promise that Muslims would henceforth be treated as *des Français à part entière*. The economic provisions were no more than a drop in the ocean of Algeria's needs. But the provisions for speeding up the education of Muslims, training more Muslim civil servants, giving them better opportunities for administrative experience in France, providing better housing for the Muslim community—all these were equally valuable preparations, whether Algeria was to remain French or to become independent.

The decision to hold elections in Algeria, in spite of the failure to achieve a cease-fire, was criticized by many people, both inside and outside France. If such elections could have led to the emergence of genuine representatives of Muslim opinion, they would also have been a valuable preparation either for integration or for independence. But here it seems that General de Gaulle was expecting too much, both from Muslims, torn between fear of the rebels and fear of the French army, and also from the army itself, many of whose officers could not so easily give up the dream of a permanently French Algeria and, therefore, could not, or at least certainly did not in many regions, act as the non-partisan protectors of the public and supervisors of free electoral expression that General de Gaulle had expressly ordered them to be.

municipal and departmental Councils as well as for Deputies ar Senators—merely as a sinister farce. It is true that the great majori of the Muslim representatives were elected to represent the e tremist views of the dominant European minority of 'ultras'. could hardly be otherwise. But, once in the Senate or the Assembl a number of these Muslim representatives gradually took a mo independent stand, and by 1960 some of them were openly expre sing sympathy with the F.L.N. point of view. There must also l noted on the credit side the fact that a country in which women ha never voted before, in which local Councils had had Europe majorities and European Mayors or Chairmen, in which the Mu lim majority of electors had been represented by a minority Muslim representatives, now for the first time took part in electio in which the two communities were represented strictly in accor ance with their population. Henceforth local Councils had Musli majorities. There were many Muslim Mayors, and there we Muslim Chairmen of all thirteen of the departmental Council Women learned to come out and vote, with the help of the arm which set up special polling stations for them. The existence of arm pressure, implicit where it was not explicit, cannot be denied, bu nor can the existence of terrorist pressure, from which the army di effectively protect electors. The presence of supervisory Commi sions also ensured a degree of honesty in the polling booths whic however low, was nevertheless unprecedented in a country hither notorious for elections 'managed' by the authorities. The positi value of the elections seemed, in 1958, small in face of the obvious unrepresentative results, rendered even more unrepresentative b the F.L.N. boycott. But seen from the vantage point of 1961, whe General de Gaulle is about to embark on a wholesale reorganizatio of Algerian institutions pending the consultation on self-determina tion, there seems a great deal to be said for the prior creation of the local Councils in which, whatever their shortcomings, some 11,0 Muslims are learning the art of responsible local government.

Nevertheless, this experiment must be accounted a setback fo General de Gaulle because it did not result in the emergence, a he and many others had hoped, of a coherent body of moderat Muslim opinion—a 'Third Force'—with which France might hav tried to negotiate a cease-fire, instead of with the F.L.N.—or eve together with them. Whether this led the President to adopt th policy outlined on 16 September 1959, or whether he had intende all along to propose self-determination once he felt that his hold o

ower was sufficiently strong, must remain for the time being a mat-
r for speculation. In any case, the declaration, in which he offered
lgerians a threefold choice, between integration (or *francisation*,
he called it), secession, or association with France, on terms to be
gotiated but which seemed likely to be similar to those governing
lations between the Republic and the States of the Community,
arked the end of the preparatory phase and the beginning of a
cond phase, in which General de Gaulle was quite clearly trying
lead his compatriots, by gentle stages, to regard as inevitable, even
ough undesirable, solutions that they would have rejected out of
and if they had been made by anyone else, or if they had been made
rlier by him.

To begin with, the President spoke of a choice between three
lutions. On 29 January 1960, he seemed to be expressing a prefer-
ce for 'the most French solution'. But by March he was already
ginning to speak of an Algerian Algeria. The abortive insurrection
24 January both helped and hindered him. It helped because it
monstrated the recovery of Governmental authority as shown by
e obedience of the military and civilian authorities, and the mas-
ve support of the public for the President. And so it made possible
ring the following months the elimination of one of the blocks, or
possibilities, namely, the refusal by French opinion to contem-
ate the abolition of the 'indissoluble links' between France and
lgeria. It hindered because it showed that, in spite of the purges,
ere were still strong insurrectionary elements in Algeria and
rong sympathies with them in certain sections of the army.

This was a second setback for General de Gaulle, and it no doubt
lps to explain the apparent contradictions of some of his state-
ents during the following months. It seemed at first that the step
rward of September 1959 was followed by two or more steps back-
rd in 1960. The President's conversations with army officers in
lgeria after the insurrection (*la tournée des popotes*) were followed
statements clearly designed to placate army opinion. The hopes
sed by the arrival at Melun in June of two emissaries representing
e rebel 'provisional Government' were quickly disappointed
the failure of the pre-negotiations and by the absence of any
tisfactory explanation from the French Government, or of any
parent desire to reopen negotiations. And these events were
llowed by a series of statements by General de Gaulle—on the
nited Nations, on the role of N.A.T.O., and on the necessity for
fence to be national in character, rather than integrated—whose

purpose seemed to be to tread sharply on the toes of all his potent friends and allies. It should be remembered, however, that, thou General de Gaulle's nationalist attitudes on foreign policy, and atomic policy in particular, were unpopular with many of his co patriots as well as with his allies, his remarks about the Unit Nations, on the contrary, were, surprisingly, very popular with cc siderable sections of the general public. He was also, througho these months, going on with his educative campaign on Algeria.

In his speeches in the provinces and in his broadcasts, he pe petually referred to 'an Algerian Algeria', gradually defining wh he meant by the term. In Rouen, in July, he spoke of an Algeri Algeria which would have her own institutions; in his press conf ence of 5 September he expressed the conviction that, when co sulted on their future, this was what Algerians would choose. 'A see it,' he said, 'the only question is whether this Algeria will Algerian in opposition to France, by secession, by breaking wi France, or in association, in friendly union with her.' He pursu this theme in his speeches in October in Savoy and in the Dauphin By an Algerian Algeria he meant a country that would manage own affairs. In his press conference of 4 November he spoke of 't Algerian Republic', 'which has never yet existed, but which will o day exist'. And he went on to warn his listeners that any attempt oppose his policy for setting up Algerian institutions, through whi 'eventually Algerians will at all stages be responsible for their ov affairs', would be countered by the use of his constitutional rig either to consult the people directly, by referendum,[1] or, if the R public were threatened, to have recourse to emergency powers. I added that the measures he would then take 'to safeguard the Stat might include decisions on Algeria's future.

All this led up to the announcement on 16 November of the d cision to submit to a referendum a Bill for the provisional r organization of the Algerian administration, a Bill which also in cluded a reaffirmation of the principle of self-determination. Wit the referendum of 8 January the President's Algerian policy ente on a third stage, by far the most decisive and the most difficul

[1] General de Gaulle several times referred to his constitutional right to appe to the people by a referendum as if he had a general right of initiative In fac the Constitution (Article 11) states that the initiative must come either fro Parliament or from the Government and that a referendum can be held only on Bill dealing with 'the organization of the public authorities, approving a Com munity agreement or authorizing the ratification of a Treaty which would affect the working of institutions' His constitutional right in this field is, therefore, strictly speaking, the possession of a veto

Looking back, in January 1961, to the situation that existed in 1958, it is evident that enormous progress has been made. The idea of an independent, or quasi-independent, Algeria, which in 1958 was acceptable only to the Communists (and even they were relatively cautious in their references to independence, preferring to concentrate on the need for negotiations) now seems to the majority of French opinion, and to a good many of the *colons* in Algeria, to be inevitable in a future which is constantly becoming less remote. War-weariness, disquiet regarding the moral implications of the war—the use at times by the French army of torture to combat terrorism—have helped to bring about the change. But General de Gaulle's re-educative leadership has also pointed steadily in that direction.

Yet, looking forward to the difficulties that still have to be overcome before any real solution can be reached, it is no less evident that the movement of opinion has still hardly got beyond the negative stage. Some impossibles have been eliminated. But the actual steps by which Algerian independence can be achieved without involving insurrection, or civil war, or at least a prolonged period of acute unrest in Algeria and perhaps also in France, are still unclear. The results of the referendum have given the President one positive advantage. They have demonstrated to the 'activists', whether civilians or soldiers, in France or in Algeria, that the majority of electors, both European and Muslim, have no sympathy with their point of view. The statistics leave no room for doubt on that point. The overwhelming majority of the 'Noes' in France were on the Left, that is, they expressed unwillingness to accord a vote of confidence to General de Gaulle for a number of reasons, some of which had nothing to do with Algeria, but they certainly did not express disagreement with the principle of self-determination for Algeria. The 'Noes' in Algeria did, of course, express opposition to self-determination on the part of almost the entire European population. But the European minority cannot, alone, impose their will on the French nation, and nothing in the recent past leads one to conclude that the army would support them in 1961, as it did in 1958.

A second positive advantage has been claimed for the President. This vote, it has frequently been said, constituted a blank cheque for General de Gaulle, since the consultation amounted to a package deal. Many of those who agree with the principle of self-determination do not necessarily approve of General de Gaulle's methods either in general or in particular. In any case, the details of the par-

ticular measure that the public was asked to approve in the same vote were not revealed. The President, it is argued, therefore, has a free hand to interpret them as he pleases.

This may be true, but comments by party leaders and spokesmen have revealed a whole series of criticisms of the President personally, as well as of the regime, which make it abundantly clear that the cheque will have to be promptly presented if it is to be honoured All that has happened is that General de Gaulle has been accorded an extension of the time-limit within which opposition forces are prepared to go on paying the, to them, high price of the President in other fields, in the hope that in this one vital field he will be able to clear the road block that has existed for the past six years. In a recent article, M. Mollet divided the 'Noes' into four categories the activists (*nostalgiques des régimes de force*); the anxious—patriots or nationalists, Europeans in Algeria (*nostalgiques des images d'Epinal*) who are still living in the past, or democrats, afraid that the regime is moving towards one of personal rule; the discontented—peasants, civil servants, old people, supporters of European integration, anti-clericals, workers, those, in fact, who feel that they are bearing the brunt of the price that has to be paid for General de Gaulle in fields other than that of Algerian policy, and the cunning (*les malins*) who, like the dissident Socialist P.S U., can afford to vote 'No' because they know that the majority will vote 'Yes', or who, like some *Indépendents*, are prepared to let General de Gaulle take the unpopular decisions on Algeria because they hope to benefit from the inevitable reaction that will set in later.

The 'Yesses' could be similarly divided. The President's foreign policy is unpopular with the moderate Right as well as with the moderate Left; the Right dislikes the Government's agricultural policy; the Left is opposed to its social and economic policy, as well as to the departure from traditional Republican anti-clericalism in the field of education. Both Right and Left have protested against what they feel to be the President's misuse of constitutional provisions to increase his own powers, and the Left, in particular, objects to the use of the referendum to by-pass Parliament, to appeal to the *pays réel* over the head of the *pays légal*.

Yet growing hostility to the President is translated into effective opposition only by the politicians—which could well explain why the President had recourse to a referendum. But even the massive confidence of the general public is one of apathy rather than of enthusiasm; and it, too, expresses the national desire to be rid of an in-

tolerable problem without the responsibility for taking almost equally intolerable decisions. Where Algeria is concerned, General de Gaulle could use the phrase attributed to President Truman: 'The buck stops here.'

To produce the required results, however, before his present time-limit expires, he has first to overcome at least four major initial obstacles which still block the road to negotiations on the main issue, the future status of Algeria. Negotiations with the F L N. have somehow to be reopened. This may be attempted first in private, in order to avoid the risk of another humiliating failure like Melun. Secondly, there must be either agreement on a cease-fire or, at least, a *de facto* cessation of hostilities (which would have the advantage of saving face for both sides). Thirdly, arrangements must be reached whereby the F.L N., now officially banned, can become a legal organization, and whereby outbreaks of physical violence both between Europeans and Muslims and between Muslims can be prevented At the moment it is difficult to see how this can be achieved without the continued presence of the French army, and equally difficult to see how the F.L.N. could agree to this. And fourthly, arrangements will have to be made for those Europeans, and there are bound to be many, who do not want to remain in Algeria in the future that is beginning to take shape. Massive emigration from Algeria to France would create problems for both countries. Algeria cannot, for the time being, do without their technical skill, and France cannot put up with the politics of many of them. Partition would create a whole set of new problems.

All these problems will be appallingly difficult to solve. And even if they are solved, this is still only the fringe of the main problem, which is to decide when, and on what terms, Algeria can become independent. The most that can be hoped for at the moment is that a beginning can be made, and that General de Gaulle's pragmatism will be as successful during this stage as it has been up to now; that the F.L N., perhaps through war-weariness or through fear of domination by President Nasser or of intervention from the East, will be led to recognize that, as General de Gaulle has often pointed out, only France is likely to provide the economic and technical aid required by Algeria, as well as employment for the 300,000 to 400,000 Algerians who regularly feed 2 million of their compatriots out of wages earned in France; and, finally, that French negotiators will be more skilful (or more anxious to succeed) than they were at Melun. One the the weaknesses of General de Gaulle's isolated and

lofty position is that he has too often assumed that an order giv
an order carried out, whereas, to much of French liberal opinio
has often seemed to be an order sabotaged.

Nor is it only in France that time is not on the side of Gener
Gaulle. The newly independent leaders of the Community
their own problems, among which is that of pressure from more
treme elements, all of whom are passionately in favour of Alge
independence. They cannot, therefore, continue indefinitel
support General de Gaulle, either in the United Nations or at ho
And the pace at which African opinion moves is likely to quic
not to slow down. The present position was well summed u
M. Bourguiba's comment on the referendum: 'There is one ch
in two that, strengthened by the massive support of the Fre
people, General de Gaulle will decide to negotiate with the Alger
who are fighting.'

DOROTHY PICKL

A Cycle of Political Events in Laos

EXCEPT that it is more grave, the situation in Laos at the tim
writing is, in general, similar to that existing at the time of
Geneva Conference of 1954. Two Laotian groups supportec
differently oriented outside forces oppose each other, the R
Government holding the major towns and the more access
cultivated river valleys and the Pathet Lao free to organize guer
activity from the sparsely populated jungle-covered hill cour
The Communists and the Western Powers have gained little,
Laos nothing at all, from the last seven years.

It was, in fact, mainly due to the deteriorated military situatio
July 1954 that Laos, unlike Cambodia, was unable to liquidat
organized Communist internal threat through the provisions of
Geneva Accords. Although the Royal Government was recogn
as having the sole right to speak for Laos at the conference, an
though the permanent cession of areas of the country to the Pa
Lao was avoided, the Government of Laos had to accept the al
ment of two provinces to the Pathet Lao for regroupment pric
reintegration. In the presence of the International Control C

mission, fighting in Laos gradually ceased and from this point the armed struggle became a political one. The inevitable and, indeed, predictable re-transformation of the struggle between opposing factions in Laos from the political to the military sphere can be traced, through a specific series of events, in the political developments of the period 1956 to 1960.

The original concord on integration called for by the Geneva Agreement, which was arrived at in August and confirmed in December 1956 by Prince Souvannaphouma, at that time Prime Minister of the Royal Government, and Prince Souphanouvong, leader of Pathet Lao, inevitably made large concessions to the latter. Obviously the most significant of these was the right of the Pathet Lao to form a legal party, the Nèo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) (Lao Patriotic Front) and ancillary organizations. Moreover, it allowed the participation of two Pathet Lao leaders in the Government pending the holding of supplementary elections. Long-drawn-out negotiations over the reintegration of the civil and military wings of the Pathet Lao were concluded at last in November 1957 and the elections, which increased the number of seats in the National Assembly from thirty-nine to fifty-nine, were held in May 1958. Although polling less than a third of the total votes, NLHS gained nine and the associated Santiphap (Peace) party four of the new seats. This result engendered strong Western, especially American, fears that full elections for a new Assembly, due in 1959, would give victory at the polls to NLHS, probably in association with other left-wing parties. The normal development of democratic procedures in Laos appeared, in this view, inimical to Western interests, and efforts to bring influence to bear in the opposite direction were thereupon intensified. In fact American opinion had been referring to 'conquest by negotiation' as early as January 1957 following the confirmation of the August 1956 accords between the Royal Government and Pathet Lao.

The first overt sign of stiffening opposition to left-wing participation in government came in June 1958 when the Nationalist and Independent groups in the National Assembly united to form the Laotian People's Rally (RPL). This represented a Laotian reaction to the feared swing to the left, for up to that time there had been little tendency to concerted action between the various moderate groups and leaders. In RPL were concentrated practically all the moderate nationalist leaders who had participated in the Government of Laos since independence.

The creation on 29 June of the Committee for the Defence of the National Interests (CDIN) brought into the field for the first time an organization specifically charged with combating Communist influence. The CDIN drew on army support, and American encouragement had been influential in its formation. It had a more youthful and more militant flavour than the RPL, and was the first truly right-wing political organization in Laos.

In July 1958 it was announced that warning had been received that the NLHS might attempt a *coup*, and a military alert was ordered. In these circumstances Prince Souvannaphouma attempted to reorganize his Government to exclude NLHS participation, but he failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority for his proposals in the National Assembly. On 18 August M. Phoui Sananikone, Foreign Minister in the Souvannaphouma Government and leader of the Lao delegation at Geneva, formed a Government which not only excluded NLHS but included four members of CDIN who were not Assemblymen. The new Government was able to rely confidently on Western and on Thai support. The previous Government had had to contend against U.S. disapproval and threats to cut American aid.

M. Phoui Sananikone's first move was to initiate a campaign against corruption in the light of a report by the U.S. General Accounting Office that officials had been profiting from American aid. An essential part of the anti-corruption policy involved the devaluation of the *kip* (from 35 to 80 to the U.S. dollar) and the abolition of the import licensing system which had been heavily abused These actions, the first of which, by agreement with the U.S. Government, created a fully convertible *kip*, were taken in October 1958.

Up to this point protests from the Communist Powers had been mainly confined to the issue of the withdrawal of the International Control Commission in Laos which had adjourned *sine die* on 19 July. This action, though opposed by the Polish delegate, was in accordance with the wishes of the Royal Government, which considered that the task of the Commission was completed once the supplementary elections of May 1958 had been held. In mid-December, however, an outbreak of fighting on the border with North Vietnam resulted in a hardening of attitudes on both Communist and pro-Western sides Charges by Laos that North Vietnamese forces had occupied a small frontier area, Huong Lap, in north Laos, and counter-claims that the territory belonged to North

Vietnam culminated in a protest by the Lao Government to the U.N. Secretary-General on 16 January 1959. On the 15th M. Phoui Sananikone had received from the National Assembly a favourable vote on his request for special powers for a period of twelve months. The effect of this move was to divest the Assembly of its legislative powers for this period. The most significant feature of the Prime Minister's proposals was that constitutional reforms were to be undertaken and that a general election should be held after the planned reforms had been approved by a national congress. Thus the elections due early in 1959 were postponed.

On 11 February M. Phoui made a policy statement in which he said that Laotian obligations under the Geneva Agreement had been faithfully discharged and that the Government of Laos could not accept the continuing validity of the terms of the agreement which imposed restrictions on Laotian freedom of action pending a final political settlement in Vietnam.[1]

On 12 February a State Department announcement supported the action of the Lao Government and American officials expressed the view that the U.S. Government was now entitled to establish a military mission in Laos. This action seemed not to be permissible under the Geneva Agreement.[2] At once China and North Vietnam responded with charges that the Government of Laos had repudiated the Geneva Agreement and that American influence had dictated this policy. Lao Government communiqués denied such repudiation and pointed out that, though a reorganization of the armed forces was under consideration, there was no intention of allowing the establishment of foreign bases or the stationing of foreign troops in Laos

A further consequence of the need for freedom from restraint felt by the Lao Government was a stiffer policy towards the final reintegration of the former Pathet Lao military forces. Discussions between successive Royal Governments and the Pathet Lao had gone on since August 1956, with the Government side successfully parrying the more extreme demands of PL. Although the fighting units of PL were officially and ceremonially integrated into the Royal Lao Army in November 1957 many points of detail remained to be settled. PL were particularly anxious to retain their battalion organization within the framework of the Royal Army. The Pathet

[1] *Further Documents relating to the discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, June 16–July 21, 1954*, Cmd 9239, p. 42, Document No 9, para. 4
[2] *ibid*, p 20, Document No 4, Chapter II, Article 6.

Lao authorities continued to hold out for better terms until the Government's final offer was put, in May, in the form of an ultimatum: integrate or be disbanded or demobilized by force. Of the two existing PL battalions, one accepted integration, but most troops of the second battalion, stationed at Xieng Khouang in north-east Laos, moved off with their arms into the mountainous jungle areas bordering North Vietnam. The NLHS political leaders in Vientiane were placed under house arrest and the party's activities were banned.

At this stage it was clear that the Royal Government had managed effectually to block every path by which NLHS could attain power by political means. It could hardly be expected that the Communist Powers supporting PL and NLHS would acquiesce in such a firm rebuff, and from this point it became certain that sooner or later there would be a deterioration to the point when a military solution would be attempted.

During these early months of 1959 the situation developed in ways which did not seem to be characteristically Laotian. Faced with an immediate threat of force, the PL battalions could have been expected to accept integration if only as a tactical procedure. It has in fact been suggested that Prince Souphanouvong issued an order to this effect. If this was so, the fact that both battalions did not comply might mean that more extreme influences than his were at work in the Pathet Lao. With regard to the policy of the Royal Government, it is hard to understand why the issue was allowed to reach the point at which the use of force was threatened. Negotiations on military integration had been deliberately protracted from 1956 onwards, though avoiding final failure which would have endangered the whole political agreement. If this had occurred the International Commission would have remained and, rightly or wrongly, no Laotian party wanted this, as its presence was felt to be a form of profitless foreign interference and an infringement of sovereignty. A more typical attitude of a Laotian Government might have been to continue indefinitely the negotiations over military integration while ensuring the relative powerlessness of the still-formed PL battalions by supervision and limitation of arms and supplies. That a movement towards more extreme solutions developed at this period suggests that foreign influences were gaining ground in Laos.

During the summer of 1959 a campaign on the part of the Communist Powers to obtain the reconvening of the International Com-

ssion developed. Britain and Russia, the Geneva co-chairmen, led to agree on this issue. India was in favour of the return of the ımmission on the sensible, if somewhat optimistic, ground that its esence was a sobering factor and that Laos should be kept out of e sphere of action of the cold war. At this time Mr Nehru expessed the opinion that outside influences were more strongly at ırk on various sides.

On 24 July the Royal Government announced that it had request- the aid of American military advisers to assist in the reorganizaın and re-equipment of the French-trained army. At the end of the ınth a series of Laotian communiqués were issued charging that ırth Vietnamese elements were assisting the resistance of the thet Lao in north-east Laos It was alleged that this resistance inlved not only the escaped PL battalion but also new elements med, equipped, and stiffened by personnel from North Vietm. At the same time the Government stated that it would bring to al certain NLHS leaders on charges of treason. During August ıotian reports suggested that the military situation was worsening, d moves to secure a U.N. fact-finding mission commenced. These re strongly opposed by China in their early stages. Also in the ne month additional American transport, arms, aircraft, and chnicians began to arrive in Laos.

On 4 September the Lao Government requested the assistance a United Nations emergency force to resist the aggression of ırth Vietnam. In the Security Council the Western Powers inıduced a resolution that a sub-committee should investigate the mplaint and report. Resistance to this move from Russia was feated and the veto avoided because the question of the submmittee's appointment was accepted as being procedural and not bstantive. Nevertheless the Communist Powers contended that e action of the Security Council was illegal and tantamount to an ıendment, in practice, of the U.N. Charter. The report of the b-committee, composed of representatives from Argentina, Italy, pan, and Tunisia, was made on 4 November. Fighting, such as it d been, had ceased and though the sub-committee confirmed the ıg-known fact of assistance in arms, supplies, and the provision political cadres by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, it 'did t clearly establish whether there were crossings of the frontier by gular troops of the D.R.V.'.

This inconclusive report was interpreted by the different parties volved to suit their own case. Assessing the general political situa-

tion, it might be reasonable to conclude that aggression from No
Vietnam in the form of invasion would be improbable in view of
'umbrella protection' offered by SEATO and definitely accepted
the Lao Government for the first time in February 1959. The i
portant aim at this stage from the Communist point of view v
merely to keep armed resistance alive.

Even at this late stage in the deterioration of the situati
negotiations with the Pathet Lao might have reopened, with t
Royal Government in a position of strength. Indeed it appears t
M. Phoui Sananikone might have been contemplating such a cou
in December. The trials of the Pathet Lao leaders, due to be helc
October, continued to be postponed. During December M. Ph
attempted to re-form his Government, excluding seven firr
right-wing members of CDIN. Among those dropped was Gene
Phoumi Nosavan, Minister of Defence. At this stage the ar
stepped in and M. Phoui was forced to hand back his special pow
of government to the King. A military command headed by
three senior generals, including Phoumi Nosavan, took over
1 January and a firmly right-wing Government under M. K
Abhay was formed to act as 'caretaker' until the holding of gene
elections in April 1960.

The elections, held under army supervision and without the p
ticipation of NLHS, resulted in the return of RPL or CDIN can
dates in 51 out of the 59 seats. The left-wing Santiphap par
which did take part, lost all its 8 seats. At this stage the strong
party was the CDIN which held 28 seats and carried strong ar
support. The trend to the right continued with the formation of t
Tiao Somsanith Government in June 1960.

On 9 August a successful *coup d'état* was carried out by a pa
chute battalion under the command of Captain Kong Lae. T
officer headed a Revolutionary Committee which announced as
aims the evacuation of foreign troops and the liquidation of bas
and acceptance of aid 'without strings' from any quarter that wou
offer it.

The Revolutionary Committee appeared anxious to obtain t
services of Prince Souvannaphouma, then President of the Natio
Assembly, as Prime Minister of a new Government. A Cabinet w
put forward which included only Touby Lyfoung, leader of t
minority Mèo community, from the previous Government. In t
confusion of events in August this Government, although
obtained Assembly approval, did not take effective power, and

'as not until 29 August that the King firmly appointed Prince ouvannaphouma as Prime Minister and accepted the resignation f the Tiao Somsanith Government. Prince Souvannaphouma's ew proposals included eight members of his previous Government and five of the Somsanith Government, including General houmi Nosavan and M. Inpeng Suryadhai. This showed a swing way from the strongly leftist composition of the previous proposals nd indicated a desire on the part of Souvannaphouma to introduce form of coalition. The inclusion of Phoumi Nosavan and Inpeng uryadhai was opposed by Captain Kong Lae. Effective control ad passed to the army factions and it was clearly impossible for iem to be reconciled in a single coalition Government under a eutral Prime Minister.

On 10 September came the first radio announcement that a new evolutionary Committee, this time a right-wing organization, had een formed in Savannakhet in south-central Laos. The leaders of is group were Prince Boun Oum, of the family of the former hereitary rulers of the old southern principality of Cham Bassac, and eneral Phoumi Nosavan. On an appeal from the King to avoid vil war the two leaders, Prince Boun Oum and Prince Souvanaphouma, had separate audiences, but their differences were not solved, and fighting became inevitable.

Vientiane was lightly shelled on 18 September by rightist forces, id Prince Souvannaphouma accused Thailand of allowing the use f her territory to the Savannakhet group. Thailand had in fact osed the frontier between the two countries after the Kong Lae *up* and shortage of supplies in Vientiane soon began to create a roblem. In the sporadic fighting of September carried out along ie Mekhong river by Kong Lae's forces and by the Pathet Lao in ie north-east, success fell on balance to the left and neutral groups, id the Savannakhet faction was given an ultimatum on 26 September to surrender before 1 October. At this point the different titudes of Prince Souvannaphouma and Captain Kong Lae were iade plain. Kong Lae wished to inflict a military defeat on the avannakhet group, while Souvannaphouma required only a ceasee, after which he wished once more to attempt to form a coalition overnment to include Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi osavan..

The pressure to move to the left which eventually caused ouvannaphouma's retirement to Cambodia had thus commenced. n 4 November a Unity party was formed with Souvannaphouma

and Souphanouvong of the Pathet Lao as co-chairmen. Attempt forming a coalition Government still continued. In the propos of 18 November arrangements were made for a cease-fire and mediation in disputes arising out of the military situation. T coalition Government would include representatives of all nation ties and patriotic parties and groups. NLHS would be included a also members of the Savannakhet group. There was clearly chance of success for proposals such as these. The extremes, NL and CDIN (Savannakhet), were quite irreconcilable, and military well as political support from the opposing cold war Powers beg to build up from this point. A Russian Embassy had been accredi to Vientiane and a Russian air-lift of food and petrol to offset shortages caused by the closure of the frontier by Thailand co menced on 23 November. The Savannakhet group was receiv supplies from Thailand.

In mid-December a large-scale attack on Vientiane develop and by 17 December the city, much damaged, was in the hands Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan. The Sava nakhet group was now in a position to form a Government a obtain for it the mandate of the National Assembly which h previously voted in favour of successive Governments of Prin Souvannaphouma. Souvannaphouma himself was now in Ca bodia, having declined an invitation to join the Pathet Lao in S Neua. Quinim Pholsena, leader of the Santiphap party, was t nominal head of the Souvannaphouma Government now driv out of Vientiane.

The whole issue is now firmly in the hands of the outside for which support rival Lao Governments, the Communist Pow recognizing the Government of Souvannaphouma and the Weste Powers that of Boun Oum. With the local military temperature s rising owing to the build-up of forces and supplies on both sides danger exists that the scale of the fighting will increase until forei troops are committed. This would involve North Vietnamese a Thai troops from the start and would presumably introduce t direct military support of their backers.

Historical considerations suggest that Laotian factional lead have always been willing to attempt the exploitation of outs interests in support of their own aims.[1] Such aims are personal ratl than ideological, and the support required from outside does not

[1] For a summary historical account see 'The Independent State of Laos' *The World Today*, October 1957, pp. 432–42.

clude military intervention. Laotian national leaders are unlikely to favour a limitless extension of the war on Laotian soil and, in so far as they are in charge of the situation, may be expected to keep the fighting within bounds. However, propaganda on both sides in recent years has in fact increased the ideological component in local rivalries, and to this extent a new and more grave situation has developed. An aspect of this is the rivalry that has grown up in the army. This stems from the participation of the army in CDIN and the accompanying subversion, as a matter of deliberate Communist policy, of officers excluded from this group.

Local psychological factors tend to favour the left wing. In a country where political consciousness has not yet developed on a national scale the political idea which has most chance of success is that one which is closest to the historical and traditional consciousness of leaders and people—which, in the case of Laos, is neutrality. Another feature which has had an adverse effect from the Western point of view is the continuing build-up of American military aid, particularly because this policy involves the stationing of large numbers of Americans in Laos. The American presence is too obtrusive in Laos and undoubtedly adversely affects Lao–U.S. relations The tremendous popular enthusiasm that greeted the *coup* of Captain Kong Lae derived partly from a reaction to this. On the other hand the Pathet Lao have been successful in building up an image of themselves as the true heirs of the original resistance movement against the French which culminated in the first declaration of independence in Vientiane in August 1945. The report of the U N. special economic commissioner to Laos which was issued in November 1959 made it clear that a start on improving the economic position of Laos has as yet hardly been made and that all the fundamental problems remain. This state of affairs has been exploited by Communist propaganda and gives point, at any rate in Laotian eyes, to their charge that the West has performed a disservice to Laos by providing, mainly from American sources, a huge preponderance of military over civil aid.

Laos, and again historical support can be found for this argument, has only existed when a state of relative equilibrium pertained among surrounding Powers, creating the need for a buffer state. It seems probable that this is fundamentally still the present-day situation, and this implies that, short of an agreement on partition which would be fiercely resisted by all Laotians, a non-aligned coalition Government will eventually be allowed to emerge.

In the existing situation of civil war this solution could only be o tained through some form of Great Power agreement. Such Government would continue, in the political climate of today, to subject to Communist subversion, thus initiating again a cycle events similar to those of the past four years, unless the West c gain confidence in its ability to resist Communist pressure l political and economic means.

E. H. S. SIMMONDS

Moscow and Peking Agree to Differ

THE only two important meetings of Communist Parties since tl war, on an international scale, were held in response to disagre ments and conflicts within the Communist bloc. (Cominform mee ings were explicitly not world-wide in scope) The Moscow meeti of 1957 followed the outbreaks in Poland and Hungary in the pr vious autumn, and the meeting of representatives of eighty-o Communist Parties in November 1960 was held primarily to resol the differences between the two leading Communist Powers Th this meeting lasted three weeks was in itself a sign of how deep the differences went. It was not the first time that Sino-Soviet diffe ences had come out into the open, but no such disagreements can l considered deep-seated in the Communist world until they are giv a theoretical formulation. That is why China's claim, made in 195 that she was rapidly approaching the Communist stage of dev lopment, with its implication that she held the leading position, w significant, though it could clearly make no difference to the actu state of affairs in China. The claim was withdrawn—its theoretic basis was far too weak to sustain the Soviet onslaught.

The present dispute, which concerns major aspects of forei policy, has been conducted largely in scholastic terms, with quot tions from the Communist classics marshalled to support ha splitting variations of emphasis. Anonymity was preserved throug out, the disputants being represented by abstractions—'the mode revisionists argue', 'some comrades maintain', etc. The Chine harped on their Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, the Russians on the 'creative development' of Marxism-Leninism.

Disputes on questions of Communist theory, on the 'correct interpretation of Marxism–Leninism', are sometimes dismissed by observers as irrelevant; this has never been true, and is patently false in the present instance. They arise from practical considerations reflecting differences in situation. Moscow's failure to support Chinese action in the border dispute with India was implicit in the Soviets' different interpretation of 'the role of the national bourgeoisie', and Chinese recognition of the Algerian provisional government could be deduced from the argument whether or not national liberation can be won without armed struggle.

The differences in the situation, both internal and external, of the two big Communist Powers require little elaboration here. The history of the Kuomintang–Communist civil war, the backwardness of the Chinese economy, China's resentment about the United Nations and Formosa, and, in contrast, Russia's advanced economy, possession of nuclear weapons, absence of any territorial claims, and her position as an equal negotiating partner with the United States —all such factors help to determine their respective attitudes and policies.

What is novel in the present dispute is that the question who is orthodox, who is revisionist, and who is dogmatist, can be settled only when the previous question of who has the *right* to decide this is settled. Professions of adherence to Marxism–Leninism do not mean that the answer can be found in Marx's hundred-year-old writings, or in Lenin's of forty years ago. These are used to provide not answers, but the trappings of legitimacy. For the first time, Moscow's right to interpret the sacred texts has been seriously challenged. (Yugoslavia's revolt was met by expulsion from the hosts of the faithful, and the Polish and Hungarian challenges were quickly absorbed into orthodox Moscow doctrine.) This is a matter of substance, for acknowledgement of that right implies acknowledgement of the right to formulate policy for the entire bloc.

So long as the theoretical differences were not formulated, an authoritative pronouncement could be avoided; once brought into the open, the issue had to be faced. The Chinese issued their challenge in April 1960 in an article which argued that imperialist policies were bound to lead to war, and that good intentions could not divert the course of history. Only with the disappearance of imperialism could peace be made secure; therefore the revolutionary onslaught on imperialism, rather than compromise with it, was the correct Communist policy. The Soviet line, since the twentieth

C.P.S.U. Congress in February 1956, has been that while impe
ism is by its very nature aggressive, the forces working for peac
now so strong that war is not inevitable.

In the six months before the Moscow conference of last Nov
ber, the debate was pursued in the press of both countries and
speeches of their leaders, with no concessions on either side.
attempt to reach agreement, when leading Communists assem
for the Rumanian Communist Party Congress in June, cle
proved fruitless; it was there that the decision was taken to holc
November conference. The Chinese emphasized their positio
failing to send delegates to the Congress of Orientalists in Mos
in August, and two periodicals devoted to Chinese affairs, publi
in Moscow, were discontinued.

Both sides agree in believing that imperialism as such has
changed its character and is declining in relative strength,
whereas Mr Khrushchev and his Government are unwilling to
any major risk to accelerate that decline, Mao Tse-tung seems
pared to use his country's position to promote and encourage '
wars' as a means to that end, arguing that to deny such sup
weakens the morale of the Communist camp and Commu
movement elsewhere.

It would be mistaken to translate these different attitudes intc
simple categories of pacific Russians and belligerent Chinese. '
Russians may be more conscious than the Chinese of the univers
destructive character of nuclear war (which is why they can
rocket threats as an instrument of policy), but this does not n
that Peking would not go to almost any length to avoid a m
conflict. On the question of war and peace, the dispute turns on
limits of brinkmanship, and the extent to which local risks ca
taken without precipitating a major disaster.

It is here that the challenge to Moscow's right to decide theore
questions may have far-reaching consequences for the U.S.S.R
the past, the Soviet Government's actions and proposals in
international field could be taken as representing the policy of
entire bloc; it could proceed without backward glances to
whether its allies were following. This can no longer be taken wh
for granted. The U.S.S.R. is not in a position to use her supe
power to compel agreement (otherwise the dispute would not h
been brought into the open). On the contrary, it is more likely '
concessions would have to be made to Peking to persuade it nc
adopt a possibly disturbing course.

It does not follow that major divergences of policy are to be expected in the near future. To both China and Russia, the advantages of unity are likely to outweigh any gain that independent action could bring to either; sharing a common outlook and common opponents, nothing less than irreconcilable differences on vital questions could justify a serious breach. Clearly there are valid differences of attitude—for example, so long as Moscow seeks a détente with Washington, the Chinese cannot conquer Formosa (for the destruction of the U.S. fleet in those waters would require Soviet aid), and any agreement to stop nuclear tests would—if it could be imposed on China—deprive her of the chance of possessing her own nuclear weapons. Similarly, any comprehensive East–West understanding (unlikely as it may now appear) would make it more difficult for the Communist bloc to support anti-Western movements, and the Chinese believe that only by the extension of such movements can danger from the West be lessened.

Briefly, then, the Soviet position is that military action is to be avoided as a means of expanding the Communist sphere. Imperialism is no less aggressive than before, but the forces against war (including those within the imperialist countries who 'support the peace policy of the socialist camp') are now so strong, and the disaster it would entail so frightening, that it is no longer inevitable. Revolutionary action may at times have to be subordinated to the maintenance of peace. Gains can still be made, and the final battle won, by economic and political warfare, invariably referred to as peaceful co-existence. Intervention must be limited to indirect means—arms deals, rocket threats, economic aid. The Chinese, on the other hand, argue that imperialism cannot act otherwise than according to its nature, even if it were convinced that to embark on aggression would be to invite disaster, and they pour scorn on the 'revisionists' who are intimidated by imperialist blackmail. Fear of 'just wars' is a direct encouragement to imperialism.

Polemics in the press of the two countries did not cease even while the conference was sitting in Moscow. Before it opened, the Chinese took advantage of the publication of a volume of Mao's writings to emphasize in an article in *Red Flag* (2 November 1960) that there could be no peaceful transition to socialism, and that it was a mistake to over-estimate the enemy's strength. While the conference was in session, a further article (*People's Daily*, 21 November) explained that there was no contradiction between the revolutionary struggle and the struggle for peace—on the contrary, it was only by

the success of the former that the latter could be made secure. The celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of Tolstoy's death, during which the Soviet press underlined his humanitarianism and devotion to peace, was taken by the Chinese as an occasion to point out his avoidance of the mass revolutionary struggle, and they smugly and triumphantly cited Lenin in support of this view. 'Bourgeois humanitarianism' always served as a means to divert the masses from struggle. The humanitarian pacifists of today were in favour of co-operation with American imperialism, which was 'the most diabolical enemy of the peoples of the world'.

The statement issued by the conference and published in *Pravda* on 6 December 1960 is diffuse and inconclusive. The length of the conference indicates the depth of the differences, and the length of the statement their intractability. It is aggressive in tone, with many references to the evil intentions of the United States and the Federal German Republic, none to the United Nations, and only a casual commendation of the desirability of negotiations; it is extremely hostile to Yugoslavia and does its best to provoke and exacerbate feelings of hatred, fear, and resentment. These features may be regarded as concessions to the Chinese point of view. The section on war and peace, however, unambiguously endorses the view formulated by Mr Khrushchev in 1959 that war is not 'fatally inevitable' 'even with capitalism still existing in parts of the world'. But to balance this, theoretical possibility of war is granted: 'as long as imperialism exists there will be soil for wars of aggression', its twin aspects being the 'exploitation of man by man' and 'the extermination of man by man'. Had they been able to have their way, the imperialists would already have plunged mankind into the abyss of a third world war, but the time was now past when they could decide at will whether or not there should be war.

Nuclear war is described as a catastrophe for the whole of humanity, and not merely for its capitalist section. Local wars, however, come into a different category; here the statement implies that Communist intervention need not lead to world conflict 'Experience shows that it is possible to combat effectively the local wars started by the imperialists'—and in this context Algeria, Laos, and the Congo are mentioned.

To answer the charge that Soviet policy implies abandonment of the revolutionary struggle, the meaning of the term peaceful coexistence is elaborated. It 'does not imply renunciation of the class struggle', it is itself 'a form of class struggle'. It provides 'favourable

ıpportunities for the development of the class struggle in the apıtalist countries' and for the anti-imperialist struggle in deıendent countries. It implies 'intensification of the struggle' of all Communist Parties. The prosecution of this struggle will bring ictory to the Communist camp because 'peace is a loyal ally of ocialism' and 'the monopoly bourgeoisie cannot rescue capitalism', vhich is disintegrating and decaying. This process is most marked in he United States, 'the biggest international exploiter'.

It is only in the section on the colonial world that a new concept merges, that of the 'national democratic state' or 'independent ıational democracy', which indirectly bears on the issue between Moscow and Peking. Differences of opinion among Communists ıbout the role of the national bourgeoisie in colonial revolutions go back at least to the second congress of the Communist International n 1920, when Lenin put forward his 'theses on the colonial question', and they became acute in the early stages of the Chinese Communist movement. The four years of Communist collaboration with he national bourgeoisie—as represented by Chiang Kai-shek and he Kuomintang—ended in a disastrous defeat for the Chinese C.P. (from which it took many years to recover) when Chiang turned against his Communist allies and did his best to annihilate them. It was also a defeat for Stalin, who had imposed the policy, and in part explains the hostility and suspicion in the official Soviet attitude so long as Stalin was alive towards countries such as India, in which the national bourgeoisie had led the independence movement to victory. The Chinese leader still appears to share this attitude to some degree, if less openly and less crudely, and it is not unreasonable to assume that he resents the political support and economic aid given to countries where (even if they have triumphed in the anti-imperialist struggle) 'courageous sons and daughters of the working class' are 'languishing behind prison bars'—a category which, in the statement, includes the U.A.R. and Iraq as well as the United States; the aid might otherwise go to more deserving countries.

Obviously, Guinea and Cuba cannot be put in the same category as Iraq and the U.A.R., though all fall within the anti-imperialist camp. Nor can they qualify as 'people's democracies' with avowed Communist Governments and goals. (In any case, this label is apparently to be confined, at least for the time being, to countries contiguous with the Soviet Union or China, and which therefore have a special status as falling within the strategic sphere of the

Communist Powers.) The new term of 'national democratic state' intended to mark these distinctions, and may well indicate, addition, the line which Communists will advocate for other cou tries about to reach independence in Africa, or which may ove throw their present regimes elsewhere.

An 'independent national democracy' is 'a State which co sistently upholds its political and economic independence, figh against imperialism and its military blocs, against military bases c its territory; a State which fights against the new forms of colonia ism and the penetration of imperialist capital... The formation ar consolidation of national democracies enables the countries co cerned to make rapid social progress and play an active part in tl people's struggle for peace, against the aggressive policies of tl imperialist camp, for the complete abolition of colonial oppressior

In countries still under colonial rule independence can be wc 'both through armed struggle and by non-military methods, de pending on the specific conditions', but the colonial Powers 'nev bestow freedom' and 'never leave of their own free will'—formul which incline towards the Chinese side of the argument, and link u with the discussion on the possibility of containing local wars an with the definition of the role of the national bourgeoisie.

Whether the colonial struggle takes a military or non-militai form, the national bourgeoisie is not to be trusted. It is 'objective interested in the accomplishment of the principal tasks of ant imperialist, anti-feudal revolution, and therefore can participate i the struggle against imperialism and feudalism. In that sense it progressive. But it is unstable; though progressive, it is inclined t compromise with imperialism and feudalism... As social contradic tions grow the national bourgeoisie inclines more and more t compromising with domestic reaction and imperialism.'

The sections of the statement elaborating the tasks of Communi Parties in the different categories of countries follow in general th lines accepted since 1956—the Communist Parties must work for united front of 'all democratic and patriotic' forces against U S imperialism and its allies in order to safeguard peace; if the clas struggle is pursued energetically inside and outside Parliamen force may not be required to win State power and so 'create th necessary conditions for the peaceful realization of the sociali revolution' (but 'the ruling classes never relinquish power volur tarily'). In ex-colonial countries Communists must work for th 'expulsion of foreign monopolies' and to promote 'economic an

cultural co-operation with the socialist and other friendly countries'.

The statement concludes with a tribute to Communist unity. 'It is the supreme internationalist duty of every Marxist–Leninist party to work continuously for greater unity in the world Communist movement.' It must be cherished 'as the apple of their eye' since it guarantees the progress of the Communist cause. 'The success of the working-class cause in any country is unthinkable without the internationalist solidarity of all Marxist–Leninist parties. Every party is responsible to the working class, to the working people of its country, to the international working class and Communist movement as a whole.' Unity can be endangered by the revisionists, who forsake Marxism–Leninism, and by the dogmatists, who rob revolutionary parties of the ability to develop Marxism–Leninism and apply it creatively. This condemnation of dogmatism (i.e. of the Chinese position) is reinforced by an implied rebuke to Peking for publicizing the dispute. 'Whenever a Party wants to clear up questions relating to the activities of another fraternal Party, its leadership approaches the leadership of the Party concerned, and if necessary they hold meetings and consultations.'

If the question of the Soviet Union's right to speak on behalf of the entire bloc is left open, its special position is acknowledged. The eighty-one parties declared unanimously 'that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been, and remains, the universally recognized vanguard of the world Communist movement, being the most experienced and steeled contingent. . . The experience which the C.P.S.U. has gained . . . is of fundamental significance for the whole of the world Communist movement.' Previous declarations have always referred to the U.S.S.R. as the 'leader' of the camp.

The statement looks forward to further meetings 'whenever necessary to discuss urgent problems . . . work out common views through consultations and co-ordinate joint actions in the struggle for common goals.' It seems likely that a further meeting will have to be held fairly soon, for the Chinese press, since the publication of the statement, has already shown that the unanimity emphasized in the Moscow statement may conceal persisting differences. On 16 December *Red Flag* warned its readers that United States talk about peace was a ruse intended to deceive the peoples; Chinese intervention in the Korean war had been undertaken to realize peace, which could be safeguarded only by active struggle against imperialism. The Chinese, like all Communist Parties, abided by the principles of peaceful co-existence, but these were obstructed by

aggressive American imperialism; therefore every struggle of the anti-imperialist forces merited Communist support. Faith in the policy of peaceful co-existence was founded on the triumphant progress of anti-imperialist struggles; and whereas Peking radio accused the U.S. administration of aggressive designs on Africa *Pravda* pointed out that the majority of new African States had won independence without armed struggle. It may be that the Chinese look for support, and for eventual leadership in the Communist bloc to their colleagues in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—to the coloured people and the have-nots as opposed to the industrialized whites.

In the early days of the Communist International its leaders looked forward to the day when International Communist congresses could be held in another capital than Moscow. It will be interesting to see whether the next such conference is held in Peking.

J. D.

Persia Today

THE economic development upon which Persia has embarked in the last twelve years or so presupposes policy-makers, administrators, a labour force, technicians, research, and the accumulation of reliable technical data on which to base decisions. Research in some fields has been and is going on; administrators and technicians are being trained but their numbers are relatively small. The great variety of physical conditions in Persia has imposed on the population certain habits of life and makes administration both costly and difficult. She has a long tradition of civilization and has, over the years, developed certain traits which were, perhaps, a condition of her survival, but which are a hindrance to the adoption of a modern Western system of economy. Many of the problems she faces are not peculiar to her but are faced by other countries undergoing rapid transition; but they are in some cases made more difficult by certain local features

Great Power rivalry in Persia throughout the nineteenth century set the pattern of political development and has since limited freedom of political experiment. When Persia joined the Baghdad Pact

in 1955 she in fact allied herself to the West, which implied in some measure the abandonment of her traditional policy which was to play off one Power against another. It might have been argued that this decision would act as a stimulus and free Persia from political indecision. In fact that has not been the case; and there are still many who query the wisdom of this step. The co-operation between the member States of CENTO over the years has built up a certain community of interest, but the old cleavage between those who look to Russia and those who look to the West continues. Moreover, and what is more serious, since it has been 'official' policy to align Persia with the Western Powers, the dissatisfied tend to look to the U S S R. Similarly, the temptation to those in power to brand all movements of opposition as Communist and, therefore, to be suppressed out of hand is strong.

This is not to deny the dilemma: it is all too easy for any discontented groups to be used, wittingly or unwittingly, by Communism, but it is doubtful whether it is wise on this account to withhold from the people a responsible share in the government of the country. Since the collapse of the separatist movements in Azarbaijan and Kurdistan in 1946 Persia has been intermittently attacked by the Soviet press and radio. Throughout most of 1959 and 1960 these attacks were severe. Moscow broadcasts by their violence to some extent defeated their own ends and roused national pride, but the self-styled National Radio, believed to be situated in the Caucasus, by its ventilation of local grievances obtained a sympathetic hearing in many quarters. Soviet propaganda accused the Persian ruling classes of complicity with U.S. and Western imperialist circles and of allowing Persia to become a potential jumping-off ground for an attack on the U.S.S R. The CENTO air exercise over Persia in May 1960 was the occasion for a Soviet protest in which attention was drawn to Article 5 of the Persian–Soviet Treaty of 1921 (which, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs had told the Senate on 4 March 1959, the Persian Government considered to be abrogated). In August 1960, however, there was a slackening of tension with the U.S.S.R. The Shah, meanwhile, assured Mr Khrushchev that Persia would not permit her soil to be used as a base for attack against the U.S S.R.; and in due course he received a personal message from Mr Khrushchev on the resumption of friendly relations between the two countries, which Persian public opinion somewhat obscurely considered to be connected with the U.S. presidential elections.

Persian economy since the fall of Musaddiq has been sustained by U.S. aid This, together with Persia's political alignment with the West, since it has coincided with the development of various stresses and strains in society which have obscured the benefits of the rise in the standard of living, has not been wholeheartedly welcomed. In fact, there has been a growing sensitivity and opposition to the weighty American presence in Persia and in 1960 a desire in some circles for 'neutralism', notwithstanding the cut-back in the size of U.S. missions and the planned phase-out in the field of technical assistance. Against this background the possibilities of political experiment are clearly limited and it is perhaps not altogether surprising that Persia has been unable to shake off the incubus of the past and sees in the most trivial events, let alone more important happenings, the nefarious hand of foreigners. The abortive elections held in 1960 bear witness to her political immaturity; and the fiasco of the two political parties, which were to be in the literal sense of the word His Majesty's Government and Opposition respectively, shows how ill-prepared the country was for responsible government and how, once again, the Persian ruling classes thought that the political advances of Western Europe could be achieved by the adoption of outward forms alone. Under Reza Shah the public was denied a responsible share in the administration of the country Today, in practice, it is still denied an effective voice in the conduct of affairs.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The economic development of the last ten years has been striking in some fields. This, too, has taken place on a modern Western pattern which conflicts with the traditional patterns of society, and has resulted in a disequilibrium which has widened existing cleavages. Enormous sums, provided in part from oil revenues and in part by loans, have been spent on capital development by the Seven-Year Plan Organization, the full results of which are not yet clearly apparent. The Second Seven-Year Plan comes to an end in 1962 and is to be succeeded by a third Plan of five years' duration. The financing of this capital development has placed a certain strain on Persian economy and administration notwithstanding the very considerable oil revenues which Persia now receives (over £100 million in 1960) and the large sums of U.S. aid of various kinds (over $500 million since 1952). Persia's foreign exchange position by 1960 had become critical; Government debt to the National Bank is high, and

inflationary trends are more marked. Moreover, only 55 per cent of the oil revenues was devoted in 1960 to the Plan Organization although the Second Seven-Year Plan Law of 1956 laid down that it should receive 75 or 80 per cent.

In July 1960 the Shah was warned by officials in Washington that there would be no more U.S. loans for Persia unless she adopted a stabilization programme acceptable to the International Monetary Fund. In due course it was agreed that there should be a reduction of 7·5 per cent in the Central Government's spending budget, a reduction in the import of luxury goods, and a curtailment in the expansion of banking credit; a retirement of some of the Government debt; and the end of the practice of permitting importers to postpone the payment of custom duties. There are signs that the seriousness of the financial situation and lack of balance in Persia's economy have given rise to concern in Persian circles also. Doubts as to the advisability of concentration on industrial development are being more widely voiced The textile factories are finding it difficult to compete with imported cloth without protection; the effects of the short-sighted policy of the boom years, when no reserve funds were built up or replacements of machinery made, are being felt On the other hand industrial development has on the whole been beneficial. It has raised the standard of living and of technical competence; and by providing, even on a small scale, an alternative means of livelihood it has in some areas forced up agricultural wages. It is significant that in areas where industry directly connected with agriculture has been developed the standard of living of the peasantry has improved, notably in districts where sugar-beet factories have been set up. An interesting experiment, on a small scale, has been the establishment, with the help of U.S. technical assistance under Point IV, of profit-sharing factories owned and run by the workers concerned. Such factories, were their number to increase, might be a valuable training-ground for greater participation in the affairs of the country.

The new Five-Year Plan due to begin in 1962 is to concentrate on the raising of agricultural output with the intention, presumably, of redressing the excessive concentration on industry and urban development which has taken place under the first and second Seven-Year Plans. It is estimated that, whereas between 1933 and 1946 there was no great change in the area under cultivation, between 1946 and 1957 there was a considerable extension and a 100 per cent increase in production. According to estimates, in 1946 there

were 1,954,725 ha. under wheat production and 1,925,209 tons wheat produced: the figures for 1957 are 3,477,010 ha. and 3,615,0 tons respectively. Similar increases are estimated for barley a rice. While accepting these figures with reserve—statistics in Pers are notoriously unreliable and figures relating to the land and i produce and livestock are often little more than guesswork—ne dams, barrages, and the sinking of deep and semi-deep wells ha led to a striking increase in cultivation in a number of areas; a large tracts have been brought into cultivation by mechaniz farming, though in the case of the dry farming areas in Khuzist this has been a somewhat uncertain venture and there were wid spread crop failures in 1960 because of insufficient rainfall. Neve theless, in spite of the increase in the area cultivated the estimat short-fall in wheat in 1960 was around 300,000 tons.

The 1956 census showed the population at nearly 19 million, figure generally admitted to be on the low side. It is estimated th the population is increasing at the rate of 2½ per cent per annu Even assuming, on a conservative estimate, an increase of 5 milli over the next ten years, a rise of 1 million tons in wheat producti alone will be needed to feed the increased population. The extent which Persia is already importing foodstuffs is giving rise to anxie in some quarters and turning attention to the problem of increasi agricultural output—hence, perhaps, the declared intention to co centrate on this in the next Plan.

Towards the end of the reign of Reza Shah, with the growth industry, the implementation of a policy of centralization, and t decline in the political and social status of the landowner, there b gan a movement from the country to the towns and from the pr vincial towns to the capital. This trend has since been aggravat by various factors, notably the exodus from Azarbaijan, which b gan in 1942 because of its proximity to the Soviet frontier, and t increased centralization of the distribution of credit and mercha dise in Teheran. So far as the peasant is concerned, the drift to t towns and, in the south, to the oil-producing areas of Khuzist and the Persian Gulf is mainly because of the promise of high wages, and because in some areas, notably those bordering on t Central Desert, agriculture does not offer, in present circumstance an adequate living. In the case of the landowner the prospect relatively large and quick profits to be made in the towns, t attraction of Government service, and the promise it offers security and status are powerful inducements. Apart from this t

anonymity of the large town offers greater security and personal freedom both to the peasant, especially now that the landowner no longer exercises his former function of 'protection', and to the landowner, who is less subject to pressure from Government officials in the town than in the country.

LAND REFORM

Some would see the malaise in the countryside to be the outcome of the relations between landlord and peasant. Few would deny that these are bad, though whether they are the real or only cause of the unsatisfactory state of affairs may be doubted. Reza Shah shortly before the war considered the possibility of modifying the existing relations between landlord and peasant, but was dissuaded from action because of the uncertainty of the international situation. Since then the pattern of economy of the country has changed, and it is questionable whether a reform in land tenure, long overdue though it may be, can by itself remedy the evils of the existing situation.

Land no longer offers the most profitable field of investment or gives unquestioned social and political status. The Shah, meanwhile, has initiated a programme for the sale, on an instalment basis, to the peasants of the royal estates; and *pari passu* with this a tendency has developed to treat the landlord as a scapegoat. He was, indeed, often to blame and the land system profoundly unsatisfactory, but what had often been justifiable criticism had, by 1959 and 1960, been replaced by a campaign of vilification of the landlord, partly, perhaps, with the deliberate intention of destroying what political influence he still retained. This culminated in an ill-conceived, loosely drafted, complicated Bill for the limitation of land holdings tabled in the National Assembly on 6 December 1959. The immediate effect of this campaign was to increase the prevailing insecurity and uncertainty and to discourage the development of land. Moreover, the nature of the agitation against the landowning class meant that the Government concentrated on the negative aspect of the question, namely the limitation of the size of holdings (a complicated matter in a country where no cadastral survey or experienced land settlement department exists), rather than on positive steps to increase production (which is fundamental to a raising of the standard of living of the peasantry) The law as eventually passed lays down, among other things, that regulations governing the relationship of landlord and peasant are to be drawn up within

six months of its having become law (which period has already elapsed without the appearance of such regulations), pending which the *status quo* is to be preserved. Thus, in the absence of new regulations, the law could, in fact, block attempts to create more favourable conditions for the peasants. Ayatullah Burujirdi, the outstanding *mujtahid* of the day, declared in January 1960 that the Bill was contrary to the *shari'a* and the Constitution and called upon the Government to abandon it. Despite this, the Bill eventually became law in an amended form on 25 May 1960. The general opinion, nevertheless, appears to be that it is unlikely to be carried into effect.

The opposition of the religious classes was probably due not only, or even mainly, to obscurantism and reaction but rather to an instinctive feeling that the whittling away in one field by the temporal Government (which during the occultation of the hidden Imam is in the eyes of the orthodox 'unrighteous') of personal rights guaranteed by the divine law and the Constitution is likely to weaken the position all along the line. The tendency of the religious classes is to acquiesce in the exercise of arbitrary power by the temporal Government; very occasionally they are provoked to make a fleeting protest

This attempt at land reform is, indeed, a sorry example of an insufficiently thought-out policy, undertaken partly, perhaps, because of a desire to conform with the prevailing climate of world opinion, reminiscent in some ways of the tribal policy of Reza Shah. Few would deny that land reform is desirable; that the land in parts of Persia is not fully utilized; that relations between landlord and peasant are bad; that the landlord takes too much from the land and puts too little back; and that the methods of subsistence farming are not likely to result in the increased production which the growth in population demands. But it is questionable whether the land law as it exists and the campaign which preceded it will materially better the existing situation; further, even if, in fact, the law remains a dead letter, the majority of landlords are unlikely to put more back into the land, while a failure to implement it may well encourage the more intransigent landlords to delay even longer in granting concessions to the peasants; and the acerbation of feelings aroused by the agitation and ill-informed criticism of the landowning class which accompanied the drafting of the law, although the agitation has for the moment died down, is unlikely to contribute to mutual understanding.

IMPROVEMENT IN RURAL CONDITIONS

Conditions in the countryside are nevertheless undergoing ıange—though the nature and rate of this vary considerably. 'here has been a marked improvement in the last few years in :onomic conditions in many of the villages near the big towns and ıain roads. Communications are better; the peasantry are more ıobile; standards of living have risen (so also has the cost of living). lechanization has raised the output in some areas; it has also rought the intrusion of the wage system into the traditional village ructure, since the labour concerned tends to be paid by a cash wage ıd not a share of the crop. What the ultimate effect of this will be ıs too early to say, but so far as mechanization increases output ıd raises the standard of living, it is clearly desirable. Better housıg, better clothing, and better equipment are also gradually spreadıg to the countryside; the village shop is better stocked; schools e more numerous, though still far below the demand; health contions are better; malaria has largely been eradicated. These ırious advances are less marked in the remote areas; poverty is the t of the majority of peasants and indebtedness is still widespread 'en in the relatively more prosperous districts. There is a great ›ntrast, for example, between the villages near Ispahan and those Rudasht nearer the Gavkhaneh where the Zayandeh Rud peters ıt and physical conditions are less favourable; and between the llages in east Persia along the edge of the central desert and ıose where wells have been sunk and water made available for rigation.

Perhaps the most striking change in conditions in the whole of :rsia has taken place in the Turkomansaray, where there has been a emendous increase in grain and cotton cultivation during the last n years or so. In 1950, 70 tons of cotton were harvested; in 1960 ›me 60,000 tons. Grain cultivation in the area, except along the ıse of the mountains, is almost entirely by tractors, of which there e some 3,000 to 4,000, and harvesting is by combines, of which ıere are some 1,000. There is in the Turkomansaray an interesting vision of labour: grain cultivation is carried on by the Turkoans; but cotton cultivation is for the most part carried on under op-sharing agreements by Zabulis and Sistanis, some 100,000 of hom have migrated into the Turkomansaray. Formerly the area as mainly crown land (*khāliseh*); it was acquired by Reza Shah and assed after the abdication to the present Shah. Most of the villages ave since been sold, or are in the process of being sold, partly in

large holdings and partly in peasant holdings of 10–20 ha., the pa
ment in the latter case being made in instalments. The livi
afforded by such a holding compares very favourably with the livi
from a similar holding on the plateau. Nevertheless, there is
general tendency for small holdings to disappear as agricultu
units, their owners preferring (or being forced) to lease them
neighbouring landlords. In earlier times the small landowner w
often forced to place his holding under the 'protection' of the neig
bouring large landowner and in due course might lose his title to
modern conditions have changed but the need for protection st
not infrequently forces the small landowner to lease his holding
his more powerful neighbour.

Various schemes are in operation, initiated under Point IV,
train village leaders and some of these schemes have now been tak
over by the Persian Government; but progress is slow. One of t
most promising developments in recent years is the agricultural c
operative movement run by the Agricultural Bank. Here, too, t
training of sufficient personnel is inevitably a slow procedure. T
work, if it is to be successful, demands a high sense of vocatio
Moreover, the education of the peasant, who is for the most pa
ignorant and sceptical of the benefits of agricultural co-operative
so that he may be able to run them is also uphill work, particular
since the local money-lenders seek to prevent his enlightenmer
Nevertheless, there are several instances of co-operatives (mair
credit co-operatives) which have achieved notable success T
value of the movement in improving the economic lot of the peasa
and in giving him training in co-operation and fostering his sense
independence could be enormous.

But much remains to be done if production is to be increased ar
the peasant assured of a tolerable livelihood. Better roads and tran
port facilities are essential; marketing methods and standardizati
must be improved; and if mechanization is to proceed better faci
ties for repair than exist at present must be provided, a somewh
complicated matter in a country as large and sparsely populated
Persia. More research, too, is needed on such things as seed ir
provement, plant protection, pest control, and soil utilizatio
Moreover, unless better health and education services are provide
and a sense of community fostered to take the place of the old villag
structure, the drift to the towns will continue and probably in
crease.

Agriculture, however, is not the only aspect of the countrysi

requiring attention. Livestock rearing could also make an important contribution to higher standards of living. In many parts of Persia the peasant is largely dependent for his livelihood on the keeping of flocks, and a large number of the population depend entirely on their flocks Traditionally there has been a long-standing opposition between the settled and semi-settled population, and Governments have usually favoured the former at the expense of the latter. The two have never been properly integrated and the neglect of the stock-rearing section of the population has often been deliberate. A raising of the general standard of flocks so that they could yield more wool, milk, meat, and draft animals requires better feeding, the control of animal pests and diseases, and the selection and improvement of breeds Here, too, improved communications and marketing methods are a *sine qua non* of improvement. An extension of the co-operative movement to the stock-rearing population would also seem a desirable step.

SOCIAL CHANGES

Economic and social changes of considerable magnitude are thus going on in town and country and have produced a situation of instability. The village, the town, the quarter, the craft, the tribe no longer provide the security and sense of community which they formerly offered; though the social disintegration of the last-named group, in spite of a more rapid economic and political decline, has proceeded more slowly. The towns have become more heterogeneous; middlemen more numerous; and speculation, especially in land and real property, more reckless. The gulf between town and country has widened. This can be seen in the apparent neglect of the remoter areas of the countryside and the semi-settled groups, the contempt with which the townsman regards the countryman, the scorn with which the northern part of Teheran looks upon the southern, and the mockery, envy, and hatred with which the inhabitants of the southern part of the town often look upon those who live in the northern districts. The concentration of labour round the bigger industrial centres and the growth of an urban proletariat is a new factor and, to the traditional leaders of Persian society, an alarming, because uncertain, factor. The recent, or relatively recent, revival of activity by the craft guilds in Teheran is perhaps an effort by the old system to reassert itself.

The growth of the Westernized class in recent years has been considerable; and the gulf in ideals between them and the rest, particu-

larly in the case of the middle classes where the uprooting from o
environment to another has been, perhaps, more abrupt, is strikir
The traditional patterns of family, social, political, and religious li
no longer satisfy. Unrest affects both sexes. Economic necessity ai
the desire for independence are forcing more women into emplo
ment; conditions in the towns militate against, if they do not ma
virtually impossible, the old patriarchal family life; but there is litt
preparation for any other type of life, and no other basis to repla
the solidity and support formerly offered by the family has be
evolved. The demand for education far outstrips the Governmen
ability to provide schools, though these tend to increase, if they
not actually create, a lack of understanding between the generatior
The people of the outlying villages and the tribal groups ardent
desire the new learning which they see as a passport to wealth ai
security; and the Government's (understandable) failure to provi
them with sufficient schools heightens their sense of being neglect
(as indeed they are). The demand for university education has lik
wise increased; in an attempt to satisfy this, partly by the foundatic
of new universities and the enlargement of existing ones, there h
been an unfortunate lowering of standards. On the other hand tho
who have been trained abroad often find on their return that th
are unable to apply in the Persian environment the new techniqu
they have learnt. But the misunderstanding is not confined to oi
side; the traditional leaders of society are reluctant to accept the ne
techniques and those who practise them unless they compromi
with their environment. Those who are unwilling to do this ter
to feel there is a 'conspiracy' against them and take refuge either
flight or in nationalism; and it is a nationalism which almost in
evitably, since it is rootless and in part a reaction against their tr
ditional leaders, tends paradoxically to look to the supra-nationa
ism of Communism.

Persia, however much she may wish to avoid it, is still caught u
in the mesh of Great Power rivalries. The cold war affects h
politically, economically, and socially. Politically her freedom
experiment has been limited. Economically her development h
been stimulated; the flow of capital into Persia has created ne
opportunities and new problems. Socially the breakdown of tl
traditional structure has been hastened. It is in Persia's own inte
ests and those of the free world that she should succeed in develop
ing an integrated economy in which agriculture, stock-raising, an
industry contribute to a rise in the standard of living of all sectior

of the population, and in integrating the various groups of society so that they can develop their several skills within a political framework which permits them to exercise freely their civic purposes.

A. K. S. LAMBTON

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Notes of the Month

The Lavon Affair

THE 'Lavon affair' which has plunged Israel into prolonged political crisis, culminating in Premier Ben-Gurion's resignation at the end of January, arose ostensibly from disputes over the responsibility for a rather Ambleresque six-year-old spy scandal. But its real motive force is a struggle for power inside the ruling Israel Workers' Party (*Mapai*), occasioned by resistance to the seventy-four-year-old Premier's efforts to secure the succession of his own nominee and to introduce substantial changes in the country's social and economic structure before he eventually relinquishes power.

The 'affair' itself first broke in 1954, when the Israeli authorities were in near-panic over the implications of British evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone and *rapprochement* between Nasser and the West. Egyptian Jews who turned out to be members of an Israeli intelligence network were caught by the police planting—or planning to plant—incendiary bombs in cinemas, public buildings, and U.S. information offices in Egypt, with the apparent aim of creating an atmosphere of unrest and impairing Egypt's relations with the West. Two members of the ring were executed, others received heavy prison sentences, and their Israeli organizer committed suicide in prison.

These disclosures created considerable indignation inside the Israeli 'establishment' and demands were made that the guilty parties be ousted from public life. The Sharett Government's handling of the whole affair, however, was extremely desultory. The Cabinet itself failed to deal with the matter, and Mr Moshe Sharett, the then Prime Minister, privately set up an investigating committee consisting of a high court judge and a former Chief of Staff with no constitutional *locus standi*, clearly defined powers, or *modus operandi*.

The committee reached no final conclusions as to who was responsible for initiating the affair. The Director of Military Intelligence claimed to have been acting under orders from Pinhas

Lavon, at that time Minister of Defence, who denied having giv the orders, and privately complained that Shimon Peress, Directo General of his Ministry, had deliberately caused him to be 'frame in order to force him to resign. He also complained that Mr Be Gurion—who had retired to Sde-Boker a year earlier when he fou himself in a minority over defence and foreign policy—had co tinued to run the defence establishment over the head of t Minister, in concert with Peress and General Dayyan, then Ch of Staff.

Though these complaints and charges were well known in i formed circles they were never published. The upshot was th Lavon resigned after the Premier refused to dismiss either Dayya Peress, or the Director of Military Intelligence. A few months la Mr Ben-Gurion took over the defence Ministry; Lavon w appointed Secretary-General of the Histadruth—after refusi Mr Ben-Gurion's offer of another Cabinet post; Dayyan and Pere remained where they were, and subsequently became Minister Agriculture and Deputy Minister of Defence respectively, t Director of Military Intelligence was soon 'rotated' to oth appointments, commanding a Brigade at Sinai, and later dispatch as military attaché to a Western capital. The 'affair' seemed to ha been forgotten.

During the last year, however, relations between Mr Ben-Guri and his entourage, on the one hand, and Lavon, on the other har had grown strained. Mr Ben-Gurion had made it clear that lacked confidence in the capacity of his party's old guard to lead t country, and was busily forming a cadre of younger men, led General Dayyan (regarded as the heir-apparent) and Peress I was also endeavouring to reduce the economic and political pow enjoyed by the Histadruth and to strengthen the State apparat These plans were resented by the majority of the old guard, a actively resisted by a group whose leadership gravitated into Lavo hands

In April 1960 Lavon told the Premier that he had informati proving that the Director of Military Intelligence had deliberat falsified documents to prove that he, Lavon, had ordered the i fated operation of 1954. The Prime Minister ordered an inquiry September Lavon demanded his complete 'rehabilitation' by t Prime Minister without further inquiries, and hinted that Pere and possibly Dayyan, should be held guilty for the injustice done him. He linked his complaints with attacks on what he consider

1e 'dictatorial' attitude of Mr Ben-Gurion and over-concentration f power in the hands of his youth cadre in defiance of demo-·atic principles and party procedure.

At first, Lavon's complaints brought him wide sympathy among 1e public at large, his own party, and the opposition parties. Later 1e majority of his own party turned against him, when it became pparent that he had deliberately sought a test of strength with their ·ader in a way which was bound to be detrimental to the party as a 'hole.

In December, a Cabinet committee, which had examined the question without calling witnesses and without much regard for he rules of evidence or customary procedure, announced that it iad found Lavon to be innocent, that the Director of Military intelligence had forged the evidence (on the basis of an alleged statement by his former secretary which she subsequently re-racted), and that no further inquiry was needed. A majority of the Cabinet accepted these findings.

Mr Ben-Gurion then announced that he found the report un-acceptable, particularly in view of the injustice it did to the ex-Director of Military Intelligence, and that nothing less than a full udicial inquiry could elicit the truth. He announced that he would be forced to resign if his wishes were not complied with, and he also stated that he could not continue to head the Government while Lavon continued in power as Secretary-General of the Histadruth. On 31 January he finally submitted his resignation. At a meeting of he *Mapai* Central Committee a few days later a sixty–forty vote eaffirmed the Party's confidence in Mr Ben-Gurion and called on Lavon to resign from the Histadruth because of the harm he had lone to the party. (Mr Sharett spoke and voted against the resolu-ion, together with Mrs Golda Meir.)

The President has since called on Mr Ben-Gurion to form a new Government, and he is finding some difficulty in doing so, since both the left-wing minority parties, which have solidly supported Lavon, and the liberal-*étatiste* Progressive Party, whose Cabinet epresentative, the Minister of Justice, has been the most active on Lavon's behalf, refuse to serve under him.

At the time of writing, a Cabinet composed of *Mapai* and the clericalist parties is being mooted. But whatever the immediate outcome, the struggle inside the Israel Workers' Party and Labour movement is further from solution than ever, and is likely to dominate Israeli political life for some time to come.

'Afrique d'expression française'

SEVEN years ago about half the continent of Africa was, in (way or another, under French control. What remains, at the ginning of 1961, of *'Afrique d'expression française'*? The protect ates over Morocco and Tunisia were terminated in 1956; Gui voted herself out of the French Community in 1958; the Tr Territories of (French) Cameroun and (French) Togoland w granted independence early in 1960; and twelve other sta formerly French colonies, achieved independence in some kinc association with the Community during the same year. When 1(opened, Algeria was juridically a part of the French Republic; (small territory, French Somaliland, remained in colonial status, a France retained direct control over the Saharan region, a v quadrilateral of almost uninhabited territory, rich in oil a minerals, which is administered by the *Organisation Commune Régions Sahariennes* (O.C.R.S.) with which adjacent territories the Community are associated.

By the *loi cadre* of 1956, the French colonies were empowerec revise their own Constitutions. Twelve African colonies establisl themselves as republics within the Community during 1958 They fall into three groups: (i) Madagascar; (ii) territories f merly administered through the colonial organization of *Afri Equatoriale Française* (A.E.F.); and (iii) territories formerly ministered through *Afrique Occidentale Française* (A.O.] Throughout the rapid changes of the last three years all these Sta have retained the French language, republican Constitutions (French type, a *cadre* of French officials, French military bas membership of the Franc Zone, and association with the Europ Economic Union (E.E.C.). They have been, on the whole, tranc and orderly, and the transfer of power has been as successful as t in Ghana or Nigeria. Political leadership has been stable, thou most of these States, like Ghana, have moved towards popu dictatorship. But the withering away of A.E.F. and A.O.F. meant the fragmentation of French Africa into small and w units and, in A.O.F., has led to some dangerous developments

Mauritania, unlike the others which are secular States, is Islamic Republic poised between the Arab world and Black Afri she has two languages, French and Arabic. Morocco claims sov eignty over her territory and declines to recognize her natio status. The application of Mauritania for membership of United Nations was vetoed by the U.S.S.R. and Poland in

Security Council on 3 December 1960. She has agreed to co-operate with France (under the pre-independence accord of 19 October 1960), but her relation with the Community is not yet negotiated. Economic development depends on the support of the French mining group, *Mines de Fer de Mauritania* (Miferma), which has engaged some British capital and has borrowed $66 million from the World Bank.

Madagascar, largely a Christian State, recognizes the existence of God in its Constitution; it has two languages, French and Malagasy. Madagascar is a full member of the Community.

The four States of A.E.F., French Congo (or Congo-Brazzaville), Tchad, *République Centrafricaine* (formerly Oubangui-Chari), and Gabon, enjoyed an uneventful transfer of power. They have retained full membership of the Community and have formed a customs union. It includes a systematic plan for assimilating their institutions and might lead to closer association. An organization known as the *Agence Transéquatoriale de Communications* (ATEC) has been created to manage their river, rail, and harbour facilities through the river-ports of Bangui and Brazzaville and the seaport of Pointe Noire. Gabon, a very small State with its own resources and harbours, sits rather loosely to this union. By contrast the adjoining State of Cameroun, the ex-Trust Territory, is in disorder.

The disintegration of the Community in 1960 can be attributed to the rivalry between M Senghor (Senegal) and M. Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast), two highly educated French Africans well known in French public life. M. Senghor consistently worked for a very loose Community 'like the Commonwealth', in which the territories should federate into their natural groups, each with independence and U.N. membership; M Houphouet-Boigny was for a single federation including France and all her ex-colonies. In December 1959 General de Gaulle accepted M. Senghor's proposition that there could be independence within the Community. During the spring of 1960 M. Senghor obtained independence for the Mali Federation, which consisted only of Senegal and (French) Soudan since the other states of A.O.F. had been dissuaded from joining by M. Houphouet-Boigny. In June 1960 the French Constitution was altered to allow the states to become independent and to negotiate '*accords*' with France '*au sein de la Communauté*'. Mali, Madagascar, and the A.E.F states took advantage of this offer, and became independent on their own terms. M. Houphouet-Boigny reluctantly accepted the inevitable and the four states which

followed his lead (Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Haut Volta, Niger) declared their independence. The paradox of the situation is they have not yet (February 1961) negotiated their '*accords*' v the Community though they opposed its fragmentation. These f states have formed a customs union and an alliance known as Entente. Togoland is negotiating to join this group by a cust union with Dahomey.

Meanwhile the Mali Federation (Senegal and Soudan) broke in August 1960 owing to rivalries between the leaders, M. Seng and M. Keita. Senegal remains within the Community. Sou (which has adopted the name of Mali), cut off from its natural ou to the sea at Dakar, has turned southwards (though there is through railway in this direction), and is negotiating to unite v Guinea and Ghana. This now seems to mean secession from Community and a problem for the Commonwealth.

The new African States have few diplomatic representat abroad and conduct negotiations either in the lobbies of the Un Nations or at international conferences. The United Kingdom, U.S.A., and Western Germany are fully represented by amb sadors accredited to States or groups of States. Communist Ch has five embassies in ex-French Africa, the U.S.S.R. two (Togol and Guinea). Israel and—surprisingly—Viet Nam have four ea

During December 1960, a new grouping of the ex-French St became apparent. The heads of State of the twelve (excluc Guinea and Mali), together with M. Kasavubu from the Co met at Brazzaville for private discussions. In their communi they declared their support for Mauritania at the U.N., for Gen de Gaulle's policy of self-determination in Algeria, for excluc the cold war from Africa, and for solving the Congo problem b conference between the Congolese political parties. A few days l the heads of State of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali (Soudan) me Conakry and announced their intention to unite. From 4 t January 1961 the three took part in an African Conference Casablanca with representatives of Morocco, Libya, the U.A Ceylon, and the Stanleyville 'pro-Lumumba' Government. T declared their support for Morocco in Mauritania, for Lumur in the Congo, and for the 'Algerian provisional government', denounced the French for holding atomic tests in the Sahara.

Portugal: A Determined Empire

THE drama of the *Santa Maria* incident may seem to have disintegrated into something very near to farce. But one of Captain Galvão's objectives has certainly been achieved. The Salazar regime has received the sort of publicity which for years it has succeeded in avoiding. Captain Galvão's gesture has also captivated public opinion and sympathies in Latin America, particularly in Brazil. The new Janio Quadros administration in Brazil, in granting asylum to Captain Galvão and his group of 'Iberian Liberators', may also be providing a rallying point for the anti-Salazar movement and perhaps even for the anti-Franco forces, although this is less likely. The riots which have broken out in the Portuguese West African possession of Angola spell trouble of a very different and far more dangerous sort.

The nature of the dangers that not only the Salazar regime but also the Portuguese in Portugal and in Africa face may never be borne in on the casual visitor. But for an inquiring traveller, to revisit Portugal after a prolonged absence and to live again for a time among Portuguese is an experience which tugs at one's emotions in a number of ways. A first reaction is one almost of shock; shock that the economic and social changes which have been sweeping the world in the past decade seem to have made so little impression here. Undeniably, the Salazar regime, after thirty years of unswerving dedication to two rigid precepts—a belief that politics are not a pursuit for ordinary people, and a thrift and caution as regards finances which would do credit to a French peasant housewife—has created a country which would seem to be singularly fortunate. Portugal's financial status abroad is impeccable, and political peace seems to have become so deep-rooted that, unlike Spain, the prospect of an upheaval, a strike, or even an open labour dispute appears to be something that simply could not happen here. This quiet, forgotten corner of Europe where the cost of living is still one of the lowest on the Continent, with its kindly climate and towns and villages as tidy and scrubbed as Portugal's budget, is the sort of place which retired senior civil servants and elderly seekers of cheap gracious living dream about. Portugal is a very pleasant dream, for some people at least, and one feels an uncomfortable sense of guilt, almost like that of an intruder into some hill-top retreat, in suggesting that the dream may not last much longer.

Portugal today, despite almost three decades of political d
plıne and austerıty, is still one of the most backward countrıe
Western Europe, where a lower-paıd worker even ın the towns
have to work ten hours a day, sometimes seven days a week an
more than one job, to sustaın hıs family. A sickness in his housel
can dısrupt hıs economy, and few working-class Portuguese
afford to gıve theır chıldren anything more than the four yeaı
educatıon—three and a half hours a day—provıded by the S
from the age of seven. It was only last year that this provision
extended to gırls. It seems a cruel fate for a people with a spleı
past, whose forefathers over four centuries ago opened up the tı
routes of the world.

An ınquiring vısıtor to Portugal may arrıve with some clear
questıons and leave with a jumble of answers. An elderly Po
guese gentleman argued with me gently on what he described,
as a Portuguese way of lıfe, but as a way of thought. 'You musı
member,' he told me, 'the pretensions of our people have alv
been very low indeed. They enjoy hard work, they even enjoy t
poverty for it gives them a sense of spırıtual cleanlıness.' A
whom I had known for many years summed up wıth equal sıncε
another facet of the outlook of one class of Portuguese, that
preoccupied cosseted minorıty, when she told me fervently: 'Tł
God I live ın a country where a man can go to gaol for strikıng.'

The Salazar regime has not put the clock back but ın many v
it has managed to keep the hands from movıng, and a good n
foreıgn visitors are ınclıned to feel that ıt is not a bad thıng. I
there are none of the outward manifestations of irresponsibılıt
the masses, no cripplıng strıkes, no polıtical agitation to discred
embarrass the Government or the country. As one Portugı
official assured me, 'It ıs not because Portugal is a dictatorshıp;
form of government ıs a system of directıon and of containıng
kind of excess and ensurıng that as a country we live withın
means—the responsıbılity for seeing that these prıncıples are
rıed out is, as it has to be in any well-ordered society, in the hanc
those capable of exercising authority. But,' he added, 'in Portı
such people are in a minority.'

That has always been the creed of the Salazar regime; ε
economic influence ıs exercised by the few. Portugal is a countı
monopolies, and a handful of families and their relations coı
almost every worth-whıle undertaking, including those in her o
seas territories. At first sight it would seem that, with few exı

tions, the Portuguese have come to accept this creed, either because, looking back at the decades of political and economic turmoil which preceded Dr Salazar, they feel it is the best form of government for them; or because, for those with wealth and status, it is the guarantee of their position; or simply because for the great majority of Portuguese there is very little they can do to bring about any other way of life.

For thirty years the Salazar regime has been virtually unchallenged. The complex machinery it has created to ensure the observance of its principles has seen to that. Portugal has been described as a police State on the Spanish and Italian Fascist patterns. But this charge today is not strictly true, although the Portuguese authorities do not hesitate to resort to what in most Western countries would be bluntly termed violence if they feel it is necessary. The evidence of this is the deep respect which ordinary Portuguese have for the security police, the highly efficient P.I.D E. (*Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estato*). The tales one hears of police brutality and the whispered accounts of disappearances of political 'suspects' and of persons who have been left crippled or have died as a result of police interrogation are perhaps exaggerated too. Yet the instinctive uneasiness that a group of Portuguese sitting peacefully in a café will show when a member of the P.I.D.E. walks in is not pleasant to watch

This security machinery has a number of seemingly insignificant yet highly effective cogs; the *bufo* or police informer, for instance, who can earn a few hundred *escudos* for 'snitching' on a neighbour. Such information, however improbable, is sometimes followed up, and even if the person thus reported gets nothing more than a shock and a couple of hours at the local *esquadra*, it ensures that he, and others, will keep an even closer watch on his tongue and feelings. It is argued that the *bufo* system could be abolished entirely, that the simple fear that it might still exist is enough Press and radio censorship, on the other hand, is one of the more tangible evidences of the machine. Some Portuguese maintain that it is not aimed at suppressing facts but at preventing sensationalism or distortion of events. Yet these same Portuguese will tell you almost sadly that this kind of censorship does not really work any more. Any Portuguese who wishes can have a medium-wave wireless set and 'listen to the truth from abroad'. This argument has been put forward by a section of the Portuguese press as a justification for the abolition of censorship.

Incredible as it might seem in the twentieth century, the coı tioning of Portuguese mentality has been such that, were it noı developments outside Portugal now, a regime such as Dr Sal. has created might continue for another thirty years or even lon The danger is that the élite are inclined to take for granted the « old docility of the hardworking underpaid masses. The deve! ment which threatens the tidy Portuguese social and econo edifice is African nationalism. Portugal is the last empire in strict sense of the word. She is a small country not much bi than Scotland, with a population of less than 10 million and sentially agricultural, yet with the tremendous responsibility administering directly overseas territories which spread from I and China to vast areas in East and West Africa. Although tw tieth-century changes are sweeping Africa, Portugal conti determinedly to administer her African territories by ninetee century methods. But the Portuguese maintain that they have colonies; that Goa, Macau, Angola, and Mozambique are provi and after almost 500 years of occupation are as much a par Portugal as the Minho or the Algarve. The rumbles of Afr nationalism, which are beginning to be heard in Portuguese Af too, are not called nationalism by the Portuguese but 'for aggression'. Most Portuguese were outraged by criticisms in United Nations of their policies in Africa, and the decision cal on Portugal to provide information on her African territories described by Lisbon as 'interference in Portuguese dom affairs'. It is not merely the Portuguese Government or the élite seem to feel that the wind of change in Africa could not blow in their own part of the continent—in Angola and Mozambique instance, which are being surrounded by new independent Afr States. Ordinary Portuguese, even those who are extremely cri of the Salazar regime which denies them a great many personal f doms, tend to avoid even discussing the theory that the Portug Africans might have a right to such freedoms too.

It is understandable that the Portuguese should recoil at thought of losing Angola or Mozambique as they lost Brazil s 140 years ago. The empire, even though the word is no longer ı officially, is the monument to remind the Portuguese and the w of Portugal's splendid past. Economically, too, the loss of these ritories, or even an all-out campaign to defend them, could s disaster. In one respect the Portuguese are quite right when t claim that their position in Africa is unique. They were among

first Europeans to arrive and their colonizing methods have a stamp of their own. In Angola, an African and a Portuguese settler may queue up for and travel in the same bus. There is intermarriage, although the Portuguese policy now is to encourage a greater flow of Portuguese families to the overseas territories to build up the white population, which is very much in a minority: in Angola, for instance, it is probably less than 200,000, compared with a native population of around 4½ million. The Portuguese also claim that, unlike other colonial Powers, their policy has been to assimilate the native population to the status of full Portuguese citizenship. But, to become assimilated, the African faces some stiff conditions. He must abandon his normal way of life, be literate; and live and, in effect, think like a Portuguese. The fact that for the African educational facilities are almost non-existent makes his hopes of assimilation somewhat theoretical. It is estimated that in all the Portuguese African territories, with a total population of around 11 million, less than 1 per cent of Africans enjoy the status of *assimilado*. The rest are regarded, however paternally, as merely units of labour.

It would seem inevitable that such a state of affairs in Angola and Mozambique will become a challenge to African nationalists elsewhere; that is what Portuguese African nationalist leaders hope for, and most of them today are operating from nearby territories such as the Congo, Ghana, and Guinea, for they realize that the 'security machinery' which works so well in Portugal is even more effective in Africa and without outside help these liberation movements will never achieve their aims. The question is, where will this help come from? The great majority of Portuguese Africans, denied education or any sort of political preparation, are amongst the most naive of Africans, and this immaturity is reflected by some of their leaders. But there is unrest too among the Portuguese settlers, largely because they resent direction of their efforts and earnings by Lisbon, which they regard as exploitation. Much the same sort of feelings brought about Brazil's breakaway from Portugal.

It is true that in recent years the Portuguese have embarked on development plans in Portuguese Africa; but, just like the Portuguese in Portugal, the settlers complain that the Salazar regime is still too deeply addicted to out-of-date financial thinking and should do very much more in the way of economic development, and not merely for the benefit of economic oligarchies. A Portuguese business man in Lisbon comparing Brazil's development with that of Portugal reached this conclusion: 'Brazil, as a result of spending

rivers of money, may be regarded by foreign economists as mad
unpredictable; but look what Brazil has achieved. We Portugu
may have a wonderful reputation with foreign banks but what h
we got to show for it?... See how most of our people have to exis
pander to Dr Salazar's tidy economic theories.' That is just the
of talk which alarms Dr Salazar, for it is a challenge to his m
sacred principle of all: that Portugal must live within her me
even if as a result of this policy the great majority of Portuguese h
to put up with conditions of life which people in new, un
developed countries—such as Brazil, for instance, her for
colony—will no longer tolerate.

The Salazar regime today is facing two challenges The real
is the upheaval in Africa. The other, and so far a less dangerous c
is the discontent in Portugal herself, for a great many Portugu
looking around at the surge of progress in the world, feel that t
have been left by the wayside Dr Salazar, who will be seventy-
in April, has shown himself to be completely competent in cop
with any disagreement at home. His greatest asset, according
those closest to him, is a supreme confidence that he knows wha
best for his people It is a confidence that presumably still prom
him to outlaw politics even as a subject of conversation abov
whisper, and the Portuguese, even some who support him,
wryly aware of the fact that their 'leader' does not really trust th
After the 1958 Presidential election, when the opposition candid
General Delgado, became something of a David, a symbol of p
test, and polled an officially admitted 23·5 per cent of the vote
remarkable achievement, in all the circumstances—Dr Sala
simply decided never to go to the country again. In future, it
decreed, the President—the theoretical Head of State—would
be directly elected by the people but by the virtually hand-pic
Assembly. Despite this outburst of protest in 1958 the policy of
regime was hardened, not relaxed; many of the more vocal su
porters of General Delgado were gaoled or sought exile. Most
them found themselves charged with being Communists, and t
charge is still the biggest risk any Portuguese runs who attempts
speak his mind.

For thirty years this process of imposing principles, which
been backed by the élite, the Church, and the bulk of the Army,
created a political vacuum. Opposition to the regime is by no me
dead. Last year some 140 people were charged with acts of su
version and, according to some Portuguese who claim to have k

a record, today there are anything up to 3,000 political offenders who are either in gaol or in penal settlements overseas. But the opposition, apart from a small Communist movement, but which some Portuguese claim is growing, is disorganized and divided thanks to the suppression out of hand of even quite constructive criticism. It has no real leaders in the sense of men known to the people. Furthermore, most of the known opposition figures, old guard monarchists and republicans, are old men; the active younger ones are simply branded and silenced as incoherent radicals, or worse. It is understandable that they should be politically immature, for some of them were not yet ten years old when the machine of the Salazar regime first began to grind Dr Salazar, in his caution and apparent fear of what he feels to be his people's lack of sense of responsibility, gives no opportunity for political education and experience even to men who are in sympathy with the basic principles of his regime, if they are not regarded as wholly trustworthy. This political vacuum he has created offsets the great services he has undoubtedly rendered his country in other ways.

Despite the threat of a crisis in Africa and of growing criticism abroad and in Portugal herself, the Salazar regime refuses to compromise. The responsible Portuguese opposition are not asking for change overnight. They are appealing for a restoration of civil liberties, such as freedom of the press and the right to have a voice in the political affairs of the country; in short, a transition to democracy Petitions to this effect, addressed to the Government and signed by a great number of prominent figures in Portuguese life, have been entirely ignored. In February a delegation of the more moderate opposition element was actually received by the Portuguese President, Admiral Thomás, and the event was allowed to be reported in the Portuguese press. But the official attitude to this interview, which was also reflected in the controlled press, was almost derisive.

The tragedy of Portugal is that if the regime continues to refuse to move or think with the times, the result may well be violence, certainly in Portuguese Africa; and all the good that Dr Salazar has done could well be swept away in a wave of bitterness and confusion

ANDREW MARSHALL

President Kennedy Takes Over

EVEN more noticeable than the enthusiasm and ferment evider
Washington since President Kennedy was elected has been
moderation which has characterized everything from the narr
ness of his victory last November to his latest recommendations
action on the economic crises at home and abroad The modera
of the victory is in fact largely responsible for the modera
which has come since, although it is sometimes forgotten that
Kennedy has always been a middle-of-the-road Democrat

His majority was narrow in every way: in popular votes, wher
won less than half of the total, 49·7 per cent to Mr Nixon's 49·6
cent, with reactionary conservative, Prohibitionist, and other ca
dates getting the balance of the 68·5 million ballots cast; in elec
al votes, where in the end, after California and Hawaii had sw
backwards and forwards for days and the Republicans had fin
given up their efforts to prove irregularities in Illinois and Texas
had 303 electoral votes to Mr Nixon's 219; and geographically, si
he triumphed only in the hard cores of Democratic strength, the
cities and industrial areas, where labour, Negro, and Ro
Catholic voters predominate, and the South, controlled by the
actionary wing of his party, which Democratic liberals always h
to be able to do without. In particular, Mr Kennedy lost in the a
cultural Middle West and the booming Far West, the regions wl
his party's influence has been growing fast.

Much of this comparative failure of Mr Kennedy's candic
was due to his religion, these were regions in which his Ro
Catholicism counted heavily against him, although surprising
did not prevent his carrying most of the supposedly big
South. Indeed, one of the most satisfactory sides of his victory
its proof that, contrary to widely held belief, a Roman Cath
could be elected President of the United States. This factor
never be of so much importance in a presidential election aga
and certainly not in 1964 (when Mr Kennedy will presumabl
the Democratic candidate once more) unless events have made
religion an important part of his Administration's record, somet
which he will certainly try to avoid.

But an even more basic factor in Mr Kennedy's inability to sw
a country in which his party has the allegiance of a large majorit
committed voters was the unreadiness of a substantial proportio
the independent voters to believe his argument that the prev

Republican Administration had left America in a dangerous state of complacency and unreadiness to face the challenge of the times either abroad or at home. Mr Kennedy has now to convince his fellow-countrymen that the sacrifices and efforts which he is demanding of them are really needed. That he realizes the importance of this has been shown by his speeches since his election, particularly his inspiring inaugural address, and his efforts to keep the people informed by the televising of his press conferences and by other means. These efforts to increase his public support are important not only to his chances of re-election in 1964, something which he and, even more, his political advisers cannot be expected to forget entirely, but also, and more immediately, to his chances of getting his present programmes through Congress.

This would never have been easy, even if Mr Kennedy had had the big popular majority that normally makes Congress wary of baulking a new President. For when the Democrats control Congress nearly all its key committees are still run by conservatives, men who oppose social legislation and put a balanced Budget and economy in government above all else. This is the result of the seniority system under which the influential chairmen of committees, who largely decide both what legislation shall be considered and what form it shall take, are the men who have had the longest uninterrupted tenure; in the case of the Democrats these are nearly all conservative Southerners.

On top of this Mr Kennedy, unlike most Presidents, ran far behind his party's other candidates in many places last November; for example, he could not have carried Texas without Senator Lyndon Johnson, now his Vice-President, or Illinois without Senator Douglas, and Democratic Senators won in Tennessee and Oregon, states which he lost. Mr Kennedy's Roman Catholicism accounted for much of this unusual lagging on the part of a presidential candidate, but as a result some Senators and Representatives can now claim that they know what the voters want better than he does. Luckily many of these members are more liberal than Mr Kennedy and will not therefore work against his progressive measures as committee chairmen will do.

While in the Senate the final result of the election brought the Democrats a loss of only one seat—in Delaware—and they have a majority of 65 to 35, in the House of Representatives the Republicans had a net gain of some 20 seats, mainly in the Middle West. The Democratic majority is still 262 to 175, but these Republican new-

comers are an addition to the right-wing coalition of reacti
Democrats and conservative Republicans which was successful
in the last Congress in blocking many liberal Bills—minimum
legislation, health insurance for old people, long-term foreig
and so on—of the type which Mr Kennedy has promised t
passed The election has done little, if anything, to weake
similarly powerful coalition in the Senate, and in both House
conservatives have already demonstrated their power in
struggles over procedure and organization which always mar
beginning of a new Congress.

One way of influencing Congress, particularly those wav
whose inclinations are conservative but who are always ready
what their constituents want, is to rally those constituents b
liberal measures, and this the President is trying to do. Anothe
is to mobilize all the various pressures which the Executive,
ticularly at the start of a new Administration, can bring to be
the Legislature. This the President has already done, to wi
fight over the composition of the House Rules Committee, th
actionary group that has recently succeeded in preventing the v
House of Representatives from even debating, let alone appro
many Bills In this fight Mr Kennedy, without any of the
interference in the affairs of the Legislature which is forbidd
the constitutional division of powers, yet backed up effectivel
desperate struggle of his experienced congressional leader
revered Mr Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House. White H
aides reminded Congressmen of the federal jobs and other be
—new post offices, river development projects, and so on—w
might come to districts whose Representatives co-operated wit
President, and some Congressmen received flattering telephone
from members of the Cabinet As a result the House decided
by only five votes, to increase the membership of the Rules C
mittee so that there would be a majority favourable to the Pres
on it—on most matters, at least, although possibly not on ques
affecting the civil rights of Negroes. This means that his Bills,
least the versions of them approved by the committees whicl
directly concerned, will reach a vote on the floor in the Hou
Representatives; but it does not necessarily mean that they w
passed.

The closeness of the vote on the enlargement of the Rules C
mittee underlined the narrowness of the President's majori
the House, a majority which will in any case fluctuate consta

depending on the question under consideration. It was close largely because the Republican leaders refused to follow Mr Rayburn on a matter on which they might have been expected to co-operate, since it was concerned more with how the House does its business than with what business it does. They were thus declaring their intention of blocking and criticizing the new Administration at every turn, to the consternation of the more enlightened Republicans who feel that in the long run a congressional record of obstinate obstruction can do their party nothing but harm.

This battle over the Rules Committee is inevitably the first of many bitter struggles; however loyally Mr Rayburn and Vice-President Johnson, who is still in effect leading the Democrats in the Senate and who is an unrivalled congressional manipulator, may work for the President's programme, some defeats seem inevitable. But at least Mr Kennedy has already proved that he intends to use on its behalf all his experience and skill as a political operator—that he is superbly qualified in this respect became clear in his campaign for the Democratic nomination last year—and all the pressures which a President can apply both directly on Congress and, over its head, on the voters in general. Mr Eisenhower's lack of interest in this essential branch of a President's work had much to do with his ineffectiveness in the White House.

The first showdown is likely to come quickly—over the minimum wage, which Mr Kennedy wants to increase and to apply to more groups of workers, over his scheme for compulsory health insurance for the aged, maybe over the Bills for helping chronically depressed areas or for improving unemployment benefits, perhaps over some other of the liberal but far from extreme measures to which he committed himself before and during his election campaign and which he is genuinely determined to implement. But now most of these measures are advocated as steps towards economic recovery which will increase spending by consumers and ease the lot of the poor and unemployed and are given an appearance of urgency by the current recession. For this reason Congress—or rather a majority of its members—may be induced to accept the proposals, especially since few of them require any new outlays, apart from increased insurance contributions which do not fall on the taxpayer as such.

But substantial opposition from the anti-Government-spending, pro-balanced-Budgets group seems sure to be met by the more drastic pump-priming measures which Mr Kennedy has forecast should the economic situation not improve by the middle of April.

It is presumed that these would include large new programmes for public works and probably also reductions in taxes—although Mr Kennedy himself obviously has his doubts about the latter, recognizing that by the time they take effect the need for anti-recession measures is likely to be over and the need for larger Government revenues to be pressing. Indeed, his economic proposals are remarkable for their calmness, their consideration for congressional susceptibilities, and their obvious reluctance to embark on deficit financing even though unemployment and the fall in industrial output are giving legitimate cause for worry. In fact, the worst of the recession is probably over, although this is not yet apparent in the statistics. The Administration's efforts, which do not require congressional co-operation, to make more money available for house building and to speed up work on Government contracts and on new roads and other local projects may be all that is needed to ensure that the seasonal spring upturn will be strong enough to bring the beginning of a new boom.

But this does not mean that the President's programme for economic recovery will not be needed, for it is only the first part of his longer-term programme for promoting the economic growth which, the Democrats believe, has been lagging ominously while the Republicans have been in power. To ensure that the full industrial, human, and natural resources of the country are used the President insists that all of them must be improved—and the measures designed to do this will also stimulate demand and thus employment. Therefore he wants changes in the tax laws, long advocated by business men, to encourage modernization and technological improvement of industrial plant and equipment, increased Government spending on education, research, and health, and the development of supplies of water and energy. Since Mr Kennedy claims that there would be a surplus in the Budget at present rates of taxation if the economy were operating at its full potential, he does not consider that such spending would be inflationary, particularly since his programme as a whole would, in his view, ensure the maintenance of stable prices.

It would also add to the ability of American products to compete successfully in foreign markets, and increased exports are one of the new President's chief remedies for the present unhealthy state of America's international balance of payments. He believes that the re-establishment of economic progress at home will also re-establish the country's economic strength abroad and so is convinced that the

outflow of American gold, which has admittedly been serious during the last two years, will be stemmed once his domestic programmes take effect and once confidence in the basic solidarity of the American economy has been restored in financial circles—a view which seems to be supported by the favourable foreign reactions to his Administration.

Meanwhile, however, Mr Kennedy is continuing nearly all the emergency measures undertaken by his predecessor—prohibitions on the holding of gold abroad by Americans, encouragement of tourism in the United States, reductions in the amount of goods American tourists may bring back free of duty, 'buying American' with foreign aid dollars, and so on—and has initiated an interesting scheme of his own. Its details are far from clear and the possibility of its success is questioned by many, but the general idea is to steady short-term interest rates in the United States and thus check that flow of capital abroad, initiated in order to take advantage of higher interest rates in other countries, which was responsible for most of the loss of gold in 1960. But as long as the recession lasts at home long-term interest rates must be held down in order that recovery may be stimulated by a plentiful supply of cheap money for investment; one of the Democrats' chief criticisms of the Eisenhower Administration was that it restricted credit unnecessarily, and if Mr Kennedy is not careful he may find certain Congressmen making the same complaint about him. This need for contrary movements in interest rates poses an unusual dilemma for both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board (the central bank) which many experts feel cannot be solved satisfactorily.

As part of the remedy for balance-of-payments difficulties Mr Kennedy is demanding, as did Mr Eisenhower, that other now wealthy countries, especially Germany, should step up their aid to under-developed countries. But Mr Kennedy is also still pressing, as he did before he became President, for America's own foreign aid programme to be put on a comparatively permanent, long-term basis and for American spending on this programme to be increased rather than diminished. Whether Congress will feel generous enough for this in present circumstances is doubtful. Equally, when the question of tariff negotiations comes up, as it must next year, Congress is likely to show a definite trend towards protectionism, particularly if domestic prosperity is not fully restored. There have been fears that Mr Kennedy himself might sympathize with this trend, but all the evidence now points towards a determined effort

by the Administration to obtain greater freedom for trade—pro vided that other countries are prepared on their side to reduc restrictions on imports of American goods.

This effort will be led by Mr Ball, the new Under-Secretary (State for Economic Affairs, an expert on both tariffs and foreign ai(There are signs that he will be backed up by the new Secretary (Commerce, Mr Luther Hodges, even though as a business man froı North Carolina he might be expected to have protectionist sym pathies. Mr Hodges's appointment was certainly a reward for help ing to rally southern Democrats behind Mr Kennedy—but th does not make the appointment a bad one. In paying off his othe political debts, to various groups and various regions, with Cabin offices—Mr Ribicoff of Connecticut to be Secretary of Healtl Education, and Welfare, Mr Udall of Arizona to be Secretary of th Interior, Mr Goldberg of the steel workers' union to be Secretary c Labour, Mr Adlai Stevenson to be Ambassador to the Unite Nations with Cabinet rank—President Kennedy has shown grea skill and judgment in also picking able, dedicated men who can b trusted to put the interests of the whole country before those of th sections which they represent.

There are only two Cabinet members about whose suitabilit for their jobs there is some doubt. Mr Robert Kennedy, the Presi dent's brother, is thought to be too inexperienced for Attorney General, but the President evidently wanted someone he kne well, and knew to be energetic, in the office which will have to dea with some of the most controversial duties of the Administration– the guaranteeing of civil rights for Negroes and the attack on cor ruption in trade unions; and the President must be grateful to M Freeman, the Secretary of Agriculture, for taking on the task (solving a problem which everyone, including Mr Kennedy himsel suspects is insoluble.

The three top posts have gone to outstanding men who, afte much consideration, were the best that Mr Kennedy could find fo the jobs regardless of their political affiliations: the appointment c Mr Dillon, the banker who was the Republicans' Under-Secretar of State, to head the Treasury has much to do with the reassuranc with which the business community has reacted to Mr Kennedy' Administration; so has that of Mr McNamara, the bright hope c the Ford Motor Company and a newcomer to government, to b Secretary of Defence. But both of these, particularly the latter, ar thinkers and administrators first and business men second. M

Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, is a trained and much respected diplomat whose return to the State Department, with a corps of able Ambassadors in all the chief capitals, will revive its effectiveness and the confidence of its staff, both of which had been dissipated during the Dulles regime and its aftermath. Mr Rusk will certainly be no figurehead, even though he intends to practice traditional diplomacy without publicity, but his appointment confirms that President Kennedy plans to keep the formulation of the main lines of foreign policy in his own hands.

While he will certainly consult Mr Rusk constantly, there are those who see difficulties arising from the presence at lower levels of his department, as well as of other departments and within the White House itself, of men who are closer personally and politically to the President, many of whom are also better known to the public than is Mr Rusk: Mr Chester Bowles, the Under-Secretary of State, Mr Mennen Williams, the Assistant Secretary dealing with Africa, Mr McGeorge Bundy and Mr Walter Rostow, the President's special assistants for international affairs, are the outstanding examples of such men but there are many more. But even should their advice run counter to Mr Rusk's this will not necessarily be a disadvantage, since President Kennedy has made it clear that he does not want to be presented with agreed opinions, but with all points of view as a basis for his own decisions. Certainly the points of view with which he will be presented will be thoughtful and well informed, even if maybe rather academic on occasions, for never, not even in the days of the New Deal, has Washington, and particularly the White House, been so full of men of intellectual distinction, all in positions to make themselves heard.

Obviously, with so much advice available it is taking Mr Kennedy time to make up his mind—and he is refusing to be hurried except where there is clearly urgency, as there is on such matters as the economic recession and the situation in Laos and the Congo Such problems as disarmament—and armaments—and how to deal with Mr Khrushchev are being studied in depth before any definite stands are taken. There are signs already that there will be a constructive approach to Latin America, that Africa and Asia hold a more important place in the new Administration's thinking than does Europe—yet the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Berlin are certainly not being ignored—and that there is eventually a possibility of a fresh approach to Communist China, although for domestic political reasons this must still be denied in public.

Whatever comes out of all this in the end, it seems sure to be a series of well-thought-out, imaginative approaches which will be followed up forcefully with full consideration being given to the practical possibilities at home and abroad. While there must of course be failures, both of individuals and of policies, the United States is now being run by a team of efficient, uninhibited, politically alive, intelligent, confident young men who believe in active, not passive, government. At their head is one of themselves who accepts, with full recognition of all it involves, the responsibility for leading not just his own country but the whole world which was bestowed on him by the American people when they chose him as their President.

NANCY BALFOUR

West Germany: A Pre-Election Survey

THIS year the Federal Republic completes its twelfth year of existence, and Dr Adenauer, at eighty-five, completes his third term as Chancellor. The fourth federal election is expected to take place on 17 September, and parties are jockeying hard for position. While the first Bundestag contained ten parties and the second six, only four survived to enter the present legislature: and one of these, the conservative German Party which originated as a predominantly Protestant, Hanoverian force, was elected only by the grace of the C.D.U. The results of previous elections are given below.

RESULTS OF BUNDESTAG ELECTIONS
in percentages of valid votes

	Aug 1949	*Sept* 1953	*Sept* 1957
Christian Democrats (C D U /C S U)	31	45	50
Social Democrats (S P D)	29	29	32
Free Democrats (F D P)	12	10	8
Communists (K P D)	6	2*	—
German Party (D P)	4	3	3
Bavarian Party } 1957 Federalist Union	4	2*	1*
Centre Party } 1957 Federalist Union	3	1	
German Reich Party (D R P)	2	1*	1*
Refugees' Party (G B /B H E)	—	6	5*
Others	9	2*	1*
	100	100†	100†

* Not represented in the Bundestag
† Does not add to 100 because of rounding.

Meanwhile the German Party (D.P.) has disintegrated, leaving the Federal Republic in effect with a tripartite system. In 1957 the liberal and national Free Democrats sought to act as an independent third force capable of allying with the Social Democrats to take over power and force Dr Adenauer's C.D.U. into opposition: instead, the C.D.U. obtained an absolute majority, and the Free Democrats, who had held the Vice-Chancellorship for the first seven years of the new Republic, found themselves out in the cold. Their new leader, Dr Erich Mende, has now put the party into reverse: conceiving of the role of parliamentary opposition as merely that of a 'passenger', he declared in January 1961 that the party must return to the role of 'co-pilot'—and made it clear that, in his view, the present pilot cannot and will not be dropped. So the stage is set—but what will the issues be?

FOREIGN POLICY, DEFENCE, AND EUROPEAN TRADE

Four years ago both the Social and the Free Democrats concentrated their fire on the Chancellor's foreign affairs and defence policy. They posed as the champions of German unity and accused Dr Adenauer of clinging to N.A.T.O. without taking any imaginative initiatives to obtain four-Power agreement on a new status for a reunited Germany. As late as 1959 the S.P.D. put forward a comprehensive 'Plan for Germany' envisaging progressive disengagement and reunification. A conference of the four Powers was to establish a commission on which the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic would both have a consultative voice. Both parts of Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were for a start to be evacuated in stages by all foreign troops, and their own national forces were to have no nuclear weapons. They were to leave the Warsaw Pact and N.A.T.O., and a mutual security system between them was to be guaranteed by both the U.S.A. and the U.S S.R. Until the settlement of the present German question the status of Berlin was to be maintained.

In the resulting atmosphere of *détente*, German reunification was to be attempted in four stages, worked out in detail. In the first, an All-German Conference with an equal number of delegates from each German Government was to deal with domestic problems, comment on all Bills put to either legislature, and set up an All-German Court to watch over the observance of the U.N. Charter of Human Rights; at this stage also an economic *rapprochement* was to begin, with West Germany's abolition of embargoes and quotas on

imports from East Germany, and with the creation of an Investment Fund and a Payments Bank to serve both areas. The second stage was to see the election of an All-German Parliamentary Council, again on a basis of parity between the Federal and the Democratic Republics. This Council would have legislative powers over th domains of transport, posts, and the encouragement of production though if either Government vetoed one of its measures, only a two thirds majority of the Council could override the veto. At this stag East Germany, too, was to abolish her quota restrictions on intra German trade and official exchange rates were to foster economic re integration. In the third stage the Parliamentary Council was t prepare All-German laws, chiefly in the fiscal and social domains and under certain conditions All-German referenda were to be come possible. Thereafter a two-thirds majority of the Council o a two-thirds majority in a referendum could institute the fre election of a National Constituent Assembly to draw up a Con stitution for a reunited Germany.

Fifteen months after launching this plan, immediately after th failure of the Summit conference, the Social Democrats buried i again and called for a common appraisal of the situation and a com mon foreign policy. The Free Democrats, who had put up a simila plan in 1959, did likewise. Dr Adenauer replied in effect that a com mon foreign policy was easy: the Opposition had but to adopt th Government's foreign policy, which had been proved right onc more by Mr Khrushchev's behaviour in Paris. Such a recantatio was too much to demand: the Social Democrats have ever since re iterated that a foreign policy can be framed only from the point a which one finds oneself—but had the S.P.D.'s foreign policy bee adopted twelve, ten, or even five years ago Germany might today b in a happier state. However, when asked in the Bundestag whethe the S.P.D.'s new line meant that the 'Plan for Germany' was now i all its aspects wholly a matter of the past, Herber Wehner, the party' vice-chairman, replied with an emphatic 'Certainly!'. Indeed it i significant of the new tactics of the S.P.D. that in its Hanove Appeal to the electorate the demand for everyone to have his ow car figures well before the call for German reunification.

Kaiser William, in 1914, declared: 'I know no parties any more, can see only Germans.' If the Christian Democrats now charge th S.P.D. with inconsistency, with having in the past pursued illusion the Social Democrats, on the other hand, can now claim the cred for such all-German anti-party sentiments. But the demand for

common foreign policy has other, not altogether equally popular, corollaries. Loyal adherence to N.A.T.O. means willingness to comply with its decisions—and perhaps even some initiatives in developing N.A.T.O. defence. In 1957 the S.P.D. had plastered the walls with its slogans: 'No conscription—so S.P.D.' and 'Atomic armaments beget mass death.' There can be little doubt that it was on a good wicket here: according to opinion polls some four-fifths of the population are frightened of such armaments. But challenged by Dr Adenauer (who has not yet himself declared in favour of atomic warheads for German forces), the S.P.D. party conference at Hanover last November went on record—if reluctantly—as saying only that the Federal Republic 'should not press for' nuclear weapons; as the advocates of this formulation made quite clear, though a functional division of labour within N.A.T.O might be so arranged that German troops need not handle nuclear arms, Germany could neither claim a higher morality than her allies and abstain on moral grounds from her share in the common defence, nor must German troops be left under-equipped as the weak link in the alliance. Herr Willy Brandt even declared *ex gratia* that he would retain conscription. The Chancellor has thus not only removed defence issues from the electoral battle (and thereby neutralized what might once more have been embarrassing slogans) but has also, guarding against the contingency that the S.P.D. might come to power after the election, secured a continuity of policy.[1]

In the heat of the campaign the C.D.U. will no doubt do all it can to open new rifts between the Government and the Opposition over foreign affairs and defence: obviously it will paint the S.P.D. as a recent, and therefore unreliable, convert to the policy which for twelve years it had opposed. If the Communists repeat their performance of 1957 and urge the German working class to vote S.P.D., their Judas' kiss will lend credence to the C.D.U.'s charge. But in any case Herr Ollenhauer's own statements even at the Hanover conference, combined with the applause they received, will make it easy for the Chancellor to accuse the Social Democrats of not knowing their own minds. Certainly there are murmurs within the S.P.D., particularly among the older working-class members and some younger intellectuals, and a small new party of neutralist and pacifist complexion was recently founded to its left. But since no

[1] For a discussion of the psychological significance of the S.P.D.'s new defence policy see 'Will Willy Win', in *Encounter*, March 1960.

party can enter the Bundestag which does not poll 5 per cent
federal votes (or win one constituency outright), this splinter grou
can scarcely hope to make any impression. The Free Democrat
official leader, Dr Mende, has no objection in principle to th
Chancellor's foreign and defence policies, though his party aligne
itself closely with the S.P.D. in these fields at the last electio
Opposition to the Government on these scores is thus confined
extra-parliamentary groups. For twelve years the bitterest issue
foreign and defence policy have now become virtually tripartisa

The one serious foreign policy divergence in Western Germar
today divides not the Government and the Opposition, but ru
right through the Government party and divides the Chancell
from his Deputy: the relative importance to be given to the politic
integration of the Six and to lower tariffs in a wider, more close
integrated Europe and in a more free-trading world. Where I
Adenauer and thus the Foreign Office have, until last summe
placed all the emphasis on merging the Executives of the thr
European Communities and advancing political unification l
direct elections to the European Parliament, Dr Erhard has argue
for liberal trading arrangements that would not force the Feder
Republic to start raising its external tariffs on 1 January 1961 ar
would bring reciprocal tariff concessions between Germany and h
other West European trading partners. Here the Free Democra
took a much clearer line against the Chancellor (and in favour of I
Erhard) than the Social Democrats, though the S.P.D. also fr
quently voices economic and political fears of tying the Feder
Republic too exclusively to President de Gaulle's France. The Fr
Democrats will be searching for issues of a not too fundament
kind in which to prove their distinctness from the C.D.U. witho
barring the way to the coalition for which they hope: here then w
be an ideal line of attack for them which runs parallel with the
opposition to State interference of all kinds, their opposition to th
trust-busting stipulations of the Brussels Commission, and the
championship of Dr Erhard as a liberal economist within the C.D.U

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY

But at home even the Social Democrats will have no strikir
principles left with which to fight the C.D.U. in the economic fiel
Professor Carlo Schmid declared as early as four years ago th
nationalization had merely been one of the 'infant ailments'
'teething troubles' of the party, and the S.P.D.'s economic spoke

man, Dr Heinrich Deist, thought it 'a primitive and antiquated method of public guidance of the economy'. Even then 'a free economic development, free competition, and private property' were inscribed incongruously on the S.P.D.'s red banner. At Hanover one misguided local party sent up a shopping list of industries to nationalize, only to be firmly squashed. The formal renunciation of Marxism and Socialism came at the Bad Godesberg Congress of November 1959, when the party adopted its first Programme of Principles since 1925. Under the slogan 'Competition as much as possible—planning only as much as necessary' the Bad Godesberg Programme 'supports a free market wherever there is real competition' and only advocates public ownership for one reason: 'competition by public enterprises is a decisive tool for preventing private domination of the market'. But: 'every accumulation of economic power, even that in the hand of the State, contains dangers. That is why common ownership must be organized on the principles of self-administration and decentralization.' Even then no proposals for the establishment of public enterprises in any particular sector of the economy have been heard.

On the contrary, it is with the spread of private ownership that both Government and Opposition hope at the moment to attract votes. Equity prices on the German stock exchanges have risen eightfold in the last ten years, and the public is acutely conscious of the advantages of property-owning—indeed many would say over-conscious of material affluence. Just before the election of 1957 Dr Erhard put forward his plan to denationalize the Volkswagen works—a plan which is coming to fruition, if in a somewhat amended form, at the present time. The 'People's Share' in the Volkswagen works is being offered at a discount of up to 20 per cent to the lower-income groups, with an additional 5 per cent discount for parents of more than two children: and every shareholder, regardless of the amount of shares he may eventually hold (for the moment shares are rationed), is to have only one vote. In two other denationalizations, including that of the Preussag steel company, 'People's Shares' were vastly oversubscribed. It is estimated that by the next election the number of shareholders in the Federal Republic will have risen within two years from 500,000 to 2 million—who, quite apart from their families, will make up more than 5 per cent of the electorate.

In this situation the S.P.D. also has come out with its own brand of 'German People's Shares'—offered for sale at a 'social discount',

but constituting not private ownership of undertakings now nation alized but private ownership of shares in a kind of unit trust con sisting of the proceeds of a tax on industrial gains on capital values which is to be paid in shares. But apart from a 'fairer' (no longer even a 'fair') distribution of the national product, and agreement with the Ministry of Economics itself that the Federal Republic's anti cartel legislation is inadequate, there is little that is fundamentally new or of major electoral appeal which the Social Democrats can hurl at the Government. Public opinion polls ever since 1950 show an almost exact correlation between those who feel that they have improved their financial position and those who approve of the Chancellor: both have risen steadily, the latter percentage being always one-half of the former. Since the money income of a typical working family has increased by about 120 per cent over the past ten years while prices have risen only about 20 per cent, economic policy is a trump card in the C.D.U.'s, not the Social Democrats' hand. With over-full employment, almost steady prices, and an 8 per cent rise in the social product during 1960, no one would be surprised if prosperity once more turned out to be decisive for the electoral contest.

Just before the last federal election the Government carried through a major reform of the pensions system, by which pensioners were guaranteed not simply payments rising with the cost of living but also a share in the rising real income of the community as a whole—the so-called 'productivity pension'. As a result pensions rose by about half in 1957, and have increased steadily since, rising once more, by 5·4 per cent, on 1 January 1961. By comparison with their plight until 1957 the old-age pensioners are now well off bu the S.P.D. contends that the contrast between 'the provocatively ostentatious style of living of certain sections and the situation o many old people, who can no longer work' (who receive about £ a week) still remains too blatant, and that, particularly in the fields of old-age pensions, of the health services, of paid holidays, o assistance to large families, and of equality of educational and occupational opportunity, there is still a good deal to be done. In these contentions their fellow party in opposition, the Free Demo crats, can hardly be expected to join them: indeed if they succeed in entering the Government after the election they may well discreetly lobby the other way, convinced as they are that those limits of the Welfare State have been reached where private initiative is under mined by far too pervasive State action—and where the level of

taxation required to finance a Budget, 38 per cent of which is spent on social security, is excessive.

In the C.D.U. itself social policy is one of those subjects on which a whole range of views is held; and this fact, no less than tactical considerations, has lately caused one of those incidents in which the Chancellor's mastery of the Cabinet and the habit of the interest groups to confer with him direct over the heads of departmental ministers were most clearly shown. Herr Theodor Blank, the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, had secured the unanimous consent of the Cabinet to a reform of the health insurance system, which introduced new arrangements between the doctors and the insurance organizations and also the principle of some participation in the costs of illness for those with incomes above £700. Nevertheless, following interventions in the Chancellery from representatives of the medical profession, Blank and the Bundestag (which had by then gone into the committee stage) had to accept the Chancellor's reversal of his Cabinet's decisions. Indeed it now looks as if very little of the original Bill will become law before the election.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

The Basic Law of the Federal Republic, quite apart from being designed in theory only 'to organize public life for a transitional period', left two major gaps to be filled by legislation which has not yet been passed: the regulation of parties, and the definition of emergency powers. Both are obviously delicate subjects. The Federal Minister of the Interior, Dr Gerhard Schroder, made bold attempts during this legislative period to plug these gaps, and Bills were introduced into the Bundestag—but it seems certain now that none of them will become law.

Until 1958 donations to political parties and to political funds distributing money among political parties could be deducted from taxable profits and income. This regulation greatly helped the non-socialist parties in the 1957 election, but the S.P.D. argued that it in effect represented a subsidy for the Government parties from Treasury funds. The Federal Constitutional Court—which has gained in prestige considerably over the past three years through several decisions against the powers that be—in 1958 ruled this system unconstitutional on the ground that it offended against the principles of equality between citizens as to political rights and of equality between parties. But the main bone of contention where the party law is concerned is the publicity which, according to the Basic

Law, must be given to the sources of party funds. For lack of a party law no public accountability is yet required in practice, though it is pretty clear by now where the money of each party comes from and even—in spite of all denials—roughly how much there is of it.

While a party law could be passed by a simple majority in both Houses, a law on emergency powers would constitute a rider to the Basic Law and can therefore be passed only by a two-thirds majority: so that in this legislative period, at any rate, it cannot be passed without some S.P.D. votes Under these circumstances it seems all the more strange that the Opposition was not consulted before the Bill was presented to the legislature early this year. The dilemma of giving the executive the powers to act effectively in time of real need without giving it the means to establish itself as an undemocratic regime was never satisfactorily solved in the Weimar system. Dr Schroder's Bill allows a state of emergency to be declared by a simple Bundestag majority: and for the duration of the emergency the Federal Government can then issue decrees with the force of law in domains appertaining not only to the Federation but also to the component Lander, can limit the human rights guaranteed by the Basic Law, and can order the use of the Bundeswehr in internal conflicts. This both the F.D.P. and the S.P.D. find an unacceptable proposal; they argue that at least a two-thirds majority must be required for the proclamation of an emergency, otherwise any Government could simply with its own party whip take over far-reaching powers whenever it felt that even an internal situation (such as a strike) could best be solved by the use of the armed forces. Both F.D.P. and S.P.D. claim to see in Dr Schroder's Bill yet more evidence of the authoritarian tendencies of the Chancellor and his closest advisers.

They argue that where, in the case of the health service reform, the Chancellor showed disregard of Cabinet and Parliament, and where, in the case of the emergency powers Bill, the Cabinet showed equal disregard of the Opposition and the Länder, so in yet another *cause célèbre* now before the Constitutional Court the Chancellor is riding rough-shod over the Länder and the Upper House representing them—namely in the question of a second television service. At present sound radio is decentralized, eight stations with their own programmes broadcasting under the general supervision of inter-denominational and inter-party radio councils responsible to the Länder; these sound broadcasting stations jointly run the

single television programme. The Federal Government wishes to supplement this programme with a second television service on the model of ITV: a public supervisory authority is to allow commercial firms to broadcast their own programmes, financed by advertising. The authority would see to it that the second programme would convey to German and foreign viewers 'a comprehensive image of Germany'.

A stream of criticism against this proposal came from three sides: the Churches, Catholic as well as Evangelical, who oppose the commercial principle and demand that a part of the licence fees should be available for the second programme in order to reinforce public control; the Opposition, who regard a federal television service as a most powerful additional medium for the Government (on the present French model) to influence public opinion in its favour, and see in the Government's haste a desire not only to claim credit for additional entertainment but also to secure an additional propaganda vehicle before the election; and the Lander, which—some of them partly because they are governed by the S.P.D., but all of them for constitutional reasons—claim that the Basic Law gives no competence to the Federal Government in television, and that therefore this field, like all other cultural matters, falls within their domain.

Unable, therefore, to pass a Bill through the Upper House, the Chancellor cut short the complicated negotiations with the Lander on an agreement between them and the Federation by a *fait accompli* in July he founded a private company, its articles so framed that the Länder could join if they were prepared to do so; but for the moment he himself controls the entire share capital. In reply, four Länder under S P.D. governments appealed to the Constitutional Court. Within the C.D.U it was urged, on the one hand, that (thanks to the victorious allies who set up the radio stations before the founding of the Federal Republic), the radio and hence the first television programme are predominantly controlled by so-called intellectuals of the left, whose monopoly ought to be balanced, while on the other hand it is argued that 'if in the Weimar Republic the radio had been organized as is now planned, it would have been controlled by Herr Hugenberg Today Hugenberg's successors are only waiting for the signal from Bonn to start again.' Whether or not a second programme would begin on 1 January this year was not decided until a fortnight before that date: the Constitutional Court issued an interim injunction in December making any but the first

television programme illegal until it can take a decision on the substance of the constitutional issue.

NAZISM, TREASON, AND CORRUPTION

These constitutional questions do not make thrilling electioneering except as illustrations of 'authoritarian tendencies' on the one side and of 'sterile obstruction' on the other. No doubt other substantial issues will be raised during the campaign or be imported into it. But apart from policy issues, there are of course always the personal ones—some of which may well be presented as revealing attitudes and principles of great importance. In past elections the C.D.U. has sought to associate the S.P.D. in the minds of the voters with Communism in one way or another, and the trial for espionage of an S.P D. deputy, Alfred Frenzel, a member of the Defence Committee of the legislature until his arrest, will provide fuel for these flames, even if the judiciary—precisely in order to avoid the campaign period—is hoping to get the trial over before Easter. The Social Democrats may reply that a C.D.U. deputy also went over to the East during the second legislative period, and that only two years ago a spy ring was uncovered within the C.D U.'s party headquarters. But these will be ineffective rebuttals, particularly as the attack is likely to imply that *émigrés* of all sorts should be treated with suspicion (Herr Willy Brandt was, of course, such an *émigré*—and so was the S P D 's chairman, Herr Ollenhauer, and its vice-chairman, Herr Wehner, who had been a Communist official to boot.)

The Social Democrats may of course give tit for tat by complaining that there are too many ex-Nazis in the Chancellor's entourage, reviving the campaign against the Chancellor's secretary of state, Dr Hans Globke (who wrote the commentary to the Nuremberg laws), and claiming that in a country with any respect for public opinion Dr Theodor Oberländer would have resigned when he had ceased to be above suspicion and not have been allowed against all protests to stay in office for precisely as long as it took him to become entitled to a ministerial pension. The fact that certain doctors implicated in concentration camp experiments have only now been brought to justice, suspicions about former members of People's Courts now active in the judiciary, and the payment of substantial pensions to high-ranking servants of the Hitler regime will no doubt be raised, but one may doubt how much impact they will make on the electorate—either the young, who wish that the divisions of the

_it were forgotten, or the old, who do not necessarily feel comfortble at such reminders of an inglorious epoch through which they hemselves have passed.

The Free Democrats will talk less about ex-Nazism, and for good easons. But they will join the Social Democrats in pointed refernces to the cases of bribery (mainly centred round the firm of Meredes-Benz) which have occupied the Bonn judiciary now for years: he Chancellor's former private secretary, who was exculpated on he ground that his chief 'visibly tolerated' his acceptance of a sucession of loaned sports cars and that these served to advance the ortunes of the C.D.U. and were not put at his disposal *qua* civil ervant; and now the cases of the former secretary of the Bundestag ransport committee and of a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Transport, which remain *sub judice.* The complications involved in hese and one or two other cases will be taken to illustrate once more he power of the pressure groups in a system in which Parliament, arty, and Cabinet are subordinated to the personal authority of the Chancellor, and in which the constitutional lines of communication ecome much less important than devious access to the Chancellor's ntechambers, where effective power is largely concentrated.

THE QUESTION OF LEADERSHIP

No doubt every case of corruption will be exhibited as a case for changing of the guard to relieve those who built up the Federal tate, made its rules, and have administered it themselves ever since. The cry for 'new blood' may also be made quite explicitly into a struggle between generations. Dr Adenauer is eighty-five, Herr Willy Brandt is thirty-eight years his junior, and the C.D.U. has not yet given an answer to the question of the 'succession to the throne'. Dr Adenauer has defied expectations before, so he may well not retire by 1963—but he cannot indefinitely stand out against all previous experience of the normal human life-span. The fiasco of 1959, when he had been induced in a surprise move to stand for President and then reversed his decision eight weeks later, was a blow to his prestige but much more to that of the C.D.U., which tamely came to heel, and to Professor Erhard who breathed fire and fury until his interview with the Chancellor—since when he has been nicknamed the 'rubber lion'. These two leading lights of the C.D.U. break into public disagreement and stage public reconciliations from time to time, though no doubt the imminence of the election will divert their energies against the common opponent. Coming up

behind Dr Erhard are Herr Strauss and Dr Schröder, both recog
nized as energetic and determined, but neither of them trusted i
all quarters, while neither Dr Gerstenmaier nor Dr Krone are ye
out of the running.

In this situation the S.P.D. may well try to represent Herr Will
Brandt, with his firm foreign policy and his moderate views at hom
as the real successor to the Chancellor: and Willy Brandt's popu
larity has surprised even the S.P.D. His young good looks, his well
dressed wife, his considerable adroitness in politics and publi
relations, and his identification with Berlin may appeal to womer
young voters, and some voters in the middle class who could see n
charismatic appeal in Herr Ollenhauer. No doubt a good deal c
mud will be slung, less in public than in the 'whispering campaigns
about his wearing of Norwegian uniform during and after the wa
and his resumption of German citizenship only in 1947—quit
apart from such matters as his illegitimate birth and his divorce i
1944. But such talk will probably serve to rationalize rather than t
motivate voting decisions taken on other grounds. And the reall
telling argument is more likely to be that the personality cult aroun
Brandt is but a smoke-screen for the ex-Communist bogy-mar
Wehner, and that the whole new Social Democratic policy is onl
a 'soft-sell' technique.

What we are witnessing in Western Germany today, then, is th
well-known decline of ideology. The emotional bubble burst i
1945, and prosperity has muffled clashes of principle. Under the cir
cumstances the Social Democrats have modelled their policies, lik
their election techniques, closely on the Democrats of the U.S.A
They seem to gauge the temper of the electorate correctly in the
demand for 'a new political style of honesty, of objectivity, of co
operation, of synthesis'. But their modern generalized policies for a
affluent society, gilded with an application of Madison Avenue tech
niques of persuasion, must both hold their traditional supporter
and win over a considerable bloc of votes in the centre of the politic
spectrum if the party is to hope for more than a grand coalitio
in the autumn; and whether even that will be possible is
different matter.

UWE KITZINGER

Madagascar: New Member of the United Nations

DAGASCAR has recently taken its place among the United ions. Its population is not to be compared with that of some other new members, Nigeria for example, for its 5 million inhabitants are equal, roughly, to only half the population of Tokyo, of greater London, or of New York. But even so, it is far from being one of the smallest member-States.[1] Its significance at the moment, as compared with other parts of French-speaking Africa, lies in the degree of its national self-consciousness, the strength of its administrative system, its growing population, its intention to develop local industry (which will affect exporting countries in Europe and elsewhere), and its eagerness to enter into international affairs.

But the island remains little known to the general public. It is situated at the opposite end of the world from the biggest conference-tables; for sixty years it lay, inevitably half-hidden, within the French Empire. Apart from the latest political developments, perhaps only three times in the last twenty years has the island been reported in the press throughout the world—in 1942, during the British attack on Vichy; in 1947–8, during the 'Malagasy rebellion'; and in 1959 on account of the disasters caused by a succession of cyclones. Many Malagasy, to whom Madagascar seems so familiar and important, have great difficulty in realizing how little the outside world knows of them and their island. Madagascar is, however, a land of absorbing interest to many scientific specialists; and it also holds a very important place in the history of Christian missions.[2]

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In ancient times waves of immigrants came to Madagascar from Indonesia, South-East Asia, Arabia, and possibly from Africa, and the link with the East is obvious in the language. European infiltration into the island from 1500 onwards was largely confined to the coastal regions, but from this time many of the groups of Malagasy peoples began to form into small kingdoms, clans began

[1] See *The World Today*, November 1960, p. 461

[2] For a general account see *Madagascar* (2 vols), Paris, Encyclopédie Maritime et Coloniale, 1947 On missions see *Madagascar on the Move*, by J T. Hardyman (London, Livingstone Press, 1950), and *The Waiting Isle*, by G. E Burton (London, Livingstone Press, 1953), also, for Roman Catholic missions, see *Annales de la Propagation de la Foi* (Lyon), 1957, No. 157, and *Pentecôte sur le Monde* (Paris), special issue of July 1959.

to give way to tribes, and an embryonic sense of nationhood began

The nineteenth century saw a clash between two main forces. On the one hand, the strongest Malagasy group (the Merina around Tananarive) had been welded into a political and military unity, with a self-given mission to make that authority reach to the coast in every direction; thus all Malagasy (even though some, such as the Sakalava, might consider themselves independent, with their own kings) were regarded as being potentially subjects of this unified Malagasy state and therefore without the right to deal directly with any outside political Power. The title of King or Queen 'of Madagascar' was generally recognized from the 1820s onwards. On the other hand, European States, especially Great Britain and France, had an interest in the island, not so much perhaps for its resources as for its strategic position in the struggle for naval, economic, and political supremacy in Europe and the East. Great Britain had no intention of annexing the island and the interest she showed was rather negative—to prevent an undue extension of French influence. But France had already made spasmodic attempts at colonization over a period of 200 years and also recognized the authority of the Malagasy kings not fully subjected to the Merina.

The power of the Merina, however, was growing rapidly and by the end of the century covered a good proportion of the island, though in some parts its writ was only nominal. A basis was laid for general administration, even though in the end it came to be excessively dominated by its chief architect, the Prime Minister Rainilairivony, who was in fact the real ruler, the authority of the three successive Queens whom he married in turn, and in whose name he acted, being apparently slight.[1]

During the nineteenth century the influence of missions was especially great, not only in the formation of churches and the inculcation of new standards, the effects of which can be traced in the laws, but also in the provision of some medical and education services.

Politically, however, disputes arose, which led to a brief war between France and Madagascar in 1882–3, after which France became responsible for Madagascar's external affairs, the island being declared a French Protectorate in 1885. French interests in Madagascar were recognized by Great Britain in the Franco–British treaty of 1890 in exchange for the recognition of British interests in

[1] *Rainilairivony*, by Chapus et Mondain (Paris, Diloutremer, 1953), gives a good idea of the political history of the nineteenth century.

Zanzibar. Further disputes arose and in 1895 a full-scale military xpedition occupied Tananarive. On 6 August 1896 Madagascar was declared a French colony.

The country was governed by 'direct rule' by a Civil Service, with no elected parliamentary authority, so that even the European resients had little chance to express their views, except perhaps hrough contacts in France. But this was a road that was not open o the ordinary Malagasy under the direct supervision of a *chef du anton.* Although at first there had been hints of a different point of iew, gradually a policy of assimilation to European (French) culure and methods was developed. It was not to be expected that the Malagasy, whose cultural background was so different and who had lready known something of self-rule, would accept all this without ome opposition. This found expression, in 1915, in an organization f nationally self-conscious intellectuals known as the V.V.S., which the authorities claimed was planning insurrection; but at the ame time Malagasy soldiers served France loyally in the first World War.

After the last war, despite great economic and social progress in e island, protests against European control became more freuent. Madagascar had been wrested from the control of the Vichy Government in 1942 and this, together with the declaration of the United Nations Charter, had made a great impression on Malagasy aders. There was much political activity during 1946, demands eing made for self-rule in close association with France. In 1947 e 'Malagasy rebellion' broke out. This led to the deaths of about 50 Europeans and of thousands of Malagasy (the majority of whom eem not to have been killed in military operations but to have died om hunger and exposure in the forest). This rising left a legacy f bad feeling between certain Malagasy groups and individuals, which has still not entirely disappeared.

After the French–African Conference held in Brazzaville in 1944 much greater freedom of expression began to be given to the local opulation through certain elected assemblies. This process was ontinued throughout the 'fifties and culminated in the *Loi Cadre.* n 1958 came France's crisis. De Gaulle acted firmly, and the French Community was born. Madagascar opted for independence within hat Community (it was the Malagasy leader, M. Tsiranana, who uggested the name). After further discussions, Madagascar was ble to present itself to the world in June 1960 as an independent tate, the Malagasy Republic (*Repoblika Malagasy* or *République*

Malgache), to which other States were invited to send their ambassadors and to which even the representative of France had to present his credentials.[1]

The three chief architects of the present position held by Madagascar are General de Gaulle; M. Tsiranana, who is popularly called 'the Father of Independence', and M. A. Soucadaux, who began his career in Madagascar with the full authority of *Haut-Commissaire*, but who has been happy to efface himself gradually and is now the representative of the French Republic, formally accredited to and voluntarily accepted by those whom he previously controlled.

The Malagasy are to be congratulated on the calm manner in which over the last few years the transition has been made from the status of 'territory within the French Union' (formerly a 'French colony') to that of an independent State. With the exception of one or two minor incidents, there has been no physical violence leading to death or destruction of property, though there have admittedly been rumours, the truth of which it is difficult to assess, about Malagasy in one particular area disposing of a few of their fellow-Malagasy. Even the excitement of Independence Day and subsequent celebrations did not give rise to excesses (in some places very strict orders were given to prevent any drunkenness in public).

This calm and order may be attributed to various factors. The Malagasy, despite some tribal and social differences, are all recognizably Malagasy, so that the new State is not a political and cultural fiction brought about by the accident of history or through European administrative convenience. There is a large trained Malagasy personnel in general administration, and distinct progress has been made over a number of years in the acquisition of new forms of administrative and legislative authority. And, again, the percentage of foreigners is small, so that the total of their vested interests of every type is not as great as that in such areas as Central Africa or Algeria. In all these matters, Madagascar has been fortunate.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

The chief issue in internal politics today is in connection with the type of 'independence' which Madagascar should have. This issue was prominent in the 'Yes' or 'No' referendum of 1958. The domin-

[1] The course of the negotiations and agreements between France and Madagascar is outlined in *Les accords franco-malgaches*, by G Devernois, in *Chroniques de la Communauté* (Paris), mai 1960, pp. 18–23.

party is the P.S.D. (Social Democrat Party), of which President ·anana is the real head. Their view is that Madagascar should be ndependent State within the French Community, this link en-ng certain reciprocal rights and oblıgations among all member-es. Some of those who voted 'No' (against this policy) in 1958 ' seem to accept the *de facto* situation. The party known as the FM (an abbrevıatıon of Malagasy words referring to a particular gress) contend, on the other hand, that Madagascar should break y from the Community and stand entirely alone. This issue is, ıct, the main one on which party views diverge. In home affairs e ıs no sıgnıficant dıfference between the two parties, whose cıes aım generally at more education, economic progress, and n.

'he Constitution provides for a National Assembly, elected by /ersal suffrage (includıng all French residents), with seats :ated to the dıfferent parties on a complicated mathematical em, and a Senate, composed of members appointed by the 'ernment and of others representıng certain major interests. The ıdent ıs also Prime Minister, but does not in the first instance office ıf hıs Government faıls to wın a vote of confidence. There ten Ministers, all of them Malagasy except two Frenchmen. By a porary delegation of some of the rights of the Assembly, most or decisions durıng 1960 were taken by the Council of Ministers. ngside this legislative authorıty stands the Cıvıl Service, still ely followıng the French pattern. There is a separate judiciary l attention is being given to the development of a new body of agasy law). A Malagasy Army has also been formed. President ranana himself comes from the Tsimıhety area in the north; he formerly a schoolmaster but then entered politics and along ı others represented Madagascar in Paris. He is ın his forties.

'he majority of the population still lead a simple agricultural or oral life, and though Government and church schools are in-sıng in number a large proportion of this class is still illiterate. 're is a small intellectual *élite*, some of whom have had higher catıon in Europe. Tananarive University, founded in November ɔ, promises well, though students at university level are still ıparatively few.

ıs worth mentioning that for the past thirty years or so there has ı a special effort to discover the essence of the 'Malagasy per-ılity' and of 'Malagasy lıfe'. Some of the leaders of this dis-ıon are in contact with the cultural movement centred round

Présence Africaine, two aspects of which may be studied in two valu
able books by Malagasy authors. In *Le Tsiny et le tody dans la pens*
malgache (1957), M. Andriamanjato, a young Protestant minist
and Mayor of Tananarive, draws out the deeper significance of ce
tain Malagasy beliefs connected with blame and retribution. On th
other hand, in *Nationalisme et Problèmes Malgaches* (1959), by M
Jacques Rabemananjara, the leading Malagasy poet and also
prominent political figure, who has been deeply influenced by a lon
residence in France, one sees the possibilities inherent in the inte
action of Malagasy and European culture when they are synthesize
in a sensitive Malagasy mind.[1]

Socially, the Malagasy, as already stated, are homogeneous, i
all Malagasy, and very conscious of it. Nevertheless, close acquair
tance with Malagasy society reveals that there are various differenc
between certain groups which, by the way they may give rise to mis
understanding, jealousy, or 'ganging together', are significant a
present. These differences or prejudices, as between differen
tribes, lie, for example, in some differences of custom or languag
in ancestral disputes reaching far back in the past, or in memori
of oppression or other incidents. There are also differences of soci
class; this is most obvious among the Merina, where the Andriar
or noble class forms a clearly demarcated group; their nobl
Merina status is of no practical consequence to many other tribe
but these latter may still have their own distinctions between soci
classes—for example, the 'royal' class and the rest among th
Sakalava, or the master and the (former) 'worker' classes among th
Betsimisaraka. To say this is not to imply that the Malagasy ar
more divided than other nations. Annoyance is shown with thos
whether foreigners or Malagasy, who, for various reasons, may ove
emphasize these distinctions, and the President pleads for everyor
to be regarded simply as 'Malagasy'. But when the situation is ex
amined from a sociological point of view these matters have to b
mentioned, especially as the course of events at some critic
moments may be largely decided by these otherwise undiscerne
factors.

The Europeans (almost all French) number only a few tens
thousands, largely concentrated in the main centres (Tananariv
Tamatave, Fianarantsoa, Majunga). A few thousand Indians (wha
ever may be their 'legal' nationality, the Malagasy regard them all a
Indians) and Chinese occupy positions of great economic streng

[1] Both books are published by *Présence Africaine* (Paris).

out of proportion to their numbers; this sometimes leads to fears on the part of the Malagasy.

Economically, the island is potentially rich, though much capital development is still needed. The chief food crops for home consumption are rice, maize, manioc, and ground-nuts (and a study is now being made by the F.A.O. of the possibilities of the Madagascar or Bambara bean). The chief exports are coffee, vanilla, quality rice, raffia, meat, and essential oils; mineral exports include graphite, mica, semi-precious stones; there are also workings in radio-active minerals (the largest deposits within the sphere of French influence). The chief imports consist of textiles, transport material, metals, machinery, and oil. France is by far the most important exporter and importer, followed by (in value) the U.S.A.; but trade is carried on with some forty different countries. There is a serious adverse trade balance [1]

In religion about three-fifths of the population still follow the old customs, whose basis may be described as being largely animatism and animism, with much attention paid to the ancestors, destiny, and taboos. The remaining two-fifths (about 2 million) claim to be Christians. The majority of these are divided about equally into Roman Catholic and Protestant. The former, which includes a large European personnel, are especially strong in educational work (in developing countries such as Madagascar the education provided by voluntary agencies—Christian missions and churches—often forms a high proportion of the education available). The recently appointed (Roman Catholic) Archbishop of Tananarive is a Malagasy and there are other Malagasy bishops. The Protestants claim a high proportion, though by no means all, of the dominant Merina group, especially of the intellectual *élite*. The missions are now external agencies offering help, as requested, to autonomous Malagasy church-synods. The Christian position taken by the majority of Madagascar's national and local leaders is significant for the future.

Mention must be made of scientific research. This is directed to the practical problems of agriculture, erosion, pest control, etc. As a result of the initiative of the two French leaders of the Institut de Recherche Scientifique, Madagascar has in the last few years been the meeting-place for a large number of world conferences on geology, meteorology, 'science in the Indian Ocean', and African

[1] See 'Le Commerce extérieur de Madagascar', in *Bulletin de Madagascar* (Tananarive), November 1960, pp 1001–12 Also *Madagascar: Birth of a New Republic* (published by the French Embassy, New York, 1959)

psychology, as well as of others on education and Indian Ocean history.

It is too early to be able to say much of Madagascar in international affairs. Great eagerness has been shown to enter world organizations such as the United Nations, the W.H.O., and Unesco Application to the first-named was made within a few hours of the proclamation of national sovereignty; a permanent representative, who combines the post with that of Ambassador to the U.S.A , has already been installed in the person of M. Louis Rakotomalala, who is accompanied by a Cultural Attaché. Another embassy is about to be opened in London. In Paris, owing to the form of the Community, there is an 'Haut Représentant', M. Rakoto R. Ratsimamanga. Another Malagasy holds a special position on behalf of the Community in Rome.

Malagasy delegations have visited the U.S.A. and Germany (West and East). President Tsiranana has made an official visit, as Head of State, to France and then to many of the other members of the French Community in Africa, as well as to Liberia. Madagascar is an associated territory within the Common Market and receives help from European development funds.

The Government sends representatives to various world conferences on labour, health, scientific research, archives, and other matters. The churches send representatives to conferences on youth and other subjects in Canada, Britain, France, Japan, India, and elsewhere. Views are expressed on, for example, the policy of the South African Government; communications on Algeria are sent by the Government or Youth Councils to the United Nations.

In short, Madagascar is determined to be seen and heard. A very active Information Service (originally formed by the French Administration many years ago) helps considerably to this end by producing material in various languages. This year will see the publication of a Madagascar Year-book in Malagasy, French, English, German, and Spanish.

It would be wrong to assume, however, that all this activity means much to or is even known to everyone in the country. It is the *élite* and those in authority who represent their country before the world, it is their sense of 'mission', their balanced judgment or their prejudices which will lead their people in one direction or another. The viewpoint of this group in Madagascar is well indicated by the West African A. Diop in his preface to a book by a Malagasy leader: 'The under-developed peoples aspire to assume world responsibilities.

ıe number and the hunger and the awakened conscience of the loured peoples are powerful springs of this dynamism which is eady coursing through the body of the human race and causes it expand and to rise to its new stature.'[1]

THE FUTURE—SOME SPECIAL POINTS

On the economic side, the following are some of the factors of the ɛatest ımportance for the future.

There is an increase of population of over 100,000 per annum, equivalent (in a population of some 5 million)[2] to a rate of about 2 per cent. This has two important consequences. The production of food must be increased to provide for a population with a rising proportion of economically non-productive members (with the addition of other non-producers at the other end of the life-scale, due to the effects of growing medical care). Further, heavy capital outlay will be needed to provide welfare services even at the present level; there is already a shortage of funds and personnel for education.

Government expenditure on administration, salaries of Ministers, elected representatives, and others is heavy. A beginning has been made in effecting economy by reducing salaries by 10 per cent. There is a serious adverse balance of trade; the island owes a great deal to help from outside sources; were it not, for example, for France's payment of a high figure above world prices for coffee, ruin would face hundreds of thousands of peasants on the east coast. Large sums for capital outlay are also contributed by France and by sponsors of development projects.

The agricultural economy is too narrowly based. Exports consist largely of coffee (of which there is already a world surplus), vanilla (threatened by cyclones and synthetic brands), and cloves (low production). Thus, especially on the east coast, new crops are being considered, such as oil-bearing palms and tea. In the west, cotton may be extended.

Another weakness lies in the lack of balance between agriculture and industry. Hitherto Madagascar has for the most part exported raw materials and bought back finished products and quality goods. At the moment, the nearest approach to heavy industry is a cement factory; other factories deal with leather,

Nationalisme et Problèmes Malgaches, by Jacques Rabemananjara (Paris, *Pré-'e Africaine*, 1959), p. 11.
1958 census.

manioc, ground-nuts, tinned meat, and paint. The present one-sidedness is likely to be considerably altered by the expansion of local industry (for processing or construction). American experts have already been invited to visit Madagascar and have made suggestions.

(*e*) Foreign investments are obviously closely linked with the stability and continuity of Government policy and authority. Certain French companies, as might be expected, have a considerable stake in the country. An enormous concern which has produced model conditions for its workers is the SOSUMAV sugar-cane plantation and factory. Major companies, still perhaps not quite sure of themselves, have been refusing credit. But conditions are still stable; there is no talk of expropriation, though there are suggestions that a larger proportion of profits should be compulsorily retained within Madagascar.

A second matter of importance is the relationship to the French Community. The dominant P.S.D. party and the newly formed coalition party known as Miara-mirindra (Agree Together) both seem to desire to retain the link. Were some others to gain control, they might perhaps break the link. But at present nothing more definite can be foreseen.

Thirdly, where does Madagascar stand in relation to the East-West division? This is not, of course, simply a matter of 'politics', though that may appear to be the striking edge. It concerns also economic methods and the form of culture in all its aspects (including religion) which may, from the outside, exert a powerful influence on Malagasy life.

In the last few hundred years, it is from the West that the chief influences have come, whether for good or for ill. Education and other social services, and Christianity, have all come from the West (introduced in the first place by the missions). The greater proportion of advanced Malagasy are Christians. There has been no sudden revulsion of feeling against Western culture or help; the Malagasy are in fact glad of much that French civilization and skill has brought them (the issue in relation to France was rather one of 'human dignity', responsibility, and control of affairs). The U.S.A. offers places in universities and elsewhere for young Malagasy; so too does Western Germany, as well as Israel; France has hundreds of Malagasy students.

With the Eastern bloc, on the other hand, links have been and still

slight. A Malagasy's own account of his country's struggle for ;pendence has appeared in Russian, but the translation seems not ıave been authorized by the author.[1] There is a small Malagasy nmunist Party; a number of Malagasy have attended conferences ourses behind the Iron Curtain or in Peking; some of these claim they go to see the world and to hear all points of view. Some of ;e with Communist or near-Communist sympathies form a part he coalition known as the AKFM; because of this association ;e who are most anti-Communist level the charge of 'Com- ıist' against all those linked within that coalition, whatever may heir personal views. Malagasy Roman Catholics are given a lead heir Church's policy. Protestants do not receive the same con- ious or authoritative lead and are largely left to weigh up the ation for themselves, with some help from the religious and ;r points of view of the forceful commentary on affairs pro- 'd by the independent and influential Protestant paper *Fanasina*. ut it is an over-simplification to think that the issue facing the agasy as a people, and not simply as a Government, is just that of ding whether to join the Western or the Eastern camp. They do judge the situation uncritically; for example, the official paper he party in power remarked in a recent editorial that 'inde- dence opens a wide door for other nations. What has been seen ır is the big nations streaming in and opening embassies through- Africa and Madagascar; and they are "tickling" those countries ıat they will follow them and join with them.'[2] Alongside this is reiterated plea that help from outside should be disinterested, ›ly for the benefit of those helped.

here are two other policies open, neither of which is yet fully ıed but which are being discussed. According to the one, lagascar should link up more closely with Africa. The Malagasy ıot usually care to be regarded as 'Africans'; but geographical ‹imity, the existing contacts within the Community and the ter 'sympathy' that they may beget, and the possibility of closer 'peration seem to be turning the eyes of some towards Africa. re is talk of a possible grouping of African States for economic other purposes.[3]

he other proposed policy is for Madagascar to remain as far as

Iadagaskar (Madagascar), by Wilfred Rabemananjara (Moscow, 1956)
·a *République* (Tananarive), 23 December 1960.
'ee reports of the Brazzaville meeting of representatives of French-speaking ·an States, December 1960.

possible outside the disputes of the main Powers and to concentrate rather on forming a 'bridge' between newly awakening Africa and the lands of the East to which the Malagasy are linked by ethnic origin, language, and customs.

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uth Africa's Withdrawal and What it May Mean

E Constitution of South Africa, like that of the other older minions, was embodied in an Act of the United Kingdom Parlia-nt (*The South Africa Act*, 1909; 9 Edw VII, Ch. 9), which has ;e been amended from time to time. The Bill now before the ıth African Parliament for transforming the Union into a Re-›lic on 31 May next is to a great extent a re-enactment of this with a few fundamental alterations. No one questions the com-ence of the South African Parliament to pass this Bill, and when, ts final form, it is presented to the Governor-General he will be stitutionally obliged to give his assent to it, in the Queen's name, the advice of her South African Ministers.

The Bill declares that, from 31 May 1961, South Africa shall be a ublic and that references made in existing laws to the Crown and he King or Queen shall thereafter be construed as references to Republic and to the State President After making provision for election of a President by the two Houses of Parliament in joint sion it repeats the greater part of the Act of 1909 with the neces-y verbal alterations. Some features of the *South Africa Act* which, r fifty years, begin to look a little antiquated are retained as, for mple, the vesting (Clause 112) of the 'control and administra-ı of Bantu Affairs' in the President, powers which were formerly tted to the Governor-General but have long since passed into hands of his constitutional advisers. It may be supposed that se powers may be resumed by an elective President. Little else ears in the Bill on the subject of 'native' affairs and nothing is l about the qualification for citizenship.

n a schedule, a large number of obsolescent statutes are listed for eal in whole or in part, among them the *South Africa Act* itself, epting Clauses 115, 150, 151 and the Schedule to 151, which ıd as still effective. Clause 115 deals with qualifications for legal ctitioners, and need not detain us. Clause 150 authorizes the liament of South Africa to 'admit into the Union the territories ninistered by the British South Africa Company [the two

Rhodesias] on such terms and conditions as to representation and otherwise . . . as are . . . approved by the King, and the provisions of any Order-in-Council'. Clause 151 raises a more complex issue, it enables the King-in-Council to 'transfer to the Union the government of any territories . . . belonging to or under the protection of His Majesty, and inhabited wholly or in part by natives', and it provides in a schedule the terms and conditions on which the 'Governor-General in Council' is to undertake the government of any such territories.

It must be admitted that the progress of events in Southern Rhodesia has been such as to renew the possibility of a movement among some of the European settlers for invoking Clause 150 of the Act and applying for admission to the Union. The procedure envisaged fifty years ago under different circumstances was that the two Houses of the South African Parliament should make addresses to the Crown and that the Crown should effect the transfer by Order in Council 'on such terms and conditions as to representation and otherwise . . . as are expressed in the addresses'. The subsequent legislation establishing self-government in Rhodesia has made this procedure wholly obsolete as far as the British and the Rhodesian Governments are concerned, even though it may be retained in principle as far as the South African Government is concerned.

Much negotiation has taken place during the last fifty years on the question of transferring one or other of the High Commission Territories to the Union in accordance with Clause 151. In 1933 the Dominions Secretary, Mr J. H. Thomas, issued a memorandum giving undertakings which have been many times renewed, notably by Mr Macmillan in the House of Commons on 16 March 1961 [1]

> In considering any suggestion for transfer of any of the South African High Commission Territories to the Union, account must be taken of the following considerations
> (i) pledges given by or on behalf of successive Secretaries of State to (*a*) Parliament, (*b*) the inhabitants of the Territories;
> (ii) the conditions prescribed in the Schedule to the *South Africa Act*,
> (iii) the wishes of the inhabitants.[2]

The Schedule does not name the Territories and it should be noticed that conditions vary greatly between the three. Basutoland, the most difficult to provide for since it is an enclave in South Africa and is economically non-viable, has moved far on the road to self-

[1] H C. Deb., Vol. 636, No. 75, col 1751

[2] See C E Carrington, *Disputes between Members of the Commonwealth* (Chatham House Memorandum), London, Oxford University Press, 1960, p 22

ernment and cannot be controlled autocratically by Order in ıncil For the same reason the form of government suggested in Schedule, an elementary form of indirect rule, is no longer ropriate. To subject Basutoland to the Schedule would be a ograde step.

'he status of South West Afrıca is too complex a question to be quately dıscussed here. Legal opınion in Brıtaın tends to the v that, whatever may have been the status of the terrıtory in inıatıonal law whıle the Unıon was a monarchical State and a nmonwealth member, that status wıll not be altered by the reıon of the monarchy ın South Afrıca nor by wıthdrawal from the nmonwealth. The Republıc of South Afrıca, ın thıs context, wıll he legıtımate successor-State to the Unıon of South Africa, and take over the responsıbilıtıes of the Unıon ın respect of this ıtory. Those who wısh to pursue the matter further may be reed to the decision of the Internatıonal Court delıvered on 11 ' 1950. The judges were unanımous that South West Africa, ıng been a mandated territory under the League of Nations, ht become a trust terrıtory under Chapter XII of the Charter of J. They were, however, dividded on the question whether the ıon was legally oblıged to place the terrıtory under trusteeshıp. ːy agreed further that the Union had not 'the competence, actıng ıe, to modıfy the internatıonal status of the Terrıtory'.[1]

. new legal definitıon of the status of Brıtısh subject or Commonlth citızen (the two terms are saıd to be ınterchangeable in use 1(2) of the Act) was made by the U.K. Parlıament in the *'ısh Nationalıty Act*, 1948 (11 and 12 Geo. VI, Ch. 56). Comıwealth cıtızenshıp, though extended by Brıtısh law to the cıtis of the Commonwealth countrıes named ın the Act (ıncluding th Afrıca), and to the cıtizens of the colonies, ıs effective only ıın the jurısdıctıon of the Unıted Kıngdom. The ındependent nmonwealth countries ınterpret ıt varıously for their own purɛs wıthın their own jurısdıctıons. Under South African law nmonwealth citizens enjoy slightly more favourable treatment ı do alıens ın respect of admıssıon to South African citızenship. en we speak of the privıleges enjoyed by South Africans as nmonwealth citızens we refer, prıncıpally, to a status they may m when outside their own country and in some other Commonlth jurisdiction. In Britain they may enjoy all the privileges of

[1] ɜilbert W F. Dold and C. P. Joubert, *The Unıon of South Afrıca. The 'lopment of ıts Laws and Constıtutıon* (London, Stevens, 1955), pp. 246–7.

other British subjects. In spite of the many specific legal restrictions which have been placed upon non-Europeans in South Africa it does not appear that citizens have been divided into two classes, European and non-European, by any general enactment. In defining the future status of South African citizens when outside South Africa, a new agreement on extradition may prove a thorny problem.

The withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth implies that the U.K. Parliament must legislate to clarify the limits of Commonwealth citizenship in respect of South Africa. When Burma withdrew, the *Burma Independence Act*, 1947 (11 Geo. VI, Ch. 3) specified the classes of persons who ceased to be British subjects but provided (Clause 2 (2)) that persons so excluded might declare their preference to remain British subjects if they were normally resident in Britain or a British administered territory. In the case of Ireland a different procedure was authorized. After declaring in Clause (2) that 'the Republic of Ireland is not a foreign country', the *Ireland Act*, 1949 (12 and 13 Geo. VI, Ch. 41) declared in Clause 5 that British subjects born in Ireland 'should not be deemed to have ceased to be British subjects' unless they were actually domiciled in Ireland. Clause 3 (1a) provided that those sections of the *British Nationality Act*, 1948 relating to Ireland were 'not affected by the fact that the Republic of Ireland is not part of His Majesty's Dominions'. In spite of protests from the Dail against this attempt of the British to legislate for Irishmen after independence, the anomalous status of Irish citizens, as Commonwealth citizens also if they chose to be so reckoned, still survives, as does the Irish enjoyment of the Ottawa preferences. Whether South Africa will receive the treatment accorded to Ireland or that accorded to Burma (who was offered, but rejected, a continuance of the preferences) remains to be seen

The peoples of the High Commission Territories are not British subjects within the terms of the *British Nationality Act*. They are 'British protected persons', which is taken to mean that 'they are not deemed to be aliens for the purpose of orders relating to the restriction of aliens in the United Kingdom.' Citizenship in South West Africa like most other questions of legality in that territory has an uncertain foundation. By the *South African Citizenship Act*, No. 44, 1949, the Union Parliament extended citizenship to the peoples of South West-Africa, who thus, it may be supposed, became Commonwealth citizens and are now to be deprived of that privilege

ı the economic sphere, South Africa's departure from the ımonwealth does not automatically affect Commonwealth erences set up under the Ottawa Agreements of 1932. These are endent on bilateral agreements separately negotiated between s of Commonwealth countries and together they cover roughly ıer cent of South Africa's trade. The U.K. accounts for almost a d of her total trade, and almost four-fifths of her exports to the :. qualify for preferential treatment. These preferences originat- n an agreement signed on 20 August 1932 which has continued ı only slight modifications ever since, the most recent being in ıl 1958.[1] Official statements in the House of Commons on nd 22 March[2] have made it clear that no change is intended from side of the British Government. The only amendment to these ·ements presumably needed is to list South Africa with Burma the Republic of Ireland, rather than under the list of Common- lth countries.

ımilar agreements exist between South Africa and other Com- ıwealth countries but, with the exception of the Central African eration, South Africa is not of great importance as a market to remainder of the Commonwealth. The average margin of erence extended by South Africa to Commonwealth goods is low, and the minimum rates of duty are applied to only a ority of imports, even from the U.K. South Africa's second best omer, after the U.K., is the Central African Federation with ım the most recently renewed bilateral agreement was signed on June 1960. It is to be presumed that members of GATT will pt the precedents followed when Eire and Burma left the ımonwealth and will not challenge the continuance of these erence agreements. But their renewal—and the agreement with Central African Federation is due to expire in 1965—could lead omplications.

ıflationary tendencies and multilateral tariff reductions ne- ated under GATT have gradually over the years reduced the ıe of Commonwealth preferences. Even so, the loss of these ıld hit South Africa in competition with a comparable Com- ıwealth member, such as Australia, in selling such products as t and wine to the U.K. Apart from the listed preferences under 1932 agreement, as subsequently modified, the U.K. informally ıits free of duty other 'non-contractual' products from Common-

[1] See *Board of Trade Journal*, April 1958, p 935
[2] H C. Deb , Vol. 637, No 78, written answers, col. 33, and No 79, col 447.

wealth countries on a unilateral basis; whether South Africa will b
able to continue to receive such favoured treatment is more du
bious. Her privileges under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreemer
are another case in point. As a result of the annual discussions hel
last November, South Africa at present enjoys a quota of 157,50
tons for sugar exports to the U.K. at the special negotiated price (
£45 2s. a ton, as compared with the current world free price (
£26 10s. a ton. In addition to this quota the Union last year ser
10,000 tons of sugar to the U.K. at the world price, but with a pre
ferential duty worth £3 10s. a ton, and almost all the rest of her cro
in 1960 (about 60,000 tons) was also sold within the Commonwealt
These quotas are negotiated by the U.K. Government with th
sugar producers and not with the Governments of the exportin
countries. It is an obvious anomaly that traders of a non-memb
State should be a party to a Commonwealth agreement.

The break from the Commonwealth is bound to have an im
mediate effect on the flow of capital to South Africa. Sixty per cer
of all overseas investment capital in South Africa comes from th
United Kingdom. Dr Verwoerd has hastened to confirm that wit
drawal from the Commonwealth does not necessarily mean wit
drawal from the sterling area, and the free transfer of funds from t
U.K. to South Africa can therefore be presumed to continue Bu
the psychological effect on the capital market, so clearly evince
after Sharpeville, will undoubtedly be as great, if not greater, aft
the break from the Commonwealth. Moreover, free access to th
London capital market has always been regarded as a Commo
wealth rather than a strictly sterling area issue, and in competing fo
overseas capital issues it is likely that the Bank of England ma
weigh Commonwealth membership in the balance. Commerci
banking, insurance, and hire-purchase finance also form an im
portant economic link, particularly between South Africa and th
U.K. The break from the Commonwealth in itself should no
necessarily affect this business.

The status of trustee stocks is another question, and for this th
case of Ireland and Burma provides no precedent. Under the exis
ing Trustee Acts and the new Bill now going through the U.K
Parliament, strict trustee status applies only to the stocks of Com
monwealth members, and future issues by South Africa will no
therefore qualify for such status. The legal position of existin
South African stocks is not clear however.

The question of South African gold sales through the Londo

bullion market is not likely to be affected by the break. Since the re-opening of the market in 1954, South Africa has been free to sell all her gold where she pleases. The London market now takes about 90 per cent of her gold output and is likely to continue to be the most practicable market.

One important economic implication of the new situation is its possible impact on economic relations with the High Commission Territories. At the moment they have a common tariff with the Union and are dependent on her for transportation, postal, and telegraph services. Bechuanaland is linked with Southern Rhodesia as well as with the Union, through its railway system. Basutoland is an important source of labour for the Rand gold-mines.

A large number of administrative questions will also be raised by South Africa's withdrawal. Is she to remain in possession of such advantageous services as the Commonwealth postal rate and the special press cable rate of one penny a word? What will be her relation to such bodies as Cable and Wireless and the Commonwealth Telecommunications Board?

From the point of view of defence the place of South Africa in the post-war Commonwealth pattern is peculiar in that she is not a member of any of the main regional defence pacts. Nevertheless her geographical situation is important from the standpoint of all members of the Commonwealth. The existing defence arrangements are now governed by a bilateral agreement between Great Britain and the Union, designated as an 'Exchange of Letters on Defence Matters' dated 30 June 1955.[1] By this agreement the Simonstown Naval Base was handed over to the Union Government,[2] but its use, in both peace and war, was guaranteed to the Royal Navy and to 'navies of allies of the United Kingdom in any war in which the United Kingdom is involved'. Headquarters for the Royal Naval Commander-in-Chief were provided in the Cape Area at Youngsfield. The agreement also specifically stated that it did not 'preclude the association of other Governments with the defence of the [Southern African] strategic zone, should all the Governments concerned so agree'. The setting up of a 'joint maritime war planning committee' under the agreement undoubtedly presumed co-belligerency, and no consideration appeared to be given to the possibility that South Africa might be involved in hostilities other than as a co-belligerent of the U.K.

In September 1957, in implementation of this agreement, the

[1] Cmd. 9520. [2] Control was transferred in April 1957.

Union was granted *inter alia* overflying rights in the High Commission Territories, and a short access route through Basutoland to a proposed radar station on Union territory. Discussions on South Africa's right to establish radar stations in the Protectorates as part of the defence of the area have continued.

C. E. C
C. M C

Greece and the European Economic Community

IT now seems likely that an agreement will soon be ready for signature on the association of Greece with the European Economic Community—though similar predictions have been confounded on several previous occasions. At all events, when the last technical difference has been thrashed out, the agreement which emerges will be the result of tenacious work on both sides, a reward for hard bargaining, and a considerable political achievement for Greece as well as for the Six.

It was on 8 June 1959, when it had become clear that the Outer Seven were seriously intending to form a free trade area amongst themselves, that the Greek Government sent a formal Note to the Council of the European Economic Community asking to become associated with the Community under the terms of Art. 238 of the Treaty of Rome.[1] The negotiations for a wide free trade area, within which Greece would have hoped to get substantial financial aid, had broken down, and she saw herself, together with the other economically weak members of O.E.E.C. (Turkey, Ireland, Iceland, and Spain), being ruthlessly excluded from the two groups of industrialized countries, which were setting out to reduce and eventually

[1] Art 238 states 'The Community may conclude with a third country, a union of States, or an international organization agreements creating an association embodying reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special procedures.

'Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council acting by means of a unanimous vote and after consulting the Assembly

'Where such agreements involve amendments to this Treaty, such amendments shall be subject to prior adoption in accordance with the procedure laid down in Art. 236.' (Official English text.)

abolish trade barriers between themselves and might quite conceivably drift into a trade war from which the Other Five could not fail to suffer.

There can have been little hesitation on the Greek side about which group to join. Apart from the immense economic vitality and expansion and the greater resources of the E.E.C., more than 50 per cent of Greek exports already went to the Six countries, which in turn supplied more than half of the total Greek imports. Geographically, too, Greek links with the Six were fairly close and those with the widely scattered members of the Seven almost non-existent.

From the Greeks' point of view association with the Common Market offered two main attractions: financial aid towards solving their problems of economic development, and assured markets for their agricultural products, above all tobacco, on which the Greek economy is largely dependent. From the point of view of the Community the association had little to offer in the way of economic advantages, save that in the long run Greece offered a big potential market for E.E.C. exports, but there was never any question of the Greek request not being accepted. Not only was an open invitation clearly written into the Treaty of Rome, but also the Six, in the face of hostile reactions, had been repeatedly affirming that theirs was an 'open Community', and here was a chance to prove it. Moreover, on political grounds, a successful agreement could not fail to strengthen the Community.

After the summer recess, therefore, a first series of 'exploratory conversations' took place (10–12 September 1959), and agreement was reached on the broadest general principles: the link between Greece and E.E.C. would take the form of a customs union within the political framework of an 'association', or associate membership—which meant that Greece would not accept the political aims, or take part in the various institutions, of the Six.

Following these talks the E.E.C. Commission consulted national experts and the Council of Ministers, and Professor Hallstein, President of the Commission, and M. Rey, the member specially charged with external relations, paid a visit to Athens. In further preliminary talks (16–20 November 1959) much of the ground to be covered in the negotiations was gone over for the first time. It was agreed that the association would have its own institutions, and that the customs union would be created at a more gradual pace than the Common Market among the Six. The question of financial aid was dis-

cussed, and the figure of $300 million over a five-year perioc
mentioned. It was agreed that formal negotiations could begin.

It remained, however, for the Council of Ministers of E.E
define the mandate of the E.E.C. Commission, whose task it
under Art. 111 of the Treaty of Rome, to undertake the negotia
on behalf of the Six countries. This took until the end of Feb
1960. The Council set up a Special Committee of national expe
assist the E.E.C Commission in the negotiations, and the Pe
nent Representatives of the Six in Brussels worked out with M
the terms of the Commission's mandate, which were approve
the Council at its meeting on 10 March as a 'basis for negotia

Official negotiations began in Brussels on 21 March 1960, an
first meeting lasted six days. The two major issues—market
Greek agricultural products and financial aid—were tackle
once. Both sides stated their points of view on the various prob
and a basis was thus established for the bargaining to begin.
protagonists then withdrew, and on the Community side the Sp
Committee met to consider to what extent the Greek demands
be accepted. When negotiations were resumed on 5 May it was
the representatives of the Community seeking to discover what
cessions the Greeks were prepared to make in their demands

The results of this first bout of bargaining were sufficientl
couraging for the Six to be prepared to go ahead with the neg
tions, and on 11 May the Council decided to give the E.E.C. (
mission a further mandate, the details of which were to be wo
out by the Permanent Representatives. The Ministers issu
statement reaffirming their desire to reach an agreement. Ther
lowed a period of optimism on the part of the Commission: v
the Special Committee was engaged on discussing the proble
Greek tobacco, agricultural exports, and financial aid, M. Rey
the Commercial Policy Committee of the European Parliame
Assembly on 13 June that an agreement was due 'by the end
month', and that a special session of the Assembly might be he
mid-July to approve the text.

But it soon became clear that things were not going so wel
9 July M. Rey began a tour of the capitals of the Common M
countries to discuss specific problems and especially financia
tobacco (a sore point for the French and Italians in particular)
the commitments the Greeks were prepared to undertake. I
evident that the experts on the Special Committee had cleared
the topsoil of general goodwill and were striking sparks on the

rock of specific national interests. As a result a new method was adopted, the various Governments trying to clear up their own particular difficulties by direct contacts with the Greeks. When the Council met on 19 July it discussed the list of goods to be included in the customs union. For tobacco, an accelerated reduction of tariff barriers and application of the common external tariff, as requested by the Greeks, were accepted, and the French agreed to increase by 10 per cent their imports of Greek tobacco.

Thus the practical outline of the agreement was slowly taking shape. Meeting again after the summer recess (on 3 September 1960), the Council discussed in concrete terms the question of financial aid to Greece. Italy and Germany backed the Commission in wanting to offer $150 million ($50 million in economically profitable investments, $100 million for infra-structural investment) over five years, and this figure was finally accepted at a second meeting (on 7 September) by the French, who had favoured granting only $120 million. At this second meeting various other points were also decided: for instance that the creation of the customs union should take place at the same pace as within E.E.C. for two-thirds of the trade between Greece and the Six—a considerably larger proportion than the Greeks had wanted to include at first. On the other hand concessions were made to the Greek demands concerning the opening of E.E.C. frontiers to a certain number of goods specified in List 'A' and the guaranteeing of markets for some Greek exports.

The Special Committee, which met on 28 and 29 September to examine the progress made, decided to set up four working parties to go into the legal, economic, financial, and institutional aspects of a possible agreement. They met on 5 October and tackled a number of questions which had been left aside whilst the bigger problems of agriculture and financial aid were being discussed, for example provisions to cover transport, institutions, free circulation of labour, and the freeing of movements of capital. Difficulties soon emerged, especially over rules of competition and over the application of the provisions of the Treaty in the social field. Meanwhile negotiations on tobacco, financial aid, and agricultural goods went on. By 20 October, despite optimistic rumours earlier in the month about a November session of the European Parliamentary Assembly to approve an agreement, it was officially said to be 'uncertain' whether the association could take effect on 1 January 1961.

The Council of E.E.C., meeting again on 19 October, came to the

conclusion that several of the demands which the Greeks were pressing were unacceptable 'on principle'. For example, it had l agreed that the association should be a customs union, but Greeks were asking for tariff quotas either duty-free or at red rates for a number of goods which Greece imports from third c tries. Then there was the question of the safeguard clause to b cluded to guard against markets being swamped by Greek exp under the Rome Treaty it would have to be applied by the C munity as a whole, whereas the Greeks were asking that it shoul applied only for the country directly affected. Thirdly, there disagreement over what say the Greeks should have, in the Co of Association, on the common policies to be adopted by the in various sectors.

On 28 October M. Rey presented new proposals to the Pe nent Representatives, and two days later in Paris he had talks the Greek Foreign Minister, Mr Averoff, who took the occasi make a statement emphasizing the need to strengthen economic l in Europe. At yet another E.E.C. Council meeting on 14 Noven most of the problems discussed at the previous meeting were visionally solved: in particular the role of the Council of Ass tion was defined, it was laid down that tariff quotas must be within strict limits, and List 'A', specifying goods to enter the C munity freely, was approved. It was further decided that the E pean Bank would grant Greece $125 million (a reduction on $150 million suggested earlier) over a period of five years.

During the fortnight that followed (14-28 November) Special Committee dealt with a further series of problems—c petition, transport, circulation of workers and capital, and S aids—and when the Council met again on 12 December it was to give the Commission further 'general instructions' and to i cate what was called the 'limiting position' beyond which the would not go.

At last the Six were ready for a further round of negotiations the Greeks, and these took place in Brussels from 9 to 14 Dec ber. From these talks it emerged that the normal time-table for t reductions should be applied to 60 per cent of the trade between Six and Greece, duties on the other 40 per cent being disman over a twenty-year period. Progress was made with the tob problem in particular: it was suggested that duties should be duced at once by 50 per cent in the association, and a first move n to bring the Greek tariff into line with the common external ta

complete dismantling of tariffs in the association was to be achieved in five years. Nevertheless, a final agreement was still far off: M. Rey reported to the Permanent Representatives that the Greeks had seemed 'unenthusiastic', and on the Community side the Council decided on 20 December that improved co-ordination between it and the Commission was essential if all the problems were to be solved. The tobacco problem cropped up again at this meeting, and in particular that of wrapper tobacco (the leaf used for wrapping cigars). It was clear that further detailed negotiations were necessary.

On 9 January 1961, M. Rey, now endowed by the Council with a wider mandate, paid an official visit to Athens. He remained for several days and had talks with Greek Ministers on many of the problems, including that of tariff quotas, to which an acceptable solution was found. On 23–25 January, this time in Paris, M. Rey had talks with M. Protopapdakis, representing the Greek Government, and when the Council met on 30 January it announced its 'readiness to make, on most of the points remaining in suspense, the concessions necessary to meet the preoccupations of the Greek Government, from which it will consequently expect a similar attitude'. All the major problems seemed to have been solved.

A further round of detailed negotiations in Brussels at the beginning of February was devoted to certain difficulties raised by the Italian tobacco monopoly concerning imports of Greek tobacco, to markets for Greek wines and citrus fruits, and to the thorny question of whether, as some Community countries were insisting, financial aid should be made conditional upon repayment of outstanding Greek debts to the Six. On this last point agreement had still not been reached by mid-March.

Although, however, negotiations on these and other technical points may drag on for a month or so, the main outlines of an agreement linking Greece with the Common Market are now more or less settled. To recapitulate, the association will take the form of a customs union between E.E.C. on the one side and Greece on the other, though with the tariff reduction for somewhat more than a third of the trade involved taking place more slowly than between the Six. Greece will in general apply the common external tariff of E.E.C. and will benefit from limited tariff quotas for imports from other countries. The Six will make special concessions to ensure markets for Greek tobacco and agricultural products and will give Greece, through their Investment Bank, a considerable volume of

financial aid in developing her economy. The affairs of the ass
tion will be regulated by a Council of Association at minist
level. To these negotiated advantages must be added the fact th
dustry in the Six will feel it has a sound guarantee for investn
the development of the Greek economy—indeed there are alr
signs that this process is beginning, with big French investme
the production of aluminium, and German firms building tr
factories and chemical plants in Greece.

When the agreement is signed it will represent an achiever
with which both sides can be well satisfied; but its interest and
portance will extend far beyond its immediate economic effects
the one hand it will inevitably set a significant precedent in its ge
al structure, if not in its detailed economic terms. Any country w
ing to conclude a similar agreement will have to bargain just a
Greeks have done to get the best terms possible from the S
indeed the risk that the concessions made to the Greeks might
dangerous precedent, particularly in the agricultural sector,
discussed by the Trade Policy Committee of the European Pa
mentary Assembly early in February—but it will know tha
agreement is possible.

The first on the list of those wishing to follow the Greek exar
are the Turks Indeed Turkey sent a similar Note applying
association not long after the Greek initiative in the summe
1959, and preliminary talks then took place. They were broker
however, the E.E.C. Commission no doubt being fully occu
with the Greeks, and the Turks preferring to see what terms
latter could obtain. Talks with Turkey are almost certain to b
sumed following an agreement with Greece, and from the poi
view of the Six should run more smoothly in the light of the exp
ence gained over the last eighteen months.

Amongst the other possible applicants for association
Morocco, Tunisia, and even Israel, and of late there have l
rumours of a coming application from Spain—though, despite
fact of her acceptance into the respectable circles of O.E.E.C.
more recently O.E.C.D., the idea of any link of the Six with S
is anathema to the vigorous and vocal Socialist group in the E
pean Parliament For some time now the Six have been try
unsuccessfully so far, to find a formula for associating the D
Antilles with the Community; and before the present associa
convention expires in 1963 they will have to face the probler
what links are to be maintained between E.E.C. and the over

territories formerly linked to member countries which are now independent States. It is inevitable that the Community, which is the world's largest single importer of commodities and a potentially vast source of development capital, should contract ties on all sides with the countries whose interests are so closely linked with its own.

Amongst those who have also been following the Greek negotiations with interest are the Outer Seven Had it not been for the creation of E.F.T.A., its smaller members (particularly Austria and Denmark, but also Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, and Portugal) might well have been obliged to come to terms with their giant neighbour by negotiating in much the same way as the Greeks have done The Seven as a group also have a problem somewhat similar to the Greek one in the projected association of Finland with E F T.A., though in this case economic problems were very largely resolved at an early stage and the difficulties which remain are almost entirely political, devolving from the special relationship between Finland and the U.S.S.R.

Finally, there are undoubtedly conclusions to be drawn from the negotiations between Greece and the Six about an eventual agreement between the Six and the Seven. On the one hand they confirm what has been repeated all along, that where there is political determination on both sides, technical and economic difficulties will be overcome by reciprocal concessions: but on the other hand they show that such a process may take a very considerable time, with hard bargaining on both sides, and with national interests to be reconciled and attitudes to be co-ordinated on one side, let alone on both. If and when negotiations for a European settlement start, the Seven will face in the E.E.C. Commission a protagonist who has learnt all the tricks of the game with the toughest of sparring partners.

J. R. LAMBERT

Independent Mauritania

IN a flat, dusty desert landscape just outside the small airport there is a new sign-post. It points to 'capital'; and a few minutes' drive down the road stand neat rows of tall newly built white blocks of

flats and small bungalows, all tightly shut to the blowing wind.
is the capital—Nouakchott—where, on 28 November 196c
independence of Mauritania was solemnly proclaimed.

Mauritania is in North-West Africa. The country is twice th
of France but has a population of less than a million. It was th
of all the former French colonies in 'Black' Africa to negotiate i
dependence; but instead of a welcome from the earlier arr
Mauritania's new status is highly disputed, and Morocco has f
several apparent allies in Africa—and elsewhere—for her clain
Mauritania forms part of Greater Morocco, and cannot ther
have status as an independent nation. Already Mauritania has h
join that no-man's-land of nations which have failed to secure r
bership of the United Nations: she expected to become the U
hundredth member, but found her application vetoed by Rus
ostensibly on the ground that the Western Powers had once
vetoed Outer Mongolia's application for membership, but in
quite obviously in pursuit of an African policy which, at least fo
time being, includes close friendship with Morocco, and whicl
makes distinctions between 'false' independence (i.e. close ties
France) and 'real' independence.

Mauritania in fact forms the bridge between 'Black' Afric
'White' Africa. The country itself is a mirror of the two wor
part of its population is negro, and the rest is of Arab-Berber o
The negro population is sedentary; the Arab population is m
nomadic. But almost to a man, the population is Muslim; and in
at least part of Morocco's claim to Mauritania is based o
spiritual allegiance which certain Mauritanian chiefs have ow
the Moroccan Sultanate

The Moors are a handsome race. Of Arab-Berber origin, ar
lated to the Tuaregs, they are tough and used to a hard life. C
small handful have had any except Koranic instruction, and
versity graduates are even scarcer than they were in the Congo
is not altogether the result of neglect, but also stems from the
culties of giving even the most elementary education to a p
whose teachers have to move with their pupils from one pitch
next, and who are, moreover, extremely conservative in the
proach to learning. The sedentary African population has ha
more instruction, and its relative sophistication adds to the co
cations which the presence of two such different races have cr
in Mauritania.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The country's history has been traced back to the third and fourth centuries, when Arab penetration of the Sahara first began. Later, when the Almoravids began to Islamize and conquer the Black kingdoms, the Mauritanian area was marked by the southward thrusts of the Arab and Berber tribes. It is indisputable that Morocco and Mauritania frequently fell at that time under the same authority, but the present Mauritanian Government firmly denies the claim that Mauritania in her pre-European history came to be regarded simply as a natural extension of North Africa, and in particular of the Southern Atlas region.

Both Morocco and Mauritania have offered extensive and often conflicting evidence to show that Mauritania either was or was not historically part of Morocco before the territory's conquest by the European Powers. Europeans began to arrive in the fifteenth century, and there was the usual influx of Portuguese, Dutch, British, and French. They were attracted by the gum trade on the River Senegal, and most of them entered the country from the south, from Senegal, and not from North Africa. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, the French arrived in earnest to conquer the country. First Faidherbe[1] and then Coppolani[2] came from Senegal to try to pacify the Moorish chiefs, who were still making frequent raids on the negroes of the rich river valley. Many of these chiefs were themselves rivals fighting each other, but gradually Coppolani persuaded some of them to put themselves under French protection, and by the turn of the century the river valley of Mauritania had become a 'dependency' of Senegal, which was already established as a colony.

In 1904, soon after the French High Commission of West Africa had been established, the 'Civil Territory of Mauritania' was officially proclaimed, though its capital was established at St Louis in Senegal. Coppolani pressed further inland, and continued his treaty-making expeditions until his assassination in 1905 But the French 'pacification' policy was maintained, and in 1920 the present territory of Mauritania was declared one of the eight colonies of French West Africa. By that time the area had become more or less pacified, though the long-standing conflicts between various chieftaincies were by no means all resolved, and indeed they are still mir-

[1] Appointed Governor of Senegal in 1854.

[2] Secretary-General of French West Africa at the beginning of this century.

rored even today in the division of views on the Moroccan c
and on various other questions. The treaties which the French
with the various Moorish chiefs, as well as treaties made early i
century by Moroccan authorities, are now all quoted by the va
sides in the Mauritanian quarrel in support or otherwise of
claims.

Morocco herself regained her independence in 1956, and sh
claims that the declaration of independence applied to Maur
and Rio de Oro, as well as to the areas now actually under her co
Formal claim was made to Mauritania, and the Moroccan Go
ment argues that this claim was to have been examined by a b
commission which should have been set up under the Ind
dence treaty but to which Morocco has never designatec
members. The French, on the other hand, say that this commi
was only intended to examine minor border disputes, and cert
not Morocco's claims on Mauritania.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

Despite Mauritania's size, only relatively small parts o
country can be cultivated. It divides into four main areas. First
is the valley along the River Senegal which forms the border
the Republic of Senegal. This valley is fertile and is culti
mainly by the 130,000 people of negro origin who live there.
there is the coastal plain, where vegetation is sparse, but wher
rainfall is sufficient to support cattle. After the plain, toward
north-east, come the Adrar mountains with their date planta
Finally there are the vast desert regions bordering on to th
gerian Sahara, Mali, and Spanish Sahara (Rio de Oro)—
latter, incidentally, is also claimed by Morocco.

Agricultural production is strictly limited. In the Senegal
valley there is a small export surplus of groundnuts, and its p
are self-sufficient in food. Fishing is important off the Maurit
coast, and there are plans for its considerable expansion. Th
still a small export trade in gum, the commodity which originall
Mauritania on the African trading map. But the half-million or
'white' Mauritanians, who spend their lives under tents, live m
on dates, maize, and the milk of their numerous cows, with w
they move from pasture to pasture according to season and
Mauritania's trump card is her mineral resources. Extensiv
posits of high-grade and easily mined iron-ore have been fou
Fort Gouraud, towards the north of the country; and conside

..pper deposits are known to exist at Akoujt. Moreover, a hopeful earch for oil is being carried on by three major oil companies.

The iron-ore project is already well advanced, and open-cast nining at Fort Gouraud is due to begin in 1963. Known reserves xceed 144 million tons, and initial production is expected to be at he rate of 4 million tons a year, to be increased later to 6 million ons. A railway 675 km. in length is being built to link Fort Gouraud vith Port Etienne, where the harbour is being enlarged and nodernized. The whole project is undertaken by an international onsortium, Miferma, whose shareholders include French com-anies, the British Iron and Steel Corporation, and Italian and German metallurgical companies. Miferma's subscribed capital is £19 million; but the capital cost of the project is estimated at £50 nillion. The difference is being met by French Government loans nd grants, and by a £20 million loan from the International Bank. Once the export of minerals begins, the Mauritanian Government vill obtain royalty payments, and eventually a profits tax, which hould more than treble its existing revenues, and this should at last nable the Government to free itself from its present dependence n external help to balance even its current Budget. Exploitation of Mauritania's copper deposits is not yet finally settled, but a de-ision is expected soon. Known deposits are estimated at 200,000 ons of metal. Capital requirements are around £45 million and an nternational consortium has been formed in which French in-erests predominate, but in which Mauritania herself will have a 25 er cent shareholding.

INDEPENDENCE

Mauritania shared in the general constitutional advance of the rench colonies in 'Black' Africa and obtained her first African-ominated Government in 1957, after the French *Loi Cadre* came nto operation. In 1958 she voted by a large majority in favour of General de Gaulle's new French Constitution, and herself opted to ecome a self-governing Islamic Republic within the French Com-unity. Last year the Mauritanian Government negotiated an greement with France, signed on 19 October, whereby the country chieved international sovereignty, and it is now an independent tate; its relation with the French Community has not yet been ecided. Mauritania's present Government, whose Prime Minister, 1 Moktar Ould Daddah, has been in control since 1957, is firmly pposed to Morocco's claims, and is determined to confirm the

country's independence as a 'bridge' between 'Black' and 'W
Africa.

Political life in Mauritania is developing slowly and cann
claimed to be as vigorous or sophisticated as that of neighbo
countries. M. Moktar Ould Daddah, who himself comes fro
aristocratic background and is one of the country's few univ
graduates, has now managed to unite behind his party, the *Pa
Regroupement Mauritanien*, a large majority of the politically
scious population. The party holds all forty seats in the Na
Assembly. But this does not mean that there is no oppositi
comes from both the left and the right: from elements who su
union with Morocco, and others who would like to see close
tions with 'Black' Africa. The opposition groups do not operate
a great deal of freedom, and indeed one party, the Naddah, w
partly supported the Moroccan case, has now been banned.
therefore hard to judge just how extensive M. Moktar Ould
dah's support is or where the major opposition lies. But it is
obvious that at least some of those who support the Moroccan
do so, not because they have any strong belief in its intrinsic
ness, but simply because they consider Moktar Ould Dadda
much of a revolutionary; at the same time opposition to him
the left comes from people who feel that he has tied himse
closely to France, and that salvation does not lie with Mo
either, but in securing more complete independence th
association with other independent African States But whil
undoubtedly easy to exaggerate both the Government's so-
dictatorial tendencies and the extent of the opposition, it is h
see any alternative to M. Moktar Ould Daddah and his admin
tion.

This administration is still very largely French—and indee
is one of the reasons why Morocco has found so many allies
she claims that Moktar Ould Daddah has signed the country
to the French. Trained Mauritanians are scarce, and as lo
Mauritania is independent without actually being admitted in
United Nations it is difficult to obtain substantial U.N. techni
for that matter, financial help.

At present Mauritania not only has the assistance of French
nicians but she also obtains much financial help from France
for her current Budget and for whatever capital developme
Government is able to undertake. No new agreements have
negotiated with France since independence; the previous ar

ments are simply continuing for the time being, but these 'arrangements' include the continued presence of French troops in Mauritania. Indeed, the Moroccans claim that Moktar Ould Daddah has signed secret military agreements with France and that France not only uses Mauritania as a base on the Algerian border but also plans to establish rocket base launching pads and to construct a military base at Port Etienne. Morocco, in fact, claims that France means to hold on to Mauritania not merely for strategic reasons but also in order to make sure of sharing in the exploitation of her mineral deposits, on which Morocco admittedly also has a covetous eye.

Has Mauritania sold herself to France? Morocco claims that she has, Ghana, Guinea, and other independent African countries, and the Arab League, share this belief, and Russia seems to agree. Nobody can pretend that Mauritania could at the moment maintain even her extremely small administrative framework without outside help There is a lot of evidence to suggest that M. Moktar Ould Daddah is well aware of the dilemma, and would like to mortgage property to international financial circles against the security of the mineral wealth to come, if this would raise sufficient money and help to reduce French control and influence in Mauritania. This seems to be one of the reasons why he has so long delayed negotiating post-independence agreements with France. But there does not appear to have been much response, nor does the United States so far seem to have made any substantial offers of help to Mauritania So whether M. Moktar Ould Daddah wants it or not he is, for the time being, thrown back on to France—or Morocco; and of the two he prefers France, from whose embrace Mauritania can, he thinks, free herself more easily once the mines come into operation.

But will Mauritania be left in peace to bridge the gap of at least three years before mineral royalties will give her greater financial independence? King Muhammad V of Morocco, until his sudden death last February, seemed very determined in his efforts to gain control of the country, and it remains to be seen whether his successor, King Hassan II, will be content to stop at the diplomatic offensive which his father initiated. At the same time most of the former French colonies in Africa have sided firmly with M. Moktar Ould Daddah, and most of the Western Powers have also made it clear that they recognize Mauritania's independence.

A few weeks before independence was declared, M. Moktar Ould Daddah was invited to a meeting organized by M. Houphouet-Boigny, President of the Ivory Coast, and attended by representa-

tives of all the former French colonies in 'Black' Africa e
Guinea, Mali, and Madagascar, at which all those present dec
firm support for Mauritania's forthcoming application for men
ship of the United Nations. To underline their support, the H
of State of these former French colonies turned up in force at th
dependence celebrations and, moreover, Tunisia came out int
open and declared herself a firm supporter of Mauritania an
opponent of the Moroccan claim. As a result M. Masmoudi
Tunisian Minister of Information, was received with open ar
the independence celebrations and was clapped and photogra
wherever he went. A further result has been a serious brea
Tunisian-Moroccan relations; this has to some extent affected
laboration between these two countries over the Algerian prob
and for the time being there is little talk of the Maghreb feder
which was often canvassed as the natural sequel to Algeria's eve
freedom.

At the Mauritanian independence celebrations, M. Moktar
Daddah firmly and publicly told the French Prime Minister
Michel Debré, that although France was Mauritania's great fr
Algeria was a sister nation, and he gave notice that he was sup
ing the Algerian struggle for independence. If Mauritania had
admitted to the United Nations, M. Moktar Ould Daddah w
perhaps have given more outspoken support to the F.L.N.
those other former French colonies who have now formed th
called Brazzaville Group. But Mauritania failed to make the n
bership grade; Morocco's diplomatic offensive against her pr
effective, and M. Balafrej, a former Moroccan Prime Ministe
Secretary-General of the Istiqlal Party, who had been in Mosc
few weeks earlier, evidently succeeded in convincing Russia th
was in her interests to oppose Mauritania's membership o
United Nations.

The Brazzaville Group was constituted in December
following discussions in that town, and its twelve members—w
include Mauritania but not Guinea or Mali—gave notice that
would again put forward Mauritania's application for membe
of the United Nations. The matter will presumably come up a
spring session of the General Assembly, and unless the U.S.
has unexpectedly had second thoughts, the application will aga
turned down by the Security Council before it ever has a chan
being debated by the General Assembly, where Mauritania's
porters are likely to be in a majority.

After Brazzaville, Morocco seriously mounted her African ounter-offensive—and the Casablanca conference of 3–7 January 961 was the result. This is not to say that Morocco's wish to rally upport for her claim on Mauritania was the main motive force ehind that conference; clearly those who came to Casablanca[1] vanted above all to discuss the Algerian and Congolese problems. But it is at least arguable that the initiative for the conference came rom Morocco because of her overriding interest in Mauritania. Shortly before President Nkrumah of Ghana arrived at Casablanca, Ghana gave diplomatic recognition to Mauritania; at the same time Mali was putting forward suggestions that certain areas of the Mauritanian desert belonged by rights to her. None of this prevent-d the Casablanca conference from passing the following motion:

RESOLUTION ON MAURITANIA[2]

he Conference·

CONSIDERING the colonialist intrigues aimed at dividing the territories f the African States in order to weaken them;

CONSIDERING that France, in order to strengthen her domination over ie Sahara, exploit its wealth, and secure for herself an outlet on the tlantic, has severed from Morocco the southern portion of her territory, Mauritania;

CONSIDERING that the setting up of a puppet State, the said Mauritania, gainst the will of the people concerned, and in disregard of the solemn ndertakings given by France, is a violation of international treaties and greements;

CONSIDERING that the setting up of Mauritania as a puppet State is ierely a means for France to encircle the African countries, secure for erself bases to which she can retreat, and increase the number of her itellites;

CONSIDERING that, in general, the increase in the number of artificial tates in Africa is a permanent threat to the security of the African con-nent, and, at the same time, a strengthening of the forces of imperialism;

CONSIDERING that the objective aimed at by France in Mauritania is the onomic exploitation and strategic use of this area, particularly against ie African countries, as well as the maintenance of artificial barriers in frica;

CONSIDERING that the defence of the unity and territorial integrity of all African States is, at the same time, the defence of the freedom of Africa;

SOLEMNLY DENOUNCES AND CONDEMNS all forms of economic, political, and military exploitation in Africa;

[1] The conference was attended by the Heads of State of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, together with representatives of Morocco, Libya, the U A R , Ceylon, and the Stanleyville 'pro-Lumumba' Government

[2] *Documentation française*, 21 January 1961.

DECLARES its determination to oppose, by all possible means, e
attempt to partition and create satellite States in certain parts of
African continent;

APPROVES any action taken by Morocco on Mauritania for the res
tion of her legitimate rights.

Not many weeks after Casablanca, the Group met its first
on the resolution: Mauritania applied for admission to the U
Economic Commission for Africa. Morocco violently oppose
and found particularly close allies in Ghana, and also in Lib
who, incidentally, had not been represented at Casablanca. Ev
ually Mauritania was elected to associate membership; the C
blanca Powers had all abstained from voting on the motion,
after it was passed, by 22 votes, Morocco walked out and refuse
take any further part in the E.C.A.'s annual conference. None o
other Casablanca Powers followed suit.

It has naturally been suggested that Morocco will try subvers
if not direct attack on Mauritania, in pursuit of her claims. B
seems doubtful whether she would obtain support from the o
Casablanca Powers—and in any case it remains to be seen how
situation in Morocco will develop under the new ruler. But cle
this struggle over Mauritania is adding to the growing division
Africa. It has underlined the problem which faces every ne
independent African nation to a lesser or greater extent: nam
just how to achieve real independence and a sense of nationhoo
distinct from paper sovereignty.

HELLA PI

Mexico Today

Aspects of Progress since the Revolution

THE year 1960 was for Mexico one of celebration. It was the 1
anniversary of the country's independence and the 50th of its
volution. Both anniversaries were celebrated with all the pomp
circumstance appropriate for such occasions; but there was a dis
difference in the way the two events were judged. Independence
fêted with unanimous enthusiasm. The Mexican Revolution
the other hand, did not escape criticism from both right and le

s still, after fifty years, a controversial matter. In estimating its chievements and failures it is well to remember that appearances re often deceptive. To find out the truth about things Mexican one ıas to do considerable digging beneath the surface.

The Mexican Revolution was launched on 20 November 1910 gainst the dictatorial regime of General Porfirio Díaz, who was lected President seven times and ruled, with one interruption, for hirty-six years. The first leader of the Revolution, Francisco I. Madero, was a liberal of the nineteenth-century British variety. He ampaigned for the restoration of democracy under the slogan: Effective vote. No re-election.' Madero won, and his slogan is oday the sacramental formula which appears at the foot of any fficial communication by the Mexican Government. But the subequent history of the Mexican Revolution seemed to justify, for all oo long a time, the popular parody: 'Effective vote? No. Relection '

Madero was soon overthrown by a counter-revolutionary *coup*, whose victorious leader, General Victoriano Huerta, made himself resident and proceeded to restore the *status quo* of the Díaz egime. General Venustiano Carranza rose against him in 1913 in ıe name of Madero's liberalism. Two peasant leaders, Francisco 'illa and Emiliano Zapata, also opposed Huerta, but in defence of ıore radical ideas, especially on the land question. Huerta was efeated; but his defeat was followed by years of anarchy, when 'residents came and went with kaleidoscopic rapidity—one of ıem, Pedro Lascurain, lasted forty-five minutes—and contending rmies marched across the country, killing, burning, and looting. 'arranza won in the end—and was converted to another brand of beralism, with a considerable social conscience. He proclaimed the 'onstitution of 1917, which still governs Mexico. In addition to the 'aditional democratic liberties, it embodies, in its Article 27, a ocial theory of property. According to it, the land and resources of Mexico belong, in the first place, to her people Article 27 was the 'arting-point of the land reform and, twenty-one years later, the ıstification of the expropriation of the foreign oil companies.

But it was one thing to proclaim democracy and another to put it ıto practice. Carranza, for all his democratic principles, actually overned the country as a *caudillo*, a military chieftain in the old Iispanic tradition. Three years after his triumph he was murdered y a rival, and all through the 'twenties and the early 'thirties Mexico was the prey of rival *caudillos*, of whom Generals Calles and

Obregón were the most successful. Obregón had himself elect
and re-elected. He, too, fell victim to an assassination, and C
learned the lesson. Instead of inviting the perils of re-electio
continued to govern Mexico for six years after the expiration o
presidential term, through three puppet Presidents. It fe
General Cárdenas to break the vicious circle. When his six-
term expired in 1940, he yielded the power peacefully to his
cessor, General Ávila Camacho. The subsequent Presid
Miguel Alemán, Adolfo Ruíz Cortines, and Adolfo López Ma
the present incumbent, were duly elected and have gove
without bloodshed.

The peaceful course of the last twenty years undoubtedly re
sents a considerable achievement of the Mexican Revolutio
means a defeat of militarism, a political disease that has plague
many Latin American countries. To grasp its full meaning, it is
necessary to compare the situation of Mexico with that of
Argentine. General Ávila Camacho paved the way for the trans
by selecting as his successor Miguel Alemán, the lawyer son
revolutionary General. The supremacy of civil over military p
has now been an established fact in Mexico for twenty y
Military expenses form only some 8 per cent of the Mex
Budget; only Costa Rica, a country which replaced its army
national guard, has a smaller proportion. Mexican generals—t
were 527 of them in 1952 for an army of about 50,000—often oc
lucrative political and economic posts, for example in the Gov
ment party or in industries connected with military supplies
their non-military ambitions are not permitted to aim any hig

The Revolution has also succeeded in eliminating another so
of civil strife by reaching a settlement with the Catholic Chu
This settlement put an end to a very serious conflict bet
Church and State which had culminated in the 1920s in the clo
of all Mexican churches by prelates resisting the Governme
General Calles and in a three-year civil war (1926–9) caused by
Cristero rebellion against that Government. During the prev
century, Mexico had time and again been torn apart by strife
tween Catholics and Liberals over Government confiscation
Church property and claims of the Church to political autono
Dwight Morrow, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, succeeded in
in arranging a truce between the Church and President Portes
successor of Calles. The final settlement was reached by Ge
Cárdenas and the Archbishop of Mexico, Luis María Martinez.

Archbishop responded to the President's peace overtures by backing his nationalization of the oil industry. President Ávila Camacho could declare in 1940: 'I am a believer' without arousing opposition In the last twenty years relations between Church and State have been entirely peaceful—so much so that Cardinal Garibi, Archbishop of Guadalajara, chose to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Mexican Revolution by announcing that there was 'a clear understanding' between the Government and the Church.

The Mexican Revolution has been called 'instinct riding a horse' and 'a revolution without ideas'. This is not entirely true, as is witnessed by the Constitution of 1917. But it is undoubtedly true that the Revolution took a long time to organize itself on an ideological basis It was almost twenty years old when General Calles organized its first political party, the National Revolutionary Party (*Partido Nacional Revolucionario*). This party has been governing Mexico ever since under different names and shows no signs of yielding its monopoly of power. Its present name, the Party of Revolutionary Institutions (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*), expresses a determination to replace the one-man rule of the *caudillo* by institutional government.

However, Mexico is anything but a one-party State. Many other parties are allowed to exist, to engage in political activities, to present candidates for the Presidency, and to win an occasional local government post or deputy's seat These parties stand either to the right or to the left of the Government. The most powerful right-wing opposition comes from the Party of National Action (*Partido de Acción Nacional*), whose candidate Luis H. Álvarez unsuccessfully fought against López Mateos in the 1958 election. It is a party of the 'respectable' Catholic right and lives up to its nickname of 'the bankers' party'. More to the right are the Sinarquists, powerful in the late 'thirties and early 'forties, but now torn by dissensions and but a shadow of their former strength. They fought against the Mexican Revolution in the manner of the Vendée and, like the Vendéens, accepted foreign aid which, in their case, was circumstantially reported to have come from Nazi Germany and Falangist Spain. There are many other right-wing splinter groups such as the National Anti-Communist Party (*Partido Nacional Anticomunista*), but they are merely the ephemeral products of political circumstances.

To the left of the Government are the Communists and various parties of Communist and pro-Communist inspiration. Until a

couple of years ago they were in a continuous decline from the
of strength they had reached in the 1930s. The official Me
Communist Party is led by Dionisio Encinas, a party hack wh
lows the changing Moscow line without even a shadow of hesita
The most flamboyant party member is the painter David A
Siqueiros. But party membership is down to a very few thous
and shows no signs of rising. More numerous is the People's P
recently renamed People's Socialist Party (*Partido Po
Socialista*), led by Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who often m
headlines in the Moscow and Peking press. His party line is
moderate and 'Mexican' than that of the official Communist P
To the left of it and more radical are the Workers' and Peas
Party (*Partido Obrero Campesino*), led by an able ex-Trotsk
Valentin Campa, and the Bloc of Workers' and Peasants' U
(*Bloque de Unidad Obrera y Campesina*) of the peasant leader Ja
López. The Trotskyists no longer have a Mexican organization

The last two years have witnessed an undoubted resurgence o
extreme Left, for two main reasons. One is the influence of Ca
felt here as elsewhere in Latin America. The other is a gro
conviction that the Mexican Revolution has been betrayed b
leaders, and that its ever more moderate course since the end o
Cárdenas Government has made the rich richer and the
poorer. The growing strength of the Left manifests itself
through its political parties, which still lead a rather rac
existence, than through the activities of sympathizers who m
eschew party membership. The most powerful of these is
doubtedly General Cárdenas; but they also include leading
tellectuals such as the novelist Carlos Fuentes and important t
union leaders, for example, Demetrio Vallejo of the railway wor
and Othón Salazar of the teachers' unions The practical resu
this left-wing revival has been a series of strikes and riots
started in the summer of 1958 and has continued ever s
Students have been very prominent in them.

The present Government, which took office in December 1
has attempted to counteract this new development by preser
itself as not only continuing the Revolution but giving it a new
radical turn. General Alfonso Corona del Rosal, head of
Government party, announced in the spring of last year th
would follow a policy of 'solid left' (*atinada izquierda*). Presi
López Mateos went farther in his 'Guaymas Declaration' last J
'My Government is of the extreme left, within the Constitut

These statements have caused considerable alarm in conservative circles both of Mexico and of the United States. But they must be judged in the light of the Government's actual political practice, which might be summarized under three heads.

First, Mexico is not a dictatorship, and the opposition, of the Right as well as of the Left, enjoys—at least to a great extent—freedom of expression. Such censorship as exists is moral rather than political. Thus, when intellectuals with Communist and Castro sympathies recently started a new magazine, *Política*, which is pretty outspoken, the Government stopped it from obtaining newsprint through an official corporation but permitted its continued publication on paper received from other sources.

Secondly, the Government invariably puts its foot down when opposition moves from talk to action. Riots and violent strikes have been invariably suppressed by the police, reinforced, whenever necessary, by the army. At the time of writing, early in 1961, practically the entire left-wing leadership was in jail, including Encinas, Siqueiros, Campa, and Vallejo, on charges of 'social dissolution', a technical crime created by a war-time law against pro-Axis activities

Thirdly, the Government saps the real strength of the opposition by subsidizing or otherwise capturing its key figures. Manuel Gómez Morín, a brilliant financier associated with the Bank of London and Mexico, is said to be the Government's pawn within the Party of National Action. Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who travels on a diplomatic passport and receives subsidies for his newspaper and workers' university, is said to play a similar part on the left. The Government also imposes picked leaders on recalcitrant trade unions, for example, the railroad workers' union. The policy of subsidizing Communists produces occasional gasps of horror from U.S embassy officials, but the Mexican Government seems to be well satisfied with its practical results.

Another much discussed aspect of Mexico's policy—her attitude towards the Castro regime in Cuba—must be examined in the light of similar considerations. On the surface, official Mexico is strongly on record in favour of Castro. When the Cuban President visited Mexico City in May 1960 he was welcomed at the airport by President López Mateos who told him that Mexico and Cuba were linked 'by similar aspirations for justice'. Emilo Sánchez Piedras, Leader of the Chamber of Deputies, repeatedly stated that Mexico was 'with Cuba'. The Mexican Government finds itself in a delicate

situation. The U.S. parliamentary delegation to the 150th ann
sary of Mexican independence ostentatiously refused to atter
official banquet as a protest against Sánchez Piedras, and Secr
of State Tello had to explain that the deputy's views wer
Government policy. The television stations which transmitte
Independence Day parade cut off the sound when the Cuban
gates appeared in order to ignore the deafening applause, and
moved the TV cameras upwards to show only the Cuban
Although the parade, complete with Cubans, was witnessed
million Mexicans, an article in a serious newspaper the nex
blandly asserted that there were no delegates from Cuba be
the Mexican Government had advised Havana that their pres
would be unwelcome and that Sánchez Piedras made his declar
out of frustrated pique.[1] The Mexican Government has, there
to move cautiously. But it did not hesitate to sign the declarati
San José condemning Communist penetration in the We
Hemisphere.

The Government also tries to make Mexico immune to C
munist and Castrist influences by giving a new push to the Me
Revolution, particularly in the sphere of economics. This m
three things: a new impetus to the land reform; intensifie
dustrialization; and measures to improve the economic positi
the majority.

The agrarian reform has pursued a somewhat erratic cour
Mexico, as is shown by the figures of land distribution unde
various presidential regimes:

President	*Land distributed* (*in hectares*)[2]
V. Carranza	132,639
A. de la Huerta	33,695
A. Obregón	971,627
P. E. Calles	3,088,071
E. Portes Gil	1,173,118
P. Ortiz Rubio	1,468,745
A. L. Rodriguez	798,982
L. Cárdenas	17,889,791
M. Ávila Camacho	5,518,970
M. Álemán	3,884,744
A. Ruíz Cortines	3,198,780

[1] *Novedades*, 17 September 1960

[2] Official statistics, quoted in *Tiempo*, 26 December 1960. 1 hectare = about 2½ acres.

These figures, while useful, do not tell the whole story. In 1910 Mexico was a landlords' paradise. General Díaz had broken up the Indian community lands and created a class of *hacendados* which owned most of the land and practically all the good land. The revolutionary Governments created, through their land policy, a situation in which about one-third of the land is now owned by the *ejidos* (a term that can be roughly translated as 'village community'), one-third by peasant smallholders, and one-third by a new class of landlords, beneficiaries of the Revolution and sarcastically called 'nylon peasants'. All is not well with Mexican agriculture. There are 1 million peasants with legal right to land, according to the existing legislation, but with small chance of getting it. Technical progress has been most uneven: it has favoured cash export crops at the expense of food crops, needed in growing quantities to feed a population that annually increases by a million mouths. Almost 150 million dollars had to be spent in the years 1953–8 on importing Mexico's basic food, maize.[1] Some 500,000 Mexicans have to go every year to the United States as *braceros* or migrant agricultural labourers There is a growing American opposition to their employment, as they tend to undercut the wages of local farm labour.

The present Mexican Government tries to counteract these endencies by accelerating the pace of land distribution: some 4 nillion hectares have been given to peasants in the two years since ts inauguration. It has also reformed the agrarian credit system, ostered the introduction of new agricultural techniques, and ittempted to extend the *ejido* system to cattle-breeding and small-icale industry. There is also a very ambitious plan to transfer nillions of people from the exhausted lands of the Central Plateau, vhere most of the population is now concentrated, to the thinly opulated tropics, where land awaits rational exploitation. But so ar the plan seems to have produced little but talk.

Industrialization, in a country like Mexico, is inevitably destined o absorb much of the surplus agrarian population. The necessary apital comes from three main sources: the Government, private apital from Mexico, and foreign capital, which, under the present ircumstances, means primarily American private capital. The Government of López Mateos is trying to keep a fair balance be-ween these three kinds of capital, a policy which, almost inevitably, nakes it a target of criticisms from all sides. This policy leaves basic ndustry in the hands of the Government, whenever it thinks that

[1] *Combate*, San José, Costa Rica, November–December 1960, p. 58.

national interest is involved; but otherwise the door is left open fo co-operation of private capital, both home and foreign. Thus, whil the Government maintains in full force the nationalization of th oilfields, it has recently offered to private capital a participation i the chemical industry of products derived from petroleum. I nationalized the electrical industry on 26 September 1960, but onl after offering it first to Mexican private capital, which refusec American private investment, very much increased in the last fe years, now tends to avoid the so-called 'extractive' industries, suc as mining, in favour of 'industries of transformation', i.e. producin finished industrial goods, and also retail trading. American partici pation is very apparent in the new industrial zone that has grown u around the capital.

Mexico is, for all her agricultural and industrial progress, still a 'under-developed' country. This term, originally a euphemism fo 'poor' or 'backward', is by now also being resented. President Lópe Mateos, asked on his Latin American tour by a journalist whether h considered Mexico an under-developed country, replied · 'No I is a country that is being developed ' It is not much use playing wit words; it is a much more useful exercise for economists to find ou statistically whether Mexico still bears the classic hallmark of backward economy: gross inequality of income and a continue trend towards making it greater still.

Daniel Cosío Villegas, one of Mexico's leading economic his torians, recalled in a recent lecture that Henry Lane Wilsor U.S. Ambassador to the Madero and Huerta Governments, re ported that the two great economic evils of Mexico were an unjus tax system and a gross inequality of income. That was in 191; Forty years later, two Mexican economists, Victor L. Urquidi an Raúl Ortiz Mena, joined with two American experts, Jonas I Haralz and Albert Waterston, in a statistical investigation (Mexico's national income, based on the census figures of 1940 an 1950.

From their findings[1] it appeared that the share of wages in th national income had distinctly gone down, while that of profits ha gone up. Although there is controversy on the subject,[2] the majorit

[1] See Ifigenia M de Navarrete, *La Distribución del Ingreso y el Desarrol Económico de México* (The Distribution of the National Income and the Econ mic Development of Mexico), Mexico City, Universidad Nacional Autónoma (México, 1960, Table 4

[2] Another investigation, conducted by Mexican experts of the Banco (México and the Nacional Financera and using the same census figures, reach exactly the opposite conclusion (*ibid.*).

of expert opinion in Mexico seems overwhelmingly to support this view, and the report had the effect of stimulating American private investment in Mexico. The Mexican Government also seems to be of the same opinion, judging by the measures it has taken to keep the cost of the necessities of life, and especially of food, clothing, and housing, much below the level that would have been produced by the free play of economic forces.

The same basic concern for the welfare of the Mexican people is behind remarkable successes in the spheres of health, culture, and education. Pre-revolutionary Mexico was one of the world's unhealthiest spots. Infant mortality in the state of Aguascalientes, to take but one horrifying example, was 775 per 1,000 during the first year [1] Today the country is covered by an ever denser network of hospitals and clinics, and the death-rate has been so greatly reduced as to make the birth-rate a serious problem.

The cultural revival produced by the Mexican Revolution is too well known to need explaining here. It is enough to mention the paintings of Rivera, Orozco, and Siqueiros, the novels of Guzmán and Azuela, and the new concern for the Indians and their culture.

Mexico has done much pioneering in education. Three names stand out, those of the three Secretaries of Education in the service of revolutionary Governments. José Vasconcelos was patron of the great painters and tried to make the best of man's cultural heritage accessible to the people through cheap editions. Moises Sáenz founded schools in remote villages. Jaime Torres Bodet, former Director-General of Unesco, inaugurated the campaign against illiteracy, which still continues. In 1910 about 90 per cent of the population was illiterate. The figure now stands at about 30 to 35 per cent (Government statistics) or 45 to 50 per cent (private estimates). The vast and striking University of Mexico outside the city, with its imaginative buildings and courts, has already proved too small for the demands of youth upon its facilities.

The conclusions to be drawn about education could be applied to the Mexican Revolution as a whole. Figures are not necessarily a reliable guide to progress, but they yield a general judgment: a lot has been achieved, and a lot still remains to be done.

I. A. LANGNAS

[1] Speech by the Secretary of Health, quoted in *Tiempo*, 12 December 1960.

Economic Development in China

THIS article aims at providing a brief outline of China's econom
development in the last twenty-five years, with the focus more e
pecially on the last three or four years. A sketch of the backgroun
may help to explain why and how development has followed th
lines it has. Very little will be said in exact quantitative terms Qui
a lot has been written on China's national income and its rate (
growth, on output figures for various products, and so forth, but i
general there is cause for scepticism about all this. It is not only th
there may be deliberate misrepresentations for political reasons i
the published statistics; much more basic is the fact that much (
this material probably does not exist at all in a reliable form

By the beginning of 1937—on the eve, as we now know, of th
Japanese invasion—the situation in China looked more hopeful tha
it had for a long time Under the Kuomintang Government th
country had at last been united. The ending of civil war improve
the economic outlook and instilled hope for the future. Railway con
struction on a large scale was undertaken. Early in that year th
British Commercial Counsellor at Shanghai commented on the wa
in which Chinese private interests were developing in many fiel
of industry where previously foreigners had been all-importan
'The outstanding feature' of Chinese economic life at that time, h
wrote, 'is the increasing justified confidence which the Chine
themselves as well as the world at large have in the future of th
country, a confidence based on the remarkable growth of stabili
achieved in recent years, and the improved political, financial, an
economic conduct of affairs—government and private.'[1]

THE YEARS OF WAR AND CIVIL WAR

It was, in fact, this favourable outlook in China which spurred o
the Japanese military leaders to launch the attack just at that tim
for fear that China would become too strong for their liking if thin
were allowed to take their course. Before long, most of China
centres of modern industry and commerce were overrun by the in
vaders. The Chinese Government retreated inland, finally estal
lishing itself in Chungking on the Upper Yangtze, in Szechwan pro
vince. Some of the machinery from the factories on the coast, as we
as managers and technicians, made the long westward trek, and th

[1] Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, *Report on Economic a Commercial Conditions in China*, 1937

war years saw a considerable growth of manufacturing industry, nainly on a small scale, in the interior, but it was insufficient to supply the needs of Free China (the unoccupied part of the country), which was cut off from the outside world and could obtain little rom abroad. War-time activity in West China engendered in- reased incomes in monetary terms, unmatched by a correspon- lingly large supply of goods on which they could be spent, and the idministrative machinery, such as it was, could not possibly have oped with rationing. Therefore a severe inflation occurred.

What little foreign trade existed was channelled through official igencies. War-time needs stimulated Government participation in other spheres of economic life as well, and by 1945, when the war nded, much of the modern sector of the economy in Free China was n the hands of State corporations. Conditions of exile in Chungking iad lowered the morale of the administrators; inflation made it im- possible to live on their small salaries, and life in the interior was strange and uncongenial to those used to Nanking and Shanghai. Thus when the war ended things had reached a very bad pass. The State corporations had turned into private empires combining the ess desirable features of both public and private enterprise. The lefeat of Japan meant that the ownership of all Japanese assets in China—and they comprised a sizeable slice of the industrial, min- ng, and public utility concerns of North and East China—became he property of the Chinese Government. The Western-owned con- erns, which before the war had played a leading part in the economy of the coastal cities, suffered badly in the war and never regained heir former position. Thus several years before the Communist ictory, State enterprise had become paramount in the modern ector of the Chinese economy. After eight years of war damage and ack of maintenance, this property of the State was not a very hand- ome inheritance Some of it never even came into the control of the Kuomintang Government at all. Manchuria—that north-eastern egion which Japan had controlled since 1931 and had built into an mportant centre of heavy industry—was liberated by Soviet forces, who removed all the equipment back to their own country.

There followed four years of civil war between the Kuomintang nd the Chinese Communists before, in 1949, the Communists were nasters of the country. By that time the economy was in a very sorry tate, far different from the hopeful picture of early 1937. Inflation eached fantastic proportions and barter replaced monetary trans- ctions. Inflation and the civil war together led to an even greater

local fragmentation of the economy than was traditional in China. The level of agricultural and even more of industrial output was well below that of pre-war days. This, of course, had tragic consequences in China where the pre-war output had in any case been very meagre.

COMMUNIST CONTROL AND THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN

The ending of the civil war and the unification of the country produced immediate and great benefits. Certain measures were taken which were urgently needed and could only be carried out by a strong Central Government. Notable among these was the ending of inflation, the restoration of the transport system, and the repair of dykes and other water conservancy works. By the end of 1952 it was reckoned that economically China had regained the pre-war level. These years of rehabilitation, from 1949 to 1952, also witnessed the land reform movement, the redistribution of landlords' land and the so-called excess holdings of the richer peasants to the poorer peasants—a movement accompanied by considerable violence. Also this period was noteworthy for the strengthening of the State's power, direct and indirect, in industry and commerce. Even where private interests were still allowed a sphere, they were severely restricted and controlled. Towards the end of 1952 the launching of the first Five-Year Plan was announced, to begin from 1953. The Plan as a whole, however, was not published until 1955

Planning can be of two types which, for the sake of simplification may be described as target planning on the one hand, and co-ordinated planning on the other. The first type is akin to New Year resolutions or to election manifestoes. Undoubtedly it has a psychological value, especially when combined with nationalist pride or a similar sentiment, and it is not to be despised. But it is for the second, or co-ordinated, type that economic advantages are frequently claimed. Of course a plan can be of both types simultaneously, but the desire to reach high targets quickly in certain special sectors of the economy is liable to militate against co-ordination. Speed may have to be paid for heavily. In China planning has been of the target type.

The first Five-Year Plan was on Stalinist lines in placing emphasis overwhelmingly on capital goods industries, while neglecting the production of consumer goods. The output of heavy industry made notable advances—steel production, for example, is reported to have risen from less than 1½ million tons in 1952 to nearly 5½

million tons in 1957. Lack of consumer goods on which the enlarged industrial labour force could spend its wages resulted in inflationary tendencies and a growth of black market operations. In agriculture, this was the period of collectivization—at first at a slow pace, when the peasants were encouraged to form mutual aid teams and then small co-operatives. In 1955 the tempo was quickened and by the end of 1956 almost the whole country population of China (96 per cent of the peasant households) was reported to be organized in co-operatives. The collectivization of the peasants in China occurred far more rapidly than in the Soviet Union, it was not until about 1938 that collectivization had gone so far there.

During the first Five-Year Plan period substantial aid was received from the Soviet Union, mainly in the form of 156 complete projects in key industries—iron and steel plants, oil refineries, chemical works, power plants, and so forth. The Chinese people were constantly being told by the Government that they should learn from 'the advanced experience of the Soviet Union'. This they did, and by the end of 1957 the Chinese were able to design and equip many of these industrial projects themselves, while of others they could provide an increasingly large proportion of the component parts In the first Five-Year Plan period the economy continued to reap the benefit of peace and centralization after the years of international and civil war. Living standards had risen from the dismal war-time levels But by the end of the period the machinery began to creak. The programme for building and construction had outrun the supply of raw materials Consumer goods available did not match increased spending power. Rigidity and bureaucracy were much in evidence. For example, in a country of the size and diversity of China, all factories were under the direct control of the appropriate Ministry of the Central Government (the Ministry of Textiles, of Machine Building, and so forth), and were supposed to get the Ministry's permission to acquire any fixed assets worth more than about £30. Centralization had clearly been carried too far, and to remedy this situation the State Council in November 1957 issued regulations to decentralize the financial, industrial, and commercial systems.

This decentralization was certainly needed to deal with the existing situation in China. It was, however, no coincidence that the year before had witnessed a similar decentralization in the Soviet Union. At that time China was still ready to learn from Big Brother. The Chinese economic decentralization did not go as far as that in the

Soviet Union. There industrial ministries were abolished and th enterprises they had controlled were put under the control of re gional governments. In China, the industrial ministries were re tained, but the scope of their activities was much reduced. A larg number of enterprises in industry and mining that had previousl been under central control were instead made subject to control b the provinces or other local authorities. Only the most importan concerns remained under the direct control of the industrial minis tries. The Central Government retained for its own use the greate part of the profits of those enterprises which it now turned over t local authorities, but on balance the local authorities' revenue ex panded. (It should be explained that profits from industrial enter prises are the main source of income for the Chinese Government— in other words, taxation is predominantly indirect, as in the Sovie Union.)

Not only local authorities were given more power Greater lati tude was also extended to the managers of factories and similar con cerns. Each such unit has a number of targets which it has to fulfi every year. Previously no less than twelve such targets had been set Now only four obligatory targets were to remain—the output o major products, total number of employees, total amount of wages and total amount of profits.

Decentralization was also to extend to the drawing-up of th annual economic plan, in which the local authorities were now t have more scope for making suggestions. In the sphere of interna trade, too, a greater delegation of power was announced. Previously the Central Government had controlled the whole commercial net work down to the supply and marketing co-operatives which acte both as retailers and as buyers of produce. Now the whole of th internal commercial organization, with the exception of certain larg warehouses, was to be turned over to local control. Before 1957 th Central Government's allocation system had covered over 40 different commodities. Now this list was to be reduced by more tha half and the local authorities were to be responsible for allocating th remainder.

Important fiscal changes were made at this time. Reference ha already been made to the predominant part played by indirect taxa tion in the Chinese Budget. These taxes were now remodelled A consolidated tax on the actual sales proceeds of manufactured good was to replace the various taxes that had been levied on such good in the course of processing. In some concerns, a new system was in

troduced for the control of funds for investment. By this new arrangement—known as the contract system of investment—an enterprise receiving a grant for capital purposes had to guarantee to complete within a set period a plant or other unit of the agreed productive capacity. Subject to this guarantee, it might spend the money as it chose, and if it completed the assignment at less cost it might retain the balance for further expansion. This superseded earlier arrangements of detailed State control of investment schemes financed from central funds.

THE 'GREAT LEAP FORWARD' AND THE COMMUNES

This decentralization movement might have been thought a prelude to a more moderate economic policy, paying respect to local peculiarities and objective facts, as has occurred in the Soviet Union. But this was not the case. Late in 1957 a change began to take place in the balance of power within the Government whereby the more moderate men, such as Chou En-lai and Chen Yun, lost importance, while the more extreme wing, to which Chairman Mao gave his support, became all-powerful. As a result 1958 became the year of the 'Great Leap Forward', of political and economic frenzy and of growing divergence from the Soviet pattern, culminating in the establishment of the People's Communes in the summer and autumn.

It was, moreover, a year of notable economic prosperity, with an exceptional harvest and quickly rising production in industry. Although the facts must have been favourable enough in themselves, the claims made and the reports put out about this year were fantastic. (We read, for example, of harvests so thick that people could walk on the surface of the solid mass of growing grain.) In the autumn, indeed just at harvest time when it might be thought that all hands were required to gather in this stupendous crop, a campaign was launched for making iron and steel by primitive methods—the backyard furnaces that proliferated throughout the country. Time and time again the targets for steel output for the year were raised, to be triumphantly over-fulfilled. Not until the following year was anything said about the quality of the steel produced in these circumstances. Most important of all, 1958 was the year of the formation throughout rural China of the People's Communes.

What was the connecting link between all these happenings—the decentralization decrees, the centralized national campaigns in in-

dustry and agriculture, and the formation on a nation-wide scale (the People's Communes? First, the Communes. The devolution (authority from the specialized ministries and departments of th Central Government down by stages to the local authorities (th province, the administrative district, the county, the rural distric meant that the basic local authorities had to be strong. The bas economic unit in the countryside at that time was the agricultur producers' co-operative, and in the previous year or two small co operatives had been merging to form larger ones. One of the fisc changes announced in 1957 was that the co-operative, and not th individual household, was to be the tax-paying unit in the country side, thus giving the co-operative an additional importance. Also about this time, in those parts of the country where tractors wer used, the State-operated tractor stations were dissolved and th machines handed over to the agricultural producers' co-operative This was, of course, an exact parallel of what had occurred in th Soviet Union a little earlier.

The Commune was to wield both economic and political authorit in its district. 'Both basic economic units and basic units of Stat power' is how a Peking newspaper (*Ta Kung Pao*) defined then They were also to be, in the original declared purpose at least, in struments for collective living. Usually the Communes tended to b equivalent in size to the rural district, but there were variations, an at one time it seemed as if they might be larger, or equivalent to th county. They were to be complete economic units in that they wer to absorb the existing trade and credit co-operatives as well as th agricultural co-operatives. The Communes also had the task of de veloping industry in the countryside, on which at first great stres was laid. Later, when the bountiful harvest of 1958 was followed b two more meagre ones, less was heard about rural industry and mor of the all-important role of agriculture.

The Communes, then, fitted into the scheme of administrativ decentralization which preceded their formation. But how can w account for the apparent tightening of central control in 195 despite the measures for devolution of authority? In the fatef autumn of 1957 the influence inside the Government of the har Party group, the extremists under Mao Tse-tung, grew. Thenc forward the Party and Government became increasingly identifie In China the Party appears to act more directly at all levels than i the Soviet Union; it performs the co-ordinating and centralizin functions in the Chinese economy—functions which have becom

more important than ever since the decentralization measures. The coming of the Party into the foreground from 1958 onwards accounts for the apparent paradox of more centralized measures and campaigns following on a decentralization of the administrative machinery.

The high claims made for production in 1958 were revised for both agriculture and industry in the following year, when the figures first published were admitted to be too high. Agriculture continued to be the weak sector in the economy—especially in 1960, with the long and severe drought in North China, plagues of insects in various parts, and typhoons in the south and elsewhere. Reports of agricultural difficulties had been coming through to Hong Kong for many months past, but it was only in January 1961 that the Chinese Government publicly acknowledged the scale of the disaster. Natural calamities obviously played a large part in this, but other factors intensified the situation. These will be touched on later

One of the reasons for the development of the Communes was, as has been seen, to provide a strong unit of basic local government, at once both political and economic. Another was the greater ease with which a unit of the size of the Commune—which might consist perhaps of a dozen of the old agricultural producers' co-operatives—could switch over labour to industrial and civil engineering projects too large to be tackled by a smaller unit. In the event, this turned out to have its disadvantages. The Communes used too much of their labour force for these non-agricultural projects. As the agricultural situation worsened, and they were urged to put more workers on to actual farming, the Communes lost much of the reason for their existence. Thus in 1959 and 1960 official pronouncements said that the basic unit for ownership should be, not the Commune, as was proclaimed in 1958, but the production brigades, its component units, which are, in fact, the old agricultural producers' co-operatives. The basic unit for actual operation was to be a still smaller unit, the production team—equivalent to a small village. More encouragement, too, was to be given to peasants to work on their own private plots and to undertake domestic crafts on a family basis.

It is difficult to judge how much of the Commune system still remains, and even, indeed, how much of it ever existed otherwise than on paper. In actual fact the most important features of the Commune movement were probably the public mess halls and the mobilization of the housewives for agricultural work. Attempts were

certainly made in places to remould social life and introduce collective living, with obvious advantages from the point of view of the Party and the Government, by enabling a far tighter social control to be exercised and by lessening the influence of the older generations over the children. But too much publicity has been given in the West to stories of collective life in the Communes—stories which no doubt had their origin in Chinese press reports of 1958. In reality, of course, the rebuilding of private living accommodation on a large scale all over the country was quite impossible. The significant feature of collective living mentioned above, the public mess hall, is an institution of obvious importance in enforcing a rationing system and in preventing the hoarding of grain by individual households From all the evidence, these halls have been unpopular and at one time many seemed to have closed, only to be reopened later in the last year or two, with the poorer harvests, their importance as a method of rationing has increased. The Government's aim is to syphon off from peasant consumption as much agricultural production as possible in order to feed the cities and to provide for exports; eating, or at least cooking, at one central point, thus eliminating both the time and the fuel needed for private cooking, makes this task much easier and also frees the women for agricultural work

LABOUR AND AGRICULTURE

This is especially important in view of the acute shortage of labour that has occurred in the Chinese countryside in the last few years. Surprise is often expressed in the West at this labour shortage when the Chinese countryside was always believed to have considerable reserves of surplus labour. Perhaps this surplus was more of a seasonal matter than had been realized, but in any case in the 1950s there was heavy migration from rural areas into the towns and cities, despite official efforts to stem it. Moreover, the demand for labour for non-agricultural tasks in the countryside was strongly pressed, even at times of peak demand for hands on the farms The iron and steel campaign of 1958, for example, coincided with the autumn harvest; in some districts almost all the male workers were put on to iron and steel production, leaving the women and children to gather in that exceptionally heavy harvest, much of which, as Government spokesmen later admitted, was left to rot on the fields Water conservancy projects have also taken up millions of man-hours. In addition, the removal of incentives for the peasants to work, since the introduction of collectivization and the Communes,

as made it necessary to have a large number of supervisors. We read f cadres going about urging on peasants the importance of doing heir spring sowing and hoeing their crops—operations which the Chinese peasant had been doing without exhortation since time immemorial.

Of course, while Chinese farming in the past has been efficient, as ld-style methods of agriculture go, there is a tremendous amount hat could be learned from modern science and technique. A comparison between Chinese agriculture and that of Japan, which operates under similar conditions to those found in parts of China, will ear this out: the yields in Japan are very much higher. A lot has een done in China recently to spread new techniques, but often ithout much discrimination. For example, nation-wide campaigns have been launched to encourage such practices as deep loughing and close planting; in some soils and conditions these ractices may be beneficial, in other conditions the reverse. There as also the ferocious campaign against sparrows, aimed at eliminatig them from the whole country and thus saving all the grain they ere said to consume. Just when success had been almost achieved, omeone discovered that sparrows ate harmful insects as well, and he whole campaign was called off a year or so ago. But it will take ome time before the sparrow population is restored, and meanhile this past year we hear that insect pests have added to the other alamities.

Agriculture is a sphere in which the Russian pattern is of very tle use to China except in the far north where, in the province of eilungkiang, large mechanized State farms on the Soviet model ave been reclaiming land (the Japanese did something of the same nd, though on a smaller scale, when they ruled that region). But he methods of agriculture practised in Japan herself would seem to e very suitable to follow as far as much of China is concerned, if griculture is to meet the heavy demands made on it at the present me—demands arising from the increase in total population (said be of the order of 2 per cent a year), from the rise in urban population, which usually consumes more, from the need to export, nd from the growing demand for raw materials for industry. China's industry is heavily dependent on the fortunes of agriculture, nd industrial production in any one year rises or falls according to he harvest of the previous year. The chemical industry is not ufficiently developed to provide synthetic raw materials on a large cale, nor can the country afford sufficient imports to compensate

for a bad harvest. Add to this the fact that the Government reven is derived first and foremost from taxes on consumer goods ma mostly from agricultural raw materials, and secondly from dire taxes on agriculture, and the dimensions and seriousness of t present crisis become apparent.

In attempting to meet the crisis there has been a desperate sear for labour for agriculture. Rural schools had already been 'combi ing education with labour', and institutions of higher education the cities, too, have had their students—and staff—sent off to ho in the fields. The Government has tried to stem and reverse t migration to the towns. This reversal has been developed into large-scale movement of 'sending down', as the phrase is litera translated, industrial and office workers to the countryside to e gage in agriculture and in ancillary occupations 'at the basic leve Government and Party cadres have figured prominently amo those 'sent down', and here the importance of their getting acquain ed with actual conditions in the country has been continuously em phasized. Another purpose served by the dispersion of cadres is strengthen political control over the country districts and to counte act the local bias of local cadres. Many of the Government cadi thus 'sent down' have been given the key position of managers public mess halls.

Mention has already been made of the water conservancy pr jects and the tremendous amount of work put into them in t countryside. In the exhilarating summer of 1958 it was confiden declared that they had made drought and flood things of the p that would never recur. Unfortunately these projects had the e fects of so much of the work done in China in recent years that mig have been splendid but was spoilt by impatience An interesti article on water conservancy by the chief of a team of Soviet wa conservancy experts working in China, Kaoerhniehfu,[1] appeared the Chinese journal *Water Conservancy and Electric Power* (Febr ary 1959). After polite congratulations on the achievements of t past year, the author went on to say that the existing general wa conservancy plans, 'as technical planning documents, fail to refle the actual conditions in the national economy and in the ri basins'. He referred to the grandiose scheme to transfer water fro South China to the North, and insisted that first there must studies and plans for the various individual river basins concern 'In 1958,' said Comrade Kaoerhniehfu, 'attention was paid to c

[1] Chinese transliteration.

signing and building, but management lagged behind. Because the problem of management was underestimated, many projects met with accidents, damaging the materials of the people and the State.'

URBAN COMMUNES

When the rural Communes were established in 1958, a few Communes were also set up in cities, notably in the textile centre of Chengchow in Honan. But at the end of the year it was announced that the establishment of urban Communes was to be postponed. Then, early in 1960, reports suddenly came in that for some time past the formation of Communes had been going on in many of the larger cities. The features which these Communes had in common with each other and with the Communes in the country areas were collective feeding and sometimes other collective welfare facilities, and the mobilization of the housewives for productive work. Several types of urban Commune appeared, notably (i) that which comprised the employees of one large factory and their families, (ii) that comprising the residents of a street or a number of streets, and (iii) a Commune predominantly urban but including some agricultural land as well The urban Communes frequently organized the housewives into small 'street factories' or workshops, generally having little machinery and carrying on production rather on the lines of domestic industry but on a somewhat larger scale. Quite often these street factories function as sub-contractors or outworkers for the larger well-established factories in the town, making spare parts or ancillary goods for them, or doing their repairs, perhaps using their waste products as raw material, and maybe receiving advice and training from their technicians. In other cases the street factories engage in the manufacture of small, light consumer goods for local use Either way, the existence of these small workshops imparts a certain flexibility to the town's economy—they do the jobs which either no one had remembered to put into the plan (such as making small consumer goods) or which the cumbersome operation of the system makes it advisable to have on one's doorstep under one's control.

Thus the springing-up of these street factories around a larger concern, and catering for its special needs, is really one example of that vertical integration which appears to be a growing feature of Chinese economic life, while the factories making consumer goods for use in the city exemplify the parallel tendency towards local self-sufficiency. In other words, the last few years have seen a fragmenta-

tion of the economy, the result partly of the decentralization me
sures, partly of the deterioration of the transport system which h
taken place since it was overstrained almost to the point of collap
in 1958, and partly inherent in the nature of planning as practis
in China. The units on which the plans are based—that is, the uni
whether factory, Commune, city, or province, which are responsib
for fulfilling a target or a set of targets—tend towards economic se
sufficiency. If the task by which the unit is judged is to fulfil certa
statistical goals rather than to respond to the expressed needs of t
market, it will naturally put the fulfilment of its own targets befo
satisfying the needs of other units. Since other enterprises are al
behaving in this way, they tend to be regarded as unpredictable an
unreliable, and wisdom demands that one should try to become
self-sufficient as possible.

There have been welcome signs over the last year or two th
common sense is breaking through the ideological barrage that cu
minated in 1958, and that now practical affairs are being handl
with more realism. This is in line with what one would expect fro
the concrete, down-to-earth outlook that is normally consider
typical of the Chinese people.[1] This tendency has undoubtedly be
fostered by the agricultural crisis, which made it impossible to affo
the time and energy hitherto given to political matters. There h
been, for example, a great reduction in many places in the number
meetings that the peasants have to attend. Also more respect is no
paid to the experience of old peasants and to the need to mod
agricultural techniques in accordance with local conditions T
greater emphasis now put on smaller units, such as the producti
brigade and the production team and even, for some purposes, t
individual household, is in line with this pragmatic approach. If t
current difficulties further this trend, the sufferings of the prese
time will not have been entirely in vain.

AUDREY DONNITHORNE

[1] The writer's favourite example is that of the local Party secretary fr
Shensi, who wrote that 'through the study of theory I clearly understood
principles of uninterrupted revolution and of revolution by stages and put th
into concrete application in pig breeding'

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Notes of the Month

The United States and Cuba

THE Monroe Doctrine has been much invoked in the dispute between Washington and Dr Castro.[1] Its influence is evident in the phrases of President Kennedy's crisp reply to Russian charges that America has backed the invasion of Cuba, and it was held up for some mockery by Mr Khrushchev last July, when he contended that it had died a natural death and ought to be buried before its decay poisoned the air. The Democratic party platform for the 1960 election contained a specific reaffirmation of the 'historic policy of opposition to the establishment anywhere in the Americas of governments dominated by foreign powers', apparently inserted in direct reply to Mr Khrushchev.

How wide a claim does the Doctrine make? Historically it has no single meaning: its manifestations have ranged from a guarantee to Latin America against overt attack from outside the hemisphere to a U.S. claim for hegemony of a sort—hegemony at least in the sense of America's determining the political and diplomatic and even economic limits within which Latin American countries may choose their courses of action. And the limits of U.S. tolerance have not been liberal, at least for leftward deviations, as was demonstrated in the case of Guatemala.

It also has to be taken into account in Washington that Mr Khrushchev has his own doctrine to compete with that of President Monroe. It may be summed up in the phrase that he used to Walter Lippmann a few years ago, that 'the revolution is the *status quo*'. That is to say, the revolutionary social ferment which is changing the power-map of the world in places such as Cuba and Africa is part of the world-order which he is determined to maintain. This is a form of revisionism which the Western Powers find it difficult to meet. But it will be a sad day for the American image in the world if the Monroe Doctrine, which in 1823 assured America's southern neighbours against a somewhat illusory danger of counter-revolu-

[1] See Note of the Month in *The World Today*, November 1960.

tion from Europe, is used in 1961 to justify counter-revoluti
from the U.S.A.

Moreover, it must be remembered that the Monroe Doctrine
it might be interpreted by the United States is not accepted by t
Organization of American States. Article 15 of the Bogotá trea
signed by the O.A.S. on 29 April 1948 confirmed the Hava
Convention of 1928 and stated categorically: 'No state, or group
states, has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for a
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other stat
The Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas in March 19
passed a resolution condemning 'international Communism',
which the key passage read:

> . . . that the domination or control of the political institutions of a
> American state by the international Communist movement, extendi
> to this hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental Pow
> would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independen
> of the American States, endangering the peace of America . . . a
> would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption
> appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.

Mr Dulles subsequently compared this resolution to the Monr
Doctrine, but the Caracas resolution gave the United States on
the right to call for collective action, and no formal right to inte
vene. The invocation of the Monroe Doctrine can in no way inva
date the condemnation of unilateral intervention as illegal.

O.E.E.C. into O.E.C.D.

THE foundations for closer economic cooperation on the tw
sides of the Atlantic had already been laid by the time the Kenne
Administration took over, but since then a new sense of purpo
and leadership emanates from the White House, discernible
international meetings and conferences of which the O.E.E.(
meeting in Paris in the third week of April has been the latest, ar
an outstanding, example.

The institutional expression of a new relationship betwe
Western Europe and North America is the impending transform
tion of the Organization for European Economic Co-operatio
(O.E.E.C.) into the Organization for Economic Co-operation ar
Development (O.E.C.D.). In the new organization, the Unit
States and Canada will co-operate with the eighteen O.E.E.(
countries as full members on a basis of equality, whereas hither
their status was that of associates and their role that of observers ar
advisers.

The first step in this direction was taken on American initiative at the Paris Economic Conference of January 1960.[1] The O.E.E.C. in its existing form seemed to have outlived its usefulness. The Six and the Seven were going their separate ways; the world balance of economic power had changed. The United States, despite her continuing superior wealth, had been made aware by balance-of-payments difficulties that her position as protector and benefactor *vis-à-vis* Europe was changing into a relationship of mutual dependence. The post-war period of chronic dollar shortage seemed to be finally at an end, as demonstrated by the introduction of external convertibility of most European currencies in December 1958 when the *raison-d'être* vanished for the European Payments Union, the O.E.E.C.'s most outstanding contribution to European recovery. Moreover, the need to save dollars had been the mainspring behind the liberalization of intra-European trade; at a time when the United States was losing gold to Europe at a considerable rate, discrimination against dollar imports was bound to assume a somewhat different aspect. Finally, whereas Europe had gained relative economic strength, the less developed countries were being left further behind and the need for effective means of assisting them was coming to be seen as a major joint Western policy objective.

Against this background, the 'Group of Four' high-ranking officials (an American, a Briton, a Frenchman, and a Greek) produced their report and draft convention for *A Remodelled Economic Organization*[2] Criticism of the proposals came mainly from the smaller European countries, both from among the Six and from the Seven, led by the Swiss who submitted counter-proposals. These countries, with the backing of Germany, were disconcerted by the apparently complete abdication of competence in trade matters in the proposed organization. They argued that the split into two European trading groups demanded all-European machinery to deal with trade problems and, furthermore, that in the absence of this, and with sole reliance on the G.A.T.T., the smaller European countries would lack an adequate voice to safeguard themselves, especially in slump conditions. Similarly, it was argued that the degree of co-operation achieved under the O.E.E.C. should not and need not be sacrificed in order to accommodate the acceding North American members. The O.E.E.C.'s legal and organizational struc-

[1] See Note of the Month in *The World Today*, February 1960.
[2] Published in Paris under this title, April 1960

ture, it was felt, should be consolidated rather than loosened throu
its replacement by a purely consultative body. Some clear differe
tiation was suggested between subjects directly affecting all t
members and those with which the European countries could pr
ceed but not the North American. Against these views, France w
reported to have supported the American wish for limited authori
of the O.E.C.D., Britain to have played the role of mediator

A meeting of senior officials in May 1960 was followed by
ministerial conference in Paris on 22–23 July when a number of k
decisions were made. The Convention setting up the O.E.C.I
signed on 14 December 1960,[1] while making some concession
those who wanted to preserve as much as possible of the character
the O.E.E.C., was kept on broad and flexible lines, taking care
avoid any far-reaching advance commitments.

The aims of the organization were stated to be threefold.
facilitate the highest sustainable economic growth in memb
countries compatible with financial stability; to contribute to sour
economic expansion in member as well as non-member countri
which are in the process of economic development; and to contr
bute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-di
criminatory basis. The accent has been placed on consultation, joi
study, and exchange of information, but a provision was add
during the negotiations for 'co-ordinated action' to be taken 'whe
appropriate'. The unanimity rule is to apply, except that a memb
may choose to abstain, in which case the decision would not apply
it, a qualification conceded by the Americans.

On the organization's trade competence, the compromise reach
was broadly that there should be regular policy confrontation an
that European regional trade problems might be examined but al
that the O.E.E.C.'s liberalization code should lapse, though existi
liberalization commitments would continue to be valid. Th
American negotiators stressed the need to satisfy Congress that i
powers over tariff and tax policy determination would not be i
fringed. In the event, the Convention was duly ratified by th
United States but met with stronger opposition than had been e
pected. Moreover, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee thoug
it necessary to attach to its report a 'statement of understanding'
the U.S. position making clear that nothing in the treaty enabled th
U.S. Executive to exceed its present powers, or bound the Unit

[1] Cmnd. 1257; also published by O.E.E.C., with related documents (Pa
December 1960).

States without complying with domestic law, or limited any of the existing powers of Congress. There is perhaps no better illustration that transatlantic co-operation can hardly become an adequate substitute for a European solution of the Sixes and Sevens.

The view could be taken that America was joining with Europe in the new organization primarily in order to influence European policies rather than to reorientate her own policies to comply with the demands of economic interdependence. Some such feeling was not uncommon during the negotiating period and contributed to a certain scepticism among British and continental commentators regarding the potential value of the O.E.C.D. Since then the United States dollar crisis and continuing imbalance in international payments has done much to draw fresh attention to the advantages of international co-ordination of economic policy. Moreover, the main lines of American policy under President Kennedy's leadership have begun to take shape and it now seems that if the O.E.C.D. does not become a valuable and effective instrument, this will not be for the want of trying by the U.S. Administration.

Formally, the O.E.C.D. Convention still needs to be ratified by the European countries, but actually the organization is already virtually in being. As far as co-operation in assisting the less developed countries is concerned, this was begun well over a year ago in the ten-nation Development Assistance Group (D.A.G.)[1] which is to be incorporated into the O.E.C.D. as the Development Assistance Committee (D.A.C.). The D.A.G. has held four meetings so far, the last at the end of March 1961 in London at which Mr George Ball, the new U.S. Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, explained the ideas behind President Kennedy's important proposals for the reform of the U.S. foreign aid programme, and stressed the need for long-term commitments of funds and systematic planning. Privately he also showed himself aware that economic aid will be wasted in the long run unless industrial countries see a way of opening their markets to labour-intensive, low-cost imports from the less developed countries. The functions of D.A.G. for the expansion and improvement of Western economic aid are essentially confined to discussion of principles, to the study of methods, and to the dissemination of information and cross-

[1] The D.A.G. includes those prospective O.E.E.C. countries able and willing to participate in the assistance effort (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United States), plus Japan and a representative of the European Economic Community.

fertilization of ideas. Administration of funds is not contemplated nor the assumption of operational functions. Indeed, the discussion of aid for particular areas, countries, and projects has also been excluded by mutual agreement.[1] One of the anxieties has been to assure receiving countries that there is no question of a ganging-up of the donors to dictate terms to them.

The United States balance-of-payments difficulties have prompted particular emphasis on more equitable burden-sharing in rendering development aid, and especially on an increased contribution in the form of long-term loans on easy terms from Germany, the outstanding surplus country. But the present ills of the international payments system may also soon be tackled at the source, as indicated by the spirit in which the O.E.E.C. Economic Policy Committee met on 18–19 April, when two working groups were set up, one to deal with measures to stimulate economic growth, the other to study the relation of monetary and fiscal policies to the international payments situation. In the words of Mr Thorkil Kristensen, the O.E.C.D. Secretary-General designate, 'though this was an O.E.E.C. meeting it had been conducted in the O.E.C.D style of the future and it could be assumed that the strength of delegations reflected a desire to work actively.'[2]

[1] Resolution on Aid to Developing Countries adopted at the ministerial conference of 22–23 July 1960 in Paris (*Board of Trade Journal*, 12 August 1960, p 357.

[2] *The Times*, 20 April 1961.

The Ryukyu Islands

A U.S. Bastion in the Pacific

THE Ryukyuan archipelago, a chain of sixty-three tiny islands between Southern Japan and Taiwan, is not precisely 'America's Last Colony', as it has frequently been termed, but it is in fact America's major military bastion in the Pacific. That the Ryukyus are of such current strategic value gives to the islands' problems and progress a considerable degree of international importance.

This importance is in itself unusual in time of peace, for even a cursory glance at Ryukyuan history indicates that the islands have in the past been largely ignored except in times of war, when their very location tragically involved them in the power politics of warring neighbours. A kingdom until 1879, the Ryukyus experienced their Golden Era in the 200 years following the assumption of a tributary relationship with China in 1372. Then, after centuries of stagnation, the islands fell under complete Japanese control from 1879 to 1945, until they were liberated by U.S. forces in the last and most bitter combat of the war in the Pacific, a ninety-day campaign that claimed 12,000 American and 150,000 Japanese and Ryukyuan lives. Once again the islands were neglected; the conquerors did little more than employ them as an 'end-of-the-line' assignment for civil servants, who administered minimum aid designed to maintain the economy at subsistence level. It was not until the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950 that the Ryukyus suddenly assumed a new importance, an importance since maintained, indeed accelerated, in this era of cold and potential hot war.

Not quite a colony nor a U.S. Trust Territory nor a prefecture of Japan—although Japan has been awarded 'residual sovereignty' over the islands[1]—the Ryukyus are occupied and governed under provisions of Article 3 in the Japanese Peace Treaty of 8 September 1951, which contained this paragraph:

> Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto

[1] The principal author of the Japanese Peace Treaty, the late U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, explained that 'residual sovereignty', an obscure term at best, meant that the islands were held by the U.S. because of military necessity but 'with a view to their eventual return to Japanese sovereignty'. To support this promise, the Eisenhower administration in 1953 returned to Japanese control the Amami Oshima group of the Ryukyus.

south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island, and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.[1]

The proposed status of the Ryukyus as a U.N. trusteeship has never been implemented by the United States on the ground of the islands' importance to both immediate and long-term U.S. defence requirements. Instead, a political dyarchy has been maintained, in which the major instruments of American control are the offices of High Commissioner and U.S. Civil Administrator. Both offices are filled by American Army generals, a fact which outwardly seems to continue the earlier status of 'occupied enemy territory' and which arouses deep resentment among the Ryukyuan people. The second instrument, not of control nor of policy-making but of day-to-day internal administration, is the Government of the Ryukyus (GRI), headed by a Ryukyuan chief executive and subject to a twenty-nine-man legislature. President Eisenhower's Executive Order of 1957 stressed the U.S. desire to continue encouragement of responsible government at both municipal and central government levels, and in economic if not political spheres the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) is increasingly delegating responsibilities to GRI.

A political organization which denies a people sovereignty and which imposes decisions that override local autonomy must inevitably engender friction, friction that at once creates problems and is the result of problems. It would be inappropriate, on the basis of facts, to speak of the Ryukyus as a potential 'Cyprus of the Pacific', yet even in those 920 square miles, with a population little larger than the city of Manchester, problems are complex and offer no easy solutions. Essentially, the major and more unmanageable problems facing the U.S. administration of the islands at present can be reduced to six:

(i) The land problem, resulting from American commandeering of some 51,000 acres for the establishment of military installations;

(ii) A penal code which smacks of military law and which, at least to its critics, appears to deny the Ryukyuans basic legal rights,

[1] The last sentence is repeated, nearly verbatim, in the present official 'bible' of the U.S. administration of the Ryukyus, the Presidential Executive Order of 5 June 1957.

(iii) Over-population and an inadequate programme of emigration;
(iv) Opposition, especially by leftist political groups, to the U.S. build-up of nuclear missile sites;
(v) The failure of the U.S. administration to allow popular election of the chief executive of GRI; and
(vi) The strong movement, which to a great extent transcends political labels, for immediate or ultimate reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan, regarded as the islands' spiritual and cultural fatherland.

Until quite recently, the land problem was the dominant dilemma for USCAR. In an archipelago with thin and rocky soil, with little more than 60,000 acres of arable land, the seizure by the U.S. military of 51,000 acres on the major island of Okinawa for the establishment of the most luxurious bases in the Far East must inevitably have serious repercussions—indeed, since 1946 more than 50,000 Ryukyuan families have been displaced.[1] During recent years, the extreme-left People's Party and the Socialist Masses Party (a moderate group, despite its alarming name), by hammering on the issue of the displacement of families and on the over-all land problem, aroused considerable sympathy, even among essentially pro-American elements. Their hammering has, to a great extent, been justifiable, for it is difficult indeed for USCAR adequately to explain the military significance of swimming pools, snack bars, bowling alleys, and spacious American housing projects to a people accustomed to surviving on a plot no larger than one of the swimming pools.

However, as Americans are quick to point out, 'money talks', and during recent months the land problem has become less crucial, as a result, in general, of the comparative economic prosperity of the islands since the introduction of dollar currency in 1958, and in particular of generous compensation payments for the land seized by the military. For example, in the period 1 July 1955 to 30 June 1958, USCAR made land payments totalling £580,000; at present more than 57,000 petitions for land rental increases are under consideration by the U.S. Land Tribunal.[2] Although the U.S. Army last year acquired another 3,000 acres for training purposes, increased and generally acceptable rental payments were awarded. Also, whenever possible, the Land Tribunal is attempting to restore un-

[1] George H. Kerr, *Okinawa, The History of an Island People* (Tokyo, Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1959), p. 6.

[2] *Civil Affairs in the Ryukyu Islands*, 30 September 1959, published by Office of Plans and Programmes, USCAR, Ryukyu Islands.

required land to the Ryukyuans; in 1959, 1,136 acres of requisitioned land were released, and nearly 7,000 acres on military installations were licensed for farming purposes.[1] Military land payments in 1960 are estimated at £6 million, a sum which has stilled most of the protracted protests against U.S. land policy.[2] The situation has improved as a result both of these generous payments and of a recently instituted uniform method for grading land, and the focus of the land problem has now moved to those Ryukyuans who are attempting to obtain land settlements for property damages and loss incurred prior to the Peace Treaty. Their claims are naturally supported by leftist political elements, who manage to keep the land issue alive and delay a definite solution.

In the summer of 1959, USCAR promulgated a revised Code of Penal Law[3] which, although it actually liberalized the existing law and removed some if not all of its martial character, ironically encountered the same type of violent reaction as that accorded in Japan to the revised and liberalized Japan–U.S. Security Treaty The new code, which 'was designed to delete certain offenses no longer found necessary and to add certain other offenses in order to supply omissions and achieve legal completeness . . . and which prescribed a bill of rights for defendants',[4] had to be withdrawn, and is at present indefinitely suspended. That part of the code to which Ryukyuans object is the provision allowing the U.S. to impose severe penalties for any crimes against American military personnel, espionage, sedition, sabotage, and even 'agitation'. Although admitting that the penal code has a ring of military law to it, USCAR justifies the provision on the grounds of Okinawa's strategic importance.[5]

However, since both the existing code and its proposed revision appear to ignore Japan's residual sovereignty over the islands—even to the point of forbidding as agitation the display of any national flag other than the Star Spangled Banner, thus including the Japanese Rising Sun in the ban—the dispute over the penal code is tied up with what is undoubtedly the major problem facing U.S. adminis-

[1] *Civil Affairs in the Ryukyu Islands, op cit.*

[2] A humorous footnote to the generally serious land problem is the fact that recently the U.S. made rental payments, retroactive to 1 July 1950, for nine acres of non-existent land. The privately owned land was dredged away in 1946 during American improvements of Naha port, but its owners have received £60,000 in back payments and are assured of future annual rental payments on the justification that although the land has been removed it is still being used as a waterway.

[3] HICOM Ordinance No. 23.

[4] *Civil Affairs in the Ryukyu Islands, op. cit.* [5] *ibid.*

trators, that of reversion to Japan. Because of this congruence of issues, Japanese reaction was sharply critical at the time when the proposed code was published, and the very publication revived long-standing, but until then subdued, objections to U.S. legal procedures in the Ryukyus.[1] In particular, the provision forbidding agitation has been cited by critics as an example of deprivation of civil rights; in a visit to Okinawa in August 1959, Roger Baldwin, then chairman of the League for the Rights of Man, publicly stated that 'there are many provisions in the code that are opposed to civil liberties. And I am confident that the American officials are not going to impose any of those penalties.'[2] He is substantially correct, and USCAR is proceeding most delicately, especially on the matter of agitation, for fear of merely broadening the problem, which at the moment is 'solved' by leaving it in abeyance.

Over-population is not a problem peculiar to the Ryukyus, yet it is a serious problem indeed in that the most common remedy for it—emigration—is hampered by the islands' semi-colonial status and lack of sovereignty. The 1960 census indicates there are 867,000 Ryukyuans, of whom 750,000 are on the main island of Okinawa, where the population density is 1,504 persons per square mile, the world's single most heavily populated area.[3] Over-population naturally complicates the land problem and aggravates unemployment, although the employment of nearly 50,000 Okinawans, out of a total labour force of 400,000, on U.S. military installations has so far solved this aspect.[4] In addition, the repatriation of some 180,000 Ryukyuans since the end of the war has further contributed to the population pressure.[5]

The Ryukyus are not a sovereign State and therefore there is no true governmental apparatus with which foreign Governments can draw up emigration agreements and quotas; thus post-war emigration has been totally inadequate. During the period 1948–60, only 11,457 persons emigrated to Argentina, Peru, Brazil, and Bolivia,[6] in most cases on an individual basis, the emigration being

[1] In an address on 30 September 1960 Byron E. Blankinship, political adviser to the High Commissioner, defended not only the revised but the original Code of Penal Law and Procedure of 16 March 1955, which, he said, 'embodied many of the safeguards ordinarily associated with due process of law. Every defendant is entitled to know the charges against him, to have counsel, to introduce witnesses, to testify on his own behalf, and so on.'

[2] *Asia Scene*, October 1959.

[3] USCAR Press Release 1159, 8 June 1960.

[4] *Civil Affairs in the Ryukyu Islands*, *op. cit.*

[5] Kerr, *op. cit.*

[6] *Konnichi-no-Ryukyu*, Vol. IV, No 9, September 1960.

possible only because of families and relatives already residing in those countries who were willing to guarantee the newcomers' support. The United States herself is strongly criticized for her failure to establish a U.S. immigration quota for Ryukyuans; instead the very few islanders who reach the U.S. do so on the tail of the Japanese quota. Thus, until a much more dynamic programme of emigration is developed, over-population remains a crucial difficulty, hampering any dreams of an economically self-sufficient Ryukyus

In a tiny island-nation utterly ravaged by war only fifteen years ago, it is understandable that a strong current of neutralism courses through public opinion. The People's Party—which describes itself as 'anti-anti-Communist'—in particular has seized upon this sentiment and translated it into one of its most persistent political slogans, tying it to a demand for abolition of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and for immediate reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan. Even within the pro-American Liberal-Democratic Party an earnest, if muffled, protest is to be heard against the American build-up of a nuclear arsenal on Okinawa. Articulate objections have been raised against the practice firing of Nike missiles, with the attendant liability of danger to shipping and fisheries, and to the establishment of Hawk and Mace missile sites. A vocal minority greeted President Eisenhower last June with posters and slogans demanding the removal of all atomic weapons from Okinawa.

The most explosive single incident related to the anti-nuclear issue occurred on 30 June 1959, when a U.S. jet crashed in the populous area of Ishikawa on Okinawa, resulting in seventeen deaths, injuries to 120 people, and extensive damage to property. The incident, which raised the possibility of an atomic explosion had the plane been carrying bombs, encouraged anti-Americanism for several months, and it was only on 20 October of last year that at least the legal aspects of the crash were settled. Of the 289 claims, 278 have been settled by payments well in excess of precedents based on Japanese and Ryukyuan laws, and American plastic surgeons are still on the island administering treatment to the wounded.[1] Thus, although the Ishikawa incident has more or less vanished as a political issue, for the nuclear base problem there appears to be no solution, since agreements between the U.S. and Japan preclude the existence of nuclear weapons in Japan, and American jurisdiction over the Ryukyus makes them the logical candidate for the No. 1 Pacific military bastion.

[1] *The Morning Star*, Okinawa, 21 October 1960.

While GRI continues to receive additional and expanded responsibilities,[1] the body's chief executive is still personally appointed by the U.S. High Commissioner. Widespread public demands for public election of the chief executive have however resulted in a promise by the High Commissioner last summer to appoint subsequent chiefs from that political party which emerges as the majority party in the islands' periodic general elections.[2] The general election of 13 November 1960 was the first in which the new policy on such appointments obtained, and the appointment itself therefore assumed considerable importance.

Undoubtedly the election was the most hotly contested in the history of the archipelago, with eighty candidates competing for the twenty-nine seats in the unicameral legislature. Three major parties contested the seats: the pro-American Liberal Democrats, headed by incumbent chief executive Seisaku Ota; the moderate Socialist Masses Party; and the People's Party, led by the rabble-rousing and once politically important Kamejiro Senaga, who was himself prevented by the penal code from running for office,[3] but who entered his wife as a candidate. She was unsuccessful.

The Liberal-Democratic Party, a coalition of conservative elements similar to its namesake in Japan, campaigned for expansion of the Ryukyuan economy, tax reductions, encouragement of investment, promotion of small and medium industries, educational development, completion of a social security system, land development, and acceleration of an emigration programme[4]—thus sidestepping most of the explosive issues that have created U.S.-Ryukyuan friction.

The Socialist Masses Party was adamant in its demand for public election of the chief executive, but just before the election accepted the High Commissioner's promise to appoint the GRI head from the majority party. The SMP further called for the return of ad-

[1] American hesitations over delegating greater responsibilities to GRI and the Ryukyuan legislature are, perhaps, well founded, if only because the legislature exhibits a remarkably unrealistic approach to Bills introduced, concerning itself too frequently with resolutions about which neither the legislature nor GRI can do anything, e g favourable treatment for the import of Ryukyuan pineapples into Japan, immediate reversion to Japan, prohibition of nuclear weapons on Okinawa, and so on

[2] This represents a definite advance over Section 8 of the Executive Order of 5 June 1957, which read. '. . . the chief executive shall be a Ryukyuan, appointed by the High Commissioner after consultation with representatives of the legislative body'

[3] As guilty of 'agitation' for his pro-Communist activities when he was mayor of Naha city.

[4] *Ryukyu Shimpo*, 19 September 1960.

ministrative authority, increased financial assistance from the U.S., abolition of atomic and hydrogen bomb bases, representation of the Ryukyus in the Japanese Diet, increased emigration, and strengthening of labour's voice in internal affairs.[1]

The extreme-left People's Party called for immediate abolition of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, removal of all American bases, rescinding of the penal code, increased U.S. aid 'as our natural right', and a drastic rise in workers' wages.[2] Originally appealing primarily to the labouring class, the People's Party before the election expanded its appeal to include small and medium business men and farmers, an appeal which failed to add much to its popular support.

The outcome of the election paralleled developments in the Japanese general election of 20 November: in each case the electorate gave its support to the incumbent conservative Government. The Okinawan Liberal Democrats increased their representation in the legislature from 13 to 22, which was seen as a stamp of approval, despite lingering grievances, for U.S. policy in the islands. This conclusion was supported by the weakening of the SMP, which fell from 11 to only 5 seats,[3] and the virtual collapse of the PP, which managed to return only one of its five representatives. Thus the demand for popular election of the chief executive has been stilled, though the question has not been solved; however, it can be said that the future political harmony between the Ryukyuans and USCAR hinges to a certain extent on a liberalization of American control over the office of chief executive, so far hindered by U.S. fears lest GRI might fall under the control of anti-American elements.

One issue upon which all major political parties agree, in principle if not in timing, is that of reversion to Japan. While the ruling party gives little more than lip-service to the issue and speaks of 'eventual return to the Fatherland' in order to satisfy widespread desires among the electorate, the SMP calls for 'establishment of a Japan–U.S. joint committee to work out the return of the Ryukyus to Japan',[4] and the PP for immediate reversion to be effected by means of 'a movement to have the Japanese Constitution and various laws

[1] *Ryukyu Shimpo*, 23 September 1960

[2] *Okinawa Times*, 19 September 1960.

[3] Including the most humiliating single defeat, that of the SMP candidate and former Speaker of the House, Tsumichiyo Asato, who had been considered the most likely candidate for chief executive had his party emerged victorious

[4] *Ryukyu Shimpo*, 23 September 1960.

and regulations in effect in Japan applied to the Ryukyus as the best way to expedite the reversion'.[1] Beyond the political parties, and cutting across them, the reversion issue is constantly pressed by the Okinawan Reversion Council, some 2,000 of whose supporters exhibited the Rising Sun and conducted protest snake dances during the brief visit of former President Eisenhower, forcing him to alter the route of his drive through Naha city.

That reversion is not, however, the unanimous wish of Ryukyuans was indicated during the election, when the infant Nationalist Party, violent foe of reversion and supporter of outright independence for the islands, managed to enlist a surprising degree of support, although it failed to gain entrance to the legislature. Citing the remarkable growth of the Ryukyuan economy under U.S. administration and with U.S. aid, the Nationalists' leader, Chotoku Ogimi, warned that should reversion occur the islands would again be treated as a poor country province by the Japanese Government, as was the case until 1945. He claims, with more than a little truth, that the Japanese *zaibatsu* combines would swallow all Ryukyuan industrial assets; local shipping lines, banks, and insurance houses would become mere branch offices of Tokyo; the 49,000 Ryukyuans employed by the American military would join the unemployed; the 10,000-man staff of GRI would be whittled down to a prefectural size of about 1,500; and the Ryukyus 'would revert to the poorest prefecture of Japan, again completely forgotten by the outside world'.[2]

On the Japanese side, the reversion issue creates little of the sound and fury that it does in the Ryukyus. Indeed, a recent poll of Japanese Diet members on the question of reversion resulted in only 129 responses out of 696 questionnaires.[3] Among the 129 there was quite naturally almost unanimous support for early reversion, and while reversion remains an official policy of the Japanese Government, it is recognized in Tokyo that the issue is but a comparatively minor part of the considerably more vital issues growing out of the Japan–U.S. defence alliance and that a solution of the reversion problem can be postponed. Indeed, former Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi agreed that 'Okinawa's reversion to Japan can be expected only when U.S.–Japan co-operation is reinforced',[4] and his successor, Hayato Ikeda, has given no indication

[1] *Okinawa Times*, 19 September 1960.
[2] *The Morning Star*, Okinawa, 15 June 1960.
[3] *Okinawa Times*, 29 September 1960
[4] *The Morning Star*, Okinawa, 27 June 1960.

that he intends to press for early return of Okinawa to Japanese control and administration.[1]

Postponed reversion undoubtedly will be. As recently as February of this year, the U.S. Defence Department reaffirmed its policy of keeping Okinawa for an indefinite period,[2] owing to uncertain political conditions in Japan; although this reaffirmation created adverse reactions in the Ryukyus, it appears that the *status quo* will persist and that the alternatives of outright independence or of making Okinawa the 51st state are no more practicable than immediate reversion.

If, then, in the political sphere USCAR is not without its failures and is burdened with numerous problems, in the sphere of economics the American administration has experienced considerable success. The poorest of Japan's prefectures before the second World War, the Ryukyus today have a standard of living well above that of the less-developed Japanese prefectures of Kyushu, Shikoku, and Tohoku.[3] The adoption of dollar currency has stimulated economic growth and investment, unemployment has been reduced to 1·2 per cent of the labour force; inflation has so far been successfully checked;[4] the 1960 *per capita* income of £70, although miserable, places Ryukyuans well above subsistence level and represents an increase of 4·6 per cent over the previous year and 53 per cent over the pre-war level; the establishment of a Free Trade Area at Naha port has stimulated export-import activities; USCAR'S fisheries section is fast developing the local industry in an attempt to overcome the ridiculous situation whereby islands located in rich fishing waters have to import annually 40 per cent of their requirements for fish; sales of fresh vegetables to U.S. forces on Okinawa, Guam, Korea, Wake Island, and in Japan have been increased, reaching a total value of £150,000 last year;[5] and the annual national income of £55 million is double the pre-war figure. Future growth is anticipated under the five-year economic plan for 1961–5 drawn up jointly by USCAR and GRI, which provides for private enterprise as the principal medium to further economic development.[6]

That economic progress in the Ryukyus is due primarily to the presence of a huge military establishment and to the generous

[1] *The Mainichi Daily News*, Tokyo, 21 February 1961. [2] *ibid.*

[3] Sheldon Wesson, 'Future of Ryukyuan Economy', in *The Japan Times*, Tokyo, 24 August 1960.

[4] In his address to the Ryukyuan legislature on 3 February 1960, former High Commissioner Lt.-Gen. Donald P. Booth stated: 'Today we can buy goods for 92 cents that cost the equivalent of a dollar in 1954 and $1·08 in 1950.'

[5] *Civil Affairs in the Ryukyu Islands*, *op. cit.* [6] *ibid.*

financial aid of the U.S. is admitted by all, including even the most rabid reversionists. In view of the fact that the Ryukyus are over-populated and far from self-sufficient, it is quite obvious that the present economic boom would become an inaudible whimper should the U.S. administration return the islands to Japan. Thus the future economic health of the archipelago depends either on an indefinite continuation of semi-colonial status or upon a most carefully constructed arrangement whereby Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyus would involve 'a Ryukyuan economy tied in with that of Japan'.[1]

While it is inaccurate to speak of the Ryukyus as 'America's Last Colony' and exaggerated to label them 'A Cyprus of the Pacific', it is no less inflated to speak of the Ryukyus' 'Second Golden Era', as prospering Okinawan business men term the U.S. occupation. The present of the Ryukyu Islands is clouded by problems, the future hinges on policies developed by the new Kennedy administration and, even more, by military developments in Asia. At present and for an indefinite future, the Ryukyus will remain what is, in fact, the most accurate epithet, an entirely military one applied by the U.S. Army to the islands: 'Keystone of the Pacific'.

JOHN BARR

Albania: A Chinese Satellite in the Making?

ONE of the strangest developments that have taken place recently in the Communist world has been Albania's tendency to gravitate more and more towards China in the ideological dispute between Moscow and Peking. Although the Albanian Communist leaders have done their best to conceal this fact in their speeches and propaganda, the first concrete outward indication that something was miss between them and the other members of the Communist bloc in Europe was the absence of Mr Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Albanian Workers' (Communist) Party, from the conference of Communist Party leaders held in June 1960 in Bucarest, where the

[1] Sheldon Wesson, *op cit.*

Sino-Soviet dispute was one of the main topics under discussion. H
was also the only Communist leader of Eastern and Central Europ
who did not accompany Mr Khrushchev to the meeting of the U.N
General Assembly in New York last September. He did, howeve
attend the conference of the eighty-one Communist Parties held i
Moscow in November. It was later reported that he had not on
supported China's policy on war and co-existence but had al
attacked the stand taken by the Soviet Union and other countries o
Eastern Europe.[1] Herr Walter Ulbricht stated, in a report on th
Moscow conference to the Central Committee of the S.E.D. of Ea
Germany, that the Albanian delegation had put forward 'dogmat
and sectarian arguments'.[2]

The extent to which the weakest and most isolated Communi
State in Europe has moved in the direction of this odd and dange
ous position was further revealed by the proceedings of the Fourt
Congress of the Albanian Workers' Party, held in Tirana betwee
13 and 20 February 1961. Both Enver Hoxha, the Communi
Party leader, and Mehmet Shehu, the Prime Minister, gave fu
support to the main Chinese points of view in matters of ideolog
and foreign policy. For instance, they maintained, unlike the oth
Communist leaders of Eastern Europe, that President Kenne
would continue the policies of the Eisenhower Administration, an
that the United States would always be an imperialist Power, n
matter who happened to be in office in Washington. In one respe
they were more Chinese than the Chinese themselves: they d
manded that Communist China should not only become a memb
of the United Nations but that she should also take part in an
Summit conference that might be held. A great deal of lip-servi
was paid to the unity of the Communist bloc, to the Mosco
Declaration, and to Soviet leadership. Mr Hoxha even said th
friendship with the Soviet Union was the cornerstone of Albani
foreign policy, but he seemed to be over-insistent about a matt
which in normal circumstances would have hardly needed stressi
at all. It is significant that what was intended to be a dramatic stat
ment about a plot against Albania organized by Yugoslavia, Greec
'certain Albanian traitors', and the United States Sixth Fleet w
ignored by Moscow and the other capitals of Eastern Europe. A
allegation of this kind would normally have received swift and wi

[1] See 'Moscow–Peking Clash: More Disclosures', by Edward Cranksha
The Observer, 19 February 1961.
[2] *Neues Deutschland*, 20 December 1960.

publicity. The fact that it fell flat seemed to be another indication that all was not well between Albania and the other countries of the Communist bloc.

Apart from the Western Powers, in particular the United States, the main target of the Albanian Communist leaders' attacks was Yugoslavia. They maintained with a great deal of frenzied and monotonous repetition that, besides pursuing a highly dangerous 'revisionist' course, Yugoslavia, far from being a neutral country, was closely linked with N.A.T.O. through the Balkan Pact. They accused the Yugoslav Government of persecuting the Albanian-speaking inhabitants of Kossovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Indeed, the whole of their attack on Yugoslavia was a mixture of crude dogmatic Marxism and extreme nationalism, with the latter ingredient predominating. As this phobia in relation to Yugoslavia appears to lie at the root of the strained relations between Albania and the rest of the Communist bloc in Europe, it may be worth while to take a look at the history of Albanian-Yugoslav relations since the second World War.

The Albanian Communist Party was founded in November 1941, with representatives of the Yugoslav Communist Party playing an important, perhaps a crucial, part in its foundation.[1] The Communist resistance movement which eventually emerged from this development was under strong Yugoslav influence throughout the war. The Communist regime which was set up in Albania at the end of 1944 came under Yugoslav influence in a still more pervasive form. The regime's links with Moscow were slender, and Albania was never a member of the Cominform. Her position at that time has been described as that of a sub-satellite. Later events have tended to show that her leaders must have been straining at the leash to become full satellites of Moscow. Their opportunity came after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, when they were the first to react with the utmost virulence against their former masters. Albanian Communist agitation against Yugoslavia has continued ever since with short periods of lull. Its principal theme throughout has been the alleged persecution of the Albanian-speaking minority. The Albanian Communists have employed all the methods of nationalist propaganda in this campaign, resorting occasionally to the Nazi technique of mixing a few half-truths with a great deal of unsubstantiated accusations and lies. After 1948 they

[1] See *Albania*, edited by Stavro Skendi (London, Atlantic Press for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, 1957), p. 77.

also embraced Stalinism with an almost religious fervour, and embarked on a series of purges. The most prominent leader to be executed for Titoist inclinations was Kochi Xoxe, a former Minister of the Interior. A new phase in Albanian-Yugoslav relations began with Mr Khrushchev's visit of reconciliation to Yugoslavia in May 1955. The Albanian regime made certain half-hearted attempts to adjust both its policy and its propaganda to the new situation, but refused to admit that Xoxe had been an innocent victim.

The new phase had a particularly sinister aspect for the two leaders of Albanian Communism, Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu. Both had become the bitterest enemies of Marshal Tito after having been his close friends and allies. They now faced the prospect of personal humiliation in having to swallow everything they had said against him during the past seven years. In addition, there was the constant fear that their own position and power might be eroded by the new ideas and influences which Mr Khrushchev's new policy towards Yugoslavia would produce. The Soviet leader's bitter attack against Stalin's regime at the twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union served to confirm the worst fears and suspicions of the Albanian Communists. They realized that they could hold on to their very precarious position only by using Stalinist methods, and yet they, together with the rest of the leaders of Eastern Europe, were now being asked to give up these methods, or at least to mitigate them. The Hungarian revolt of 1956 must have brought a great sense of relief to them, because from then onwards they were able once more to vent all their bitter feelings against Yugoslavia. A deep note of smugness began to creep into Albanian propaganda, which very conveniently blamed Yugoslav revisionism for the events that had taken place in Hungary.

Meanwhile, the nationalistic propaganda campaign was intensified. The Albanian leaders perhaps hoped that this campaign would help to achieve two main purposes. It would help to discredit Yugoslavia and all that she stood for in the eyes of the world. In addition, their own position in Albania would be strengthened by proving themselves to be uncompromising Communists as well as ardent nationalists. But the campaign seems to have worried the Russians. In April 1957 Mr Hoxha and Mr Shehu went to Moscow to discuss economic and technical aid with the Soviet Government. At the end of the talks, Mr Khrushchev, speaking at an official reception, said: 'The present difficulties in the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia are greater than those obtaining in the rela-

tions between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. We sincerely hope that these difficulties will be overcome and that good-neighbourly relations will be established between your countries. Naturally this requires time, mutual desire, and persistence. . . Much will have to be done, particularly in overcoming ideological differences. But this must be done.' The Soviet leader went on to say that less attention should be paid to matters that divided Communists than to matters that united them in the 'struggle for socialism and the consolidation of peace'. In the joint statement on Soviet economic and technical aid issued at the end of the talks the Albanian leaders undertook 'to promote better relations with Greece, Italy, and in particular with Yugoslavia'.[1]

But Mr Khrushchev's advice did not appear to make much difference. Propaganda attacks and counter-attacks went on. Albania and Yugoslavia accused each other, among other things, of sending agents across the frontier. The Yugoslav Legation in Tirana found it increasingly difficult to perform its functions owing to the restrictions imposed on its diplomatic personnel. Meanwhile, within a year or so after their visit to Moscow, the Albanian Communist leaders had begun to turn their eyes towards China. It seems likely that by that time they had come to despair of Mr Khrushchev's opportunistic policy towards Yugoslavia and of his dangerous liberal ideas. China may have become attractive to them because, apart from her more uncompromising general policy, she was also showing herself highly critical of revisionism, which was held responsible for the Hungarian troubles. The Chinese press and radio were now praising the Albanians for their brave stand against their heretical neighbours, and also giving a good deal of publicity to Albanian propaganda. Another development was the exchange of visits between Chinese and Albanian delegations. These became fairly frequent during 1958 and 1959, just as Chinese influence on Albanian Communist affairs became more and more manifest. In 1958 there was a sharp rise in the number of collective farms in Albania, possibly as a result of employing Chinese 'leap forward' methods. It was also decreed that Albanian Government and Party officials should do forty days' manual labour a year. The inspiration in this case was unmistakably Chinese.

Mr Hoxha and Mr Shehu seemed at last to have found a Communist country which was willing and powerful enough to protect them from the Soviet leader's nagging advice and constant pressure.

[1] Moscow Radio, Home Service, 17 April 1957 (B.B.C. Monitoring Report).

It is quite probable that when they first turned to the Far East for help they had no idea that sooner or later they would have to pay for it by being obliged to support China in her controversy with the Soviet Union. But whatever illusions they may have had on this score were soon dispelled when the controversy came out into the open at the beginning of 1960. From then onwards they had no choice, even if they wanted to tread the path of caution and moderation. The first great debate on the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy was held in Bucarest in June 1960. Mr Khrushchev and all the other European Communist leaders took part, but Albania was represented merely by Mr Hysni Kapo, a member of the Politburo He was reported to have espoused all the arguments that the Chinese delegate used against Mr Khrushchev's policies.

Again, Mr Hoxha was absent when the Soviet Prime Minister and the other Communist leaders of Eastern Europe attended the autumn session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Albanian delegation was headed by Mr Shehu, who appears to have been ignored by his Communist colleagues. Whatever may have been the reason for Enver Hoxha's absence from New York, there seems to have been enough trouble in Albania itself at that time to require his presence there. Early in September, Liri Belishova, a member of the Politburo, was dismissed from the Central Committee of the Party for 'serious mistakes', and Kocho Tashko, Chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, was expelled from the Party for 'hostile activities'. Coming at this particular time, it seemed very likely that the purge had some connection with the Sino-Soviet dispute. There were also reports that several people who were opposed to the regime's close ties with China had been arrested. Another signal of crisis was the postponement of the Party Congress from November to December, and then from December to February 1961.

A rift between Albania and two other East European countries was revealed during the session of the General Assembly. On 28 September Mr Zhivkov, the Bulgarian Communist leader, submitted to the Assembly a proposal that:

(i) a treaty of non-aggression should be concluded between all the countries of the Balkans;
(ii) the armed forces of these countries should be reduced to the level required for guarding national frontiers; and
(iii) the Balkan area should be the first to implement the plan for general and complete disarmament.

Mr Shtylla, the Albanian Foreign Minister, opposed this proposal without mentioning Bulgaria. Speaking in the Political Committee of the United Nations on 13 October, he said that while his Government supported Mr Khrushchev's plan for total world disarmament, it believed that this should be carried out 'in all areas of the world simultaneously'. The Albanian Prime Minister made his Government's position even clearer when he returned home from New York. In a report on the proceedings of the General Assembly to the Parliament in Tirana, he said that Albania 'could never accept the idea of local and complete disarmament which may have originated in somebody's head in the Balkans'.[1] He went even further and criticized another proposal put forward by Poland in the General Assembly. Mr Gomulka had suggested that, as a first step towards disarmament, no new military bases should be built on the territory of other countries. Mr Shehu was against this suggestion as it 'would mean accepting the existence of hundreds of American military bases which now encircle the Soviet Union and other socialist countries'. He added that the proposal would not help the cause of peace, but would make it possible for imperialistic Powers to embark on military adventures. The rejection of the Bulgarian and Polish disarmament proposals may stem partly from the Chinese attitude to the whole problem of disarmament and partly from the Albanian Communists' own sense of isolation.

The fourth Congress of the Albanian Workers' Party showed fairly clearly, as was said earlier, to what lengths its leaders had gone in veering towards China, despite the tiresome double talk they used to obscure the fact. None of the Albanians who spoke ever referred to Mr Khrushchev by name, although Stalin was mentioned and quoted on several occasions. Mr Shehu admitted that he and his colleagues were accused of being tyrants, dogmatists, sectarians, and narrow-minded nationalists, but he put this down to the fact that they were true and consistent Marxists. Mr Hoxha said that any liberalization of Communist rule so long as imperialism existed was tantamount to suicide, and adduced the 'bitter experience of the Hungarian counter-revolution' in support of his case. The speeches of the delegates of the various Communist countries were also revealing. In a sober and restrained statement, Mr P. N. Pospelov, the Soviet delegate, laid equal stress on the revisionist and dogmatist dangers to Communist regimes. He had no word of

[1] *Zeri i Popullit* (Voice of the People), official organ of the Central Committee of the Albanian Workers' Party, 26 October 1960.

praise for the Albanian Workers' Party, and refrained from mentioning any of its leaders by name. Mr Roman Novak of Poland was more direct and explicit in his address to the Congress. Speaking on the policy of co-existence, he pointed out that 'everything undermining the belief and the reality of this policy, as well as any clinging to the obsolete thesis about the inevitability of wars, could do harm to the cause of socialism.' He also spoke of 'the creative ideas of the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party' which could not be ignored by Communists who wished to go forward. Li Hsien Nien, the Chinese representative, spoke on a different wavelength altogether. He was almost as complacent as the Albanian Communist leaders are themselves about their achievements in every field. He praised their struggle against Yugoslav revisionism, and made a point of singling out Enver Hoxha as a leader of outstanding qualities. For the rest, most of the Albanians who took part in the proceedings spoke like extreme nationalists who also claim to be revolutionaries and guardians, almost the sole guardians, of the sacred tables of Marxist doctrine.

The latest example of Albania's boycott of Communist conferences occurred at the end of March, when the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact met in Moscow. Each delegation was headed by the Communist Party leader of the country concerned. The Albanian delegation was led by the Minister of Defence.

Albania's odd position in the Sino-Soviet dispute, which concerns genuine differences of policy presented in ideological terms becomes even more bizarre when one remembers that she is completely dependent on Russia and the other countries of the Soviet bloc in Europe for trade and for economic and technical assistance. She has just embarked on a new five-year plan which will require considerable capital investment from outside sources A large Albanian economic delegation went to China at the beginning of this year, when a short-term trade and economic agreement was concluded, but no details have been published. The fear that the supplies from Eastern Europe may be cut off at any time must be constant source of worry to the Communist leaders in Tirana. Indeed, last year Albania imported wheat from China, although normally her grain supplies come from the Communist region of Europe.

Mr Khrushchev is not by temperament the kind of man who would tolerate for long the sort of behaviour in which Messrs

Hoxha and Shehu have been indulging lately. But in dealing with his rebellious underlings he may perhaps want to avoid irritating still further Soviet relations with the Chinese, who seem to be showing special tenderness towards their protégés on the shores of the Adriatic.

ANTON LOGORECI

Morocco Under the New King

THE sudden death of King Mohamed V on 26 February plunged Morocco into deep mourning. He was loved as a good and wise man and father, respected as a symbol of national independence and unity, and admired as a statesman and politician of uncommon ability and a ruler on whom the whole burden of government rested.

The King's death also aggravated the political crisis which has been endemic in the country for some time. When he formed the present Government in May 1960 and was unable to find a leader under whom the other Ministers would serve, the King took its direction into his own hands and delegated the functions of Prime Minister to his son the Crown Prince, now King Hassan II, whom he appointed *Vice-président du conseil.* This Government has been under constant and at times violent attack from the opposition led by the movement that backed the left wing of the Istiqlal at the time of that party's split, in January 1959.[1] The prestige of the King was never seriously affected, but the Crown Prince was severely, if not often directly, criticized.

Although Morocco must be counted among the 'under-developed' countries and receives all kinds of technical and financial assistance, and although her standard of living is low, her chief problems are political rather than economic. Her infrastructure was brought to a high point of development under the French protectorate and is gradually being extended, and agricultural and industrial production has been slowly rising. There is much under-employment and poverty, and the demographic problems are daunting, but on the whole the country's economy is viable. A Five-Year Plan is actually in its first year of application.

[1] See Note of the Month in *The World Today,* May 1959, pp 179 ff.

The same can hardly be said of her political structure. The Istiqlal party, which formed the spearhead of Moroccan nationalism and which emerged triumphant when independence was finally won, acquired its broad popular basis in two successive stages: by its alliance with the Sultan, as the ruler was called when the country was still under French administration, and by the creation of a trade union organization. The party was everywhere recognized as standing for the support and defence of the Sultan, and thus was able to penetrate even the remotest mountain and desert tribes; and the trade unions provided the ground for training cadres and for teaching the principles of Arab and Moroccan nationalism. During the first three years of independence they were fostered by successive Governments and the union organizers enjoyed salaries and privileges of a quite uncommon degree.

When the party split, in 1959, the U.M.T. (*Union Marocaine du Travail*) also divided. The rump, with its central office and most of its organizers, remained firmly in the hands of its Secretary-General Mahjoub ben Sadik, and provided the main support for the dissident politicians, led by Mehdi ben Barka, who left the Istiqlal and founded the U.N.F.P. (*Union Nationale des Forces Populaires*) Many unions, however, including some of the large ones (e.g. the dockers), shook off their affiliation to the U.M.T., and others divided, with the result that the old Istiqlal, led by Allal al-Fassi, was able to form another trade union organization, the U.G.T.M (*Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains*) which survived and finally obtained official recognition only because the King would not allow it to be suppressed. The Istiqlal and the U.G.T.M. may be described as progressive, with conservative backing, while the *Union Nationale des Forces Populaires* and the U.M.T. are socialist, with a revolutionary wing preaching class war. None of the leaders—neither Allal al-Fassi, nor Mehdi ben Barka, nor Mahjoub ben Sadik—has accepted responsible office. They apparently prefer to stay outside the ring, to criticize, or to organize their forces.

Morocco is still an absolute monarchy. Local elections were held successfully last year, but the municipal and regional councils have only a minimum of power over their affairs and are hardly ready for more. Mohamed V, who wished to become a constitutional ruler and promised a constitution to his people, appointed a Constitutional Council last year to work out a draft. But the U.N.F.P. refused to co-operate and would have nothing to do with a constitution given by the King. They demanded the election of a Con-

stituent Assembly, which Mohamed V judged to be very premature, if only because, to be truly representative, it would have to contain many responsible but illiterate members of the tribes. As it was, some of these were to be found among the King's councillors. The Istiqlal, left with a big majority on the Council, made Allal al-Fassi chairman, which prompted the members of two of the smaller party groups, the *Libéraux Indépendants* and the *Parti Démocrate Constitutionnel* (resurrected from the collapsed old *Parti Démocrate de l'Indépendence* of Mohamed Ouezzani), to resign. So, even if the Council produced a draft constitution, which seems doubtful, it would certainly be opposed by important sections of public opinion.

In his first proclamation Hassan II made a moving appeal for national unity, but the divergences are much too strong to be eliminated by mere emotional pressure. The factions, which have a hold on the articulate and politically conscious city population, are really fighting for possession of the inert masses of the plains, the mountains, and the desert regions, and here they must compete with another political grouping that is slowly spreading, the Berber *Mouvement Populaire* led by Mahjoub Ahardane and Dr Khatib. This movement had the support of the late Minister of the Interior, Mbarek Bekkaï, himself a Berber, and the Istiqlal attacked him for gradually replacing its own nominees in administrative posts in the countryside, mainly Arabic-speaking city people, by Berber-speaking officials in places where that language is dominant, i.e. in the mountains of the north, the east, and the south of the country. The local rebellions that happened in the Rif and the Middle Atlas during the three or four years after independence can all be traced back to the failure of the new administrators to understand and to communicate directly with the people in their charge. There cannot be any doubt that nationalist sentiment for Morocco is just as strong among the Berbers as it is among the Arabic-speaking population, and a break between these two sections, for this and many other reasons, is inconceivable. Loyalty to the throne, however, although comparatively recent, is probably stronger in the mountains, and a parliamentary regime would accentuate the natural division of the country.

Under these circumstances it may seem comprehensible that a really concerted effort towards modernizing agriculture, raising investment, and generally improving the condition of the people has been lacking and that progress in the domestic sphere—with the

notable exception of education—has been hesitant, piecemeal, and impeded. In the field of foreign policy, however, the pace has recently become dynamic, and here King Mohamed V left a legacy that will need skilful managing if it is to yield returns.

After some years of holding aloof from any commitments outside the Maghreb, Morocco joined the Arab League in October 1958, and Mohamed V, taking the opportunity of his pilgrimage to Mecca last year, visited most of the member countries. But in his last speech from the throne he took a much more decisive step. In this pronouncement, which under his reign took place every year on 18 November and constituted a major statement of policy, he put Morocco firmly on the side of the newly born or about-to-be-born African countries. He called Morocco a 'Muslim, Arab, and African nation', proclaimed Moroccan solidarity with the African peoples still fighting for their freedom, and spoke of the 'resurrection of the African continent' and of his endeavour to strengthen and to assert '*la personnalité africaine*'. The first result of this new policy was the Conference of Casablanca in January 1961, with consequences for Morocco reaching further than its resolutions concerning the Congo which had been the occasion for its calling. President Nasser attended this conference and his entry into Casablanca raised storms of enthusiasm that quite overpowered the traditional hearty welcome on which the King could always count wherever he went in his country. It was almost a matter of 'Saul hath slain his thousands, and David his ten thousands'. Moreover, by backing the Lumumbist cause and withdrawing the Moroccan contingent from the troops under United Nations command Mohamed V not only placed himself and Morocco in the vanguard of African affairs but also joined the radical African and, by implication, the Soviet camp in this international dispute and found himself opposing the 'Brazzaville' group, an alignment for which his conservative temperament and Morocco's former position in the political Western hemisphere had seemed to predestine him. He apparently felt confident that he was in the company of 'all the peoples who share our own economic and social conditions and who make up the overwhelming majority of mankind'.[1]

The main cause for this *revirement* was, of course, the late King's Mauritanian policy, for which he attempted to get supporters wherever he could. He conducted this policy with an insistence that surprised many of his friends, and he sacrificed to it not only some

[1] Inaugural speech at the Conference of Casablanca, 3 January 1961.

valuable diplomatic positions but probably even his health. It must be admitted that Morocco's ambition to occupy the territories south of her present frontiers may well be motivated by the proved or suspected mineral and oil deposits of Mauritania and Spanish West Africa and her desire to match Algeria's and Tunisia's exploitation of the Sahara. Algeria, although not yet an independent State, has made her claims widely known through her provisional government, and Tunisia has at least the imminent prospect of royalties from a pipeline under construction and owns a sizeable corner of the Sahara not far from existing oil wells. Only Morocco, apart from a narrow *glacis* beyond the foothills of the Atlas mountains and her southernmost province of Tarfaya, until recently part of the Spanish protectorate, is excluded from that land of promises and *fata morganas*. She is claiming practically the whole western Sahara, which includes Mauritania,[1] the present Spanish territories of Saguiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro, and a considerable portion of what at the moment is the Algerian Department of the Saoura, i.e. roughly the desert south of Colomb Béchar to the borders of Mali. On the other hand, the late King's efforts to find new friends for his plans of territorial aggrandisement might perhaps have been expended to greater advantage in strengthening as far as possible his country's economic and social potential and thus exercising a stronger attraction for the populations beyond its borders to join it.

King Hassan II affirmed on his accession that he would continue his father's policies in every field, and since he had been presiding over the Government in his father's lifetime this is likely to happen, at least in the immediate future. His first test came in the third week of his reign when Moroccan armed bands, members of the revived 'Army of Liberation', kidnapped eleven technicians who were prospecting for oil under a Spanish concession in the Saguiat al-Hamra, south of the Moroccan frontier. These men, whose nationalities were Spanish, French, American, and Canadian, were held for a few days, then handed over to the Moroccan regular army. The King dealt adroitly with the incident. He summoned the ambassadors of their countries and informed them that 'eleven foreigners working for foreign companies in the southern part of Our territory still situated outside Our authority have been captured by patriots acting with a view to completing the liberation of the kingdom.' While fully approving of his subjects' action, he wished to preserve his friendly relations with the foreign Governments concerned, and

[1] See 'Independent Mauritania', in *The World Today*, April 1961.

was therefore ready to deliver the oil prospectors to their respective diplomatic representatives. This was done, and the incident was considered closed.

It took some time for Mohamed V to become convinced that he must claim Mauritania and the other territories. For years, the driving power in this campaign were Allal al-Fassi and the leaders of the Istiqlal party, until the late King adopted their ideas and put them across with great force. Hassan II has now appointed the former Secretary-General of that party, Ahmed Balafrej, to be his itinerant ambassador. M. Balafrej was the first Moroccan Foreign Minister and later served as Prime Minister until his resignation in November 1958. He is identified with the views of Mohamed V who, a few months before he died, sent him on a special tour of European capitals, including Moscow, in order to win support for Morocco's Mauritanian policy. The Istiqlal party has taken a clear line in foreign policy but has lacked a defined social and economic policy, while the U.N.F.P. has gone far on the way to planning a controlled economy, with everything that implies. It remains to be seen how King Hassan will deal with the difficult political problems confronting him.

E. A. ALPORT

Stagnation in Soviet Agriculture

A Problem for Khrushchev

'DEAR Nikita Sergeyevich, Last year, before the opening of the Plenum of the Central Committee, I wrote you a long letter. But it seems not to have reached you. I know you sometimes see kolkhoz chairmen and have talks with them. But there are a great many chairmen like me, and you are you alone, it is practically impossible for you to talk to everyone. I do not expect a personal interview with you. But I beg you to listen to me, dear Nikita Sergeyevich, even if it is only in writing and I just a simple kolkhoz chairman. I don't ask it for myself, but for the future of all the kolkhozes. I know about your zealous and untiring efforts for the progress of agriculture, your deep interest in rural life, and your gifts as an organizer of a

new life. That is why I ask you, dear Nikita Sergeyevich, to act, at the next Plenum of the Central Committee, as the spokesman for our grievances. . .'

This is the opening of a long letter of complaints addressed to Khrushchev by the chairman of a kolkhoz in the Kiev region, Daviduk, published in the agricultural periodical *Selskaia Zhisn* (13 December 1960). Perhaps it was not a case of spontaneous initiative; the letter may have been solicited by Khrushchev himself, in accordance with the old Soviet habit of getting people to ask for something that it has been decided to impose on them. In any event, the document merits attention because it reveals in epitome the plight of Soviet agriculture.

THE KOLKHOZ—RICH OR POOR?

The writer of this letter presides over the destinies of one of those 'economically weak' kolkhozes which proliferate throughout the U.S.S.R. and form an obstacle to the modernization of the country's agriculture. In flagrant contradiction to Khrushchev's stated aim of reaching and surpassing U.S. farm production, the yield per worker in Soviet agriculture still stands at only about 20 per cent of that of the United States. As Khrushchev himself admitted in 1956, one of the main reasons for this lag lies in the fact that the majority of the kolkhozes are not viable. They fail to make progress since they lack the necessary resources.

To end this state of stagnation, Khrushchev recommended a whole series of more or less long-term measures, one of which consisted of combining the rich and prosperous kolkhozes with the backward collectives. In consequence the number of kolkhozes was reduced from 84,000 in 1957 to little more than 61,000 at the end of 1958. But these regroupings were accepted only unwillingly by the rich kolkhozes, which saw their revenues diminished by the burden caused by collectives which failed to pay their way. The measure had only limited success.

The compulsory sale to the kolkhozes of machinery from the recently dissolved machine tractor stations after their abolition merely served to accentuate the disparity between the progressive kolkhozes and those which remained stagnant. For only the rich kolkhozes can afford to buy the machines, while the poor ones have so far failed to pay the State for them. The gulf between the income of peasants on rich and poor collectives remains. In December 1959 Khrushchev stated that on certain kolkhozes in Central Asia

and the Caucasus peasants earned 40 to 50 rubles per working day, a reasonable wage. At the same time, the average share-out on the poor collectives was barely 10 rubles a day, a return certainly not calculated to stimulate the productive zeal of the peasants.

How does it come about that these collectives continue to be poor? According to Daviduk, the writer of the letter to Khrushchev, bad organization of their work bears a large part of the responsibility. Khrushchev's correspondent said that there had been twenty changes in the chairmanship of his own kolkhoz since it came into being: most of the chairmen only stayed in office a year. Either they were removed or they resigned of their own free will. Kolkhoz chairmen in fact find themselves between two stools between the administration, which orders them to fulfil unattainable objectives, and the peasants, whose chief aim is not to have their way of life upset. More important, nearly all the poor kolkhozes are in debt and cannot obtain new credits. They are thus unable to buy farm machinery, pedigree livestock, certified seed, or building materials. They are condemned to remain poor.

The poverty of these collectives is supposed to be in striking contrast with the wealth of the kolkhoz peasants who exploit them. In pointing to this contradiction, Daviduk touches on a fundamental paradox of Soviet agriculture. In fact, side by side with a highly mechanized and collectivized agriculture, there subsists in the Soviet Union a large number of individual smallholdings, averaging about 1¼ acres, which still provide the bulk of the vegetables and meat coming on the market. Almost half the total income of the peasant population is earned from work on the private plot, and about a third of the country's livestock is in the hands of private peasant ownership. 'Some of our kolkhoz members', writes Daviduk in this connection, 'get two harvests a year from their own plots. They simply haven't the time to work on the kolkhoz. In fact, they only stay in the kolkhoz in order to be able to keep their plots of land.'

This is the kernel of the problem. The Soviet peasants have, in a sense, 'by-passed' collectivization. They regard work on the kolkhoz—work which brings in so little—as a new version of the forced labour exacted in the past by the landlords. They manage to make a living by cultivating their own gardens and looking after their animals and selling their own produce on the 'kolkhoz' market. They sell 'at the expense of the workers', as Khrushchev's correspondent put it.

HOW TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK?

For more than twenty years, Soviet writers, exasperated by this state of affairs, have been demanding the suppression of small-holdings, and the complete assimilation of the kolkhoz to the sovkhoz, the large State farm worked by agricultural labourers. Khrushchev is known to have been attracted by this idea, as his earlier campaign for 'agro-towns' proves. He spoke of it at the 21st Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1959 and again at the plenary session in December of that year. But so far he has always drawn back when faced with such a radical solution. By fusing the rich and the poor collectives and introducing a monthly advance, tied to performance, for kolkhoz members, he intends gradually to assimilate the kolkhozes with the State farms. However, in the past only rich collectives had sufficient funds available to pay advances to their members.

In the meantime, Khrushchev tried to get the collectives gradually to increase the share of their annual income devoted to investment. But here, too, only the rich were in a position to follow suit. The problem is how to get the poor collectives out of the impasse in which they find themselves.

To this end, one of the proposals made by Khrushchev's correspondent is the suppression of the free market. 'In my view,' he writes, 'it is the job of the kolkhozes to produce, not to trade... The time has come when the kolkhoz members ought to stop selling their own meat and milk in the market and instead deliver their goods to the purchasing centres, which will distribute them where they are needed.'

This was doubtless a 'ballon d'essai', launched by Khrushchev on the eve of last January's Plenum on agriculture. The same was true of another proposal of Chairman Daviduk's, which aims at making permission to exploit individual plots of land dependent on the extent to which the peasant participates in work on the collective. This represents a compromise which, without taking the private plot from the peasant, compels him to devote more time to the kolkhoz. According to Daviduk, the direction of the peasants' work is to be put under stricter surveillance by the authorities.

FAILURE OF LAND RECLAMATION

This problem is all the more difficult to solve because the progress realized on the sovkhozes, the nationalized sector of agriculture, is also unsatisfactory. The campaign for land reclamation

in Siberia and Kazakhstan does not appear to have fulfilled Khrushchev's hopes. This is due not only to climatic reasons (winter came very early in both 1959 and 1960) but also, and, it would seem, more particularly, to defective organization. It was not just 'the fault of the climate' that, as Moscow Radio reported on 9 October 1960, 'millions of hectares were still covered with grain which, though cut, had not yet been threshed when the first snows appeared in Kazakhstan'. Beliaev lost his job the previous year because he had failed to foresee the coming of winter. It seems that his successor, Sokalov, has, despite unfavourable circumstances, succeeded to a certain extent in eradicating the serious deficiencies manifested in agriculture in Kazakhstan; yet 3·3 million sheep were lost there in 1960 for want of fodder.

Soviet writers do not attempt to disguise the fact that the great colonization operation in Kazakhstan was undertaken in conditions of great hardship, without any proper overall planning. Tens of thousands of young workers were sent there without provision for their lodging, and this resulted in large-scale desertions. Also machines were sent without any provision for sheds, repair shops, or qualified personnel to operate them.

In short, this was one of the most wasteful experiments in economic history. At the same time, nothing could demonstrate more clearly Khrushchev's position within the Party than the fact that his adversaries, if such exist, have failed to exploit this monumental mistake, for which, in the final analysis, he alone is responsible. On the contrary, they allowed Khrushchev to transform the January Plenum into something of a public trial of his principal collaborators, who were openly accused of neglect, if not trickery. Was this perhaps a sort of preventive offensive designed to steal a march on his enemies?

Since the Plenum Khrushchev has devoted a great deal of his time to agriculture. He has visited the principal agricultural regions of the U.S.S.R. preaching the gospel of productivity, making changes in personnel, and proclaiming his determination to make the success of farming a first priority. His tour coincided with the announcement of certain measures towards eliminating some of the most obvious deficiencies of Soviet agriculture.

ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES

Based on the resolutions of the Central Committee adopted at the end of its plenary session in January a series of measures has been

decreed aimed at reorganizing Soviet agriculture so as to facilitate increased production and improved marketing. Four decrees are relevant in this context, of which two were issued on 20 February and two followed five days later. In essence they are to legalize what was anticipated during the plenary session, if not before, i.e.:

(i) a drastic reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.;
(ii) the creation of a Farm Supplies Corporation (*Soyuzselkhoztekhnika*) with the status of a State Committee of the Council of Ministers;
(iii) a major revision of the existing marketing system with the help of a State Procurement Committee, also holding the powers of a State Committee of the Council of Ministers;
(iv) the improvement of marketing of farm surplus through the 'co-operative' marketing organization (*Tsentrosoyuz*) in place of the kolkhoz market.

The Ministry of Agriculture has shed its planning responsibilities which are now to be the responsibility of Gosplan; it has handed its statistical and accounting functions to the Central Statistical Office; it has lost its overall control of the purchase of farm requisites and the procurement of farm products to the Farm Supplies Corporation and the State Procurement Committee. What is left are, broadly, the tasks handled in Britain by the Agricultural Advisory Service. Olchanski, an academic rather than an administrator, has been appointed Minister of Agriculture in place of Matskevich, who had been criticized for agriculture's failure to reach its unattainable plan targets.

The new Farm Supplies Corporation is to provide, under its chairman Kuchumov, a former Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R., farm machinery, spare parts, commercial fertilizers, and other requisites needed for a satisfactory performance of farm operations. The Corporation will have offices at republic, kray, oblast, and rayon level. It is also to assume the functions of the R.T.S., the repair shops which remained when the machine tractor stations were dissolved. A council consisting of the chairmen of the republican offices of the Corporation, certain kolkhoz chairmen, sovkhoz managers, agronomists, and representatives of the agricultural machine industry is to be attached to the Corporation.

The State Procurement Committee is to operate under the chairmanship of N. G. Ignatov, a member of the Party Presidium and a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The appointment of so important a personality reveals the significance attached to this organization. His deputy will be the former head of the State Com-

mittee for Grain Products which has been merged with the State Procurement Committee. Like the Farm Supplies Corporation, this Committee will have offices at republic, kray, oblast, and rayon level. In place of compulsory deliveries formerly laid down by the organs of the State, the Committee will fix the procurement of farm products by way of contractual agreements negotiated for periods of two to five years between the local offices of the Committee on the one hand and State farms and collectives on the other hand. State purchasing Inspectorates will see to it that deliveries remain in line with overall policies on farm production and marketing. Inspectors will have 70 per cent of their salaries guaranteed as a minimum, the remainder being paid in accordance with their performance as enforcement officers. Over-fulfilment will bring a bonus to the supervising inspector and not to the farm delivering the produce. The system of payment by result which is also applied in the case of workers on State farms is thus withheld from the members of the collectives who form the bulk of the farm population.

Lastly, 'co-operative' marketing, which has never flourished in face of competition from the kolkhoz markets, is to be revived. The peasants' unwillingness to sell through the State-controlled organ rather than individually in the urban market stalls is to be overcome by a system of inducements. Apparently no compulsion is to be applied to bring sales in the kolkhoz market to an end. In the absence of any enforcement measures, price inducements would have to be introduced to make the 'co-operatives' work; these are, however, conspicuously absent from the new arrangements.

How far the reorganization of the State apparatus will lead to improvements in agriculture remains to be seen. As the basic dilemma which Government and Party has to face in dealing with the farm population remains unresolved, it would be prudent not to expect miracles. It is noteworthy that—contrary to the expectations of some observers of the agricultural scene—such controversial issues as the fate of the private plot, the creation of agro-towns, the provision of fixed minimum wages for members of collectives, and the adjustment of farm prices and net incomes have remained in abeyance, though they have hardly been shelved for all time.

The organizational measures have been supplemented by a number of financial concessions which were in fact anticipated when the Minister of Finance, Garbuzov, made known his budget before last Christmas. This in itself is a pointer that all that was to be revealed about the state of the farm industry was known to the political

leadership well before the plenary session was held in January. The surprise and indignation displayed by Khrushchev at some of the revelations of leading agricultural personalities was merely part of the setting to which spectators were treated at home and abroad.

The efforts made in administrative change and financial sacrifice —as well as in oratorical exhortation—are too great to be dismissed. It seems unlikely, however, that the success will match the effort.

F. FEJTÖ

Israeli Socialism and the Multi-Party System

THE 'Lavon affair' seems likely to be a turning-point in Israeli political history. It began as a personal struggle inside the leadership of Israel's ruling Socialist party, the M.P.I.,[1] but soon precipitated a general political crisis which split the M.P.I., and brought about a break-up of the Government coalition and the calling of fresh general elections only eighteen months after the last.[2] Perhaps even more important, the affair has become Israel's 'moment of truth', in the sense that it has shocked important sections of the body politic into awareness of the dangerous shortcomings inherent in their highly politicized and 'partified' socialism. These developments make timely an assessment of Israeli social democracy in the light of the past twelve years' experience of independent statehood.

Though a good deal has been published on Israel in the West, there has been remarkably little analysis of the structure and workings of Israeli socialism, apart from the more superficial or generally propagandist accounts. Yet the wider relevance of Israeli experience stems from the light it throws on the workings of socialism under multi-party democracy in a relatively under-developed country enjoying lavish economic aid from abroad.

THE ROLE OF THE PARTIES

Neither the political crisis in Israel nor economic developments there can be understood without a thorough analysis of the special

[1] The initials, which stand for the Israeli Workers' Party, are usually pronounced as a single word, *Mapai*

[2] See Notes of the Month in *The World Today*, December 1959 and March 1961.

structure, role, and functions of the political parties, which are far and away the most important social institutions in Israel. Attempts to compare them with parties in the West (i.e. *Mapai*=Labour Party, *Mapam*=I.L.P., General-Zionists=Conservatives, Progressives=Liberals), as some writers have done, are completely misleading, since the Israeli parties play a fundamentally different role in society. (The one exception is the small and uninfluential Israeli Communist Party, which is similar to any other Communist Party.)

The role of the parties stems naturally from the nature of Israeli social democracy. Socialism has been carried much further in Israel than in any other country outside the Communist bloc. Something over three-quarters of the national income is generated in the public sector of the economy,[1] while both private and public sectors are under strict State control and are heavily dependent on the Government for assistance and permission to operate—for grants, subsidies, loans, tariff protection, import and export licences, etc

The public sector accounts for the greater part of the country's agriculture, forestry, and land reclamation; banking, finance and insurance, building and contracting; housing and real-estate; land, sea, and air transport; power and public utilities; mining and quarrying and important branches of manufacturing industry, administration and social services; and a substantial share of wholesale, retail, and foreign trade. The public sector is nominally divided into a number of segments. These include central and local government, the General Federation of Labour (*Histadruth*), which is the country's largest entrepreneur, the 'National Institutions' (i.e. the Jewish Agency, Jewish National Fund, etc.), and smaller bodies directly affiliated to political parties. In practice, however, control over the whole public sector is exercised by the political parties in a complex pattern of co-operation and rivalry. Control is contested at elections, including general and municipal elections, election of the General Federation of Labour national, local, and union councils, and elections to the World Zionist Organization

[1] This figure is agreed on both by public-sector and Government spokesmen and by independent economists—viz , e g., 1956 *Mapai* Congress, and such studies as *The Israeli Economy A Critical Account of the First Ten Years*, by Dr A. Rubner (London, Cass, 1960), p 222 To the best of the writer's knowledge, there is no single source where it has been worked out, and anyway there are questions of definition which can be argued, but as a rough check the *Histadruth* Annual *Statistical Bulletin*, the State Comptroller's *Report on Publicly-Owned Companies*, the Jewish Agency Yearbooks, and the National Accounts justify this order of magnitude.

(which controls the Jewish Agency) in which foreign Zionists also vote. Elections to all these institutions are based on proportional representation, but whereas the Labour Federation and Jewish Agency 'portfolios' are shared out among all parties participating, central and local government are run on the basis of Government and Opposition coalitions.

Now party control over the State machinery and public-sector enterprises and institutions is not confined to policy-making and general supervision but extends also to detailed administration and management, and bears many of the characteristics of ownership. Control is exercised by the appointment of party cadres and supporters to the department or institutions concerned, not only in key posts, but in many minor jobs too—in some cases party staffing goes right down to doormen and messengers. Where institutions are jointly controlled by two or more parties, appointments are made according to a 'party key' based on the relative strength of the parties and adjusted after elections.

The cadres (*askanim*) are shifted from one institution to another according to their party's changing fortunes and needs. An *askan* may serve consecutively as elected political office-holder, civil servant, local government officer, trade union official, journalist on a party newspaper, managerial executive or director of public-sector enterprise, banker, social service administrator, diplomat, or Zionist emissary; cadres quite often fill several of these functions simultaneously. Their appointment and grade depend primarily on their standing inside their own party, and the cadres owe loyalty primarily to their party and not to the institution in which they happen to be serving at any given time. Party committees co-ordinate the work and decisions of cadres in various fields of activity, and these channels of decision cut across formal lines of demarcation between Government, labour, and business, politics and administration, or politics and economics. This system wields the various party 'fiefs' into co-ordinated party empires, making the parties the real locus of economic power and patronage as well as of political power, and indeed eroding the difference between these forms of power.

This system has produced a number of interesting results which were rarely foreseen by its pioneers and are only now being realized by Israelis themselves. In the first place, since opportunities outside the public sector are limited (by the country's size and relative poverty as well as by the social system), the public sector has become the main avenue for personal advancement, and even private busi-

ness and the professions are largely dependent on the custom or aid of the party-controlled public sector. This has made patronage an integral part of the system, and since a party's strength depends to a considerable extent on the amount of patronage at its disposal and the number of retainers it can employ, every party is tempted to expand the opportunities for employment—particularly in white-collar and administrative jobs—in the institutions and enterprises under its control. This tendency, together with the labour-absorbent character of economic controls themselves, helps to explain why Israel has so large a proportion of its labour force engaged in administrative and service occupations in spite of the Tolstoyan reverence for the therapeutic value of productive labour which plays such an important part in Socialist–Zionist theory.

Another result is that the criteria and sanctions of the market economy have relatively little place in Israel's socialized economy, economic decisions, at the enterprise as well as the national level, are dominated to a considerable extent by political considerations, party interests, and ideological preoccupations. This, in turn, helps to explain Israel's failure to progress towards some measure of independence from foreign aid and loans, even though immigration has been reduced to a very small trickle since mass immigration came to an end in the early 'fifties.[1]

This interdependence of economics and politics has made the party struggle correspondingly fiercer and caused it to intrude into almost every sphere of public life and many fields of personal life too. Not only economics and employment but also housing and education, religion, burial, social life, literature, education, and sport are all politicized and 'partified'. Party vested interests interact with ideology and power struggles and impinge on high policy-making.

The system gives party struggles a much greater impact on the national life than they would have in a Western country. It also encourages multiplicity of parties: the economic advantages of political success, combined with the proportional representation system, make it fairly simple for a dissident group to set up on its own.

THE PARTIES

Of the ten Israeli parties now represented in the *Knesseth* (National Assembly), Mr Ben-Gurion's Israeli Workers' Party is

[1] See 'Israel's Economic Problems', in *The World Today*, October 1959 The main outlines of the economic situation remain unchanged

by far the strongest. It cannot by any stretch of the imagination be compared with the British Labour Party or with continental Socialist parties, since it is the 'establishment' *par excellence*. Comparison with the Communist Party in the Soviet Union would be misleading and even unfair, since the I.W.P. not only shares power with smaller parties, but is characterized by a wide measure of ideological toleration and organizational autonomy.

The I.W.P. could best be described as a combined party and 'establishment', in which the managerial classes, political leadership, top defence executives, diplomats, and civil servants coexist with the labour movement proper. Its upper strata have become accustomed to the exercise of power and—to some extent—the enjoyment of its fruits. Besides its formal power the party has its own family, social, and other informal links with the armed forces, police, professions, arts, academic life, and corporate business. For most of the period under discussion it has succeeded in maintaining discipline and unity of action partly by its appeal to national and political loyalties, partly by its control over patronage and appointment, partly by Mr Ben-Gurion's charismatic leadership and prestige as a national leader, and partly from the genuine belief that the party alone could ensure the State's survival and further development.

The only 'pillar of the establishment' missing from this ensemble so far is the Synagogue. During the past few years the I.W.P. has been making strenuous efforts to win the support of a substantial section of lay and clerical religious leaders by offering concessions on matters of State religious observance and prohibition and a larger share of patronage. They have been meeting with a fair measure of success in these endeavours, particularly among the Sephardi and Oriental communities who have hitherto been under-privileged, where religious preferment and patronage are concerned, *vis-à-vis* the *Ashkenazim* (Europeans) who dominate the clericalist parties. The fact that the clericalists can never gain more than a sixth of the total poll, whereas anything from a third to a half of the population is estimated to be observant, speaks for itself.

The two left-wing Socialist parties, Labour Unity and the United Workers' Party, are both more concerned with ideology than the I.W.P., as well as being more left-wing. Their main strength lies in their collective settlements (*kibbutzim*) where the self-taught East European ideologists still leave their mark on the mental climate. Though these two parties have had an increasing share in power and

responsibility since 1955, this has mollified the extremism of their views less than might have been supposed, since so long as they have to compete with the I.W.P. they are tempted towards ideological extremism. The existence of these two parties as an alternative rallying-point for left-wing dissidents lends added force to currents of militancy inside the I.W.P. itself. The two left-wing parties, in turn, are under a certain pressure from the small but active Communist Party.

Facile comparisons between the Israeli and European Right are equally misleading. The General Zionist Federation is not part of the 'establishment' but a tolerated 'outsider'. It has hardly any supporters in the armed forces, the police, the higher civil service, or in intellectual and academic circles; it is rarely supported by big or corporate business, which prefers to deal directly with the Government, i.e. the Israeli Workers' Party. Its main support has come from small business, independent farmers, and the free professions Business classes in Israel are not a social and political force as they are in most Western countries; on the whole they enjoy a status comparable with that of the business classes in Turkey and other Middle Eastern States, subordinate to and dependent on the State both politically and economically.

The Progressive Party, though originally non-socialist, is now broadly similar to the Labour parties in structure and function. It has a large core of cadres who derive their livelihood from public-sector employment which the party dispenses. The Progressives and General Zionists have recently unified their fraction inside the Labour Federation, and negotiations between the two parties for a complete merger to form a new 'Liberal Party' are under way. It is evident that such a party would remain Liberal only in name if it continued to depend on the patronage system for its mainspring and support.

The Freedom Party (*Herut*) is a non-Socialist Zionist party modelled on the East European romantic nationalist movements. It has a strong radical trend, and has been able to gain considerable support among the frustrated Oriental Jews. The logic of Israel's social system has, however, obliged it to create its own public sector in order to hold its own with the other parties. It has its own Labour Federation, with trade unions and economic enterprises, its own medical services and health insurance, holiday camps and convalescent homes, housing estates, finance and banking, sports federation, etc. The same is true of the clericalist parties. One of

these, the Religious Nationalist Party (*HaMiflaga HaDatit HaLeumit*), began as a Zionist party in Eastern Europe[1] and shared in the Zionist patronage-economic structure from the beginning, in addition to possessing banks, economic enterprises, and other perquisites of its own.

The other two clericalist parties, *Agudath-Israel* and *Poale Agudath-Israel* ('The Assembly of Jewry' and 'The Assembly of Jewry Workers' respectively), were originally anti-Zionist organizations (on the ground that the re-establishment of a Jewish State should await the Creator's will); their main support came from the ultramontane Orthodox Jews whose settlement in the Holy Land ante-dated the Zionist movement, though they have subsequently found reinforcements among post-war immigrants and even a few Orientals. However, the logic of Israeli politics has not spared them; they have found it expedient to take their share of patronage and even fight for a larger share, and to establish their own economic and distributive organizations: they now have agricultural settlements (collective as well as co-operative), housing estates, sporting organizations, medical services, and a share in central and local government and Labour Federation patronage. This enables them to compete with the Religious Nationalist Party and among themselves for the support of those observant Jews who must balance the needs of this world with those of the next. At the time of writing relationships between *Poale Agudath-Israel* and *Agudath-Israel*, which were originally wings of one party, are becoming increasingly estranged. *Agudath-Israel* has formed a new workers' organization of its own to compete with *Poale Agudath-Israel*, which has joined the Government despite a ban by its spiritual mentors and is carrying on negotiations for a merger with the Religious Nationalist Party. (The English reader may be confused by the fact that a section of the Israeli body politic is nominally anti-Zionist, while a substantial proportion of Zionists inhabit the diaspora. His only consolation is that most Israelis find this—and indeed the workings of their ten-party system—no less confusing.)

As with the Labour movement, both the non-Socialist and clericalist wings have extremists beyond the pale (nationalist-terrorist groups in the one case and religious zealots in the other) who regard

[1] It was originally known as *Mizrahi* (the word ostensibly means Eastern—Jews pray turning eastwards—but is actually a contraction of the term 'Spiritual Centre') *Mizrahi* subsequently split into two wings, one traditional and one Socialistic, which reunited a few years ago to form the Religious Nationalist Party.

the existing parties as too compromising and who press for more extreme measures. Their pressure is sometimes capable of setting up a chain reaction which permits the tail to wag the dog.

PRESSURE FOR REFORM

The obvious inefficiency, untidiness, and instability of Israeli party-socialism has led to pressure for reform from both inside and outside the 'establishment'. The most effective drive for change has come from the very core of the 'establishment', from Premier Ben-Gurion himself. His efforts have been directed towards three main objectives: (i) electoral reform, in order to provide stable single-party government and responsible opposition and to reduce the number of parties; (ii) streamlining of the economy, in particular the transfer of many economic functions and social services from the Labour Federation and the Jewish Agency to the State; and (iii) replacement of the 'old guard' ideological leadership of the I.W.P. by younger men who owe their rise to executive success.

Many of Mr Ben-Gurion's proposals and aims met with considerable sympathy among the public but with opposition inside his own party and the other parties. The 'Lavon affair' can perhaps best be understood as the result of interaction between opposition to Mr Ben-Gurion inside his party and opposition inside the other parties.

It will be recalled that this 'affair',[1] which has become something of a *cause célèbre* in Israel, centred round Mr Lavon's claim that he had been 'framed' by rivals, including General Dayyan, in connection with an espionage scandal in 1954, at a time when he was Defence Minister. The affair was resuscitated last year when the struggle within the I.W.P. came to a head: Mr Ben-Gurion was trying to advance his 'Younger Generation'—Dayyan, Peress, Eban, and Yoseph-Tal in particular—to the head of the party, while Lavon had by then emerged as leader of the 'old guard' resistance to Mr Ben-Gurion's plans. Though Lavon was then exonorated, Mr Ben-Gurion brought the whole of his prestige to bear against him inside the I.W.P., and was able to muster a majority in the party's ruling bodies to have him removed from all offices he held under the party, particularly the Secretaryship of the Labour Federation, on the ground that the manner in which he had raised and fought his case—whatever its rights and wrongs—had brought great harm to the party, the State, and the good name of the armed forces.

[1] See Note of the Month, 'The Lavon Affair', in *The World Today*, March 1961, pp 89–91.

But this proved to be something of a pyrrhic victory for Mr Ben-Gurion. In the first place it created considerable public indignation and catalysed or channelled resentment against the workings of party-socialism, particularly against the concentration of political and economic power it had brought about. The other parties have naturally endeavoured to harness this indignation to their own plans, though they are no less responsible for the existing state of affairs than the I.W.P., indeed they have been among the most active opponents of all reform. In order to induce his own colleagues in the party leadership to oust Lavon last February, Ben-Gurion resigned the Premiership and stated that he would retire for good unless Lavon were removed from office. The threat was effective, but the other members of the coalition (the two left-wing parties, the Progressives and the Religious Nationalist Party) refused to rejoin the coalition with Ben-Gurion as Premier. Since the Israeli Workers' Party refused to nominate another Premier-designate, and the balance of seats in the National Assembly makes it impossible for any other party to head the Government, the result was complete deadlock.

After six weeks of negotiations, the Assembly voted unanimously to hold fresh general elections in August, after the Eichmann trial and the worst of the summer heat are over. At present it is difficult to see how fresh elections can change the situation. Even if the Israeli Workers' Party loses a few seats as a result of the affair—some to the left-wing parties, some to the right—it seems most unlikely that the balance of power in the Assembly could be upset to such an extent that an alternative Government would be made possible. Nor have any of the I.W.P.'s opponents adduced a serious programme for reform which could obviate the evils shown up by the Lavon affair. The Left is in favour of the political *status quo*—with greater representation for themselves, of course—though the fact that the two extreme left-wing Socialist parties cannot agree on a common platform hardly inspires confidence, while their Russophile and 'neutralist' leanings count against them. The Right has little new to say. It is not yet certain whether or not the Progressives and General Zionists will appear in the elections as a united 'Liberal Party'. In any case the new party would still have to produce serious proposals for reforming Israeli party-socialism, which it has not done until now.

These reforms would presumably have to accept the existence of a large public sector of the economy (since there is no private sector

capable of taking it over and administering it, even if that were politically feasible) and a large foreign-currency income most of which accrues directly to the State or the Jewish Agency. They would have to work out methods whereby the public-sector enterprises could combine operational autonomy with overall public control and accountability, and yet be taken out of the party-political and patronage arena. They would have to propose means by which the State's economic and social life could be partially depoliticized—or at least 'de-partified'—through political action. It would be fair to say that the same problem has, *mutatis mutandis*, engaged most newly independent or under-developed countries, from Turkey to Mexico, with only limited success: Israel's experience in this regard is highly instructive but does not suggest any apparent solution.

All parties know that they must solve the deadlock soon if parliamentary democracy is to survive, in view of urgent defence needs which make disunity too expensive a luxury, and of the need to introduce economic reforms which will decrease excessive dependence on foreign aid before the inflow of aid begins to decline. But so far the parties—and the rival groups inside the Israeli Workers' Party—are pulling vigorously in opposite directions. Mr Ben-Gurion hopes to solve the problem by greater concentration, his opponents by intensifying Israeli society's character of 'a federation of independent parties', as one critic called it. Whatever the outcome, Israeli experience suggests that Socialist power and public ownership are not the short cut to unity of purpose, social solidarity, and brotherhood, or to rapid economic development, which their partisans have traditionally claimed.

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Notes of the Month

Crisis in Iran

WHEN it was decided some months ago—possibly rightly, possibly wrongly—to reduce the power of the security organization in Iran, a decision which was reflected in the resignation of General Bakhtiar, it was clear that unless this was followed quickly by a marked improvement in the administration of the country and a lessening of corruption, the position of the Government would be seriously weakened and a revival of activity by Communists and fellow-travellers likely. Nothing was, in fact, done to remedy grievances, to curtail corruption or lessen incompetence. The past few months have, indeed, seen an astonishing degree of incompetence or stupidity, shown particularly in the failure to take into account the views of the Persian people; it would seem that those who held the reins of power were concerned only to impress foreign opinion, believing that public opinion at home could be ignored—provided that the West could be induced to believe in the administration's intention and wish to carry out reform, failure to implement this would not matter.

This was underlined by the conduct of the elections in 1960 and 1961. The promise that these would be free, whereas in fact interference on the first occasion was more blatant than ever before and on the second little less so, was an affront to the public conscience of the older generation and exacerbated the frustration of younger people. The new Prime Minister, Dr Ali Amini, stood as an independent candidate for Teheran in the abortive elections of 1960 and achieved some support among the intellectuals by his forthright attacks on the Government's conduct of affairs. He was 'dissuaded' from standing in the new elections of 1961. In such circumstances it is odd that he should have been asked to form a Government. How far the pressure of hostile Soviet or Soviet-inspired propaganda induced the Shah to turn to Amini as a man having the ability to devise measures of financial reform which are essential if the spread of discontent is to be stopped, to what extent the uncompromising

hostility of Amini to the Government in 1960 caused the intellectuals to look to him, or how far future aid from the U.S.A. was thought to be conditional upon financial reform at home which only someone of the calibre of Amini could be expected to accomplish, are matters of speculation. Once having assumed office, it is not altogether surprising that Dr Amini should have secured the dissolution of the Majlis; though the fact that the Senate has been dissolved also indicates, perhaps, that he has some rather more radical changes in view than simply the holding of 'free' elections. But the dissolution of the two Houses, like the annulment of the elections of 1960, is, in fact, unconstitutional; and the wisdom of ruling by decree is doubtful and its dangers, in Iran, great. The Government has apparently been empowered to revise the electoral law prior to the holding of new elections: this, too, is unconstitutional.

Dr Amini by birth and temperament belongs to the old bureaucracy: his father was at one time first Minister to Muzaffar ud-Din, his mother was a daughter of Muzaffar ud-Din His methods are those of the old-fashioned Persian diplomacy and politics, but to this he brings a clear mind well-trained in Western techniques The constitution of his Cabinet suggests that he may seek a solution to the problems of the country by manipulation; the inclusion in it of Ministers with links with the National Front and the Tudeh party may perhaps indicate an inclination to turn to neutralism in foreign affairs. On the other hand it would not be surprising if Amini was seeking to emulate the example of Qawam as-Saltaneh, with whom he was at one time closely associated—but if this is the case he will need to remember that he who would sup with the devil must needs provide himself with a long spoon. But Amini has never been a 'popular' figure, and perhaps one should consider the composition of his Cabinet and the early measures of his Government merely in the light of this fact.

The intellectuals and the middle classes are demanding a greater say in affairs and a new type of society Discontent is endemic in Iran but it has unquestionably been growing; and in some areas there is an ugly mood among the intellectuals and the town proletariat. Periodic demonstrations by students have been a feature of recent months; and the teachers have been growing increasingly restive. Both groups have legitimate grievances, but perhaps no more than other groups of the population. The recent crisis was brought to a head by the death of a teacher from a bullet fired by the police who were attempting to disperse a demonstration of teachers

demanding higher pay. Amini may well have realized that the support of the middle classes and intellectuals could only be won by the inclusion of Ministers with National Front and Tudeh sympathies or associations. His prohibition of alcohol at Government receptions and his ban on the entry of foreign cabaret artists reflect, partially at least, a bid for the support of the religious classes and with them the smaller bazaar merchants. In this he may be wise. If his intention to stop corruption is serious he will need popular support to enable him to put it into practice. He will also need strength to prevent the charge of corruption being used as a stalking horse for the paying off of old scores; and wisdom to prevent emotions from clouding fundamental issues and exacerbating the hatred and misunderstandings of the different groups of society.

The programme of the new Government is in many respects not very different from that of former Governments: it includes the limitation of landholdings, the curtailing of Government expenditure, the improvement of the condition of civil servants, especially teachers, and the prevention of corruption; what is new is its declared intention to decentralize and to prosecute embezzlers. Moreover, Amini's frank exposition of the economic plight of the country and his attribution of this to large-scale peculation in Government expenditure and his call for austerity are new and offer a strange contrast to the line taken heretofore; and the fact that a number of highly placed persons have already been detained is perhaps an earnest of his intention to stop corruption. Whether Amini will in fact be able to rally public support to his Government and take steps to reform the finances of the country—steps which, if successful, are bound to lessen the privileges and opportunities for financial gain of many—will perhaps depend upon the extent to which he gives the public a responsible share in running the affairs of the country.

Nuclear Test Negotiations

DURING 1960 the three-Power negotiations in Geneva for a nuclear test ban[1] dragged on, despite the Summit fiasco and the breakdown of general disarmament negotiations. In March agreement had been reached on the U.S. proposals for a phased ban, excluding underground explosions registering less than 4·75 seismic magnitude, which according to the U.S. 'large hole' theory could not be identified sufficiently to be included in a comprehensive treaty. Re-

[1] See Note of the Month in *The World Today*, March 1960.

search into the identification of these smaller explosions was to be accompanied by a voluntary moratorium on tests below this threshold. The length of such a moratorium and the co-ordination of a joint research programme remained the outstanding issues in the negotiations, together with the vexed question of the quota of on-site veto-free inspections to be allowed in the territory of the three nuclear Powers.

A *de facto* moratorium has obtained since 31 October 1958 by the unilateral decision of the three Powers to suspend all tests during negotiations. There has been, however, growing feeling, particularly in the United States, that this amounts to a ban without any controls and is therefore very dangerous to national security, and also that a moratorium of five years, as urged by the Soviet Union, would make it difficult both practically and politically for the U.S to resume tests after such a long interruption. The Eisenhower Administration made it plain, moreover, that it could not bind its successor to a long moratorium, and on 7 May 1960 President Eisenhower announced the Vela project for resuming underground tests before the end of the year, but for peaceful research purposes to try new identification instruments for smaller explosions.

The Russians argued, however, that such research could cover tests of new weapons, and they therefore demanded full inspection and blueprints of the devices to be used. The U.S. offered in return a joint programme pooling obsolete, declassified devices or alternatively 'the black box', a sealed device not to be recovered after use; any further disclosure would have required amendment of the McMahon Act. The Russians, on the other hand, refused to contribute to the pool on the ground that they had no intention of carrying out any further tests.

On the same basis the Russians refused Western demands for an annual quota of approximately twenty on-site veto-free inspections in the territory of each of the three Powers, though a grid system of control posts throughout the world had been agreed by both sides. The Russians insisted moreover that no inspections could take place until all the control posts (180 in all) had been set up, which would take at least four years after the signing of a treaty, while the West considered inspection possible within two years and objected to any further prolongation of the moratorium.

The three-Power conference adjourned on 5 December to await the establishment of the new U.S. Administration and did not re-

sume until 21 March this year. The new U.S. delegation came to the 1961 meeting armed, in agreement with Britain, with a new programme which conceded many points to the Russians. The length of the seismic research programme into explosions below 4 75 magnitude was to be increased from the previous U.S. proposal last September of two and a quarter years to three years, the moratorium to begin with the signing of the treaty. The Russian demand for full information and inspection of U.S. devices to be used in this research was conceded, subject to Congressional approval, and the Russians were asked to reconsider their earlier decision not to participate on similar terms in a joint research programme. The Western Powers agreed to reduce the number of control posts in Russia from twenty-one to nineteen, with a reduction from seventeen to sixteen in the U.S. Parity was conceded in the composition of the control commission on the basis of four countries from the West, four from the Soviet bloc, and three uncommitted, and it was conceded that each of the original parties to the treaty could veto the whole annual budget of the control organization. Parity in the annual quota of inspections was also conceded, meaning in practice that Russia could carry out twice as many as the West, but the minimum of twenty inspections a year was maintained, together with the criteria of such inspection, namely that inspections must be by nationals other than those of the country to be inspected These proposals, together with seventeen articles and a preamble previously agreed by both sides, were tabled by the West on 18 April as a draft treaty.

On their side the Russians, immediately on resumption of the conference, demanded that there should be a three-man directorate of the control organization in place of the single neutral administrator previously agreed. In the Western view this would amount to a Russian power of veto over the whole control system. Russian opposition to any single neutral administrator was reiterated by Mr Khrushchev in his recent interview with Mr Lippmann,[1] together with a rejection of the Western figure for an inspection quota. The Russian delegate suggested three 'symbolic' inspections as a sufficient annual quota, on the ground that any more would amount to full-scale reconnaissance of Soviet territory and that in any case inspection was unnecessary as no party to the treaty would dare to face the propaganda damage involved in being convicted of 'cheating'. Moreover, in his opening speech on 21 March, he accused the

[1] *New York Herald Tribune* (European edition), 17 April 1961.

Western Powers of using French tests for their own research, and on 15 May he threatened that continued French testing would be held to absolve Russia from her undertaking not to resume her own tests.

American military circles are reported to be 'concerned' at the indefinite continuation of an uncontrolled moratorium. It would seem however that both sides in the controversy should be equally concerned to achieve a ban on tests before more countries achieve nuclear status, and the U.S. representative, on his return from reporting in Washington, reaffirmed on 8 May the U.S. desire for 'a prompt and effective' treaty.

Britain and the Common Market

The State of the Debate

VEN eighteen months ago, though Bntish mterest in the new onomic unit on the Contment was growing, it occupied only a very ght proportion of public debate: only 8 per cent of Conservative id o per cent of Labour candidates, for example, referred to Euro- :an trade in their election addresses.[1] The fact that 54 per cent of iberal candidates did so, and that the Liberal party wanted Britain join the Common Market, was a harbinger for the future; but it is only in 1960 and the early months of this year that a groundswell intelligent, if not always very well-informed, opinion has come to ke the Economic Community seriously to the extent of formulat- g sometimes vague feelings, sometimes more precise attitudes on hat Britain's reaction should be. At present three major influential wspapers, *The Financial Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Economist*, e running campaigns to persuade Britain to sign the Treaty of ome.[2] One might hazard the guess that probably the larger part of ticulate industrial opinion on the employers' side is in favour of a ose arrangement of some kind with the Common Market or even itish entry into it; a number of trade union leaders (including Mr ousins)—though hardly perhaps the rank and file of the unions— ld the same view. A significant proportion of higher civil servants d Foreign Office personnel favours British entry into the Com- on Market and several score M.P s, particularly among the unger ones, seem prepared, even without a Government initia- e, to exert themselves in favour of such a step. It is said that— unting noses rather than political weight—a majority of Her ajesty's Ministers would favour British participation if it can be ranged, and there seems little doubt that the Lord Privy Seal, arged with this question, would like to take Britain in.

DISCARDED ALTERNATIVES

The debate has, in fact, narrowed down. Two years ago the Euro- an Free Trade Association of the 'Outer Seven' was founded in ibivalent mood: if it did not facilitate a settlement with the Six, it ould at least be a holding operation preventing the Six from mak- g bilateral arrangements with each of the other European coun-

[1] D. E Butler and Richard Rose, *The British General Election of 1959* (Lon- 1, Macmillan, 1960), p. 132.

[2] The *Daily Mirror* has since joined the ranks (10 May 1961).

tries in turn, and it might even become a rival bloc that could put pressure on the Six: did not Germany send as much of her exports to the Seven as to her Common Market partners? In any case it would do something to assuage the appetite for new markets which the Government, like the sorcerer's apprentice, roused in British industry when it tried to sell that greater Free Trade Area which it then failed to deliver. But today, even in the high quarters which had originated the concept of a rival bloc, it seems tacitly admitted that E.F.T.A. was not the most brilliant move in the annals of British post-war diplomacy, and that this new organization may be even more of a problem for a real settlement than the difficulties caused by Commonwealth preference.

Implicit in the ambivalence of E.F.T.A. was the alternative notion of 'bridge-building'—or, as it has been put least happily, 'the Six joining the Seven' in a Free Trade Area even looser than that rejected by the French Government at the end of 1958 The exploratory talks of late 1960 have shown that this alternative is no more practicable today than it was two years ago; and realizing this, the British Government is now prepared to consider ways and means of associating Britain with the Common Market without necessarily bringing in all her E.F.T.A. partners immediately on the same basis. There have been protests from Scandinavia and above all from Switzerland at this turn in British thinking, but it would seem that British policy today is based on the view that once the peculiar problems of Britain have been fully explored with the Six, satisfactory arrangements for the rest of the Seven should not be too difficult to invent.

Thus in February Mr Heath put forward once more the idea of a modified customs union between Britain and the Common Market on goods not coming from E.F.T.A., the Commonwealth, or the Common Market countries and their overseas associates, Britain would be willing to harmonize her external tariff with the Six It needs only a moment's reflection to show that in practice not much trade is left after these exceptions; and if this move was made to look as another British step towards Europe 'in principle', no one can have thought it to be a solution acceptable to the Six. Like the Profumo suggestion of 1960 that Britain should join Euratom and the Coal and Steel Community, this proposal was again interpreted by French officials and some European federalists as yet another attempt at sabotage by perfidious Albion. The Foreign Office cannot have been altogether unaware that this would be the reaction: and

so one can only conclude that Mr Heath's method of 'leaping a precipice in little hops' is aimed primarily at the British public and not at continental Governments.

France had for two years rejected both these alternative means of obtaining commercial advantages without political commitment—'bridge-building' and a customs union between Britain and the Six; and now she has also made it clear that the obverse notion—political consultation without economic commitment—will not be allowed to develop further than the existence of Western European Union already implies. In the minds of many 'federalists', the real community of interest on which alone a concerted foreign policy can be based is dependent on economic community: and British participation in the political processes without the economic would only hamper the political development of the Six Similarly, to the President of France leadership remains indivisible: British participation would jeopardize the whole special position which France hopes to hold in the world by virtue of her political leadership of the Six.[1]

As other avenues have been explored and found only to turn into culs-de-sac, discussion in Britain has more and more focused on British entry as a full member into the Economic Community with all the rights and obligations that this entails. The debate has even gone so far as to enter into the tactical point whether Britain should offer to sign the Treaty of Rome unconditionally and negotiate about protocols covering her special difficulties afterwards, or whether she should negotiate about these problems first, and sign only afterwards. This particular discussion—carried on even in the editorial and correspondence columns of *The Times*—is of course fairly unreal: but it illustrates the extent to which the notion of 'unconditional surrender', of 'entry at any price', has gained ground. It is no longer a rival bloc, bridge-building, a customs union, or purely political participation, it is now full-fledged entry into the three Communities that is at stake.

DECIDING IN UNCERTAINTY

If the debate has thus narrowed down, it remains none the less far from clear. And the uncertainties that surround the decision do not make it easier to take.

The first problem is perhaps whether there is any problem at all: is membership of the Common Market open to Britain anyway? Formally, under Article 237 of the Treaty, 'Any European State

[1] See 'The New France in the New Europe', *The World Today*, October 1960.

may apply to become a member of the Community.' But any one Government, or any one ratifying legislature of the Six, may blackball the application. the Community is 'open' to applications for membership, but 'open' to new members only by the unanimous consent of the old. A State applying for membership

> ... shall address its application to the Council which, after obtaining the opinion of the Commission, shall act by means of a unanimous vote
>
> The conditions of admission and the amendments to this Treaty necessitated thereby shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. Such agreement shall be submitted to all the contracting States for ratification in accordance with their respective constitutional rules.

No one in Britain can be certain that the French Government will not attempt to delay and complicate the negotiations to an extent which will make it very difficult indeed for Britain to join At the time of writing it looks as if Mr Kennedy will give powerful support to any British application for membership; and to that extent perhaps the first uncertainty may soon be diminished.

A second obviously remains: what will the conditions be on which Britain can gain admission? However many protestations there are to the contrary, the whole history of the negotiations leading up to the Rome Treaty shows that it constitutes no abstract scheme of eternal justice, but a highly political, delicately balanced compromise bargain between the interests of the original participants. The Treaty will clearly need substantial amendments if what suited the constellation of the Six in 1956–7 is to be applied to seven or more countries in 1962. And so the shape of the treaty which Britain would be asked to sign is in itself incompletely known.

In some 'responsible' quarters, moreover, the debate has been hampered by the fear that any detailed discussion of Britain's difficulties and the ways in which they could be resolved would not only rouse sleeping dogs in Britain herself, but might also prejudice Britain's bargaining position once negotiations begin The British press is read far more widely on the Continent than continental papers in Britain, and it is difficult for the British to argue among themselves without being overheard. There has thus been some embarrassment over the discussion of the maximum concessions that Britain could afford to make: and it is not altogether easy to decide what concessions must be offered before negotiations can even be started up again, and what concessions then remain to be traded at the bargaining table.

Fourthly, the treaty is after all only a *loi cadre*: and in many of its vital fields of application the real decisions have not yet been taken even between the Six. This is an argument for Britain coming in quickly and making her voice heard and her weight felt before these vital decisions are taken: but on agriculture, on the harmonization of social, fiscal, and monetary policies, and on a whole range of other matters, adherence to the Rome Treaty is in effect a pledge to pursue policies which shall hereafter be revealed.

Nowhere, of course, is this uncertainty greater and on no subject is it more important than on the political side: the political and constitutional implications of the Community remain a mystery—even to the Six. Those who invite Britain into the Common Market alternate between calling it a commercial arrangement which need pose no major constitutional problems for Britain, and a first step towards a United States of Europe which none who do not accept federalist objectives should enter. (It is a sad paradox that at the very time when French policy, by stressing a confederal link between individual fatherlands as against a federal union, makes it easier for Britain to adhere, French policy also looks as if it were directed at keeping Britain out.) No one should be surprised if those who have for so long been accused of 'dragging their feet' in other organizations now feel that there are times when good fences make good neighbours and that Britain should not—in her own interest any more than in that of European unity—sign what some would wish to construe as a blank cheque which she might later fail to honour.

In the last resort the honest 'European' must admit that to sign the Rome Treaty with the intent only of carrying out its letter would sooner or later lead to tensions and frictions. To sign the Treaty is to accept certain processes of decision-making in which Britain, too, would have a formal veto, but in which the spirit of 'an ever closer union' expressed in the preamble would be the guiding one To join the Community in sincerity would thus be an act of faith of which the full consequences cannot now be foreseen with any accuracy. Indeed it would be inappropriate and in conflict with the whole spirit of the Community to attempt to delimit its nature by a legal contract. As in a marriage, the legal instruments to be signed by the partners are no more than a minimal basis for the relationship which will evolve with time—an inter-relationship simultaneously both cause and further consequence of internal changes in each of the partners which naturally result as a function of the relationship itself.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising if on the other side —either explicitly recognizing this 'gamble' or else instinctively suspicious of any foreign entanglements—sensible, cautious, and hard-headed people feel that to take an irreversible decision of this kind in the present miasma of incertitude would be foolhardy in the extreme. After all, in her finest hour Britain stood alone: she won the war, her institutions remained intact through all political upheavals, she was never defeated, never occupied, never rent by really fundamental internal dissensions. Neither intellectually nor psychologically can the case for going into Europe be regarded as proven and until it is, many people believe, it is better for Britain to stand aloof.

Thus on the one side we have a tiny but fervent federalist minority and the rather larger group of 'realistic' pro-Europeans, and on the other the Empire Loyalist and *Daily Express* anti-Europeans and a substantial group of sceptics. Between them there is a large vacuum of opinion that would be prepared on the whole to accept whatever lead the Government might decide to give, but may well prefer not to be bothered with far-reaching change. In a sense, here is one of those big decisions which could be taken by the Cabinet either way. What, then, are the reasons for and against as they are argued in public debate? What are the arguments which the Cabinet must weigh?

ARGUMENTS FOR

On both sides the argument is fought out on three levels the economic, the political, and a third and even more general cultural, psychological, and philosophical plane. Each of these is best taken in turn.

Economic Arguments

The debate was originally begun in terms of purely commercial considerations: the fear that the common external tariff would exclude British products from the Common Market at the very moment when, e.g., German products would be able to enter the other five countries free of all duties and restrictions. The cry of trading 'discrimination' with which the British Government operated in 1956–9 was a wholly adequate expression of this original motivation: and the original Free Trade Area proposals were designed precisely to minimize commercial damage to Britain without troubling about the other aspects of the Economic Community.

To the fear of tariff discrimination was later added that of discrimination by other, particularly non-governmental, trading practices: commercial arrangements between firms inside the Community which would directly or indirectly give a relative advantage to Common Market firms against all outsiders.

The actual experience of British traders so far has not altogether borne out these original apprehensions. The Six have substantially increased their imports from the United Kingdom in spite of the progressive business integration between Common Market countries and in spite of the beginnings of tariff discrimination. While British exports to the rest of the world have increased by only 8 per cent those to the Common Market have increased by 21 per cent. Of course, it is too early to say how the full rate of preference (when the common external tariff is applied and all internal tariffs within the Community are abolished) will affect British exports: but for the moment at least the European neighbours of the Community cannot claim that trade diversion has been greater than trade creation. The argument has thus turned less on absolute losses than on missed opportunities for British exports If the Community's imports from the E.F.T.A. countries have been expanding so satisfactorily, the imports of Community countries from each other have risen more than twice as fast—by nearly half in only two years. It is a larger share in this most dynamic of world markets that Britain should attempt to conquer—particularly at a time when her exports to the sterling area show signs of stagnation.

The argument has in fact shifted away from primarily mercantilist to primarily growth considerations. The rising imports of the Six are a function of their buoyant industrial expansion. But why are the Six growing so fast, and why should not Britain herself join in this economic dynamism? That became a positive argument for joining the Common Market as against the earlier negative attempts to limit the damage. British opinion began to be impressed by the fact that industrial production among the Six has even since 1953 grown by almost 80 per cent while that of Britain grew by only 30 per cent. Moreover, the stimulus of competition within a common market can be expected to lead to further improvements in productivity; and the stimulus to investment for a market of 165 million people can be expected to accelerate economic growth. *Per contra*, the overspill of Common Market competition into third markets may be expected to threaten British exports on a far wider front than the 15 per cent that is actually exported to the Six; and the diversion of

American investment from Britain to the Continent, and the autonomous flow of British capital to the Six, will do nothing to allow Britain to catch up. Major firms have decided to set up plant and subsidiaries on the Continent—I.C.I. has only just decided on an investment of £100 million in Holland—and the Stock Exchange has discovered the possibilities of continental securities. Increasingly the spectre of a Britain working with antiquated organization and machinery against a modern *Europe des grandes boîtes* came to haunt economic commentators, one of whom even wondered whether Britain's political stability could stand the long-run social strains entailed by such a prospect. And to those who see Britain's biannual balance-of-payment crises as a major factor in her economic retardation, the thought that by some means or other continental currency reserves might be used to buttress the slender gold base of the sterling area presents an added attraction: do not the countries of the Community have reserves four times as large as those of the whole sterling area?

Political Arguments

Just as economists see a relative British decline in the economic field which calls, to their mind, for Britain to hitch herself to the Continent, so in the political field it is argued that the whole balance of power in the world has shifted since 1945. This shift, taking place partly at the expense of Britain's position, requires a fundamental reorientation in foreign policy.

On the morrow of the second World War, Ernest Bevin could view the world as dominated by the Soviet challenge in the heart of an exhausted, demoralized Europe, which only the strength of an Anglo-American alliance could rebuild. A few years later Churchill could formulate the doctrine of the three circles—the Commonwealth, Europe, and the Anglo-American alliance—the intersection of which constitutes Britain's natural place. But today Western Europe has grown out of all recognition in strength and cohesion; the Commonwealth has continued to change its character and its nature is perhaps more problematical than ever, while the consequences of South Africa's disassociation from it remain to be digested; and with the disappearance of President Eisenhower from the American political scene the last sentimental vestiges of the wartime alliance have evaporated. The new Administration will recognize power and dynamism where it finds it, and there is no reason to believe that Mr Dillon or Mr Ball (the Common Market's chief

Washington adviser and lobbyist until he entered the Administration) will change their views now they are working for Mr Kennedy. And in spite of the talk about Berlin, the Soviet challenge has changed both its direction and its character, so that the world political context in which the problem of Britain and Europe must be seen has been revolutionized.

The first political argument, then, is that by standing aloof from Europe Britain may find herself cut off from the main axis of power in the Western alliance. Both for ideological reasons and for reasons of power politics Washington will be tempted to work at least as closely with Bonn, Paris, and Brussels as with London if London's stake on the Continent is confined to a few divisions on the Rhine. Mr Harriman and again more recently Mr Kennedy have made it clear that political considerations take precedence over the commercial disadvantages which the United States might suffer, and want Britain to join the Six. (Indeed it is said that when Mr Macmillan, at their meeting in Washington, asked President Kennedy if Britain's participation in the European Community would not threaten her special relationship with the U.S.A., President Kennedy just did not understand what special relationship Mr Macmillan meant.) With the U.S.A. neutral the political argument might have been weighty enough: if the U.S.A. is anxious for a wider political consolidation in Europe, then it might be difficult to see how British influence in Washington could survive intact after Britain's refusal, but possible to imagine an increase in British influence if she takes up a leading place in the European Community.

That Britain's influence on the continent of Western Europe itself has declined, is declining, and is bound to decline further if she stands outside the Community is taken as axiomatic. Where internal European affairs are concerned this is a natural course of events which some hardly even regret, though others feel that each time Britain has withdrawn from Europe she has had to come back to fight a war; and that France still has more need of Britain to balance German influence in the Community than France herself, in her present mood of buoyant self-confidence, is apt to realize.

More particularly it is on the side of European foreign policy that the decline of British influence is feared. Just as French statesmen have, from the beginning, argued for tying Germany so firmly into Western Europe that she can never make any deals with the East for the sake of the German territories beyond the Elbe, and Dr Aden-

auer has at times argued the case for a united Europe in terms of his fear of a Franco-Russian *rapprochement* at the expense of Germany, so it is now argued by some in Britain that both President de Gaulle and some successor to Dr Adenauer (such as Herr Strauss) might come to have interests that would be served by arrangements with the Soviet Union independently of Britain. The reverse accusations from Europe against Britain were after all voiced loudly at the time of Mr Macmillan's Moscow trip. It is hardly surprising if today some prophets of doom feel that Britain must be able to influence the foreign policy of a united Europe from within.

Then again it is argued that the Commonwealth might even gain a new impetus if Britain can stand uniquely both within Europe and within the Commonwealth, interpreting the one to the other, safeguarding the overseas Commonwealth's economic interests in Europe, and acting as the hinge between two potentially major political groupings. In a sense, therefore, this argument maintains that the theory of the three circles, in so far as it can be maintained at all today, can be realized with less difficulty if Britain enters the European Community than if she stands outside it. and between those alternatives there is now no half-way house

Psychological and Cultural Arguments

Particularly from the moderate left of both parties these economic and political arguments are sometimes subsumed under a more general line of thought—that it is time for Britain to abandon attitudes of effortless superiority which ill become her in the seventh decade of the twentieth century. E.F.T.A. is denounced as a last attempt once more to set up a solar system with little nations playing the part of British satellites—now that bigger nations can no longer be enlisted for the role. Entry into the Common Market is seen as a recognition of Britain's changed position in the world, an adaptation to reduced circumstances, an abandonment of grandiose self-delusions, and a realistic attempt to come to terms with nations of Britain's own size.

These political and economic arguments can be used on the social, cultural, and artistic planes as well. There are radicals who hope to break ingrained British self-satisfaction and insular complacency by increasing contact and competition with the Continent.[1] In the worlds of social organization and of design, literature, and the arts,

[1] Compare, for example, Michael Young, *The Chipped White Cups of Dover* (London, Unit 2, 1960), p. 20.

interest in continental achievements is widening in Britain already: entry into the Common Market might provide the right sort of stimulus for further exciting discoveries and mutual cross-fertilization of ideas. As the Channel narrows and communication across it increases, so standards will rise and become eclectic, choosing the best that each nation can offer: and once Europe makes a real impact, a much more open-minded attitude to all sorts of other countries outside Europe and to their achievements should further serve to goad and inspire British performance.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST

The arguments against joining the Common Market seek to meet those for doing so on each level: the economic, the political, and the very general psychological and cultural planes.

Economic Arguments

On the commercial side it was always argued that some 15 per cent of British exports must not determine steps which might prejudice the 45 per cent of British exports that go to the Commonwealth—but the specific difficulties that would arise for Commonwealth trade are discussed below. As the imports of the Common Market even from Britain have continued to expand significantly since its formation, however, the purely tariff argument for joining the Common Market has not seemed to need any particular rebuttal over the last few months.

Another commercial argument, used by at least one leading British economist, is however worth mentioning as a pendant to the argument from industrial arrangements used in favour of British adhesion: according to this view, the provisions of the Rome Treaty dealing with monopolies, cartels, and other restrictive arrangements are too tight. Continental industrialists may be morally willing and may by experience and legal equipment be able to circumvent these provisions, but British industry, accustomed to the severe interpretation of British legislation in this field, would be appreciably handicapped if it now became subject also to the Common Market's rules.

Then of course there are the specific objections to the Common Market as it is envisaged in the Treaty and as it is being run: Labour commentators who believe that it is too *laisser-faire*, Conservatives who believe that it is too addicted to planning; Labour people who fear that it does not pay sufficient attention to social security, and

Conservatives who fear that it may entail excessive levels of transfer payments for social security. But on both sides few people have so far troubled to go into these questions in detail, so that these arguments often turn out on closer inspection to be rationalizations rather than real reasons.

It is when we turn to the growth arguments that more fundamental questions of economic analysis are involved. Of course, at least the growth of the years 1953–5 on the Continent cannot have been provoked even by anticipation of the Common Market: only after 1956 could expectations and only after 1958 could the first steps in the implementation of the Common Market have shown economic results. But if it is conceded that competition does stimulate growth, then there is no need for Britain to join the Six: a selective lowering of British customs duties at British discretion could be as stimulating—though obviously this would not necessarily call forth reciprocal concessions from the rest of the world.

The pessimistic view of British competitive strength naturally implies hostility to any automatic reduction and abolition of tariff barriers. Weak economic areas united with strong ones may even become absolutely weaker, or at least may grow more slowly than if they were protected from the competition of strong ones. Capital concentrates in the strong areas, enterprising personnel is attracted to the prosperous areas, and the terms of trade turn against the weak Southern Italy was severely handicapped by Italian unity, and so this 'under-developed region', the United Kingdom, must be protected from European competition at least on its home market. This argument from resignation, once its premise is accepted, tells simultaneously against the arguments from economic growth, from capital movements, and from the balance of payments advanced in favour of British entry into the Common Market. If the challenge would be too much for this country, then it is better not to accept it

Political Arguments

A totally different set of arguments is used in the political and constitutional sphere. The basic objection—often unexpressed or explicitly denied, but then implied in other reasoning—is that entry into the Common Market involves abandonment to supra-national institutions of British sovereignty in certain important spheres of action. This objection has different variants. In so far as the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community is concerned—and, to a much lesser extent, the Commissions of the other two Communi-

ties—the objection is to decisions taken by bodies in which the British Government as such would not even have a vote: only one or two members originally nominated by Britain but pledged to a supra-national loyalty to the whole economic unit might be expected to have a special concern for the peculiarly British point of view. In the Council of Ministers, Her Majesty's Government would of course be represented: but it would have only a small part of the total voting power, so that a coalition of continentals could outvote it except in those cases where the veto is retained. The objection to the first form of supra-nationality is stronger, both on theoretical and on psychological grounds: 'irresponsible bureaucracy' is a plausible cry until such time as the European Parliamentary Assembly is directly elected and has more direct powers over the Commission; and somehow the British Government has become accustomed in international organizations to the possibility of being outvoted in a body in which it is itself represented and can put its own view, while decisions taken by a supra-national body on which the Government has neither voice nor vote are harder to swallow. Nevertheless, even where the Council of Ministers is concerned, the ultimate absence of a veto on most questions of substance, and the direct impact of international decisions on internal British affairs, make the Rome Treaty different in kind from anything that has been accepted by Britain so far, and it is no wonder if supra-nationality even in this attenuated form is looked upon with distrust

If it is better to be master in one's own house, even if the house is not quite as shiny as a result, it is also argued that perhaps Britain can influence the decisions of the Six better from without than from within. Evidence on this point, however, seems fairly hard to come by

There is a further argument, urged by specialists in public administration: if Britain goes into Europe, then she must put thought, energy, and first-class personnel into it. For the moment problems lying well beyond Europe take up so much of the Cabinet's time and thought and so much Government machinery that not enough is left over for the European Community. To go in unprepared to devote an appreciable portion of our political and administrative talent to this new task would be morally and politically wrong.

More weighty appear to be the arguments which posit a fundamental incompatibility between the survival of the Commonwealth

as an association of independent States and the subordination of some aspects at least of British policy to Community institutions If trade agreements between Britain and New Zealand have to be negotiated through Brussels—so the extreme supposition runs—what remains of the Commonwealth? And if this particular argument about commercial talks seems far-fetched, what of the much more general problem: how can Britain occupy her traditional or indeed any worthy role in the Commonwealth if Community foreign policy is made in a Council of Ministers or Heads of State in which Britain has only a fraction of the votes?

Just the same argument is used by all those who see Britain's role primarily as that almost of a fifty-first state of the U.S.A. For both the Commonwealth and the Anglo-American schools of thought European integration poses the question: are intersecting circles in this very tight sense of the metaphor really conceivable?

Allied to this constitutional question there is also a political one The European Community contains France and Belgium—until recently prominent colonial Powers against which there is still considerable animus in Africa—and Germany, whose new riches are not hidden under a bushel. Is not this European Community essentially a rich men's club, at a time when Britain's role in world affairs should, above all, be that of bridging the gap between poor and rich nations? It may be that this argument overestimates the distinction in Africans' minds between British, French, and Belgian policies or underestimates the extent to which that distinction would survive British entry into the Community. Perhaps it also underestimates the determination with which the Community is proposing to set about the task of development aid for its associates overseas.[1] But in a general way the belief that the Commonwealth's greatest function today is that of providing a multi-racial association of peoples round the globe just when the Afro-Asian world is a major, if not the greatest, stake in the East–West conflict, and that entry into the Common Market may detract from the Commonwealth's effectiveness in performing that function, is perhaps the most convincing reason given for Britain—in the interests of the world as a whole—steering clear of continental entanglements.

But it is not only their past colonial policies which are urged against any political association with continental countries. They

[1] Cf. 'The European Common Market and Africa', in *The World Today*, September 1960. The next major step in this development will presumably be the meeting of African and European parliamentarians in Strasbourg in June.

are regarded as being unreliable in their domestic policies too. 'In constant danger of relapsing into tyranny'[1]—as Germany and Italy proved only two or three decades ago—or of being exposed to revolution—as France has been three times in the last three years—their political ineptitude might drag Britain into awkward situations. 'It is difficult for the leopard to change his spots', Europe is the place where both world wars have come from—and the wider the Channel, the better.

Psychological and Cultural Arguments

These political judgments shade easily into more general historical, biological, and even xenophobic attitudes. Britain's chief interests, since the loss of Calais, have lain overseas. It was by turning seaward that she was able to escape the role of a secondary, because peripheral, European Power and assume world hegemony. Her natural affinities, many feel, lie with 'her kith and kin throughout the world' who are 'British in language and in stock'. To join in a European union, as Mr Eden put it, 'we know it in our bones that that we cannot do'. At its crudest, this is the line of thought of 'Niggers begin at Calais' and 'Foreigners don't like cricket'; at its most sophisticated, it runs in terms of the differences between case-law and Roman law, and the absence of a common spiritual and emotional experience formed by a common language, literature, and history.

Such cultural differences are also translated back—quite apart from the political side of the issue—into the economic sphere. On the trade union side the argument against the Common Market sometimes takes the form of objecting to a mobility of labour which would bring more Italians, for example, to Britain—and the early post-war experiments with Italian labour in the British mines failed not least because British miners complained that the Italians had too great an appeal for British womenfolk. On the managerial side hostility to direct competition from abroad can take a rather different form: British business often still retains a certain pride in its amateur status, likes to maintain a gentleman's way of life in the aristocratic tradition, and does not see that the all-out pursuit of profit and economic growth—ending so often, for German managers at least, in a premature coronary thrombosis—is worth the sacrifice. In other words, for some, opposition to the British entry

[1] H. C. Allen, *The Anglo-American Predicament* (London, Macmillan, 1960). This and the following three quotations are taken from pp 68, 75, 79, 82.

into the Common Market takes on almost the significance of a defence of the British way of life. It is for this reason that such opposition must not be treated too lightly.

SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES

Even if the opposition to British entry into the Common Market as such is overcome, two major substantive difficulties remain which cannot be wished out of existence. The political will to overcome them is the prerequisite for their solution, but the political will is not enough: technical means must be found. The first of these problems is that of Commonwealth preference, the second that of agriculture.

Commonwealth Preference

At the moment Britain grants preferences to the Commonwealth on about half her imports from it: this preference amounts to abou 8–10 per cent of the value of these imports, making an averag preference on all imports (including those which receive none) o 4–5 per cent.[1] This preference is of vital importance to som Commonwealth countries, notably to a country such as New Zea land. British signature of the Treaty of Rome as it stands woul mean not only the ending of this preference, but also in some cases a rise in import duties on Commonwealth produce (in some cases in deed the imposition of a variable import levy) just at the very tim when tariffs against Common Market producers would be dis mantled. The Commonwealth may not depend for its political ex istence on commercial preference: but it would be politically im possible to reverse Commonwealth preference and impose anti Commonwealth preference. The effects of a simple adhesion to th Rome Treaty would make themselves felt not only in Britis domestic politics but also in the sense of loyalty of Commonwealt countries towards each other and in the economics (and thus per haps even the domestic politics) of developing countries in Asia These are really problems which the European Community an Britain would have to face together if Britain decides to apply fo membership.

At the same time British exports to certain Commonwealt countries enjoy a preference over Common Market and other non Commonwealth goods. There can be little doubt that the Com

[1] Political and Economic Planning, *Commonwealth Preference in the Unite Kingdom* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1960), p. 5.

munity would regard it as unfair for Britain to seek admission to the Common Market as an equal partner while preserving a privileged position in the overseas Commonwealth against her new partners in Europe. Here the solution would perhaps be easier: Britain could waive the preferences granted to her against Common Market producers. The effects on her exports might not, indeed, be very serious.

It is thus with the United Kingdom's imports of Commonwealth products that we are chiefly concerned. This is in fact a highly complex problem, which requires flexible solutions to the rather different parts into which it may be sub-divided. The table on p. 250, based on a study by Political and Economic Planning, shows the relative importance of different types of commodities and different Commonwealth exporters in this question. Let us take different types of products in turn.[1]

(*a*) *Raw Materials.* Here the United Kingdom could afford to apply the common external tariff of the Community: over a wide range of products the Common Market tariff is zero and in many cases the United Kingdom tariff is zero also. Only in the case of five commodities (aluminium, lead, newsprint, wood-pulp, and zinc) would the Common Market tariff be a hindrance to trade between Britain and the Commonwealth. And in these cases the Community could no doubt allow the United Kingdom to import enough under a tariff quota to cover her own reasonable needs.

It is of course to be hoped that the Community, which has made notable progress in the abolition of tariffs on raw materials, will continue to be inspired by the desire to help the largely underdeveloped overseas producers of raw materials by maintaining the most liberal import policy possible. It is only fair that Europe, which only ten years ago was calling for 'trade not aid', should give these countries the greatest opportunity of earning the funds they need for their development, and low raw material prices will in turn help the manufacturers of the Community to compete with other manufacturers in the rest of the world.

(*b*) *Manufactures from high-wage countries.* As the table shows, two-thirds of these come from Canada, a wealthy country which would not really suffer any serious economic harm if the United

[1] A detailed examination, product by product, has been made by the Economist Intelligence Unit in its *The Commonwealth and Europe* (London, 1960), and most subsequent proposals have been based on the material assembled in that study The suggestions here canvassed run parallel to those which Mr Robert Mathew, Conservative Member of Parliament for Honiton, was to present to the Assembly of Western European Union meeting in London at the end of May (W E.U. Assembly, Document 200, of 29 April 1961).

VALUE OF IMPORTS IN 1957 AND AVERAGE MARGINS OF PREFERENCE

	Total Imports		*Food, Beverages, Tobacco*		*Raw Materials, Mineral Fuels, etc.*		*Manufactured Goods*	
	Imports £m	*Margin* %*	*Imports* £m	*Margin* %	*Imports* £m	*Margin* %	*Imports* £m	*Margin* %
Temperate Countries								
Canada	315	3	102	4	169	2	44	8
Australia	228	4	105	8	117	—	6	14
New Zealand	183	4	132	5	50	1	1	12
Irish Republic	106	4	78	3	13	—	15	14
Commonwealth Africa								
West Africa	114	6	26	4	85	7	2	11
South Africa	98	5	44	8	46	1	7	9
Central Africa	82	2	26	4	55	1	1	4
East Africa	30	4	17	5	12	2	1	12
Asia								
India	157	7	95	6	24	3	37	14
Malay Peninsula	70	1	5	5	63	1	2	5
Ceylon	41	6	35	6	5	3	—	—
Pakistan	25	3	4	7	19	—	2	16
Hong Kong	23	17	1	10	1	5	22	18
Other Areas								
Persian Gulf	153	—	—	—	152	—	—	—
West Indies	44	5	21	11	22	—	1	15
Minor Suppliers†	101		31		64		3	
Total Commonwealth Preference Area	1,769	4	722	6	897	2	144	12

* Calculated as the difference between full and preferential rates as a percentage of the import value of each commodity (usually excluding duty but in the case of beverages and tobacco including duty) weighted by the value of imports of each item

† None of these sent more than £20 million of exports to the United Kingdom

SOURCE: Adapted from Political and Economic Planning, *Commonwealth Preference in the United Kingdom* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1960), p. 12

Kingdom negotiated to discontinue the preference she grants to manufactures coming from high-wage countries of the Commonwealth. Canada's main fear might be of an even greater dependence on the U.S. market; but both Canada and the other Commonwealth countries affected should be able to use the concession which they are here making to the Community in order to obtain counter-

concessions from the Community on Commonwealth exports to the whole of Europe.

(*c*) *Manufactures from low-wage countries.* By importing substantial amounts of Asian textiles and similar manufactures from under-developed countries, the United Kingdom is making an appreciable contribution to the world problem of economic development. The United Kingdom should be left free to pursue such a liberal policy, and the Community as a whole might well wish to join Britain so that progressively larger quotas of such goods can be sold in Europe and the industrialization of these countries proceed apace.

(*d*) *Tropical products.* These raise a special problem owing to the existence of the overseas associated countries to which the Common Market grants a preference analogous to that granted by the United Kingdom to the Commonwealth. If the parallel existence of two preferential areas linking different parts of Africa with different parts of Europe is politically and economically absurd, a simple merger of the two preference areas would throw the whole weight of discrimination upon a minority of producers to be found above all in Latin America. It would therefore be best if both the United Kingdom and the Community abolished their tariffs on tropical goods, which do not in any case serve a protectionist purpose. Where such a course is impossible and the Community feels it necessary to retain customs duties, the United Kingdom could no doubt be granted tariff quotas analogous to those given to Germany, whereby she may import sufficient for her own needs (or part of her own needs) at a tariff lower than that of the Community as a whole.

Even so, of course, the problems of tropical producers are not solved. It is the stability in their export income that matters most for their development, and no merely European or purely tariff measures can assure this. Only world-wide measures of stabilization involving major financial and stock-piling mechanisms can help there. But this is a problem which the Kennedy Administration, too, may be expected to understand.

(*e*) *Temperate foodstuffs.* Until British agricultural policies have been harmonized with the various agricultural policies of the European Community into a single common agricultural policy Britain should be able to import for her own needs under tariff quotas. This (according to *The Financial Times*, 7 March 1961) appears to be an interim solution quite acceptable to the French. The final solution will of course have to be a function of the common agricultural

policy of the whole Community including Britain, and it is here tha a good many intricate problems remain which have so far been onl insufficiently explored in public discussion.

Agriculture

The Treaty of Rome does not envisage free trade in agricultur but merely a common policy: internal sluices such as minimum import prices will continue to protect farmers of one Communit country from competition from farmers in other countries of th Community. *A fortiori* the Community's external tariff on agri cultural products will be made into a stimulus for production and variable import levies on non-Community foodstuffs are pro posed such that the prices within the Community can in general b held well above world prices.

British agricultural policy, on the other hand, is broadly based o the desire for cheap food at the world level of prices: the Britis farmer is protected *vis-à-vis* the low-cost farmers of the wide ope spaces overseas largely by direct subsidies costing the taxpaye between £250 and £300 million per annum In practice the syste is more complicated than that:

> Milk is protected by a monopolistic marketing scheme, which als affects butter and cheese on which there are tariffs; most fruits an vegetables (an important part of our imports of foodstuffs) by a combina tion of tariffs and import controls; wheat and mutton by subsidies t farmers in the form of deficiency payments; sugar by a complicated sys tem administered through a State controlled board; barley and beef by combination of tariffs and deficiency payments.[1]

But broadly speaking the main protection is given by the system o deficiency payments.

For Britain to abolish this system and to institute the commo external tariff would involve a rise in the price of British food an result in grave danger to the prosperity of a country such as Ne Zealand which is heavily dependent on its agricultural exports to th United Kingdom. For Britain to retain the system would mean th she was refusing to subscribe to a politically essential aspect of th Rome Treaty, and the French argued (at least before their last de valuation) that it would distort British costs by allowing British em ployers to pay lower wages than they would need to do if Britis food prices were higher.

[1] M. W. Butterwick, 'Agriculture and the Common Market', *The Guardia* 29 March 1961.

This dilemma, too, will need to be split into many component parts before alternative technical solutions can be outlined as a preliminary to reaching political agreement. The National Farmers' Union has recently launched an all-out attack on British participation in the agricultural provisions of the Rome Treaty, which, after listing the changes that would be involved in the British agricultural support system were Britain to adopt the measures now being proposed for the Six by the Commission, concluded with a variant of the supra-nationality argument:

> Under a common policy, designed to reconcile the differing interests of all Member States, the interests of United Kingdom producers would tend to be subordinated to those of other Member States, which are more alike, particularly in the structure of their industries.[1]

On the other hand this opposition may be merely a tactical negotiating weapon. once the political decision was taken that Britain should join the Common Market the farmers might in fact find that to transfer the cost of their protection from the expenditure to the income side of the national budget would improve and stabilize their bargaining position, and the more vigorous the N.F.U.'s opposition now, the greater the price it may hope to obtain for agreement.

It is significant in this connection that academic students of agricultural economics have taken a very different line from the National Farmers' Union and are beginning to canvass various solutions[2] The strategic question would seem to be whether the Community will pitch its price so high that its production will overshoot Community demand or not: in the former case, the United Kingdom market might be expected to absorb Community products at the expense of Commonwealth producers, while in the latter case the questions arising out of price differences should be soluble. The tactical question is whether Britain should await the result of the negotiations now going on to formulate the Community's common policy for agriculture or whether she should take part in those negotiations as a full member herself.

The domestic political implications of Britain subscribing to the agricultural clauses of the Rome Treaty should not be overestimated. The number of constituencies in which agricultural abstention can

[1] National Farmers' Union, *Information Service*, Vol 16, No 2, 1961, p. 68

[2] Cf. 'The Agricultural Nettle' (*The Economist*, 8 April 1961), Graham Hallett, 'British Agriculture and Europe' (*Crossbow*, supplement to Spring issue 1961), D T Healey, 'Some Implications of the Common Market for European Agriculture' (*The Farm Economist*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1959); and 'Can Agriculture do a deal with Europe?' (*Westminster Bank Review*, August 1958)

lose the Conservatives a seat is small.[1] More important perhaps is the influence of the National Farmers' Union on constituency chairmen and constituency associations: it is not so much the party's as the individual Member's seat in Parliament which the Farmers' Union can threaten. But then even within the Conservative party there stand, over against this agricultural pressure group, the interests of the City and of industry. The concrete, substantive difficulties should not, therefore, even politically be major arguments affecting Britain's choice. And that ultimately is not a choice about tomato prices or duties on Canadian refrigerators, but a choice about Britain's whole place in the world in the last decades of this century.

UWE KITZINGER

Kenya's Frustrated Election

THE Lancaster House Conference on Kenya, held in January and February 1960, opened the way to an African Government Although there was no provision for a Chief Minister in the new Constitution, it did concede an effective African majority in the Legislative Council by the establishment of the first open seats on a wide common roll franchise: there were to be thirty-three of them, against twenty seats reserved for the minorities, Europeans, Asians, and Arabs. Besides this, Africans would form for the first time the largest unofficial group in the Council of Ministers. Rumour had it then in Nairobi that Africans were being granted independence; from then on *Uhuru* (Swahili: freedom) became the slogan of African politics. Later, 1 March 1961, the day subsequently fixed for the announcement of the poll in the forthcoming elections, was regarded by many as the day on which this would come. In consequence, the twelve months following the Lancaster House Conference was a period of excitement mounting into the election campaign of early 1961 and culminating in the elections which took place between 20 and 27 February. For the European settler community, on the other hand, Lancaster House was the final shattering of the

[1] J Roland Pennock, 'The Political Power of British Agriculture', *Political Studies*, Vol 7, No. 3, October 1959

dream of the 'white colony' to which they had been encouraged to come from the beginning of the century by successive British Governments and Governors of Kenya. To them the Conference was a betrayal of hopes, as also of their constructive work in Kenya. Thus one settler cast thirty pieces of silver before the European leader Michael Blundell on his return from the Conference, though this provoked Africans to cry: 'Mr Blundell, we will vote for you, if necessary.'

Could Africans now exploit their success? For this, as many saw, unity was essential. In May 1960 the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was established, proclaiming by its title both descent from the proscribed Kenya African Union which Kenyatta had led, and also comparison with the Tanganyika African National Union; it set out to be the monolithic structure seen as essential in the fight for independence, from India to Ghana. Curiously, in Kenya, where there was the struggle not only against colonial rule but also against settler domination, this unity soon dissolved.

There were three main reasons for this. The new party was soon regarded as the construction of two tribes, the Kikuyu and the Luo, the largest and most densely populated of the agricultural tribes. Cain's actions aroused the fears of Abel: the tribes of pastoralist tradition drew together to defend themselves, forming first the Masai United Front and the Kalenjin Political Alliance. Then these two bodies came together with associations of some of the smaller agricultural tribes to form the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). The third word of its title indicated a rejection of the monolithic structure of the nationalist party and an assertion that this would be a party considering and accommodating diverse interests. Inherent in the party's formation was, too, a dislike of many of its leaders for Tom Mboya, the Kenya African leader best known —apart from Kenyatta—in Britain and America. However, the financial support he had raised there for scholarships to send students to America and for his trade union activities had roused fears and jealousies among other leaders. These found expression at the end of the Lancaster House Conference: Ngala and Muliro, later the two leading figures in KADU, expressed in a press conference their disapproval of the way in which Mboya had been accepted by the British press and television as the leader of the African delegation when he was only its secretary. After the return to Kenya, a deliberate attempt was made by some of the African leaders to shut Mboya completely out of the formation of new parties.

Whilst this African political activity went on, the minorities were considering their position. Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck resigned as Speaker of the Legislative Council to defend, as he said, the interests of those whom he had encouraged over the years to settle in Kenya in reliance on the promises of successive British Governments. He formed the 'Kenya Coalition', a 'movement', as he called it, to appeal first to the Europeans but then to the 'minorities' generally. Unfortunately for this, Sir Ferdinand, the leader of European opinion in the 'thirties and 'forties, was regarded by the Asians as an old opponent. He and the Coalition made no appeal to them or to the smaller African tribes, who preferred to form their own Union, KADU, and to work in the new framework of African politics.

They were ready to contest the new open seats, in the formation of which they had certainly been favoured. The new constituencies were drawn up by a Kenya Government Working Party composed of the Chief Secretary and the Attorney-General. Although the pastoralists formed only 10 per cent of the population, six of the thirty-three seats were allotted to their areas, and fifteen to the 60 per cent of the population represented by 'KANU-tribes' (Kikuyu, Embu, Meru, Luo, Kamba, and Kisii). The disproportion is most starkly seen in the allocation of two seats to the Masai and four to the Kikuyu, with populations respectively of 60,288 and 1,026,341 (1948 census, the latest available); was this the traditional administrator's favouring of the noble Masai and another punishment of the rebellious Kikuyu? If the latter, it may be observed that the Luo, with 757,043 (1948), received only three seats, one more than the Masai. Yet when the Working Party Report was debated in the Legislative Council the African elected members made little comment. Indeed the Chief Secretary, in introducing the Report, placed them on the defensive by saying that if more seats were claimed in any one area they would have to be taken away from another. Tribal jealousies prevented any effective reply.

As 1960 went on, the events of the Congo increased profoundly the fears among the minorities of Kenya for their future under an independent African Government. The flight of capital, at the rate of £1 million a month since the Lancaster House Conference, continued so steadily that in September KANU leaders—the president, Gichuru, and secretary, Mboya—sought to reassure foreign investors by moderate statements in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. Even there they remained firm on one point: Kenyatta, regarded by

Kenya Africans as the father of their nationalism, must be released. To Europeans, Government officials and settlers alike, Kenyatta was, as the Governor described him, 'a leader to darkness and death'. Here there was no basis for a meeting between the Governor and KANU, a situation which became worse in the pressures of the election campaign. The original moderation of KANU's election manifesto, particularly with regard to land, was overthrown under the pressure of a more extreme nationalist opinion. Gichuru was reported as saying to a KANU meeting in November: 'After *Uhuru* Europeans and Asians will kneel to us.' Moderation may be possible for Kenya leaders in Britain but not in Kenya; this was now no less true of Africans than it had been of Europeans in the past.

Effective leadership in KANU was passing to the more extreme Oginga Odinga, the Luo who, since 1958, had taken the lead in the acceptance of Kenyatta and in the demand for his release. Odinga became even less popular with the administration when in August–September 1960 he went off on a visit behind the Iron Curtain, returning with favourable impressions of Chinese methods. Whether he had become a Communist rather than a Luo tribal nationalist is debatable, but certainly he had much money which made him a formidable figure in the coming election campaign, though he told the Legislative Council he had received this from friends in Britain. His return imported the politics of the cold war into KANU, for Odinga and Mboya were soon being attacked as stooges of, respectively, Sino-Soviet and American imperialism. It was not long before the leaders' quarrels reached down to infect and divide the branches of KANU across the country. The party resembled in no respect the monolithic organization it had set out to be.

These quarrels, the apparent link of Odinga with Communism, and the naturally outspoken remarks of an election campaign served in no way to allay European fears. Indeed they made more difficult the task of Michael Blundell's New Kenya Party, which sought to persuade the Europeans that it was possible to work with Africans, that there was a future for them in co-operation in an independent Kenya. The party had originated in the Legislative Council in 1959 as the New Kenya Group, with a multi-racial membership. Now, faced with the need to appeal to their own communities, the Group's Asian and African members had refused to stand under such a multi-racial banner. The Europeans of the Group found themselves left alone to appeal to their own electorate under the name of

the New Kenya Party. At Lancaster House the Europeans had insisted that they would not have the system of common roll elections adopted in Tanganyika, but that candidates should first show some basis of support in their own community by a primary election. The Working Party fixed 25 per cent of the votes as the qualifying figure to be obtained before proceeding to the common roll. The Europeans clearly showed what they thought of the possibilities of racial co-operation: three of the N.K.P.'s candidates failed to obtain the necessary 25 per cent, whilst their leader only scraped through with 26·7 per cent. Blundell's image had been successfully projected by the Coalition as that of 'A man of many voices . . . a politician', whom it was not possible to trust. On the announcement of the primary results Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck could justifiably claim an outstanding triumph, but this was only the first stage of the election. The principle of Kenya's new Constitution established at Lancaster House was the common roll, so it would be the mass African vote that would prove decisive. Would Sir Ferdinand's be a Pyrrhic victory?

Any doubts appeared to be set at rest when leaders of both KANU and KADU refused to meet him when he invited them for discussions saying they should respect European wishes to build confidence. Instead, his approaches were rejected with contumely, Cavendish-Bentinck being called for his pains 'a European tribalist'. Then began the most interesting stage of the election as the two European leaders, Blundell and Cavendish-Bentinck, competed for African votes. Both the African parties proclaimed support for Blundell, and KANU's president, Gichuru, spoke on his behalf. Yet the division in KANU became evident here too. Odinga announced that KANU's Governing Council had not been consulted and that he would support Cavendish-Bentinck, saying: 'At least with Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck we know where we stand. Mr Blundell gets his support from the Colonial Office. . . Better the enemy you know than the one you do not.' In the end the intervention of Odinga's supporters had little effect; Blundell was returned with overwhelming African support. Back went with him into the Legislative Council, on the support of the African vote, all his surviving candidates from the primary stage, except one who appears to have been so discouraged by only narrowly scraping by (with 28·01 per cent) that he had ceased to campaign. The European feeling against Blundell was such that he almost went into hiding for some days after the election, not daring to visit leading European

clubs; in one of them a leading supporter was then assaulted, as he himself had been during the campaign.

In the open seats there were few real surprises. The pattern of Kenya African politics was that of 'one-party tribes'. Since individual tribes were committed to either KANU or KADU, all that remained of any real interest was whether the official party candidates or the 'party-independents' would win. As these latter were allowed by their respective parties to join their parliamentary groups after the election, the relationship of party to seats which had been forecast was almost exactly fulfilled: 19 KANU, 11 KADU, and 3 Independents. There was some interest in the fortunes of Mboya in Nairobi East, for he was here being attacked by Kikuyu politicians appealing to tribal feeling, but he won with 90 per cent of the votes. In Nairobi on the night of 1 March, when the results were announced, African nationalism was triumphant. Crowds chanted, '*Ndege*' (Swahili: aeroplane), Mboya's election symbol which had conveniently been turned into a reference to Mboya's air lift of students to America. Armed police prevented entry into the business centre of the city, they were determined to contain the rejoicing, and twice during the night broke up throngs with tear-gas This confrontation symbolized well the problem for the future: would African nationalism sweep all before it, or would the forces of the administration provide a check?

Next day the Governor announced on the radio that Kenyatta would not be released but would merely be moved to a more healthy place, though still some 200 miles from Nairobi. Expectations that any may have held of action comparable to the release of Dr Nkrumah, Kenyatta's old colleague, in 1951, were not to be fulfilled. KANU might have obtained two-thirds of the African vote and nineteen seats, but it was a disunited party incapable of enforcing its will in the demand for the release of Kenyatta. Against it was KADU which, with only 16 per cent of the vote, had obtained eleven seats, and, besides, there were three Independents. African nationalism was not solid, nor was KANU united. It proceeded to quarrel about whether it should accept the Governor's offer of a visit to Kenyatta, and then left KADU leaders to go alone, though five KANU leaders did go later. KANU's splits prevented it from acting effectively in the elections for the National Members when the Legislative Council sat as an electoral college. Instead, KADU, by co-operating with the N.K.P., increased its membership by three, KANU gaining only one of the four African seats.

The time had now come for the formation of the Government KANU had made it plain that it would not participate before the release of Kenyatta. The Governor, Sir Patrick Renison, appears then to have largely ignored KANU, apart from approaches to certain 'moderates' among the KANU elected members. KANU's constant faction-fighting had naturally caused many to expect its imminent demise, and many predicted this for the immediate post-election period in a complete reshuffling of party alignments This seemed possible, since a number of the KANU parliamentary group had been elected against official party candidates and the opposition of the local KANU branch; they were naturally regarded as less committed to the party and, therefore, as possible participants in a coalition Government. However, such ideas overlooked the fact that there was no individual among these KANU moderates capable of taking such a decisive step. When one or two thought in these terms and visited their constituencies to test the ground, it was made plain how adverse the local reaction would be.

The Governor's attempts to form a Coalition of KADU and moderate KANU elements having failed, he was left with KADU Ngala, its leader, saw that certain conditions were necessary: some progress both in the release of Kenyatta and in constitutional development, and some large financial assistance from the British Government. In search of these requisites, he visited London in April for discussions with the Secretary of State. After receiving certain assurances, he returned to Kenya and began negotiations with the Governor and the other racial groups. Eventually, on 27 April, two months to the day from the end of the polling, the formation of the new Government was announced, Ngala becoming Leader of Government Business, the title Nkrumah had once held as a stepping-stone to being Chief Minister—here was the constitutional advance. It had been agreed that a house should be built for Kenyatta in his home district of Kiambu, near Nairobi, into which he would move on its completion. Finally, financial assistance was promised. This last was the real necessity, for Kenya's economic position was desperate after the financial drain of the past fifteen months. Moreover, the prolonged drought had now been followed by a failure of the long rains and by a plague of caterpillars. Already some areas of the Colony had been on famine relief for some months—much of the relief being American—and this would clearly have to increase, not end. Then there were the problems of landlessness, particularly among the Kikuyu, and of a growing un-

employment caused largely by the slackening of Kenya's economy. It would be a brave man who would undertake a Government in such circumstances, but Ngala showed his courage the more by becoming Minister of Education, the one subject in which Africans had, throughout election meetings, been demanding most rapid development.

Yet Ngala's position to undertake these burdens was, indeed, weak. He represented the minority African party, both in seats and, overwhelmingly, in votes. Allied with him were Europeans who had been rejected by their own community and then returned by an African vote which was mainly KANU. This was an unrepresentative Government, certain to be attacked as 'stooges' of the Governor's civil service advisers who had so largely created it. It was a link-up of minorities, the policy of Cavendish-Bentinck to which he could do no more than aspire.

While this might be the kind of moderate African Government which would give some reassurance to European opinion, it seemed likely only to provoke Africans. Since the Lancaster House Conference the Mau Mau detainees, except for a few major figures, had been released. During the election campaign the lack of strife—beyond the verbal—and of party clashes was remarkable. Two factors had restrained the feared violence: a large and efficient police force and the control exercised by party leaders over their followers. Now the question was whether this latter could be maintained. Even as the KADU Government was being formed, two moderate KANU leaders solemnly warned that it might not be possible to restrain the extremists for long. During the election campaign they had been persuaded to try constitutional methods. Now, by the formation of this minority KADU Government, it would seem to them that constitutionalism had not paid. Some would also conclude that the extremist Odinga had been right not to trust Blundell, for he became Ngala's Minister of Agriculture. Over this step the N.K.P. did in fact split, for the former holder of this post, Bruce McKenzie, saw the danger of increased bitterness towards the settlers from the formation of this Government and refused to join. To succeed at all, Ngala's Government will have to show results, and show them fast. Otherwise its formation may only lead to an increase of tribal bitterness and of feeling among the majority tribes directed particularly against the Europeans for their action in joining the Government.

GEORGE BENNETT

Italy 1961

A Developing Democracy in a Dual Economy

QUEEN ELIZABETH II's State visit to Italy early in May has combined with centenary celebrations of the country's unification to turn English thoughts towards Italy this spring. Commentators reviewing the course of Anglo-Italian relations over the past hundred years have stressed the extent of British interest and influence in the Risorgimento; and the outstanding success of the Queen's visit has been interpreted as significant of the return, after a difficult period, to the old footing of friendship between the two countries.

On the more purely Italian plane, two points in particular have emerged from the flood of commemorative articles: the new 'economic miracle' of Italy's prosperity today, and the comparative apathy of Italians themselves towards the unification centenary celebrations. Both these points have a relevance in any discussion of the Italy of 1961. The first, indeed, in part explains the second. The 'economic miracle' is visibly apparent to any visitor to the North Italian towns—though it has its reverse side to which we shall revert later. The self-assurance of modern Italian architecture, from the elegant skyscrapers of Milan to the daring Nervi Hall of Labour in the Turin 1961 Exhibition; the diversity of wares displayed in shop windows even in the smaller towns, let alone Rome and Milan; the well-dressed crowds, the plethora of cars and television sets—all these things bespeak an Italy buoyant on an upward wave, fascinated by its new prosperity after the lean years, and with little time or inclination to turn its thoughts to a remote-seeming past.

Yet the past, ignore it as they may, keeps on obtruding itself upon Italians. Its legacies account for a good many of their present difficulties which some of them would prefer to forget or disregard. A unified Italy barely a hundred years old still presents very great disparities between its two main component parts of North and South. Equally, a republican democracy barely fifteen years old is still laboriously spelling its way towards recapturing the parliamentary tradition and experience of which Fascism had deprived it for twenty years.

There are even wide differences of interpretation today concerning the Risorgimento itself—a fact which may have a good deal to do with the lack of popular enthusiasm for the centenary celebrations. As the well-known commentator Domenico Bartoli points out

(*Corriere della Sera*, 18 April 1961), while the clericals' resentment against that secular architect of unification, Cavour, may have diminished, the Socialists make no mention at all of him in the message on Italian unity published during their recent Congress, merely criticizing him by implication when they deplore 'the monarchist solution of the Risorgimento'; and the same message contrasts the 'revolutionary undertaking' of Mazzini and Garibaldi with the Risorgimento as it actually turned out, the work of Cavour and the monarchy The existence of such varying interpretations, Bartoli suggests, argues the lack of a common national basis or universally accepted tradition.

POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES

These divisions form the background to what has now become the perennial difficulty in Italian politics: that of evolving a Government with sufficient support to stay in power for long enough to carry through overdue reforms. The Christian Democrat party has now been in power for so long—ever since the end of the war except for the few immediate post-war months of the Parri Government in 1945—that its predominant position has come to be accepted as a fact of life, inevitable if not particularly welcome even to some of its supporters, who in the last (1958) general election numbered over 41 per cent of the electorate. Yet there is still no viable alternative in sight, since the next largest party is the Communist Party, with nearly 22 per cent of the total votes. The search for such an alternative has come increasingly to dominate Italian political thinking of recent years.

Since the Christian Democrats have not an overall majority in Parliament, the search has resolved itself into one for alliances which will reflect and temper the direction of the Government. On this subject the Christian Democrats are still sharply divided among themselves, though the bitter differences apparent at the time of their last Congress in October 1959[1] have been somewhat attenuated. Those differences concern the political complexion of their potential allies, and the crux of the matter has been, and still is, whether support should be sought from the Nenni Socialists. The right wing of the Christian Democrat party regards such support as quite inadmissible; its centre might contemplate it in theory, but only at very long range; its left continues to press for it. But such divi-

[1] See 'Problems of Christian Democracy in Italy', in *The World Today*, December 1959

sions are by no means hard and fast, except for the extremes, and are constantly readjusting in relation to the political picture as a whole

The fall of the Segni Government in February 1960, soon after the last Christian Democrat party Congress, came about largely as a result of these tensions and of the increasing support expressed at the Congress for a centre-left type of Government. Signor Segni's Government had, in addition to the Christian Democrats, relied on the parliamentary support of the Liberals, the Monarchists, and the neo-Fascist M.S.I. Though the votes of this latter, still discredited, party were not regarded as essential for a majority, their presence inevitably heightened the impression that this was in fact a Government of the right, and left-wing trends within the Christian Democrat party, as well as the other left-of-centre parties, were anxious that such a situation should not become stabilized. The ground thus seemed to be prepared for a swing in the other direction under the auspices of the leading left-of-centre Christian Democrat, Signor Fanfani. But it was delayed by a strange interlude.

President Gronchi in fact first called on Signor Segni to form a new Government, and he attempted to do so by seeking support from the small left-of-centre parties, the Social Democrats and Republicans. This attempt foundered owing to pressure from his own party's right wing and, it was rumoured, from the Church as well. The President then turned to another Christian Democrat, Ferdinando Tambroni, a former Minister in Signor Fanfani's short-lived Government of 1958–9. He had then ranked among the centre or centre-left trend within his party, but the 'caretaker' single-party Government which he announced on 25 March obtained only a very narrow vote of confidence in the Chamber—a majority of three, with only the M.S.I. and three Independents voting for it in addition to the Christian Democrats. Three Ministers (including the important left-wing leader Giulio Pastore, Minister for the Depressed Areas) and three Under-Secretaries promptly resigned, since they would not accept that the M.S.I.'s votes should be decisive (as they were in this instance) for the Government's majority. Signor Tambroni therefore resigned too.

At this point Signor Fanfani came briefly into the picture, when the President asked him to form a Government which, given his views, would have been avowedly left-of-centre. But the time was not yet ripe, and he abandoned the attempt. By this time the country had been without a Government for almost two months, and the President adopted the expedient of rejecting Signor

[ambroni's resignation and insisting that he should present his aretaker Government—already approved, if only narrowly, by the ;hamber—to the Senate. Once again the same voting pattern merged, the only support apart from the Christian Democrats oming from the M.S.I. and three Independents. Nobody could onsider this a very satisfactory solution, and the Christian Demorats themselves made it plain that they regarded the new Cabinet's ormation as an emergency measure, to remain in force only until)ctober. But the country was weary of upheavals and uncertainties; he Olympic Games were in the offing, and it was essential that Italy, s host country, should present a compact façade then; in short, it /as anticipated that there would be no more difficulties till the utumn.

This spurious calm persisted throughout the early summer. The 'ambroni Government did nothing spectacular, but a good deal of elayed parliamentary business was worked off, fevered preparaons for the Olympic Games went ahead, and by June people were ıying that perhaps it wasn't such a bad Government after all, espite its curious method of coming to birth.

But unrest continued underneath, and came out into the open arly in July. The M.S I., emboldened by their position as suporters of the Government after years of ostracism, had decided to old their party Congress in Genoa, a stronghold of the Left and ›rmer centre of partisan resistance during the war. This prospect roused violent opposition in local left-wing circles, and on 30 June, ıe day before the Congress was due to open, a general strike was roclaimed, followed by clashes with the police in which more than hundred people were injured. Similar clashes also took place in 'urin. Feelings rose so high that the Congress was called off. Anti'ascist demonstrations went on for some days in other parts of the ountry (notably in Reggio Emilia, where five people were killed in a lash with the police) and in Parliament as well. The Right mainined that these incidents formed part of a chain of disturbances rganized by the Communists after the failure of the Summit con'rence; but it was plain that they also commanded widespread symathy from non-Communist anti-Fascist opinion. The former esistance leader and first post-war Prime Minister, Ferruccio arri, now a Socialist Senator, demanded the dissolution of the 1.S.I.; Pietro Nenni, describing the party as a negligible minority, he poisonous tail of Fascism', urged that the time had come for ew alignments.

This last view was echoed in the Christian Democrat party itself, where there was a general feeling that this was the opportunity to get rid of the Tambroni Government with its embarrassing associations. Negotiations for an alternative were quickly set on foot, and now the Liberal Party seemed ready to join once more in a four-party centre combination (Christian Democrat, Social Democrat, Liberal, and Republican) such as it had adhered to in Signor De Gasperi's day and had subsequently deserted. It was emphasized, however, that this new combination was to be something different from a revival of the old *quadripartito*: the three smaller parties would give their parliamentary support to a single-party Christian Democrat Government; no other party's votes should be 'determinant' and if any of the four parties withdrew the Government should resign; none of the four should be expected to abandon its own ideology; and the proposed Government should not be avowedly of the centre, or centre-left, or 'open to the left' ('omnis definitio pericolosa', as the *Corriere della Sera* sapiently observed).

Nevertheless, despite all these provisos, it was obvious, given the background, that a more leftward-orientated Government was to be sought, and hence that Signor Fanfani would be the man to lead it. Signor Tambroni resigned on 19 July (the official communique stated that his Government 'no longer corresponded to the new political situation') and the President called on Signor Fanfani to form a Government, which, in early August, obtained the largest parliamentary majority since that of Signor De Gasperi in 1948. The notable feature of the vote of confidence was that the Socialists, for the first time in post-war Italian politics, adopted a different line from the Communists in a decisive vote and abstained.

The Socialist Party was, in fact, to play a key role in political developments during the early months of Signor Fanfani's Government. His previous history suggested that, once in the saddle, his policy would be to work towards a *rapprochement* between Christian Democrats and Socialists and eventually to convert this initial instance of Socialist abstention into more positive support. At the same time the previous history of his latest partner in the new combination, the Liberal leader Signor Malagodi, suggested that any such move would be viewed with suspicion by the Liberals.

The first test came in the nation-wide municipal elections on 6–7 November, nominally for local councils but inevitably political in their implications. It was soon clear that the Socialists did not in-

end to pursue their autonomous line to the point of renouncing col-aboration with the Communists. True, the two parties no longer an joint lists as previously, but Signor Nenni announced that in ocalities where the combined Left already controlled the councils ollaboration would continue. These half-way tactics succeeded in nnoying both Communists and Christian Democrats, and the ocialist poll fell by about 200,000 votes by comparison with the eneral election of 1958. A good many of these votes presumably vent to the Communists, whose poll advanced by 1·5 per cent to tand at 24·5 per cent of the total. An improvement in the position f the Social Democrats and Liberals compensated for a slight fall 1 the Christian Democrat vote; the four centre parties together olled just over half the total vote. On the right, the Monarchists ustained severe losses, some of their votes going to the M.S.I., who olled 5·9 per cent of the total

In a number of localities, including several of the main cities, the lections produced no clear majority for any political grouping, and ne problem of forming a council in such places—they became opularly known as the 'Giunte difficili'—created a good deal of issension among the parties and in some cases trailed on unsolved or many months The Social Democrats, Republicans, and Christian Democrats (officially, if with right-wing disapproval) autiously favoured the idea of experimenting with Socialist col-aboration where feasible, though the Socialists themselves showed ttle enthusiasm for such limited collaboration, and indeed Signor Nenni originally proclaimed that Socialist support should be ac-cepted either 'globally' or not at all. But the Liberals opposed it in ractice whenever the situation arose, and the more bitterly when heir own stronghold of Milan eventually voted in January for a entre-left municipal council under a Social Democrat mayor. In-eed at one point it even seemed as if Signor Malagodi might take is opposition to the point of threatening to withdraw his party's upport from the Government, until he was dissuaded by the grow-ng realization that there was no feasible alternative to the existing ombination.

That realization, which gained ground throughout the early nonths of this year, was strengthened by reflection on the diffi-ulties now being experienced in Sicily. That island, indeed, pre-ented an example of the dangers inherent in extreme political olarization. There, the Christian Democrat party is weaker in rganization than on the mainland, while the other centre parties

have a much smaller following; at the same time, the extremes of both Left and Right are strong, in tune with the sharply accentuated contrasts of wealth (and influence) and poverty present in the island. The result, politically, had already been seen in the hybrid Milazzo Government, formed in 1958 with support from both Communists and M.S.I. After its fall in February 1960 it was succeeded by a Christian Democrat Government with right-wing support. When it in turn fell a year later, every effort to find a viable combination failed until, in a surprise vote on 17 May, Signor Milazzo once more emerged as the island's chief Minister.

It was hoped that the Socialist Party Congress, held in Milan from 14 to 20 March, might do something to clarify that party's equivocal position. But in the event it provided little encouragement to the supporters of a *rapprochement* between it and the Centre. True, Signor Nenni stressed the party's progress in autonomy and cautiously offered indirect support for a centre-left Government, but he gave no sign of abandoning its neutralist line in foreign policy or its collaboration with the Communists in local administration or trade union affairs. The left-wing Socialist leaders Tullio Vecchietti and Lelio Basso remained uncompromising in their scepticism about any closer relationship with the centre parties, and even within the autonomist trend a rift appeared between Signor Nenni and his more rigid lieutenant, Riccardo Lombardi. Thus, though a few progressive commentators (e.g. Giuseppe Ciranna in *Nord e Sud*, April 1961) discerned in the Congress hopeful signs of a further, if wary, advance of Socialism towards genuine autonomy, centre opinion in general found it disappointing, and right-wingers were frankly jubilant that there was now less excuse than ever for playing with fire.

The result of all these adjustments to the vagaries of the Socialist wind has been that Signor Fanfani has found himself involved by circumstances in a Government in which he has had gradually to retreat from positions which he would himself have wished to adopt and has in general been hampered by difficulty of movement, especially in relation to his Liberal allies. The manœuvrings of the past months have, however, forcibly brought home to politicians the plain fact that there is at present no viable alternative to the Fanfani Government and the combination which supports it. If the Government can hold its own until early November it will then be safe for a further six months beyond that date. For elections for a new President of the Republic are due in May 1962, and under Article 88 of

the Constitution the President cannot dissolve Parliament during the last six months of his term of office.

Because of this situation, all the centre parties, and indeed probably some of the others too, are now trying to avoid provoking a crisis This inevitably leads to the avoidance of discussion of embarrassing questions, and may consequently, as the year goes on, mean that some important legislation may be held up. New development plans for the South and for agriculture received parliamentary approval earlier this year, but a more awkward subject will be the ten-year plan for education, initiated by Signor Fanfani during his earlier Premiership, which was approved by the Senate in December 1959 but has since hung fire. Signor Fanfani sets great store by his plan for raising the standard of education in all its branches, but discussion of the Chamber Commission's report on it, now completed, is bound to prove controversial, raising as it will such questions as extensive State support for private (i.e. Catholic) schools, a proposal which the Church approves and for which the M.S I. can be expected to vote, but which secular parties such as the Social Democrats and Republicans are bound to oppose.

ECONOMIC UNIFICATION: THE SOUTHERN PROBLEM

The problem of the backward South of Italy has been much discussed during the winter, and was debated in Parliament in early February. It is now just over ten years since the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, or Southern Development Fund, was established to promote development in the South, so this has seemed an appropriate moment to survey what has been achieved.

The data for such a survey have been provided by a report laid before Parliament in April 1960 prepared by Giulio Pastore, Chairman of the Committee of Ministers for the South and himself Minister for the Depressed Areas.[1] This report, while demonstrating that a great deal had been done in the past ten years to establish the 'infrastructure' for further development, made it clear that the original hope of bringing the Southern economy nearer to the level of that of the North had by no means been achieved. In the North, the average annual increase of total income between 1951 and 1959 was 5·7 per cent; in the South it was only 4 per cent—half the figure laid down in the Vanoni Plan of 1954[2] as the target for that region.

[1] Comitato dei Ministri per il Mezzogiorno, *Relazione al Parlamento* (Rome, 1960)

[2] The ten-year plan for the development of income and investment in Italy,

Investments in the South have also failed to reach the level envisaged in the Vanoni Plan: to take the most recent years, in 1958 they totalled 800,000 million lire (the Plan figure was 850,000 million) and in 1959, 841,000 million (the Plan figure was 980,000 million; it envisaged an annual rate of increase in investment of 15·3 per cent in the South and 3·4 per cent in the North).

The failure to reduce the gap is due to a number of causes To mention only a few: first, planning for the South had to tackle a state of backwardness so deep-rooted that it has taken much of the initial ten years to provide the necessary infrastructure in the way of communications, river control, drainage, irrigation, and the building of dams and power stations before the introduction of new industries on any extensive scale could be begun.[1] Secondly, the Southern economy is still predominantly an agricultural one, and one which suffers from excessive fragmentation of landholdings These have been bad years for agriculture not only in Italy but elsewhere, and in spite of all that has been done to introduce modern methods in the South, such an economy, with industry still at a low level, can have small hope of catching up with the North. Thirdly, the very increase of prosperity in the North of recent years has militated against any such 'catching-up' process.

Pasquale Saraceno, head of the SVIMEZ organization in charge of planning for the South and one of the main drafters of the Vanoni Plan, puts these points very clearly in a recent article [2] He argues that the problem of an economic unification of Italy, corresponding to the political unification whose centenary is celebrated this year, will only be solved when the country is included in a single, unitary mechanism of development. At present, largely as a result of the different role played by industry in the respective economies, two different mechanisms operate in the North and the South. In the North, expansion of industry is of a long-term kind, due to the increasing role of Italian industry in world markets and to the expansion of the level of consumption: hence there we find a so-called 'opulent' society, in which 'the dynamic of consumption is the decisive element of development'. But in the South, owing to

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which *inter alia* laid down prerequisites for closing the gap between the levels of the Northern and Southern economies

[1] Nevertheless, by 1958 several hundred new industrial plants had been set up in the South, and several thousand old ones expanded, through the granting of credit facilities etc Cf. P. Conca, 'La ripresa produttiva di Napoli e del Mezzogiorno Continentale' (*Orizzonti Economici*, January–February 1958)

[2] *Nord e Sud*, March 1961

e inadequate development of industry, there is as yet no mechan-
n of automatic development which would allow the region to in-
ease its own income independently of State intervention. In
ort, Saraceno argues, even if the South had developed more and
e North less, the discrepancy between the two economies would
ve remained so long as the two mechanisms differed; and the only
iy to effect an improvement is by means of a greater influx of pro-
ictive investment to the South. One outstanding example of such
vestment has been the recent establishment of Italy's fourth large
·el foundry at Taranto, a site deliberately chosen, not to be in
mpetition with the North, but to provide both work for Southern-
s and an impetus to further industrial development in the region.
Saraceno and the Government planners believe that what has
en initiated in the South is well worth pursuing. They recognize
st mistakes, but believe that the way to achieve better results in
e future is to link up planning for the South much more closely
th plans for the development of the country's economy as a
iole. Not everyone shares their optimism. There is, for instance, a
ıool of thought[1] which believes that the plans for the develop-
ent of the South have been proved unworkable, that further
empts to establish industry there on any appreciable scale will be
ıtamount to pouring good money after bad, and that, rather than
ntinuing on these lines, surplus Southern manpower should be
couraged to migrate northwards and seek work in that part of the
ıntry where the economy is expanding and is in need of labour.
This is of course a highly controversial question. The economists
both sides can make a good case. The statesman—let alone the
linary Southerner—may well feel that from the political and
cial standpoints it would be well-nigh impossible to renounce at
s stage the efforts embarked on in the South, which already far
rpass in scope and seriousness anything previously attempted
ere since the unification.

Moreover, large-scale migration from South to North in itself
ses a host of new problems. Particularly since the relaxation of
old law (dating from Fascist times) restricting internal migra-
n, it has been going on on an increased and quite extensive scale
thout any official encouragement. In the past ten years the outer
rld has, quite literally, been opened up to Southerners. Better

[1] See, e.g., 'Italy as a Study in Development', by Vera Lutz (*Lloyds Bank
iew*, October 1960, pp 31–45), an article around which a good deal of con-
versy has centred in Italy.

roads and means of transport, television in the local cafés, cheap modern wares in the shops, technicians from outside to advise on farming, have all made them realize that there is another Italy where living is not so hard, where there are other ways of making ends meet than by scratching a livelihood from an unproductive patch of land In the old days the Southerner desperate to escape from the grinding poverty of his surroundings would emigrate to America. That way has long been closed to him; but now, he has realized, there is no need to cross the Atlantic—he can just pack his bundle and get on the train to Milan or Turin.

These and other Northern towns may not always prove the Mecca of which the Southerner dreamed. Unless he has some special skill he may find it difficult to get regular work. Housing is already strained to bursting-point despite much new building, and he may find himself relegated to the shanty-town areas that are developing around the big cities to accommodate such as he. Psychologically, too, the background of a remote Southern village has ill prepared him for life in a big industrial town; his dialect, customs, and whole mentality set him apart. Far from the close-knit life of the family and the village, where the influence of the parish priest is still strong, he may easily become disillusioned and fall a victim to Communist inducements. Such effects of migration can indeed be seen in the figures of the last municipal elections in some Northern towns where the Communist vote, which had been fairly static for the past few years, was found to have risen, due largely, it is thought, to the influx from the South.

Thus in this centenary year the economic unification of Italy is clearly still a long way off Yet there are reasons for hopefulness The prosperous condition of the economy as a whole, brought about largely through the enterprise and hard work of Italians themselves, must in the long run, by whatever methods, help to improve the situation of the less fortunate South. Italy's statesmen have taken this problem to heart as never before. The old barriers are breaking down. As Southerners move north to find work, Northern technicians and business men move south to help to provide it for the many who remain. Despite the setbacks of the past forty years, Metternich's 'geographical expression' is gradually being welded into a nation.

M. K. G.

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Notes of the Month

Breakdown at Evian

THE Evian negotiations which opened on 20 May were interrupted on 13 June, after thirteen sessions which, by common consent, had made no discernible progress. France's hopes that her unilateral declaration of a cease-fire for one month would be followed by a similar gesture on the part of the Algerian 'provisional Government' were disappointed. On the contrary, rebel activity increased during the negotiations and there was a considerable rise in the number of deaths due to terrorist attacks.

On the three main problems discussed at Evian the two sides remained as far apart as ever. The guarantees sought by the French for the million or so European residents in Algeria were seen by the Algerian delegation as an attempt by France to obtain a privileged status for Europeans in a predominantly Muslim State; the French request for the recognition by Algeria of the rights of neighbouring States to a share in the resources of the Sahara was seen as a denial of the right of a future independent Algeria to sovereignty over the entirety of the traditional territory of Algeria; the French request for bases was seen as an attempt to establish a European enclave in Algeria, a kind of Gibraltar, as one Algerian spokesman put it.

In spite of the divergences, however, for the first few days following the suspension of negotiations both sides seemed to be doing their best to avoid burning any boats or slamming any doors. On the French side, though M. Joxe, Minister for Algerian Affairs and leader of the French delegation, remarked in his press conference of 15 June that he had heard more about war aims than peace aims during the Evian talks, he nevertheless assumed that the 'time for reflection', which was the stated purpose of the suspension, would last from ten to fifteen days. As an earnest of goodwill, the French also announced on 15 June that the unilateral cease-fire would be prolonged for an indefinite period and, as a further contribution to appeasement, that many more Muslims would be released from internment or regroupment centres and, in regions where conditions

made this possible, would be restored to normal life. On the Algerian side, there were references to the positive elements in the 'balance-sheet' of the talks, and even hints that, when they were broken off, the Algerian delegation had been on the point of putting forward some definite proposals. The resumption of negotiations seemed then, deliberately, to be taken for granted. In his press conference of 15 June, M. Belkacem Krim, Foreign Minister in the Algerian 'provisional Government' and leader of the Algerian delegation, was (on the whole) conciliatory, though he made no attempt to minimize the opposition of his delegation to what he called 'the so-called plan for de-colonization' put forward by the French delegation.

But even before the Algerian delegation returned to Tunis on 17 June, attitudes had begun to harden. There were references by Algerian spokesmen, in conversation, to the resumption of negotiations 'when General de Gaulle realizes that he is facing partners and not subjects'. M. Saad Dahlab, who remained in Geneva as M Belkacem Krim's deputy, maintained that, if the French were expecting the pause for reflection to result in concessions by the Algerians, then it would be likely to last for some time. M. Louis Joxe's visit to Algeria, and more particularly the references on 17 June by M. Jean Morin, Delegate-General for Algeria, to the possible setting-up of an 'Algerian Executive', cannot have improved the atmosphere. It is true that the idea is not new. In his broadcast of 4 November 1960, General de Gaulle stated that, in certain circumstances, he might use his emergency powers under article 16 of the Constitution 'to make decisive moves towards a solution of the Algerian problem'. The 'circumstances' certainly included the kind of threat to the security of the State that resulted from the army insurrection of April, which led him to assume these Presidential powers under article 16.[1] If negotiations with the F.L.N. leaders do turn out in fact to have broken down, or even if there were to be a prolonged stalemate, then this threat might well be renewed and General de Gaulle may therefore well feel that the time has come, or is approaching, when he will feel obliged to carry out this alternative to the plan for negotiating the conditions of the referendum on self-determination with the leaders of the F.L.N.

[1] In view of the ambiguity of many of the President's pronouncements it is perhaps worth while quoting the passage: '... Il m'appartient, quand la patrie et la République sont menacées, de prendre les mesures exigées par les circonstances, ce qui pourrait, le cas échéant, permettre d'avancer de manière décisive la solution algérienne, tout en sauvegardant l'Etat.'

Whether such a move could succeed can at present be a matter nly for speculation, but the prospects are certainly not favourable. ll attempts to create a 'Third Force' in Algeria have so far failed. ndeed, all the evidence has pointed to mounting Muslim support or the F.L.N. The virtual recognition at Evian of their leaders as alid spokesmen for Algeria must have increased their prestige still urther with Muslim opinion. The kind of Muslim notability on hom the President would have to call to form an 'Algerian Executive' would have no comparable status. It can, of course, be argued hat the 'Executive' is intended to be merely a provisional and temorary expedient. The use of the term 'Executive', indeed, clearly ndicates that, in French minds, it is not intended to have the status f a Government. Its function is to be solely that of preparing for the eferendum on self-determination. But whether the F.L.N. leaders would be prepared to allow such an organ to be set up is another atter. They have not laid down their arms, and so are in a position carry on a campaign of terrorism which could make the whole lan for holding a referendum impossible of achievement.

In other words, without some *de facto* truce and the co-operation f the F.L.N., no plan for Algeria would, in present circumstances, e likely to succeed. How far Muslim support for the F.L.N. would e maintained if they seemed finally not to be succeeding in bringing eace is another matter, but one which is not likely to be decisive in e immediate future. The truth is that, where Algeria is concerned, time is on nobody's side. General de Gaulle has seen this learly. The difficulty is to convince the F.L.N. that this is so. Up to ow they have worked on the hypothesis that time is on *their* side, d events seem to have supported their view, at least up to last pril. It is to be hoped that they will realize, in time to save the vian negotiations, how real is the danger of their losing their last pportunity to make a reasonable settlement with France, and how rim the alternative may turn out to be.

tandstill over South Africa[1]

WHILE the South African Parliament is competent to amend its onstitution and to repeal the *South Africa Act* 'so far as it is part of e law of the Union', even to the extent of extra-territorial jurisiction, it is not competent to annul the provisions of Acts of the .K. Parliament within that Parliament's jurisdiction. The new

[1] See 'South Africa's Withdrawal and What it May Mean', *The World Today*, pril 1961.

South African Constitution, therefore, cannot become fully effective until there has been concurrent legislation in the U.K. and during the interval a conflict of jurisdiction may arise. It was to avoid any such complication that the *Republic of South Africa (Temporary Provisions) Bill* was introduced into the House of Commons in March and received the royal assent on 18 May 1961, a few days before South African independence. A concurrent measure was brought before the South African Assembly.

The speech of Mr Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, on the second reading of the Bill, 24 April 1961, is noteworthy. The intention of the Bill was that it should be 'a standstill measure to maintain unchanged the laws governing the relationship' between the U.K. and its Dependencies on the one part and the Union of South Africa for a period of one year after South Africa became a Republic. Mr Sandys drew several interesting distinctions. When, on 31 May, South Africa became a Republic there was ample precedent for her doing so by her own legislative act, and when she withdrew from the Commonwealth this was a unilateral Act of State which, in itself, required no concurrent act by the Government of the U.K. The consequences of this Act of State within the jurisdiction of the U.K. were, however, so varied and involved that they would need time for elucidation. They fell into two classes: the provisions of U.K. laws referring to the Commonwealth as a whole which would be automatically voided in respect of South Africa by her withdrawal unless re-enacted; and the provisions of laws which referred to South Africa by name which would be unaffected until new legislation was passed. The former class included a number of commercial and administrative provisions of great complexity, such as the *Merchant Shipping Act*, 1894. If this were annulled, 'a ship owned by a company incorporated in South Africa would lose its status as a British ship on 31 May unless legislative action was taken.' Or again, the *Maintenance Orders Act*, 1920 enables maintenance orders made in South Africa to be enforced in the U.K. and *vice versa;* this could not merely be allowed to lapse. Subjects on which political feeling runs strongest, however, such as citizenship, the High Commission Territories, and the Ottawa Preferences are covered by legislation specifically applying to South Africa which will remain effective in the eyes of the law until altered by new legislation.

The Temporary Provisions Bill was hotly debated in the House of Commons, both on the Second Reading and again at the committee

age when the House was divided. Many objections were raised on e grounds that some matters demanded an immediate decision or at South Africa should not be allowed to retain the benefits of ommonwealth membership for a year after secession. In the South frican Assembly also, the standstill proposal was challenged but 1 the grounds that it extended the powers of the executive, enab-ig them to 'suspend the provisions of acts of parliament'. The in-ntion of the South African Bill, which passed its second reading 1 19 May, was to ensure that 'existing South African laws in which ference is made to Commonwealth countries will not be affected r reason of South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth'.

Neither the case of Burma nor that of the Irish Republic gives a ear precedent for the South African problem. In the case of irma, the grant of independence followed upon friendly negotia-ons. The principal points at issue had previously been agreed in a eaty' signed by the British and Burmese Prime Ministers. All that is necessary was an Act of the U.K. Parliament, the *Burma Inde-ndence Act*, 1947 (11 Geo. 6. Ch. 3) which made provision for leasing Burma from the King's protection on an 'appointed day', January 1948. While the Burmese arrangements were made in vance, those for Ireland were retrospective, but only for a few ys. Ireland made a unilateral declaration of independence on April 1949. *The Ireland Act*, 1949 (12 and 13 Geo. 6. Ch. 41) was once passed by the U.K. Parliament and received the royal sent on 2 June On the part of the U K. the intention was to retain many links as possible with a country whose secession from the mmonwealth was widely deplored. Section 2 of the *Ireland Act* cordingly declared that 'the Republic of Ireland is not a foreign untry for the purposes of any law in force' in the U.K. and its ependencies. These provisions were bitterly denounced by the ish Government as a continuance of imperialism.

Background to the Angola Crisis

THE Congo–Angola frontier has long been recognized as part of the political watershed of Africa; to the north black government would one day prevail, to the south few Europeans ever considered seriously the passing of white dominance. Fifty miles south of that frontier stands the tiny hill-top town of San Salvador, the capital of the ancient Kongo kingdom, and the centre of one of the regions where, since 15 March 1961, there has been open war between Africans and the Portuguese Government, a war of great violence and bitterness.

From San Salvador to the border of South-West Africa is a thousand miles; in this continuum one passes from the tropical savanna on the rim of the Congo basin, through the sandy uplands of the Luanda hinterland, across the well-settled plateaux of Benguela and Huila with their Rhodesian climate, and so down to the Kalahari desert with its Welwitschia Mirabilis, its sable antelope, and the valley of the Cunene. This is a vast land with its long coastline studded with tiny anchorages like Landana and Cabinda in the enclave, Sazaire, Ambrizete, Ambriz, and Porto Amboim further south, and the two fine modern ports of Luanda and Lobito as the major outlets for the produce of north and south, a land biting deeply into the southern half of the African continent, larger by far than Nigeria, the geographical equal of the Central African Federation or the Union of South Africa, yet with a population but little over 4 million. The climate, its fevers tempered by the cooling winds of the Benguela current, no longer repels the immigrant: in 1940 there was a European population of 44,000, in 1950, 79,000, and today there is an estimated figure of from 180,000 to 200,000.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This is the land that Diego Cao awakened as long ago as 1482 when his tiny caravels touched the southern headland of the Congo estuary. He came in peace to trade and to spread the Christian faith Nine years later the first company of Roman Catholic missionaries settled at the capital of the ancient kingdom of Kongo, 200 miles south-east of the river mouth, where the local king received the ambassadors of his royal cousin and gave much encouragement to the preaching mission. In 1534 the foundations of a cathedral church were laid, dedicated to Our Lord as St Saviour, whose name eventually displaced the local title in public memory, though not in local

ɹfrican usage. 'Ekongo dia Ntotela', the judgment seat of the great ing, is still a name to conjure with. Sixty-two years later this church ecame the centre of the see of Congo and Angola. The ruined hancel still stands, the oldest Christian building in the southern emisphere.

In 1570 the king sought the direct intervention of the Portuguese ı driving out some cannibalistic invaders, the Jagas, and as a result 'as compelled to recognize the suzerainty of the king of Portugal. ut gradually Portuguese interest shifted south, to the neighbour-ood of Luanda (founded 1575) and Benguela (founded 1617), 'here there was better harbourage and no problem of overland avel. For sixty years from 1580, Portugal was a vassal of Spain and ›st much of her overseas empire to others At the end of this period ,uanda itself fell to the Dutch, but in 1648 was retaken by the ortuguese in a notable feat of arms. Shortly after, the king of Kongo ›asserted his own independence, allegedly putting a force of ɔo,ooo men in the field, only to be defeated in 1666 at the battle of mbuila (one of the areas where the present revolt took its most ıolent expression). This defeat sounded the death-knell of the ˌongo kingdom as an effective political and military force.

For the next century missionaries alone sustained the European ɔnnection at San Salvador, though the character of the priesthood ›ems to have sadly deteriorated. In 1763 Pombal, an efficient anti-lerical despot, expelled the Jesuits from Portugal and her domi-ions, with the result that activity in the interior of the country ractically ceased. When Commander Tuckey, a British naval fficer, penetrated as far as San Salvador on an expedition in the ear 1816, he could find no trace of Christianity save some cruci-xes and relics which were not distinguishable in use from the ›tiches of the Kongo people. Portuguese influence away from the oast had in fact become sporadic and indirect save for the decima-on of the population by the continuing practice of the slave trade, ıe common denominator of all maritime peoples of the time. Then ame the days of the great explorations culminating in Stanley's pic journey across Africa in the years 1874–7 from Zanzibar to the ıouth of the Congo river, a journey which in turn led to the Berlin 'onference of 1885 and to the partition of Africa. Further south ,ivingstone had crossed the continent to Luanda between the years 852 and 1854, meeting Silva Porto and other venturesome Portu-uese traders who had forsaken the littoral for the healthier uplands f the interior. The journeys of Capelo, Ivens, and Serpa Pinto were

still to come in the last quarter of the century, a tardy effort to justify Portugal's claim to most of the central African plain. All this goes to show that, while the Portuguese assertion of having had an attachment to Angola for nearly 500 years is a true one, her constant reference to historic rights has in fact done her a disservice, since the world judges her not by the realities of eighty years of growing endeavour, but by her own insubstantial but constantly reiterated claim to have had 500 years of effective occupation.

THE MODERN EPOCH

The modern epoch may be divided into three periods, the Regal, the Republican, and the Regime.

The Regal period 1885–1910. During these years Portuguese non-racialism pursued its contradictory and equivocating way. The European population was sparse. In the south Madeiran peasants settled to eke out their peasant existence in close association with African villagers. Among the administrative officials were not a few men of noble family who fulfilled their vocation with real altruism and devotion. Yet the evils of the slave trade persisted, as Nevinson's book, *A Modern Slavery*[1] indicated. In the 1890s Portugal's economic position became critical, and it was bruited abroad that she would soon have to sell her colonies. So, in August 1898, Britain and Germany signed a convention, whereby spheres of influence were assigned to the two Powers, should Portugal have to contract a loan with her colonies as security. Portugal weathered the storm and contrived during the next two decades to overcome the final resistance of the Cuanhamas in the south, the Ovimbundu in the central highlands, and the Dembos (Kimbundu people) in the north. A revolt in 1913 in the San Salvador region led to many of the Bakongo migrating across the frontier to the neighbouring Belgian Congo.

The Republican period 1910–26. The fall of the monarchy did not usher in the anticipated era of peace and progress. Inexperience in the practice of democracy, the antagonism of the Catholic Church, and (some would say) the Latin temperament led to constant changes of government and many revolutions. The first World War weakened still further Portugal's economy: but the appointment of the dynamic Norton de Matos as High Commissioner in Angola was followed by a series of measures that revealed what might be achieved with adequate capital and administrative integrity. Insta-

[1] Angola, San Thomé and Principe, 1906

lity at home, however, continued to frustrate development, and in)26 the military *coup* brought the Republic to an end.

The Regime 1926–61. Salazar joined the Government for the first me in 1928 as Finance Minister. A brilliant economist and sincere atholic, he soon imposed his masterful personality upon his colagues. Within five years he had balanced the budget, internalized ie national debt, and become Prime Minister. The world economic isis of 1931 impeded progress, but the Spanish Civil War helped consolidate the position of the regime by demonstrating the terble consequences of fratricidal strife. The second World War still rther strengthened the regime's hold, the state of emergency stifying the arrest or exile of opponents without any danger of otest from abroad In 1946, after twenty years of power, the reme at last found itself firmly in the saddle. Neutrality had kept ortugal from devastation at home, and shrewd trading had left r with substantial financial reserves. If the war years had been a llow period for Angola, the post-war quinquennium, 1945–50, ought the beginnings of development and new riches to both fricans and Europeans and to the national exchequer. Europe and merica, deprived of the exotic produce of the tropics for more than lf a decade, readily imported the coffee, ground-nuts, and other ricultural products of Angola, while timber for reconstruction und an easy market. This new-found wealth has proved to be, as an earlier occasion in Portugal's history, the corrosive of fine eals, and one of the chief causes of the present disaster

PRINCIPLES OF PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM

So much for geography and history. What of the principles that ive, it is claimed, determined the policies and progress of the ortuguese in Africa?

First, *the unity of Empire.* In the early days of Portuguese exoration and settlement, the overseas territories were regarded as itposts of the mother country In the nineteenth century they were insidered as 'overseas provinces', administrative units in the me sense as the districts of metropolitan Portugal. They were erefore subject to the same laws and regulations, and in theory the habitants, both Europeans and Africans, had an equality of status between themselves and in relation to the Portuguese in Portugal rself. At the beginning of the twentieth century the idea of lonial autonomy became more basic and colonies were encoured to rule themselves, formulating legislation in accordance with

specific local needs, with Portugal exercising a loose form of general supervision. But since the accession to power of the regime, there has come a reassertion of the dynamic unity of empire. 'Portugal and her colonies form one complete and indivisible unit. Portugal extends from the Minho to Timor', or, as in Art. 2 of the Colonial Act,[1] 'It is the essential attribute of the Portuguese nation to fulfil the historic function of possessing and colonizing overseas dominions and of civilizing the native populations inhabiting them'. This revival of the nineteenth-century philosophy was crowned by legislation in 1951 when the colonies, as they had come to be called, were once again denominated 'overseas provinces'.

Second, *the assimilation of indigenous populations*. This policy dates explicitly from 1811 when, by the Juntas do Governo of that year, the native populations were specifically given legal status and protection as Portuguese citizens. This was confirmed by the Constitution of 1826 which granted political freedom and privileges to everyone, irrespective of race, colour, and religion. It was paradoxical that slavery should remain, as it did, a recognized institution. The principle of assimilation, however, not infrequently worked in the reverse direction and many Portuguese became largely assimilated to African ways of life and thought. As a policy however, assimilation has never become a potent influence.

One aspect of the policy of assimilation that merits special consideration is the development of a coloured population. Intermarriage or cohabitation has been a considerable psychological factor in mitigating racial tension. 'This,' says a Portuguese writer,[2] 'is characteristic of Iberian colonization It is more than mere assimilation, it is a fusion of the races, the inclusion of new types in the national unit.' The number of coloured people remains however relatively a small proportion of the whole.

The twin principles enunciated above did not meet with any real resistance up to the present century. The coastal belt had come to accept the Portuguese presence, and 'colour-blindness' had produced a significant half-caste population. But the attempt to extend Portuguese influence to the hinterland provoked strong opposition, as we have already seen. By 1926 however the military campaigns were a matter of history and in the next twenty-five years the Salazar regime grew ever stronger, partly through its own draconian

[1] Initiated July 1930, embodied in the Constitution 1933, revised August 1938

[2] Julio Ferriera Pinto, *Angola—Notas e Comentários dum Colono*, as quoted in *International Review of Missions*, Vol. 29, p. 231

methods and partly through the vicissitudes of history. Many would agree that some kind of authoritarian government was necessary in 1926. The nation was bankrupt financially, morally, and spiritually. Salazar was able to redeem the country's finances and to restore the nation's self-respect, but the spiritual revival has not come.

THE LAST TEN YEARS

So we come to 1951 when there was still a real opportunity for Portugal to show the way to a non-racial integrated society in Africa. The tradition of non-racialism was alive; many government doctors in Angola were Goans, the judge for the northern circuit was a Cape Verdean of African descent, and many coloured people held significant positions in commerce and in the administrative service. Because of the slender educational opportunities available to Angolan Africans, few of them had attained the status of citizens, but the door was open; it was not colour but culture that divided.

Psychologically too there was the acceptance of an integrated society. Education and economic standing in the community did not follow the bounds of race. Among the white population were many artisans, fishermen, and peasant agriculturalists who in their work suffered the same hazards and hardships as the indigenous African population There was no racial segregation.

The mechanism of assimilation provided a useful means of fulfilling the aspirations of Africans who wished to enter the body politic, and many sought the privilege for the status and opportunities which it afforded. Where it is of definite intention to create a multi-racial society, it is difficult to see what better scheme can be devised, provided that it is operated honestly and that the State provides the opportunities for acquiring the standards necessary to gain the new status.

The tragedy of present-day Angola is the tragedy of the last ten wasted years, years during which the accumulated non-racialism of centuries was squandered like the wealth of Brazil and the Indies three hundred years earlier Wherein lay the failure?

First, in the quenching of altruism. At the time of the *coup d'état* in 1926 the military leaders had a real concern for the state of their country. There was, of course, ruthless repression of the opposition, but even Salazar's enemies respected his financial skill and shrewdness. When the war ended in 1945 legislation for the improvement of social services at home was introduced, though the legacy of corruption and maladministration inherited from centuries of auto-

cratic rule stultified much that was good in inception. The overseas territories also benefited by increased investment. Unfortunately they were treated less as an end in themselves than as a means to an end—the glorification of the motherland. Much good work was done in Angola (the campaign against sleeping sickness being a notable example), but the approach to colonial problems was doctrinaire and unimaginative. All the other colonial Powers (Spain excepted) had been involved in the war effort against the Axis and the ideals of freedom and democracy had been implanted in the hearts and minds of the colonial peoples. Not so with Angola. '*Isto é nosso*'—'This is ours'—has been the constant refrain of Portuguese leaders throughout the post-war period, a revelation of the inflexible determination to retain hegemony, come what may Although Carmona visited Angola in 1938 and Craveiro Lopes in 1954, Salazar has remained in the ivory tower of his own thought, well muffled up against the tonic airs of the outside world. He has never visited Angola. The opposition at home was stifled and criticism from within the party was given its quietus when Henrique Galvao's report on the state of Angola was suppressed in 1947 Altruism was no more. The maintenance of the regime and the *status quo* had become the highest good.

Secondly, in the obsession of nationalism. In the resurgence of the nation great emphasis had been placed on the glories of the past The exploits of the founders of the nation, the freedom-fighters, the explorers, the navigators, were depicted on postage stamp and monumental plinth with an invariable constancy. National history was invoked to inspire the new generation to an emulation of its ancestors: but the cult became an obsession. Modern history (apart from the history of the regime) and the exploits of other nations and peoples were grossly neglected. Travel abroad was not encouraged save for those considered reliable. The overseas territories in particular were insulated from the outside world to the utmost degree possible. Out of all this came three sorry evils: a false assessment of the national achievement, a nostalgic romanticism concerning the past, and a deep suspicion of foreign influences in the present Xenophobia became almost a national disease, although individual Portuguese continued the tradition of hospitality that is famed all over Africa, if not the world.

Thirdly, the fear of economic imperialism. Self-consciousness concerning their own poverty has made the Portuguese very sensitive about the wealth of others. Criticism of Salazar's political

philosophy did not decrease admiration for his financial acumen: and Salazar was determined not to allow the nation to incur any more foreign debts. He therefore refused to borrow abroad, and placed such limitations on foreign investment as to discourage many who might otherwise have contributed to the development of the overseas territories. Foreign capital was viewed as a Pandora's box that might release a variety of ideological demons whose presence inside the body politic would be detrimental to its delicate constitution.

Fourthly, the theory of gradualism. By her introspection Portugal supposed that she could insulate herself from the winds of change blowing across the world. 'Progress is a slow business' was the official line. 'Development must be gradual. Let the Africans become acclimatized at a pace that is consonant with *our* resources and *their* capacity.' This attitude is understandable; Portugal herself has so much leeway to make up in literacy, social progress, and industrial development. But the retarding of advance in Angola has undoubtedly been a fruitful source of friction with the Africans, particularly with those living in the frontier areas.

So much for the failures of the regime—failures of doctrine as we might call them; but there have also been practical failures in the economic, social, and political realms. Chief among these have been disputes about land and the practice of 'contract' labour. While the law purports to protect African interests where regular cultivation is made, administrative integrity has not infrequently failed to match the high principles set down in black and white. At the same time the forced recruitment of Africans, not only for public works, but for private enterprise, has on occasion resulted in Africans being compelled to give compulsory service for the benefit of others on their own ancestral holdings. In 1955, on Portugal's entry into the United Nations, there was a temporary abandonment of the obligatory principle, and a permanent improvement in labour conditions on the plantations, but resentment of the whole system smouldered steadily beneath the surface.

'Colour-blindness' had been a traditional feature of Portuguese settlement. But few Angolan Africans were able to rise to positions of authority because the determined and persistent effort necessary to prepare Africans for a new status in society did not exist. Education was left to the religious missions with little or no financial assistance from Government sources. Goan doctors, Cape Verdean administrators, and people of mixed racial origin all played a sig-

nificant part in the complex of a non-racial society, but the number of Angolan Africans assimilated was in 1950 less than 1 per cent of the whole population. In 1954 a new Statute was introduced regulating the status of *indigenas* and the conditions for acquiring 'citizenship'. Article 64 states: 'The citizenship conceded or recognized . . . can be revoked by decision of the judge of the respective circuit on the basis of evidence of the competent administrative authority.' This destroyed African confidence in the good intentions of the authorities concerning the policy of assimilation, since they could never obtain anything more than a contingent citizenship, which could be lost should they come to be regarded as politically unreliable. Moreover, the years 1950–60 brought very extensive immigration which boosted a white population of 79,000 to an estimated 200,000 in ten years. Their interests became a first concern of the Government; for instance vast sums of money were spent on the experimental white settlement at Cela. This fact was not lost on the Africans. Again, many of the new immigrants did not assimilate themselves to the African situation and failed to reveal the easy tolerance and understanding of earlier settlers.

There was little political activity in Angola prior to 1950. The post-war boom brought general satisfaction to all sections of the community and the national exchequer was in a healthier state than at any time in this century When the economic recession began to impinge on the well-being of the community, political interest quickened. Some found in the evils, which Captain Galvao had reported in 1947, the source of unease and foreboding in the territory. Anti-Salazarism increased. The election for the presidency in 1958 showed that the opposition to Salazar was indeed much stronger than the regime had supposed, and support for General Delgado, particularly in the towns, was widespread. That 33 per cent of votes cast should have been for him was a remarkable achievement. At the same time African nationalism began to organize itself within the country, encouraged undoubtedly by the evidence of dissension within the European community. UPA (the Union of the Populations of Angola) was well established by 1957 though its headquarters were of necessity outside the country, and in October 1959 its pamphlets were distributed over a wide area in the north of Angola, demanding independence during 1960. Measures to stifle self-expression within both white and black communities were increased when PIDE, the political police, was greatly reinforced following the 1958 election. The autonomy of French West African

territories in 1958, and the hope of independence for the Congo, promised in the speech of King Baudouin in January 1959, stimulated still further the ambition for self-determination.

Economic, social, and political conditions have conspired between them to exacerbate relationships between the European and African communities: but the picture would be incomplete without a word on human relations. These have often been very good in local situations, but physical cruelty and a callous disregard for human rights have been all too frequent. Harsh beatings, collective punishments, the arrest of hostages, the use of spies and informers, arbitrary imprisonment, all these indignities, coupled with what Laurens van der Post calls 'the look in the eye', have at length brought an end to African patience.

THE PRESENT REVOLT

On 15 March 1961 Africans revolted over a large area of northern Angola Spanning a distance of 300 miles from the Congo frontier to the neighbourhood of Luanda, and on a front some 200 miles broad, guerrilla bands attacked Government outposts, isolated plantations, and small trading centres. The assault was a terrifying success and many hundreds of Europeans, men, women, and children, were massacred The weapon used was almost always the long knife or *panga*, the very nature of which requires hand-to-hand fighting In some cases bodies were mutilated, and these atrocities aroused a violent emotional reaction on the part of the Portuguese community.

Many Europeans were already armed, but, with the uprising, the administrative authorities issued arms to all male civilians, who, forming themselves into groups of vigilantes, carried out punitive measures on a large scale. To date, if European casualties are estimated at 1,000 or more, African deaths are put at at least 20,000. For some weeks it was impossible for the administration to restrain the armed civilians from wreaking a terrible vengeance on Africans, many of whom were as innocent as were the white victims of the initial onslaught.

The present campaign owes its origin to UPA which, though organized from outside the country, has gained widespread support from within, as reports of the constant destruction of bridges and the interruption of communications testify. Both the Bakongo and Kimbundu tribal groups have been heavily involved in the fighting. Their combined population in 1950 was registered as 1½ million.

The authorities have suggested that the Ovimbundu, the large tribal group in the country, are loyal to the regime: but the report widespread arrests and intimidation throughout the south does n support this view. The Benguela plateau does not offer the cov that the mountainous north provides, and frontiers are many hur dreds of miles distant.

A second nationalist organization, the MPLA (*Movimen Popular para a Libertacao de Angola*) has its headquarters i Conakry. It would seem that so far there has been no direct partic pation by this group in the current uprising, but attempts have bee made to form some kind of united front of the two organizations i the hope of bringing about a more liberal, democratic, and equitabl order in Angola.

What is the end to be? Totalitarianism is not renowned for it readiness to negotiate with dissident groups within the body politi The African nationalists of Angola, described as 'terrorists' be cause of the violence of the first attacks, are themselves all too we acquainted with terror and are not likely to be very eager to parle with those they consider their oppressors. In terms of militar logistics their chances of success must seem remote, yet they ar fighting in their own land, where every hill and valley and forest i known. And they are fighting for a cause. Guerrilla activity ma decline during the dry season when the threat that the Portugues military forces will burn the bush grass away and drive the rebel into the forests, where in turn they will be bombed, may be put int effect But the effect of a long-term campaign upon Portugal' economy will be most serious and support for a colonial war amon the common people is likely to flag. A specious peace may howeve temporarily be secured.

The final outcome must however be a more liberal policy toward the African majority and a rectification of the abuses of the years. I Portugal cannot herself summon the will to do this, it would seer that sooner or later the United Nations, or Brazil at the behest of th United Nations, must be called in to act as midwife of the ne nation that struggles to be born.

CLIFFORD J. PARSONS

Japanese Politics and the Approach of Prosperity

IN a good many of the world's industrial countries 'creeping affluence' is one of the most important of the long-term factors affecting the basic pattern of politics. Japan is no exception; though 'creeping' is, perhaps, hardly the appropriate word for a country where the rate of growth in the national income was 8 per cent for the year 1959–60, and for the previous year reached the extraordinary heights of 16 per cent. The present Prime Minister's campaign pledge—that everyone's real income will be doubled in ten years—may seem a bold one, but it would be an equally bold man who would predict that this will not happen

Japanese living levels are still, of course, low by European standards. Translated into dollars, the income of the average Japanese is about a third of that of the average Englishman. But differences in the way that income is spent mean that every Japanese can share in some way in the glitter and the magic of 'modern living'. Roads and some public services are bad by European standards; housing conditions are still extremely cramped, car ownership is still a rarity; but Japan has a wider diffusion of television than France, washing machines and transistors abound, and the increase in tourist expenditure runs at a rate about double that of the growth in national income

In any case, the politically important aspects of economic growth are not so much the heights reached as the speed of the climb—and the way in which the benefits are distributed. It is extremely difficult, given the elusiveness of business income in Japan, to say whether inequalities of income have increased or decreased in recent years. Certainly if one observes the acreage and the opulence of the expense-account restaurant areas in Tokyo and in Osaka one gets the impression that inequalities are increasing. On the other hand, official statistics of average wages (though one should discount their bias towards the more modernized large-scale industries) show an increase, between the years 1951 and 1958 at least, about equal to the growth in national income. The 1961 budget provides for an 18 per cent increase in public-assistance benefits. And there can be no doubt of a considerable rise in the living levels of that third of the nation's families which is still engaged in farming—partly as a result of a succession of excellent harvests, partly due to higher prices for

Government-controlled foodstuffs, and partly because of increase opportunities for side-earnings in industry and the rapidly develop ing programmes of public works. One farmer whom the write visited in 1955 seemed distinctly pleased with life on a second visi in 1960. In the interval the family had acquired an electric pump fo the well, a television set, and a washing machine. The kitchen ha been entirely remodelled, they had a new machine to mill their ow rice, and the son had bought a motor bicycle. They now took th *Sankei Shimbun*—the poor man's *Financial Times*—since they ha recently started to put their savings into equity shares. All this, i appeared, had been accomplished on the proceeds of three acres o land and the earnings of an energetic son in part-time forestry Th story is told that in some of the richer southern villages, where th farmers have all their two or three acres profitably planted wit heavy-bearing orange trees, the washing machine is now a symbol o low status. The really top families send all their washing to th laundry.

One might reasonably expect as a result of these development a growing complacency and a growing political apathy. Compla cency, at least, is still not a prominent Japanese vice. An America visitor, who reached Japan via Moscow recently, remarked tha whereas in Russia, where life is drab and dreary and efficiency not ably absent, Russians are never tired of telling visitors how wonder ful their social system is, in Japan, on the other hand, where every thing sparkles and seems full of vitality, Japanese are constantl apologizing to visitors for the backwardness, inefficiency, and gener al inferiority of their country. Japanese tend to judge their country' performance not by the standards of their Asian neighbours, but i relation to their—often highly idealized—conception of Wester standards. Tokyo intellectuals never tire of telling visitors of the lo level of intellect and personal integrity of Japanese politicians, o of the voting public's lack of political sophistication. Even th economists discount the current vitality of the Japanese econom and suggest that it still rests on insecure foundations or that it is 'bicycle economy'—one has to pedal hard to keep seated and if on does fall off the crash is likely to be painful.

If there is little complacency, one would not infer, from account of last year's massive demonstrations and occasional riots agains the passage of the Japanese-American Security Treaty,[1] that ther was much political apathy either. It is significant, however, that thi

[1] See Note of the Month, *The World Today*, July 1960.

was a dispute in part over foreign policy, in part over the use and abuse of parliamentary procedure; not a dispute over domestic policy. And it is significant that the widespread support which the Socialist party gained in its demands for Mr Kishi's resignation in June was not reflected in any substantial increase in the Socialist vote in October. At least it is clear that there is not the kind of increase in economic dissatisfactions within Japan which is likely to help left-wing parties.

THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY

This is a situation which, as in England and Western Germany, has the most serious consequences for the Socialist party. But the growing prosperity is having some effects on the conservatives too. They have held power in Japan for the last twelve years; since 1955 within the framework of a single party, the Liberal-Democratic party. The party holds more than 300 of the 467 seats in the lower house of the Diet and can count on the support of two-thirds of the members of the House of Councillors. With some justification they have come to look on themselves as the permanent Government. There is a growing self-confidence in the party which expresses itself in two contradictory forms

In one section of the party it has led to an increased determination to 'get tough' with the Left. In concrete terms this means, in part, stronger measures to curb the power of trade unions, revision of the liberal labour laws enacted during the American occupation, restrictions of the right to strike, and a much greater willingness to use police power and court injunctions to break strikes. In particular it means more positive measures to break the power of the Teachers' Trade Union, the wealthiest and, in its leadership at least, the most extreme of the left-wing unions, which has long been feared by the Liberal-Democrats as a channel for the diffusion of left-wing ideas among the younger generation. It is significant that the present Minister of Education, the foremost exponent in the present Cabinet of the advantages of an aggressive policy, declared on his assumption of office that, unlike his predecessor, he intended under no circumstances to hold talks or negotiations with the Teachers' Union. A second concern of the 'get tough' school of the party is to introduce legislation to give the police greater powers to restrict political demonstrations and so prevent a recurrence of the incidents of last summer. The Liberal-Democrats should, according to this school of thought, be prepared to make much more ruthless use of their

parliamentary majority to force their measures through the Diet whatever tactics the Socialist Opposition adopts.

So far, however, this school of thought has not succeeded ir dominating the Liberal-Democratic party since Mr Ikeda's suc cession to the leadership, and the Premiership, last July. He seem to have taken seriously the threat to Japanese parliamentary insti tutions implicit in the deep divisions which developed over th Security Treaty and to have decided to avoid measures or tactic likely to provoke the kind of Socialist opposition which would onc again require the use of police and tear gas in the precincts of th Diet. It has not been easy for him to maintain this 'low posture policy, as the Japanese press calls it, and in May and June of thi year he has twice been forced by pressure from the party to appl closure procedure and force Bills through the Diet in the teeth o strong Socialist opposition, which has once again taken the form o boycotting Diet sessions and the organization of street demonstra tions. In neither case, however, are the issues involved big enoug for the Socialists to carry their opposition to extreme lengths, and i does seem that as long as Mr Ikeda remains in control of his part more fundamental provocation will be avoided. His willingness t hold his hand and wait patiently until opposition has spent itself is of course, the other, more considered, expression of the party' mood of self-confidence. As long as the boom continues and th parliamentary system is maintained, conservative supremacy i unlikely to be threatened.

How long Mr Ikeda will remain in power depends in part on hi own skill in maintaining public support, in part on a comple balance of forces within the party. The Liberal-Democratic party i in effect an alliance of factions, each of which is united around on or two leading politicians who could possibly harbour reasonabl ambitions of becoming Prime Minister. Some eight main faction divide between them almost the whole membership of the party They have faction offices, and they usually have some semi-forma procedures for holding meetings and reaching decisions. They hav official titles and they are registered formally as political organiza tions. As such they report their financial affairs to the Ministry o Self-Government, and it says something for the importance of thes factional organizations that during the first six months of 1960, dur ing which time Mr Ikeda was campaigning actively for the presi dency of the party, his factional organization (the Broad Lak Society, 'lake' being a pun on the name Ikeda) spent 30 per cen

more than the total expenditure of the Liberal-Democratic party organization itself.

In an indirect way the new prosperity is having the effect of strengthening these factional divisions, chiefly because elections are becoming increasingly expensive to candidates. At each succeeding election in the last ten years costs have spiralled. The formula frequently repeated in the newspapers as the basis of calculations for Liberal Democratic candidates at the last election was: 'three you're in and two you're out', meaning that an expenditure of 30 million yen (£30,000) would always guarantee election, while the candidate who spent only 20 million yen would be almost sure to lose There is doubtless some journalistic exaggeration here, but there can be no doubt that many candidates spent sums of that order, and since the legitimate forms of expenditure in posters, leaflets, meetings, and advertising are carefully regulated in quantity, a good deal of it is spent in illicit ways. One candidate was reported to have loaded a fleet of forty taxis with consignments of underwear which were distributed to the villages in his constituency the day before polling-day. Another sent out truckloads of sugar. Most of it, however, goes into the pockets of election-brokers, people who approach the candidate's agent with expressions of their admiration of the candidate, promises of their fervent support, and boasts of their ability to marshal votes They often make off with a sizeable 'gift', not because the agent believes in their vote-getting powers but because he fears their ability to scare off voters by malicious rumour-mongering should they be disappointed.

This inflation of electoral costs is a natural result of increasing prosperity, given the nature of the Japanese electoral system. The two main parties compete in constituencies each of which elects from three to six members. This means that Liberal-Democrat candidates are competing for the electors' single vote, not simply with Socialist candidates (who are usually poor) but also with each other. The result is that at each successive election there is a hardening of the lines of factional division within the party. Each faction vies with the other for the limited number of nominations as official party candidates. Prominent politicians campaigning in constituencies other than their own are enthusiastic about their own protégés, but often lukewarm in their support of members of other factions. A more important form of indebtedness, tying the faction member to his leader, is financial. Liberal-Democratic candidates are reported to have received only £1,500 each from central party funds at the

last election. The rest they had to raise themselves, but the ability c
the ordinary rank-and-file candidate to raise money from busines
friends is obviously much more limited than that of a prominer
faction-leader, and a good many candidates have to rely on suppoı
from that quarter—support which must, in duty bound, be re
quited in loyalty to the faction and its leader.

Drawing his support from a party constituted in this way, a Prim
Minister has to tread very warily. The patronage at his disposa
usually makes it possible for him at least to muster the stronges
faction for himself, but he has to make sure, in choosing his Cabinet
that each faction is given a sufficient share of the offices available t
prevent it from becoming a centre of disaffection. It also means
paradoxically, that the party organization, as the organization withi
which the conflicting claims and policies of the various factions ar
resolved, comes to rival the Cabinet as an organ for the formulatio
of policy, particularly in matters involving sectional interests wit
which various factions might be differently involved During a re
cent doctors' strike against the national health service it was th
party secretariat, rather than the Minister of Health, which playe
the main role in negotiating a settlement.

The increasing cost of elections has other consequences than th
hardening of factional divisions. The publicity given to the les
savoury type of electoral practice induces a general mood of cyni
cism about the electoral process in particular and the parliamentar
system in general. (The total number charged with offences agains
the election laws at the time of the last elections was 31,000, of whor
over 27,000 were accused of bribery or related offences.) Moreover
there is a very real danger of increased corruption in Governmen
inasmuch as the business men who provide their political friend
with these large sums of money are likely to expect in return some
thing more concrete than the mere maintenance of a climate favour
able to business.

So apparent were the ill consequences of the present system a
the most recent elections that there has since been rather mor
serious consideration than usual of the possibilities of electoral re
form; not least because the business world was making it clear tha
they did not intend to be milked on this scale indefinitely. A com
mittee to study the question of electoral reform has been establishe
(one in which politician members do *not* have voting rights) and
is possible that it may effect some changes, chiefly in making a grea
range of electioneering a public charge, using public facilities mad

equally available to all candidates. There is unlikely to be any fundamental change, however, inasmuch as opposition from both the main parties has succeeded in removing the large-constituency system as such from the Committee's terms of reference. A change to the single-member constituency system would alter the situation substantially and help to focus elections on differing party policies rather than on personal rivalries. But too many Liberal-Democrats have their pockets of support distributed widely over the present constituencies, and the Socialist party fears, with some reason, the effects of the single-member system in exaggerating the Liberal-Democratic majority of the popular vote in terms of the number of seats gained.

THE SOCIALIST OPPOSITION

The problems of the Liberal-Democrats are as nothing compared with those of the Socialists. Six years ago, when the two divided wings of the earlier party came together to form a new one after the elections of 1955, they faced the future with confidence. For three successive elections the Socialist vote had increased at an encouraging rate which suggested that, if they could continue to claim a large share of the votes of each new generation of voters, they could reasonably expect a parliamentary majority before too long. Five years later, having still gained no more than 27 per cent of the popular vote in the elections of November 1960 (another 9 per cent went to the breakaway Democratic Socialist party) power seems as remote as ever.

The Socialist party is a complex amalgam of many elements, among which the Marxist element predominates and determines the basic outlook and policies of the party. Its assumption is that Japanese capitalism, like capitalism anywhere, is bound ultimately to collapse. Its own internal contradictions will lead inevitably to crisis. The Socialist party, having prepared itself to act in its historic role as the spearhead of the working class, will be able to take advantage of this crisis to gain power and so establish socialism, a form of society qualitatively different from capitalism.

Such long-term prospects apart, the immediate policies of the party have had two main emphases; firstly, neutralism in foreign policy—a neutralism which leans with greater goodwill towards the Communist, or more particularly the Chinese, side of the world than the American—and secondly, defence at home of all the post-war reforms in the face of efforts by the Liberal-Democrats to cut back

Japan's post-war democratic growth into a more disciplin authoritarian framework. Thus the major political battles have bee concerned with the Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty wi America, the question of constitutional reform and the re-establis ment of an army, measures to recentralize control over the poli and education, a measure to enlarge police powers to search and arrest. Economic problems have not figured prominently in th Socialists' immediate concerns. Since they see no hope for th capitalist system, they have no particular interest in trying to mak it work more efficiently. The left-wing General Council of Trac Unions, which works closely with the Socialist party, has consi tently refused to co-operate in any Government-sponsored pr ductivity campaigns All such campaigns have been condemned attempts to intensify the exploitation of labour.

Recently there has been a growing feeling in the Socialist part that perhaps the time has come for a rethinking of these basic a sumptions. Japanese capitalism has staved off the crisis for the la fifteen years. It may do so for fifteen years more. With wages risir faster than price levels consistently year after year, the party whic declares that the workers are getting poorer and that disaster is ir evitable is not likely to get much of a hearing. What is more, thos who read Government statistics are aware that the working class- the manual industrial working class of which the party is suppose to be the political organ—is hardly in fact increasing in numbers Japan. Between 1948 and 1956 10 per cent of the labour for moved out of farming, fishing, and forestry. But the correspondir increase came not in the industrial but in the tertiary trades—th service and clerical occupations notorious as breeding-grounds f bourgeois values.

The first signs of dissatisfaction with the traditional party lir came with the formation in January 1960 of a new Democrat Socialist party. It was led by Nishio Suehiro, a right-wing labo leader who had sat in the Diet since 1928 and had never been real at home with the ideologues of the Socialist party. It was supporte outside the Diet, by the smaller and less radical of the two trac union federations (*Zenro* with rather over a million members, con pared with the 3¾ million members of the left-wing General Cou cil) and by a group of intellectuals who had long been lookir for a political home—men who wished to see the Liberal-Dem crats removed from power, but being of a generally Fabian pe suasion could not accept the Socialists' assumptions or the

sometimes cavalier attitude towards parliamentary institutions.

The new party was enthusiastically hailed by the press as the solution to Japan's problem of finding a 'responsible' Opposition dedicated to welfare socialism and the maintenance of parliamentary institutions. Its record in the November elections, however, betrayed these high hopes. Its programme lacked the clear-cut definiteness of those of the other parties. It was difficult, for instance, to decide exactly where it stood on the issue of the Security Treaty except that it was not, like the Liberal-Democratic party, enthusiastic in its support nor, like the Socialist party, in favour of its immediate repudiation Its promise of a higher standard of living lacked the imaginative appeal of Mr Ikeda's promise to double incomes in ten years Nishio, too, proved a less attractive personality than either of the other two party leaders in the television debate which was a new and, it seems, fairly influential feature of Japanese electioneering The party's trade union support also proved less effective in mobilizing votes than the General Council's backing of the Socialist party. The result was that the party lost 23 of its original 40 seats and suffered a serious crisis of morale from which it is still painfully trying to recover

The Socialists themselves gained all the Democratic Socialists lost, increasing their Diet representation from 122 to 145. To many in the party the result was a vindication of the virtues of maintaining the traditional uncompromising line, come what may. Others, however, were less jubilant. The Liberal Democrats' strength had not been reduced, and with only 27 per cent of the popular vote, power seemed still a long way off. Just before the election an important strike against the dismissal of redundant and 'obstructive' workers in the Miike coal mine had ended in defeat, despite the support of the whole Socialist movement, and had shown the difficulty of maintaining a rigidly uncompromising attitude towards all programmes of industrial rationalization. The party was a long way from the confident mood of the summer when its—and the Communists'—extra-parliamentary campaign had forced the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit and the resignation of the Kishi Government.

The result has been a slight shift in Socialist party policy, apparent in the adoption, at its March 1961 convention, of a new policy of 'structural reform'. This is largely the brain-child of Eda Saburo, the shrewd Secretary-General of the party who temporarily took over the Chairmanship after Mr Asanuma's assassination. The bur-

den of the new policy seems to be that it *is* possible to mitigate t worst aspects of the capitalist system if the Socialist party can, wi sufficient energy and with sufficient mobilization of popular supp(outside the Diet, demand improvements in welfare, minimum wa legislation, full employment, or new housing policies. In the proce it may be possible so to modify the structure of capitalism th organizations of the working class can approach closer to the centr of power and so bring nearer the eventual achievement of socialisı

For a Japanese Socialist politician to propose the adoption of policy of this sort requires rather more courage than is needed ir British Labour leader who offers to amend Clause Four. It is, critics of the new line very vocally pointed out, one which smac dangerously of 'reformism', and reformism, to a good many Japa ese Socialists, is a kind of moral backsliding finally and autho tatively condemned by Lenin in 1920 The proponents of the ne line leaned over backwards to meet such criticism They deni firmly that the new policy constituted reformism in any sense (public at least; some were quite prepared to accept the epithet private); they insisted that the new line represented a change only tactics, not in strategy, they dissociated themselves from any Cro land-like thesis that capitalism might have essentially changed lost its qualitative difference from socialism, which it was still t party's object to achieve, and they claimed that the policy h respectable Marxist origins, being developed from hints supplied l Togliatti. The defence succeeded, perhaps in convincing, perha simply in saving faces, but at least in securing the programme acceptance.

Policy statements of this degree of generality may not mean ve much, but there are other signs of a fresh breeze in the Social party. This year, for the first time, the Socialists proposed an alte native budget which was meant, not simply, as in previous yeaı as a detailed statement of their irreconcilable differences with t Government, but as a series of amendments on lines which mig seem just within the bounds of possible Government acceptanc Socialist leaders also asked for—and got—talks with Governme leaders to see how far their amendments could be incorporated.

These recent developments seem very much like tentative ste along the same road as the German Social Democratic party h recently trodden with such determined finality. It will, however, l a long time before the Japanese Socialist party reaches its Wie baden Convention. The proponents of a more moderate line w

face a hard struggle, not least because of the tradition of militancy in which the Socialist party has been bred. It is a tradition which dates from pre-war days when a man had to be at least militant enough to face jail with equanimity if he wished to be a Socialist. And it is a tradition still apparent in the popularity of the word 'struggle' in Socialist party statements and in the ease with which the parliamentary party can adopt the last-ditch tactics of barricading the Speaker in his room to prevent the Diet from being called into session to pass legislation they oppose.

This militancy, and its occasional expression in parliamentary tactics, is also a symptom of the Socialists' sense of alienation from the political process in Japan They tend not to look on the rules of parliamentary procedure as evolved for the mutual benefit of all parties They can break them without giving much thought to the possibility that they may one day need the protection of those rules in order to pass unpopular legislation of their own. *They* have never enjoyed, and still see no immediate prospect of enjoying, a parliamentary majority.

And here, perhaps, is the nub of a dangerous dilemma which the Japanese parliamentary system faces It is unlikely to be firmly established until the Socialists do manage to form a majority Government and secure a stake in the system themselves. And the present electoral map is such that they are unlikely to be able to do so unless there is a severe economic or political crisis—a crisis which, to secure that effect, might have to be of such proportions that it is in itself a danger to the maintenance of parliamentary government.

R P. Dore

Economic Commission for Africa: Progress Report

The third session of the Economic Commission for Africa (E.C.A.) held in Addis Ababa in March was a lively occasion, and an important one. It was a mine of information for those interested in the dynamics of Pan-Africanism; the changing relationships between Europe and Africa; the pattern of competitive coexistence; the transitional problems in under-developed societies; and the role of the

United Nations. This is a brief attempt to pinpoint some of the ii portant developments, and to provide a guide to the informati now available from the E.C A. headquarters in Addis Ababa whe Mr Mekki Abbas, the Secretary-General, is building up an ii pressive staff of Africans and non-Africans.

First a word about the five categories of participants in the co ference. The full members are the independent African States a the former colonial Powers, the dependent territories are associat members; observers are divided between U.N. members (other th E.C.A. members), non-U.N. members (e.g. Federal Republic Germany), specialized and technical agencies, and non-gover mental organizations. All this added up to more than 300 parti pants. The question of the colonial Powers continuing as full mei bers was keenly debated. In the end a motion calling for them to relegated to associate membership was not carried only because t colonial Powers, South Africa, and Congo (Leopoldville) voted w the majority of the French-speaking States to achieve an equality voting. But the tide is unmistakably strong: independent Afric States wish E C A. to be controlled by themselves. This questi will no doubt be settled at the next conference.

The composition of the twenty-two observer nations reveals a glance both economic and political patterns Latin America se only Brazil and Mexico; from Asia there were India, Pakist Japan, Indonesia, Ceylon, and Nationalist China; from Europe Austria, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Yugoslav Israel came but no other Middle Eastern Arab State; there we also the United States, and the Soviet bloc—the U S.S.R., R mania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria T U S.S.R sent the largest and the most distinguished delegation l by the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr V. S. Semen and in all the Soviet bloc produced twenty-one members. T U.S.A. had a delegation of five; but Mr Mennen Williams, he of the African Affairs Department, arrived on the last day in ti to give a large reception for the whole conference.

Within the conference itself there was a desire which gro stronger with each meeting of the E.C.A. to eschew politics and concentrate on economics. Nevertheless, politics keep intrudir for instance the first two days of the fortnight's discussions we taken up with the question of the proposed membership of Mau tania, which Morocco fought to a standstill. Nobody objected to t seating of Congo (Leopoldville); but there was a tense day wh

news of Mr Patrice Lumumba's murder came in the middle of the conference. South Africa was another divisive factor. At a caucus of the African States it was decided to walk out in protest against *apartheid* when the Union's delegate came to make his opening statement. Later, the decision was changed: it was agreed instead to boycott a reception offered by the South Africans. In this way the work within the conference was not disturbed, although delegates did not hesitate to attack South Africa's policies, and the conference passed a resolution instructing the E.C.A. to examine the economic consequences of racial policies in the Union.

Both inside the conference and in the lobbies, 'competitive co-existence' was a lively factor with the running made chiefly by the Soviet bloc. On the whole their observers' long speeches of 'fraternal greetings' set up a reaction as much by their length as by their tone. The Soviet technique has now become clear, as the following extract from Mr Semenov's speech reveals:

> The economic co-operation of the Soviet Union with the under-developed countries does not serve the aim of getting profits through the exploitation of their resources. All enterprises constructed by independent countries of Asia and Africa in co-operation with the U.S.S.R. become a full property of those countries where they are built. The Soviet organizations do not become shareholders in these enterprises, they do not participate in the administration and profits of the enterprises constructed with their help. The acquisition of special advantages at the expense of other nations is alien to the very nature of the Socialist Soviet State based on the principles which preclude the exploitation of man by man.

Mr Semenov gave details of the U.S S R 's programmes of aid to Africa, both under bilateral agreements and also through the United Nations. He also went further and extolled the virtues of Soviet economy, producing massive figures of growth. By way of special illustration he cited the growth of a relatively under-developed Republic in the Soviet Union—Tadjikistan—whose Planning Commission Chairman, Mr Kakharov, was on hand to meet delegates.

The Americans, on the other hand, were careful to limit their single intervention at the conference to economic issues. Mr Mennen Williams, at his official reception, developed at length his theme that 'we want the nations of Africa to be their own masters and to grow in vigour and prosperity'.

So much for the political overtones. The economic discussions fell into three parts; the presentation of documentation, addresses

by each of the delegations, which took the best part of five days t deliver, and the formulation of resolutions. The most obviousl urgent question was the likely 'Impact of Western Europea Economic Groupings on African Economies', which was set out in document of that title[1] by an *ad hoc* committee comprising Cong (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria Sudan, Tunis, South Africa, the U.A.R., and Britain. Its delibera tions were attended by observers from Western Germany, th Netherlands, Japan, the U.S S.R., and the U.S.A. Its most im portant conclusion read: 'it was generally recognized that it is no yet possible to demonstrate any significant damage made to th trade of African countries either by E.E.C. or by E.F.T.A.' (para 38). Although there were differences of opinion regarding the likel impact of Western European groupings on African economies, 'n opposition was raised against the principle of economic integratio in western Europe' (para. 49). The further view was expressed tha 'some favourable effects could also be expected since the increase i the national income of E.E.C. and E.F.T.A. countries induced b integration would result in higher export earnings of African coun tries' (para. 44). After debate, the Commission declared tha Africa's economic relations with countries outside the continen should be based on African continental and regional realities, with view to establishing maximum co-operation and particularly th creation of large enough regional markets capable of supportin industrialization. It requested the Executive Secretary to kee under constant review the impacts of the European econom groupings on African economies, and to undertake studies on th ways of creating African regional markets with a view to the creatio of an African Common Market.

The central fear of all those concerned with the future of Africa economies turns of course on the problem of commodity stabiliza tion. The problem is well documented; but there has never been a adequate African orientation to it The E.C.A. staff produced a exemplary study on 'International Action for Commodity Stabiliza tion and the Role of Africa'.[2] Two important points of elucidatio emerged from this study:

> There is (thus) a real dilemma in African policy toward certain com modity schemes which are primarily restrictionist. On the one hand restrictionist schemes may conflict with the basic interests of Africa growth and efficiency. On the other, strict avoidance of internationa

[1] UN ECA E/CN. 14/100. [2] UN ECA E/CN. 14/68.

schemes might impede international co-operation. It is for this reason that stabilization schemes which are essentially non-restrictionist deserve particular consideration by the African countries. . .

At the same time, to the extent that consumption of many primary commodities is still being restricted by high tariffs, domestic excise taxes, and quotas in importing countries, speedy dismantling of such restrictions would undoubtedly help to alleviate the surplus problem and ease the difficulties of the African producers. In this connection, it is perhaps useful for the developed countries, which have been unanimous in pledging aid to the African countries, to extend the concept of aid through commodity policies that would help African economic development.

Whatever the outcome of international action in stabilizing commodity markets, the problem of commodity instability is likely to remain for the foreseeable future. This fact must be recognized in any overall consideration of economic policy. The need for diversification through economic development, for greater access to international liquidity, for better control of supply, and for more adequate provision of storage facilities must be viewed in this light. Furthermore, while the present paper is concerned with the problem of instability, it should always be remembered that the problem of growth is often more fundamental. Measures such as development of under-utilized resources, expansion of capacity, and improvement of quality can obviously make a great deal of difference to export earnings and must therefore be considered along with stabilization policies

A resolution was passed calling for a meeting of African primary producing countries to formulate a concerted policy of price stabilization The question has since been considered at the ninth session of the Commission on international commodity trade, 1–16 May.[1]

A glance at the budget of any African State will show that by far the largest single amount is spent on transport. The question of rationalizing transport and communications by encouraging regional programmes was studied in relation to West Africa, and the conference passed a resolution drawing attention to 'the urgent necessity for a comprehensive inter-African transportation network'. It also urged the establishment of a network of all-weather roads linking all the West African countries. This is an urgent necessity, since one of the effects of different colonial regimes was a system of communications which ended at the frontiers of the territories for which different colonial Powers held responsibility.

The results of a research study on 'International Economic Assistance to Africa'[2] was published, providing a good picture of the importance of such assistance to individual countries and also, at a

[1] E/CN. 13.   [2] E/CN 14/88. 16 November 1960.

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time when there is so much talk about contributions from variou competing blocs, a useful guide to what is really involved.

Public economic assistance in about 1958 represented 18 per cent of the total export earnings of the under-developed areas of Afric as compared with 13 per cent for all under-developed countrie The proportions varied greatly among the individual African coun tries and territories included in the calculations; 226 per cent fo Libya, 67 per cent for Algeria, 22 per cent for former Frenc Equatorial Africa, 21 per cent for Morocco and Tunisia, 20 pe cent for Liberia, 16 per cent for Madagascar, 14 per cent for forme French West Africa, 12 per cent for Cameroun, 12 per cent fo Ethiopia, 9 per cent for the Sudan, 4 per cent for the Belgian Cong 2 per cent for the U.A R. (Egypt), 1 per cent for Ghana, and 1 pe cent for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

There is also a disturbing negative factor in the growth of inte national aid. The report[1] submitted to the Economic and Soci Council showed that by 31 December 1958, the external publ indebtedness of African under-developed countries—as of oth under-developed countries—had sharply increased as compare with the situation three years earlier. For instance, in the U A R. th increase was from $5 million to $291 million, in the Belgian Cong from $316 million to $516 million, in Ethiopia from $33 million t $51 million, in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland fro $371 million to $526 million. This meant that public debt servic at the end of 1958 absorbed 4·6 per cent of all total current receip for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 4 per cent for th Belgian Congo, 1·9 per cent for Ethiopia and 0·2 per cent for th U.A R. (Egypt). One African country (Libya) was shown to be th recipient in 1957–8 to 1958–9 of the largest amount of assistance *pe capita* of the under-developed countries represented in the calcul lations. Of the other African countries thus represented Liber received on a *per capita* basis more than the average of unde developed countries, while the Sudan, Ethiopia, Ghana, and th U.A.R. (Egyptian Region) all received less than the average.

Both Mr Paul Hoffman, Executive Director of the U.N. Speci Fund, and Mr David Owen, Executive Chairman of the U.N Technical Assistance Board, in their speeches at the conferenc conveyed a new sense of urgency about the size and scope United Nations aid to Africa. The figures presented by Mr Owe are, at least, encouraging: since 1956 the percentage of Africa

[1] Doc. E/3395. Tables 11–19, p 91.

participation in the total field programme has shown a steady increase from 8·9 per cent in 1956 to 15·9 per cent in 1960. For the 1961–2 biennium the African share in the programme planned for the world as a whole is due to rise to about 29 per cent of the total. In 1960 the project costs in respect of African countries and territories amounted to about $4·4 million. In the 1961–2 biennium, however, the planned programme for the African region totals $20·1 million or an average of over $10 million a year. This represents an increase of 130 per cent over the current programme of the same region.

There was also an important reminder in the ECOSOC report mentioned above of the great gap between the time of allocating capital for economic development and the actual start of a project. The experience of the European Economic Development Fund (E.E.D.F.) is pertinent. Of a total of $581 million earmarked for five years, the amount of $66·5 million was approved for projects: but less than half of the grants originally planned for 1958 and 1959 had in fact been authorized by mid-1960. The difficulties experienced by associated countries in preparing suitable projects are reported as the main factor making for this delay. More recently it has been possible to speed up activities considerably and further simplifications of procedure are contemplated by the E.E.C. Commission with a view to accelerating action.

The comprehensive survey presented on 'The Economic Situation and Trends in Africa'[1] draws attention to several significant developments. For example, although the relative trade position of the franc zone countries and territories does not seem to have been affected by fluctuations in demand for primary commodities, either between 1957 and 1958 or between 1958 and 1959, the figures show that these countries and territories account for a much larger part of the total trade deficit of Africa than would be expected from the role they play in African trade. Their relative share in total African trade in 1959, for instance, did not reach 30 per cent; but their balance-of-trade deficit was responsible for approximately two-thirds of the over-all African gap. On the other hand, the improvement in the balance of trade of the sterling group accounted for 90 per cent of the reduction in Africa's total deficit between 1958 and 1959. The devaluation of the French franc at the end of 1958 makes it difficult to follow the dynamics of the franc zone exports in dollar terms; but, even allowing amply for the effect of that devaluation, it seems

[1] E/CN 14/67.

clear that the volume of exports of the group in 1959 was not abo\
the 1958 level.

The bulk of African trade is still conducted with present (
former metropolitan countries, which means that, although sligl
shifts have been taking place in the distribution of African expor
and imports, Western Europe continues to dominate trade i
African countries. In the last few years, however, and in particul
between 1958 and 1959, the six members of the European Econom
Community have gained some ground at the expense of other We
European countries, particularly the United Kingdom. It is wort
while mentioning, for instance, that the E.E C. group of countri
bought 38 per cent of Ghana's total exports in 1959, compared wit
33 per cent in 1958. A similar shift took place in the trade of Nigeri
The share of the E.E.C. in that country's total exports increase
from 31 per cent in 1958 to 34 per cent in 1959. A rising trend in th
relative share of the E.E.C. can also be observed in the exports (
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland—from 16·2 per cent i
1957 to 17 per cent in 1958, and to 21·2 per cent in 1959.

With the exception of the U A.R. (Egypt) and, more recentl
Guinea, trade with the U S.S.R. and Eastern Europe remain
small and does not appear to be undergoing spectacular changes. A
indicated by the rising number of trade agreements concluded b
tween these countries and African countries, trade with the U.S.S.I
and Eastern Europe is, however, likely to become more importa
for Africa.

There was apparently a small increase in trade among Africa
countries between 1958 and 1959, but this remains very low an
probably does not amount to more than 10 per cent of their tot
recorded trade. But intra-African trade is of considerable impo
tance for a few countries or territories; for instance, exports fro
the Union of South Africa to the rest of the region amounted
1959 to more than 22 per cent of that country's total exports, whi
the share of imports from Africa—mostly from the Union—in th
total imports of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland reache
37·5 per cent. The most serious obstacles to the development (
intra-African trade arise from the proliferation of econom
frontiers and even more from the serious lack of adequate com
munications and transportation, together with the low level (
industrialization characteristic of most of the continent. There ca
be no doubt, as the report concludes, that there are excellent pro
pects for expanding intra-African trade in line with the econom

development of African countries, increasing mutual contacts and a growing awareness of common interests and objectives.

COLIN LEGUM

Russia and the Arab World

RUSSIA'S direct relations with the Arab world are of very recent origin, much more recent than those, for instance, of Britain, France, or even Germany. On the other hand, her association with the Muslim world in general is far older and more intimate than that of any other European State In the first place, the Mongols, who dominated Russian lands from the middle of the thirteenth to the end of the fifteenth century, were early converted to Islam. After the end of the Mongol domination in 1480, Russia proceeded to annex the Muslim Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, and these have been an integral part of Russia since the sixteenth century. Most of Transcaucasia and the whole of Turkestan had been under Arab domination in the eighth and ninth centuries and although the Arabs themselves had long ago disappeared at the time of the Russian conquests, these regions remained Muslim. By the end of the nineteenth century, the southern fringe of the Russian Empire from the Crimea to outer Mongolia was, with the exception of Georgia and Armenia, almost exclusively peopled by Muslims, whose number, including those of the Volga region, amounted to nearly 20 million. Since the end of the seventeenth century, Russia's frontiers marched with those of the two most important Muslim States, Turkey and Persia.

Before the first World War, almost the entire Arab world was included in the Ottoman Empire, with which Russia had close, but mostly hostile, relations. Two of Russia's most important aspirations were concerned with the Turkish Straits—the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles—and with the eastern Mediterranean, and these two aspirations could only be realized by the complete neutralization, if not the liquidation, of Turkish power. The countries of Western and Central Europe, on the other hand, were concerned with blocking Russia's ambitions and were therefore interested in bolstering up the decaying Turkish Empire. The West, and par-

ticularly Britain, had fairly close cultural connections with th Arabs, especially with Egypt, which for practical purposes can b regarded as an Arab country. Britain and France were to some ex tent aware of nationalist stirrings among the Arabs. Russia's cultura connections with the Arabs were confined to the Levant and sh never seems to have thought of trying to disrupt Turkey by en couraging Arab nationalism. There were some remarkable Russiai Arabists such as Krachkovskiy, but there was in Russia an almos complete absence of expertise on Arab affairs and no counterpart o the British Levant Consular Service. The Arabs for their part wer very conscious of British and French power but almost completel unaware of Russia's existence

Up to the Revolution, Russia was prevented from realizing he ambitions in the Middle East, partly by her own political an economic backwardness and partly by the concerted opposition o the Western Powers. At the beginning of the first World War, sh seemed to be very near gaining at least one of her objectives Istanbul and the Straits were promised to her by the Sykes–Pico Agreement of May 1916. But this of course came to nothing. Wit the Revolution, the break-up of the Turkish Empire, and the rise o Arab nationalism, Russia's interest in the Arab world increase rather than subsided But until her entry into the second Worl War, the Soviet Union's attempts to establish her influence in th Middle East were no more successful than those of Tsarist Russia This was partly due to Western opposition and military occupation partly to the rise of Middle East nationalism, and partly to Sovie ineptitude and miscalculation. The extent of the Soviet Union' continued interest in the Middle East can be gauged by the fact tha in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Agreement of 1940, the area to th south of Batum and Baku, in the general direction of the Persiar Gulf, was recognized by both parties as the centre of the territoria ambitions of the Soviet Union. In 1941, Russian influence on and ir Turkey and Persia was less than it had been in 1914, and the Arab world hardly regarded the U.S.S.R. as a great Power. By 1945 however, as a result of her alliance with Britain, Soviet missions had been opened in Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad, and the Soviet Union had obtained a firm foothold in the Arab world.

Up to 1947, the means by which the Soviet Government tried to further its policies in the Middle East were subversion and revolution. Although Soviet writers claim in retrospect that Soviet moral support and the spread of Communist ideology were largely

responsible for the rapid rise of Arab nationalism, this is not at all in accordance with the facts. Small Communist Parties had, it is true, been formed in some of the Arab countries, notably in Syria, but these had had little effect on Arab nationalist movements which had everywhere advanced with their own impetus. Indeed, a careful examination of Soviet writing shows that before 1955 neither the Soviet Government nor the Communist Party made any formal or outright statement in support of Arab nationalist aims. Pan-Arabism and Arab unity were, on the contrary, officially described as ideologies of the national bourgeois intelligentsia which had first been exploited by Britain against Turkey in the first World War. Later, just before the second World War, plans for an Arab Federation and for Greater Syria were described by the Russians as mere devices for promoting British interests. The article on Arab culture in the second edition of *The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (1950) lays little or no emphasis on its unity and it is in general written in a disparaging tone.

Students of Soviet foreign policy are aware of a constant conflict between ideology and realism and that often, and more particularly recently, realism wins the day. Soviet policy towards the Arab world is an interesting example of this In both Tsarist and Soviet Middle East policies, the neutralization, if not the liquidation, of Turkey and Persia has always been a cardinal point. After the second World War, between 1945 and 1947, Russia concentrated pressure on both these countries, but both, partly owing to Western support, were able to resist her. The turning-point was probably the failure of the Azerbaydzhan separatist movement in 1946.[1] Soviet instigation of this movement was without doubt a very serious miscalculation. As a result, the Soviet Government, if not Stalin himself, evidently realized that, at any rate for the time being, Persia and Turkey presented a front which could not be broken by any means short of war and that they would have to be by-passed It was this realization which led the Soviet Government to change its attitude to the Arab countries on the one hand, and to Afghanistan and India on the other.

The new policy began to take shape after Stalin's death in 1953, perhaps even before, but it did not become manifest until 1955, when the broad outlines of Soviet policy towards the 'uncommitted' countries of Africa and Asia emerged. The year 1955 saw the foundation of the Baghdad Pact, with what appeared to most of

[1] See 'The Azerbaijan Problem', *The World Today*, February 1946.

the Arab States as strong militarist implications; of the Bandu
Conference, with its affirmation of the five principles of peacei
co-existence; and of great advances by Nasser's Pan-Arab nation
ist ideology, with its increasingly anti-Western impetus. The nece
sary correlation of Soviet policy and ideology was outlined at t
Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956.

Perhaps a word should be said here about the broad aims
Soviet policy in the Middle East. There has not been general agre
ment on this matter in the West. In the Eisenhower Doctrine a
nounced in 1958, the Soviet objective in the Middle East was d
scribed as the establishment there of international Communism,
if this were an end in itself. Such a view presupposes that Sov
policy is nowadays informed more by the ideology of Communis
than by what the Soviet Union considers to be her national intere
This is a debatable matter, but it is perhaps important to rememb
that although many things have changed in Russia since the Revol
tion, there remain certain immutable factors, such as geograph
climate, and national character. For reasons of national securit
national prestige, and national economy, Russia has for the past 1
years wished to supplant the West as the political, economic, a
cultural mentor of the Middle East countries, as well as of oth
Asian countries lying on her borders. The present Russian Gover
ment is always prepared to use Communism as a means towar
achieving this end when and where it seems appropriate. At tl
same time, in order to preserve the monolithic position of the Cor
munist Party inside the U.S.S R., it must always seek an ideologi
justification for its foreign policies. These two factors have result
in a disproportionate importance being attached to Communism
the deciding factor in the formulation of Soviet policy, whether
Asia or elsewhere.

After 1955, the tone of writing by Soviet authorities on Ar
affairs displayed a marked change. Already at the end of 1955 th
were speaking of the 'growth of national consciousness' in Ar
countries and of the solidarity shown by them in each other's cause
and they were expressing for the first time recognition of the fa
that the leadership of the so-called national liberation movements
the Arab countries was in the hands of the national bourgeois
They continued to emphasize, however, that the ultimate leader
these movements was the proletariat, 'the sole revolutionary cla
consistent to the end'. The high-watermark of Soviet enthusias
for Arab nationalism and Arab unity was reached in 1957 by V.

Lutskiy, the author of the disparaging article on Arab culture in the *Soviet Encyclopaedia* mentioned earlier. He now declared that 'the Arab peoples have community of language and culture, community of historic destinies and of territory', and that 'they are also united by community of political interest which, while not constituting the definition of a nation, immeasurably strengthens national links.'[1] He added that Arab unity had now been translated into living reality and that the Soviet people with all their heart wished for the Arabs the strengthening of that unity.

It is at least permissible to suppose that Russia's ultimate aim is still what it was over a century ago—the establishment of Russian, or rather, Soviet, political, economic, and cultural influence in the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Most people will probably agree that this aim has been in the minds of Soviet leaders ever since the Revolution, but that they have often changed their views on the means by which it could best be attained. The means at present advocated by the Soviet Government amount to the abandonment of earlier methods of subversion and violent revolution in favour of moral and material support for all elements, including the bourgeoisie, propertied classes, and clergy, in what is called 'movements for national liberation' directed against the West. These methods, although superficially less alarming, are likely to prove more dangerous in the long run. Moreover, while in the eyes of the Middle East they seem to contrast favourably with the military preparations of which the West is constantly accused, it is often forgotten that the Soviet Union has no need of military pacts with Middle East countries. The present technique of peaceful penetration could almost overnight be exchanged for direct action.

The years 1956 and 1957 were in many ways profitable ones for Soviet policy The failure of the Suez venture was widely considered by the Arabs to be the result of Soviet intervention, and the Soviet Union began to appear as the undoubted defender of Middle East rights. Western propaganda about the Soviet arms build-up in Egypt and Syria and about the possible dispatch of Soviet volunteers merely reinforced Arab convictions about Soviet readiness to fight their battles for them if the need should arise, not only against the West but against Israel. During 1957 and the first half of 1958 the opinion was widespread that, except for Iraq and Jordan, the Arab countries were lost to the West and that Soviet influence would now spread apace. The creation of the United Arab Republic,

[1] *Sovetskaya Etnografiya* No. 1, 1957.

the disturbances in Lebanon, and finally even the *coup d'état* in Ira
were all thought of as victories for Communism. In fact, howeve
the Soviet Government was very soon to be assailed by misgivin
on the subject of Arab nationalism.

The ideological limitations of the *rapprochement* between th
Soviet Union and the Arab countries began to appear more sharp
after the establishment of the United Arab Republic in Februa
1958. Soviet welcome for the new republic was not unqualified. I
creation was greeted as an anti-imperialist move, but it was point
out that the Arab unity movement could be used for purposes co
trary to the interests of the people. Nasser's campaign against Com
munism and his attitude towards Iraq after the *coup d'état* we
decisive in modifying the Soviet attitude to Arab nationalis
Soviet dissatisfaction with the U.A.R. does not mean, however, th
the Soviet Government regards the situation in Iraq with equan
mity. So far from being a source of comfort to the Soviet Union, th
activities of the Iraq Communist Party, or rather Parties, have bee
a cause of acute embarrassment It would be different if the Ira
frontier touched directly on the U.S.S.R.; but as it does not, th
establishment of a Communist Government in a country situated
Iraq is situated might well precipitate a war in the Middle East, a
event which the Soviet Government is at present most anxious
avoid

It is probably true to say that the West has gravely underest
mated the importance of Middle Eastern, and particularly Ara
nationalism But it is probably equally true to say that the Russia
in the beginning of their latest Middle East drive gravely ove
estimated the extent to which they could exploit this nationalism
their own interests in the same way as they have done with the Mu
lim peoples of Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

After the Twentieth Party Congress of 1956 there was a cle
tendency to lay more emphasis on nationalist movements support
by all classes and less on the role played by local Communi
Parties. But as disillusionment with Arab nationalism grew, an
particularly after the repressive measures taken against the Com
munist Party in the U.A.R. in 1958, the importance of local Com
munist Parties as the firmest and most consistent champions
national unity and the people's cause had to be reaffirmed and th
was done in forthright terms at the Twenty-first Party Congress
January and February 1959.

As an indication of how far the Soviet Union had moved aw

from the idea of Pan-Arab unity it may be interesting to quote from a speech delivered by Khrushchev in March 1959:[1]

> It is said that Arab nationalism supposedly stands outside the interests of separate Arab States, and outside the interests of different classes of the population of the Arab countries. Undoubtedly, the interests of the majority of Arabs are indivisible in the struggle against the colonial yoke. But after a country has freed itself from foreign domination the interests of the people cannot be ignored. For the interests of all the Arabs cannot coincide. Therefore attempts under the flag of nationalism to ignore the interests of separate classes of the population and the interests of the working people are futile.

With this speech an episode in the history of Soviet-Arab relations may be said to have come to an end. The Soviet Government seems to have given up, at any rate for the present, the idea of dealing with the Arabs as a whole. It is, however, evidently intent on entering into closer relations with the individual States of the Arab world

In dealing with the United Arab Republic, despite the anti-Communist line taken up and maintained by the U.A.R. Government, the Soviet Union has gone ahead with her plans for economic and technical aid. At the beginning of 1960 *Izvestiya*'s Cairo correspondent said that the Soviet Union could 'leave the settlement of ideological controversies to history',[2] and since then there has been no direct comment in the Soviet press about anti-Communist measures in the U.A.R. At the same time, Soviet writers strongly criticize the notion often expressed in Arab nationalist circles that the Arabs, having defeated Western imperialism, have no need to veer towards the East ideologically and that Arabs naturally are and must remain anti-Communist. The Soviet press has quite recently also expressed indignation at certain unfavourable reflections, both on Soviet Communism as a system and on the motives of Soviet aid to the U.A.R., which have appeared in the U.A.R. press; but it maintains that these are not representative of U.A.R. opinion or of Nasser's own attitude.

The idea gaining ground among the Arabs, and one which is not entirely unacceptable to the West, namely that they should derive the maximum material benefit from both East and West without allowing themselves to submit to or acknowledge the mentorship of either, is one which the Soviet Union finds thoroughly objectionable. The earlier attitude towards Nasser's Revolution was one of almost unqualified flattery and approval; but there has lately been a

[1] *Izvestiya*, 17 March 1959 [2] 8 January 1960

tendency in Soviet writing to question the reality and efficacy (Egyptian so-called democratic reforms. There has, however, bee no criticism of the development of State capitalism in the U.A.R. I the Arab countries, as elsewhere in Asia and Africa, this is regarde as 'progressive' in the sense that it weakens the position of foreig capital. The established Communist doctrine that State capitalisı is a stage on the road to 'socialist transformation' of the economy never specifically mentioned.

The embarrassment caused to the Soviet Government by the ex cessive activity of the Communist Party of Iraq has already bee mentioned. Here too the Soviet attitude has in general been one (non-interference. But criticism of the Iraq Government's ant Communist measures has been stronger and has lasted longer tha in the case of the U.A.R. Nevertheless, Soviet writing continues t represent the Soviet Union's relations with Iraq as close an friendly and the policy of technical and economic aid is proceedin unabated. On the subject of oil, the Soviet Government was at fir inclined to commend the Iraq Government's policy towards foreig oil companies. Quite recently, at the beginning of this year in fac there has been a significant change in this attitude. In a long articl called 'The Oil Policy of the Iraqi Republic' in the importar periodical *Problemy Vostokovedeniya*[1] the author strongly crit cized the Iraq Government for its lack of resolution and consistenc in defending the people's interests against the exploitation of th foreign oil companies. Since the article quotes extensively from th views expressed by the Communist newspaper *Itthad ash-Sha'b* writing on the subject, it is clear that the article is a new and ovei expression of Soviet support for Communist pressure on the Ira Government. It is not yet clear whether this support springs from new Soviet estimate of the strength of the Communist movement i Iraq, or from the ever-present need to assure the Soviet people (the power and prestige of Communist Parties everywhere. It woul seem that so long as Persia remains relatively stable and in th Western camp, the Soviet Union will not attempt any direct intei ference or subversion in Iraq. The fact remains, however, that th article does introduce a new note of critical appraisal.

As was mentioned earlier, the Levant is the only part of the Ara world with which Russia has any traditional cultural connectioı This fact was perhaps an additional, underlying—although neve expressed—reason for her dislike of Syria's union with Egypt. Sinc

[1] No. 1, 1961.

the Revolution she had devoted more attention to Syria than to any other Arab country and it is significant that Syria was the first country dealt with in a series of manuals on Middle East countries which the Soviet Union started to publish in 1958. She is now debarred from dealing with Syria as a separate country. Her interest in Lebanon, however, remains close, if cautious. Soviet writers in general limit themselves to advocating progressive dissociation of the Lebanon from Western influence. They sharply criticize what they call 'the Arab nationalist extremists' who are agitating for the inclusion of the Lebanon in the U A.R. 'without taking into account its national peculiarities and democratic traditions'. Lebanese abstention from the anti-Communist attitude of the U.A.R. has been noted with approval.

The only other Arab country with which the Soviet Union has any close relations is the Yemen Here Soviet technical aid has been on a considerable scale, particularly in rebuilding the Port of Hudaydah Although Soviet writers continually emphasize Soviet friendship with the Yemen, they also criticize her backward 'feudal' condition. They have, however, refrained from reporting the growth of workers' movements, in contrast to their treatment of other Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia.

With Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf States the U.S.S.R. has no diplomatic or economic relations But Soviet specialists on Arab affairs pay a good deal of attention to them and from their writings it is easy to discern the official attitude. For instance, in 1957, the Soviet Government approved Jordan's *rapprochement* with Egypt, followed as it was by the Nabulsi Government's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R But for British intervention, it was suggested at the beginning of 1958, a union with the U.A.R. might have come about. But, since Nasser's anti-Communist campaign at the end of 1958, Soviet writers have stopped thinking of the 'anti-imperialist struggle' in Jordan in terms of the Arab unity movement. Opposition to the present regime in Jordan, however, continues to receive Soviet support.

The Soviet attitude towards Saudi Arabia is in general sympathetic. The absence of Saudi-Soviet diplomatic relations is deplored and the country is regarded rather as a victim of American imperialism than as a willing collaborator with it. The operations of the Aramco Oil Company are an object of constant Soviet attack.

As to the Arab States of North Africa and the Sudan, the Soviet

tendency, is to regard these countries as African rather than Arab, particularly since the waning of Soviet enthusiasm for Arab unity

One might sum up the present Soviet attitude towards the Arab world in one word as realistic. While the Soviet Government must continue to deplore any display of anti-Communism and continued association with the West on the part of the Arab countries, its attitude is not irrevocably affected by these considerations; it is rather the attitude of the Arab countries towards the Soviet Union which is the deciding factor. Zhukov, one of the leading Soviet writers on foreign affairs, recently wrote an important article in *Pravda*[1] about the foundations of Soviet solidarity with the 'bourgeois' States of Asia and Africa. He said that to sneer at the 'bourgeois nationalism' of such States would amount to 'sectarianism of a most dangerous kind leading to self-isolation'. The use of this word 'self-isolation' may well express a genuine Soviet fear that, by putting ideological aims first rather than second, the Soviet Union could jeopardize the friendly contacts with Arab countries which she has been so successful in establishing during the past ten years

GEOFFREY WHEELER

Postscript THE RECENT SOVIET–U.A R. DISPUTE

During May and June of this year a dispute of proportions unprecedented in Soviet–U A R relations arose between Moscow and Cairo, each side accusing the other's propaganda machine of deliberately seeking to poison relations However, while being conducted at the highest propaganda level, the dispute appears to have had no visible effect on inter-State relations.

On 20 May *Trud*, quoting the Lebanese paper *An-Nida*, reported the death of Riyad at-Turk, a member of the Syrian Communist Party, in prison in Damascus, 'as a result of savage torture'. The report was broadcast by Moscow radio On 22 May, according to Cairo radio, the U.A.R Deputy Foreign Minister drew the attention of the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo to the 'false report' about Riyad at-Turk published in 'biased newspapers'; Riyad at-Turk was alive and in good health; 'it is better for Moscow radio to scrutinize the reports it receives from a biased press'.

On 31 May *Pravda* published a long and indignant article taking issue with U.A.R. journalists who had criticized Soviet Communism and had cast aspersions on Soviet aid to the U.A.R. On the latter subject, it complained that Fikri Abazah in *Al-Musawwar* had

[1] 26 August 1960.

published an open letter to Mr Khrushchev asserting that the U.A.R. had had a high political price to pay for its loans from the Soviet Union, and that the U.S.S.R. hoped that such assistance would 'automatically lead to Communism'. To this *Pravda* replied that Communist Parties in all countries were independent agents and were 'the creation of the peoples themselves'. On the subject of Soviet Communism, *Pravda* said that Kamal Hamdi Abu Khayr in *Al-Ahram* had attacked the Soviet order as depriving the individual of the right to property. *Pravda* replied that in the Soviet Union the means of production belonged to the people, who governed the State through their elected representatives; Soviet socialism was genuine democracy

> The 'socialism' of Abu Khayr—as he puts it, 'our socialist society'—is as far from socialism as the sky is from the earth. The order which he champions and which he calls 'socialism' is like as two peas to capitalism which is doomed by history—a society in which exploiters rule and people make speeches about democracy, while for their political beliefs progressive people languish in torture-chambers. Such 'socialism' is acceptable to any capitalist or monopolist.

On 4 June Cairo finally replied to what it called 'the organized campaign directed against the U.A.R. by official Soviet propaganda machines'. It is only possible to select a few of the points brought up by the Cairo and Damascus press and radio in the course of a massive attack which was comparable in scale to earlier campaigns of which the Western Powers were the target It was asserted that the Soviet campaign against the U.A.R. had never ceased since the U.A.R. was set up and the Syrian Communist Party was banned; that the U.A.R. had hitherto kept silent, hoping that better counsels would prevail, but 'this concentrated attack . . . has become attempted aggression based on foreign forces'; that Soviet 'dreams of world domination by Communism' could not be realized against the opposition of the peoples, and that Soviet propaganda had interpreted the U.A.R.'s policy of non-alignment in an 'opportunist' manner, trying to turn it to its own ends The coincidence of the Soviet campaign with the Cairo preparatory conference of non-aligned States did not escape notice, Cairo radio said that the Communists were 'incensed' at the arrangements for the full conference (which is to be held in Yugoslavia). It also asserted that the matter was not one of 'theoretical differences with Communist concepts'; it expressed sympathy with Yugoslavia in 'the bitter attack to which the Yugoslav Communist Party was subjected', the plain fact was

that 'there are people in Moscow determined to use beliefs as a means for political domination'.

During the first half of June Moscow made no direct reply to the U.A.R. attacks. However, *Pravda* in its issue of 31 May had published a report that the Secretary-General of the Lebanese Communist Party, Farajallah al-Hilu, had died in a Syrian prison as a result of torture; and for the next ten days Soviet newspapers published reports of Soviet and other protests at al-Hilu's death. (According to Cairo statements, no such person as al-Hilu was imprisoned in the U.A.R., and the story of his death was put out in order to distract attention from the failure of the fabrication about the death of Riyad at-Turk On 13 June *Trud* finally retracted, with a bad grace, the report of at-Turk's death.)

On 17 June *Pravda* published a reply to the U.A.R. campaign, in which it complained that the sense of its original article had been 'distorted'. It denounced some of the more extreme Cairo attacks on Soviet policy, and defended the Soviet Union's right to speak up on behalf of imprisoned 'patriots' and Communists anywhere in the world. In conclusion it declared that the Soviet Union valued Soviet–Arab friendship and strove to strengthen it, 'one must suppose that the United Arab Republic also is striving for this.'

Whether or not this episode is now concluded, it must have provided salutary lessons for the leaders of both the Soviet Union and the U.A.R. It must now be apparent to Moscow that the whole complexion of one large aspect of Soviet policy is viewed with repugnance in the U.A.R. To Cairo observers it must be clearer than ever that Moscow only supports neutral groupings which serve its own purposes. Now that the dispute has been fought out at the propaganda level, it remains for the U.A.R. and its 'non-aligned' colleagues to take up their positions at a 'summit' meeting which—to judge by Moscow's silence on the matter—is not at all to Soviet liking.

D. L. M.

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Notes of the Month

The Berlin Crisis

THE publication on 19 June of the three Western Powers' Notes to Moscow makes clear the alarming gulf between West and East in the critical dispute over Berlin. The British put the Western case in somewhat more conciliatory terms than the Americans, but basically the Notes were similar. All underlined the danger to peace if the Soviet Union went ahead with her threat to change the status of Berlin unilaterally. Some practical idea of the danger had previously come from America, particularly by revelations of military plans to meet any obstruction to free access to Berlin; and, from Moscow, by Mr Khrushchev's announcement that he was keeping men in the forces who would otherwise have been demobilized. But in Britain, the grave issues have not been grasped by the public.

Basically, both East and West are contesting for the future of all Germany, and not only of Berlin. In his Memorandum of 4 June, Mr Khrushchev founded his call for an immediate peace treaty on the alleged danger created by the West German 'militarists' who claimed a revision of the frontiers. This, he said, was 'the question of the Soviet Union's national security'. It may be that the Soviet leader really fears that the Federal German Republic will be in effective control of nuclear arms in a few years' time, and thinks it essential to commit the Western Powers to the Oder–Neisse line and German demilitarization in the meantime—as well as to strengthen his East German satellite. These plans may have been increased by German support for the proposal that N.A.T.O. should become a fourth nuclear Power, and, on the other hand, by the economic difficulties caused in East Germany by the flood of refugees to the West. Over 2,600,000 of these have fled since 1949, and it is estimated some 21,000 left in the first three weeks of July 1961.

Mr Khrushchev declared that a peace treaty would 'normalize' West Berlin's status. According to him, West Berlin is a dangerous centre of tension. (In fact, aggressive propaganda and actions are more a feature of the East German regime, with its headquarters in

East Berlin.) The Western part of the city should become a 'de militarized free city'. He did not deny that the Western Powers have occupation rights, but declared that they were outdated and would be automatically nullified by the treaty which would be concluded with one German State or 'both'. Mr Khrushchev affirmed that West Berlin would maintain its connections with the outside world unhindered, and that its internal order would be decided by 'the freely expressed will of its population'. It would, however, have to be 'strictly neutral'. It could not be 'the base for provocative, hostile activity against the U.S.S.R., the D.D.R., or any other State'. Non-interference, he maintained in the same breath, would be guaranteed, and symbolic contingents of Western forces could stay in West Berlin, as well as neutral troops under the auspices of the United Nations. Other measures could be discussed, but the sovereignty of the D.D.R. would have to be strictly observed.

Mr Khrushchev's ultimatum consisted in a demand that within six months the 'two German States' should work out a peace treaty and, if they failed, measures would be taken to conclude a treaty with 'both States or one'. The Soviet Union was ready to negotiate on 'all constructive proposals' and indicated that a solution of the German question would open good prospects for agreement on disarmament. As a parting shot, he said that after a treaty all means of communication with West Berlin would have to be settled with the D.D.R.

Herr Ulbricht has on several recent occasions spelt out Mr Khrushchev's indications that a 'free city' would have its freedom severely limited in the name of 'neutrality'. He has declared that other countries would have to ask the consent of a sovereign D.D.R. for entering or flying over its territory to West Berlin. For years, he said, 'at least 95 per cent of West Berlin's communications have been controlled by the D.D.R.' and 'the world will get used to control of the remaining 5 per cent'. He has hinted that West Berlin's airports would be closed, and Western machines would have to use East German airports. This would, of course, enable the Communists to prevent refugees from being flown out. The American radio station, RIAS, which is run by Germans, would have to shut down, as well as all 'centres of espionage and subversion'. There would be no freedom of movement for 'militarists and revanchists'—which would doubtless include Bonn politicians and all active anti-Communists. Hints have also come from East Berlin that the Western city would be forced to abandon its present currency, which is on

a par with the Federal *Deutschemark*, and adopt the less valuable Eastern mark. In short, it is clear that West Berlin would be cut off from its links with the West.

In the British Note, Mr Khrushchev (and world opinion) have received a reminder that the Soviet Government is responsible for refusing to entertain various peace treaty proposals from the West. The Note also rejected the Soviet thesis that lack of a treaty, or the present Berlin situation, was in itself a threat to peace. The West Berliners, it said, were not trying to bring about a change unilaterally and they were not threatening the interests of the other parties concerned. Mr Khrushchev was reminded that the Bonn Government had undertaken never to have recourse to force to bring about reunification or a modification of the 'existing boundaries'. As to nuclear arms, the West repeated that Federal Germany had pledged herself not to manufacture the so-called ABC weapons and had submitted to control of this undertaking 'The Federal Republic does not aspire to a nuclear force of its own nor is it trying to secure national control over nuclear warheads', London reminded Moscow.

The Soviet treaty proposals would in themselves create permanent tension if they were adopted, the British Note pointed out. And a 'most serious situation' would indeed arise if the Soviet Union carried out her threat of settling the Berlin problem unilaterally. Berlin's status could only be altered by agreement between the Four Powers; the Protocol of 12 September 1944, approved by the Soviet Government on 6 February 1945, was still in force, which provided for a special system of occupation for Berlin. (The Western Notes speak of 'Berlin' and Mr Khrushchev only of 'West Berlin'. The Eastern sector he considers to be already established as part of the D.D.R.)

Two hints of readiness to negotiate came from the British Note. It recalled that the Western Allies were always willing to 'seek to improve the present situation in Germany', and that the British Government was always prepared to 'consider in agreement with their allies a freely negotiated settlement of the unresolved problems of Germany; such a settlement must be in conformity with the principle of self-determination and in the interests of all concerned'. Washington's Note also gave an indication that the proposals for an interim five-year solution to the Berlin problem, which were nearly agreed at the Four-Power Conference in Geneva in 1959, were still valid. The Western Powers are now engaged on trying to co-ordinate their further policies, including plans to meet

military contingencies that may arise if Mr Khrushchev carries out his threats.

Arab Reactions to Kuwait

It is not easy to conceive of any development more embarrassing to the Arab world than the Iraqi threat to Kuwait raised on 25 June by Abdel Karim Qasim—except, indeed, the subsequent arrival of British troops in Kuwait at the Ruler's request. It is of interest to look at the way in which some Arab States reacted. The Iraqi threat itself need not have come as any great surprise, as Qasim's message to the Ruler of Kuwait on 20 June, the day after the Sheikhdom's independence, was sufficiently odd to suggest the possibility of trouble to come. 'I have learnt with pleasure,' he said, 'that on 19 June 1961 the English acknowledged the cancellation of the forged and illegal document, which was not recognized internationally and which they called the 1899 agreement, after having falsely concluded it with Sheikh Mubarak as Subah, Qaymaqam of Kuwait, who was under the Governor of Basrah Province, without the knowledge . . . of the then lawful authorities in Iraq. . .' Here, of course, were the seeds of the ideas expressed at the press conference five days later. In the days and weeks as the crisis developed the only press comment in the Arab world that Baghdad Radio could quote as positive approval of Qasim's policy came from certain sections of the Lebanese press. For instance, the respected and politically independent *An Nahar*, under Greek Orthodox direction, sympathized with Qasim. Not that this was a distinctively Greek Orthodox attitude. *Al Anwar*, edited by members of the same sect, was strongly critical of Qasim's behaviour. But the Lebanese press, to which one automatically looks for an indication of the likely currents of opinion in the Arab world, was sufficiently divided to show that the formulation of policy would not be easy elsewhere. Inside the Lebanese Government, there were signs that Foreign Minister Philippe Taqla was a less ardent supporter of Kuwait's independence than Prime Minister Saeb Salaam.

The Jordanian attitude throughout was markedly cautious and reserved, perhaps because of a reluctance to abandon the dream of the Fertile Crescent, of which Kuwait should be a part, and perhaps also because of a fear that military attention would be diverted from Palestine. On the day after Qasim's press conference, in reply to a cable from the Ruler of Kuwait, King Hussein wrote in vague terms that 'we confirm to Your Highness that Jordan was and will always

remain the supporter of right and justice and will continue its endeavours for the welfare of its sisters and brothers and the welfare of the entire Arab nation.' The Jordanian press was not encouraged to take a line or to make any noteworthy comment. A remark made by the Jordanian Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo at quite a late stage in the crisis was that it should be solved within the Arab family, but without indicating whether the solution should be broadly along the lines called for by the Ruler of Kuwait or on those demanded by Abdel Karim Qasim.

Another Arab country which hesitated for a long time to take sides was Morocco. Morocco's problem, evidently, lay in the fact that her claim to Mauritania is based on very similar arguments to the Iraqi claim to Kuwait. And this was promptly pointed out with some relish by the Tunis newspaper *Al Amal*, which wanted to know why Arab States were for the most part recognizing Kuwait's independence, whereas Tunisia had been the only Arab State to recognize the independence of Mauritania. And it was undeniably paradoxical that when the Arab League Political Committee came to meet on 12 and 13 July, it should have been a Moroccan resolution that embodied Kuwait's wishes. The Tunisian delegate became the object of a good many malicious attacks by Cairo press and radio for asking for a week's postponement of the vote so that Governments could be consulted. Cairo spoke of this Tunisian move almost as though it were a deliberate manœuvre by President Bourguiba to keep British troops on Kuwait's soil for an extra week.

Tunisia's attitude was, in fact, clear at an early stage. So was that of Libya and the Sudan—namely that Qasim was wrong to make the claim and that Kuwait was right to resist it. But, of course, Kuwait's speediest and firmest support in the Arab world came from Saudi Arabia.

It is easy to see that the situation must have given the Yemen Government something to think about, in relation to Yemen's ambitions in Aden Colony and Protectorate. But Yemeni pronouncements generally followed the U.A.R. line, with differences of emphasis attributable to Yemen's special circumstances and ambitions. For the U.A.R., the Iraq–Kuwait dispute created a situation which called for the greatest finesse in diplomacy and propaganda. The necessary subtlety was not lacking. Forty-eight hours after Abdel Karim Qasim's announcement of his claim to Kuwait, the U.A.R. Minister of State who is in charge of propaganda and publicity affairs, Colonel Abdel Kader Hatem, issued a statement setting out

President Jamal Abdel Nasser's thinking on the subject. This was, briefly, that the U.A.R. did not accept the concept of annexation, but supported every trend towards unity, whether partial or comprehensive. The U.A.R. believed that there were factors of unity between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti peoples profounder and stronger than the documents of the Ottoman Empire. The U.A.R. did not expect to see the day when one Arab soldier would face another Arab soldier. But on the evening before the British landing in Kuwait a second statement from Colonel Abdel Kader Hatem said there were indications that Iraqi forces had been ordered to move towards the Kuwaiti border. At the same time, the U.A.R. was following the movements of the British fleet, 'regretfully and with a deep feeling of disapproval'. A third statement from Colonel Abdel Kader Hatem came on 3 July, expressing alarm at the large-scale military operations being carried out by the British. These, if not entirely premeditated, were being carried out on the smallest pretext. The Iraq Government had abandoned the concept of annexation by force, and so the U.A.R.'s delegation at United Nations would be instructed to demand the immediate evacuation of the British troops. These three statements contained the themes on which press and radio commentators played skilful variations through a great part of the crisis. But a more realistic note gradually became audible as it became more and more apparent that Abdel Karim Qasim was not ready to reassure the Ruler of Kuwait, and after the arrival in Cairo of the Kuwaiti Mission led by Sheikh Jabir al Ahmed. It is clear that the Kuwait delegation stated its case very effectively (as did Kuwait Radio throughout the crisis) and had good support from the Saudi Ambassador in Cairo. The emphasis was more and more on the fact that entire responsibility for the crisis lay on the shoulders of Colonel Abdel Karim Qasim and that it was an Arab duty to find a solution. And by the second, decisive meeting of the Arab League's Political Committee the Kuwaiti case had, in fact, been accepted unreservedly.

Problems and Prospects in the Central African Federation

This article is based on a talk given at Chatham House. It has been rewritten and brought up to date to 12 July 1961.

SINCE the Report of the Monckton Commission[1] there have been three sets of talks, on the Federal Constitution, on the Southern Rhodesian Constitution, and on the Northern Rhodesian Constitution. They have been conducted against a background of intense feeling which takes one back to the bitterness about Mr Lloyd George's Budgets in the years before 1914. Today in Rhodesia, as then in Britain, interests are threatened and a new set of values is envisaged. And there is little progress towards agreement, because the assumptions of the two main parties are contradictory. On the white side, it is argued that voting is a special skill, a contention that recalls the Reform Bill of 1832 and the novels of Peacock. On the African side, it is assumed that after a revolutionary change of power the whole complicated network of business and administration will go on as before—the whole social contract, the social bluff, the discipline which sends people to work in the morning, brings food to the market, works the post and the telephones and the trains. But this is not very likely unless the goodwill or at least acquiescence of the people who control these things has been secured.

Let us glance back to the Monckton Report; its basic analysis of the situation, crudely over-simplified, ran like this.

There *are* advantages in Federation.

But there is bitter and widespread opposition to it.

It cannot succeed unless it wins African confidence.

To win African confidence a reshuffle and a new deal are necessary.

In the light of that Report the task of a British Government must surely be to convince Africans that there *are* advantages in Federation, Europeans that they *have* to win African confidence. The Europeans need to be convinced that real changes have to take place, the Africans that those changes really are going to take place. To put it in a third way, we have to hold the Federation together until Africans suddenly perceive that it is going to be *their* Federation and that it is better not to be Balkanized. This double task of persuasion must be looked at against the background of one of Britain's world

[1] Cmnd 1148 See also 'Some Reflections on the Monckton Report', in *The World Today*, December 1960

objects in this phase of her history—the need to replace the old leadership based on wealth and strength by a new leadership based on influence and example, of which the symbol is her position as senior partner in a Commonwealth of many races. If Britain fails in Rhodesia, she loses the friendship of the new African States as surely as she has lost the friendship of the Arabs.

She has to convince both the Europeans and the Africans, and the slightest deviation towards one side produces horrified reactions from the other. If Sir Roy Welensky comes out of Admiralty House with a smile on his face, Africans in London send telegrams to Salisbury and Lusaka that they are going to be 'betrayed'—a word freely used by both Africans and Europeans, in each case with the implication that Britain has a responsibility for 'us' but none for the other party. This double task of persuasion has been the key to British policy ever since the Report, and it is complicated by the time factor. It is no use 'buying time' unless time is on your side—and in Rhodesia the time factor for one task of persuasion works in the opposite way for the other. Looking only at the Europeans, delay before a decision generally means that it is likely to be a better decision; they are on the whole getting more realistic. But looking at the Africans, delay is dangerous, because as events move faster and faster in other parts of the world, they get more and more impatient; pressure from below grows stronger; they become more and more likely to make a bad, that is, a violent and disruptive, decision.

Many people fail to perceive the need for speed on the African side because there is a stage in the colonial process when the task is one of education, which takes time; but a later stage comes when there is no longer time for education and the important thing is to hand over power to an organized and responsible body.

At the talks about the revision of the Federal Constitution most of the preliminary heat was about timing. The Africanist leaders were in a hurry to get advances in the two Northern territories before the revision of the Federal Constitution; and for the United Federal Party it was an object to settle the Federal Constitution before too much advance had taken place in the North.

The federal talks were held from 5 to 17 December 1960, in accordance with the agreement reached between Sir Roy Welensky and Mr Lennox-Boyd. But this brought a danger of losing the African nationalists, which was countered by starting preliminary talks about Northern Rhodesia at the beginning of November. If this had not been done there seems every likelihood that the situa-

tion in Northern Rhodesia would have become serious. We have always to remember two dangers. There is the danger, if we go too fast, of producing chaos because the people who help to keep the whole machinery of the State running are not there, or are not co-operating, when the transfer of power takes place. But there is the equally serious danger of chaos if we go too slowly, because the majority of the population may become so impatient that they resort to State-wide non-co-operation and violence.

By Christmas all the different shades of opinion had expressed their views and had a hearing. That was a necessary first step. But it had become clear that the federal talks would not get far until something was settled about revision in both Southern Rhodesia and Northern. And it was settled that talks on these should take place soon, while federal talks were postponed. Thus on points the round had gone to the Africans.

Next came the Southern Rhodesian talks (16–17 December 1960 and 16 January–7 February 1961). To these the background was, on the one hand, a series of events which indicated a hardening of both African and European opinion, but also, on the other, various indications of movement in a liberal direction. There was the break-up of the Central Africa Party which put inter-racial co-operation in the forefront of its programme, and many signs that the kind of African who has a degree was becoming more and more hopeless about a peaceful solution, more and more desperate and impatient. There was trouble in Gatooma in September; on 8 October there were riots in Harare and seven Africans were killed. There was trouble at Gwelo soon afterwards. All this was met by drastic action for the maintenance of law and order, of a nature that in Britain would undoubtedly be called repressive.

But there is another side to the picture. There were immediate protests from the Church, the Press, the Bar, and the University. Sir Robert Tredgold, who has acted at least twice as Governor-General, resigned his post as Chief Justice. A Select Committee in Southern Rhodesia published a report on the Resettlement of Natives which was described in the *Rhodesia Herald* as meaning virtually the end of the Land Apportionment Act. There was the Public Services Amendment Bill, which seeks to end all racial differences in the Civil Services. There was the National Convention, at which a number of Africans, Europeans, and a few Asians were present, and which passed a number of liberal resolutions. Again, we have the Government of Southern Rhodesia bringing

pressure to bear on the Salisbury City Council to force them to let African labourers build African houses; this is the reverse of what happens in Johannesburg. But none of these events could produce results on opinion so swift or so dramatic as the move of troops into the townships.

Against this background of contradictory tendencies, the agreement reached in Southern Rhodesia was an achievement. The right-wing Dominion Party disassociated itself from all that happened, but the United Federal Party, the Liberals, and the Africans did at the time agree to certain recommendations to the United Kingdom Government. There should be, they said, a declaration of rights embodied in the Constitution. There should be a constitutional Council to enforce these rights, though against the Legislative Assembly it would have delaying power only. On the franchise it was impossible to obtain complete agreement—that was hardly to be expected—but something was produced as a compromise, a second-best. This was one of those complicated arrangements in which Rhodesians have lately become specialists.

There was to be an A roll with high qualifications and a B roll with low qualifications. There would be fifty A roll constituencies, which is the present number, plus fifteen new B roll constituencies. In the A roll constituencies, both kinds of electors would vote together, but the B roll votes would be limited in value to 25 per cent of the A roll votes. There would thus be enough African votes to influence the candidates but not enough to dominate the election In the fifteen B roll constituencies there would be the converse arrangement. Both A and B electors would vote together, but the A votes would if necessary be devalued, so that they could not count more than 25 per cent of the B votes. Thus there would be fifty seats in which the electorate would be predominantly European, but with the possibility of a sizeable African element of about one in five, and for fifteen seats a predominantly African electorate but a European element which again might rise to one in five. In return, the United Kingdom would forgo certain powers of withholding assent to legislation.

At the time, there was agreement not only of the United Federal Party but of the National Democratic Party. Mr Nkomo of the N.D.P., however, was under fire, as soon as he left the conference, from members of his own party who thought he had agreed too readily, and he has since then issued a number of disclaimers. It does not seem to be his lieutenants or rivals for power who want him

ɔ go back on what he agreed to, but the rank and file of the party. 'his is a point of general importance. Europeans in the Federation ften suggest that the African leaders keep themselves in position y intimidation alone. But in almost any movement there will be a :w enthusiasts, a larger number of the half-hearted, and a few 'hose agreement is slight. The small active element will try to get ıe half-hearted to commit themselves and will use whatever means :em most likely to be effective; the difference between persuasion nd intimidation is one of degree. Every Government rightly uses ›rce to maintain the social bluff, and a colonial Government gener-ly uses more pressure than a metropolitan Government. This has › be countered by any opposition party. It is perfectly proper for Government to take strong measures to deal with intimidation; it ıould also try to avoid using it itself. But it is not legitimate to ·gue, because intimidation is being used, that African leaders have ɔt got the backing of a large number of supporters.

Sir Edgar Whitehead from the start made it clear that he must :fer the agreement to a referendum. This referendum is to be held n 26 July, and the Dominion Party will vote against the proposals. ' Sir Edgar Whitehead is defeated, it seems inevitable that South-·n Rhodesia will become a satellite of the South African Republic, hile the Dominion Party has announced its intention of filling the ›untry with Greeks and Italians, a proposal which the Africans see ; a declaration of racial war.

It has been generally assumed that the referendum will be influ-ıced by events in Northern Rhodesia. The Northern Rhodesian ılks were opened in London before Christmas (19–20 December). 'hey did not last long; after a statement of views by all sides the ɔnference was adjourned for a month. But the Rhodesian Euro-eans must have left with a clear impression that the British Gov-·nment did mean to see that there was real constitutional advance ı the North. This no doubt was why the United Federal Party re-ısed to attend when the talks were resumed on 30 January in ondon, behaviour which, when indulged in by Africans, is usu-ly regarded as a sign of political immaturity. The talks came to a ·mporary close on 17 February and the Government proposals ere published on 21 February in a White Paper.[1]

These proposals were hardly ideal. The question was whether ıey made a useful second best. Let us first look at the existing orthern Rhodesian Constitution. In the now familiar Rhodesian

[1] Cmnd 1295.

pattern, there is an Upper Roll and a Lower Roll, devised so that the Upper Roll will be mainly European and the Lower Roll almost entirely African. There are twelve constituencies in which most of the voters are Europeans; these are in the Copper Belt and along the line of rail. There are six constituencies in the rural areas, where most of the voters are Africans. In the twelve mainly European constituencies people on both rolls vote, but the Lower Roll votes—the Africans—are limited so that they cannot count more than one-third of the total of the Upper Roll votes. In the six mainly African constituencies, again both rolls vote, but there is no limitation on the Upper Roll votes. This is an irritant to one party and a soothing syrup to the other but cannot make any difference in practice. There are also two seats for Europeans who will be voted for by the predominantly African constituencies and two seats for Africans who will be voted for by the predominantly European constituencies.

The 1961 proposals put forward in Cmnd. 1295 were that there should be about fifteen seats to which the members would be elected by Upper Roll voters, who in practice would mainly be Europeans, about fifteen elected by Lower Roll voters, who would in present circumstances be Africans; and about fifteen national members elected by the two rolls voting together. In the first place, it seems a pity that the Upper and Lower Fifteens should not be elected by the two rolls voting together, as in the old Constitution; it should have been possible to provide that in each case the votes of one roll would, as before, be devalued if they exceeded one-third.

The national seats, however, are the most controversial. The suggestion in the White Paper was that a successful candidate must get a certain minimum percentage of the votes from each of the two rolls; it was not laid down what this percentage should be. For any candidate who had fulfilled that qualification, the votes from either roll would be equalized. That is to say that if the candidate won 40 per cent of the upper votes and 60 per cent of the lower votes, he would score the average, which is 50 per cent.

This meant that a man who was unacceptable to either main group of parties would not get elected; and incidentally it was not made clear what would happen if all the candidates were unacceptable to one roll or the other and if no one got the minimum required percentage from both rolls. Apart from this, the method of taking the average of percentages does in effect give parity to the votes of the two rolls and does favour the party which makes concessions to the other side.

These proposals were open to criticism as being too complicated nd also too harsh in their operation. They were likely to return ıfteen representing the Upper Roll, who would not have had to pay nuch attention to the Lower Roll, and fifteen on the Lower Roll /ho would not have had to think much about the Upper Roll, with fteen in the middle who would be so moderate as almost to be ıeutral. But they were an attempt to produce parity in Northern Rhodesia, which was regarded as the middle term between a Southrn Rhodesia controlled by Europeans and a Nyasaland controlled ıy Africans. And criticism of course takes no account of what ecoıomists used to call the higgling of the market. It was necessary to ry to get as much support as possible and therefore to make conessions to the different parties in turn.

To be more concrete, it seemed that on the Upper Roll the only ıarties to have had a chance would be the Dominion Party and the Jnited Federal Party, between whom there would have been a traight fight. For the Lower Roll seats, in the same kind of way here would have been a straight fight between what might be called ıro-African parties. U.F.P African candidates would have had no hance here. The United National Independence Party would probbly have won most of these seats, though some might have been aptured by African National Congress or an Independent or Libral, probably for personal, regional, or tribal reasons.

The national seats were more difficult to guess about. But if Afrian voters showed the same spirit as in the last election, it is doubtful vhether any U.F.P. candidates would have secured the required ninimum. At the last election, African voters were sometimes votng for the Dominion Party, not because they wanted it to get in, ıut in order to ensure that their rejection of the U.F.P. was made lear. Really it seemed that only the Liberal Party had much chance n these national seats.

It is useful to consider why the United Federal Party should have ıeen so indignant about these proposals. Most Europeans from the Rhodesias will agree that the time must come when there will be an African majority in Northern Rhodesia. And it has been an object ıf United Federal Party policy to increase the number of Africans vho have seats in the House—but they must be *safe* Africans, who vill vote in general accordance with European ideas. One need use ıo opprobrious words; let us give them the credit of a genuine belief hat the line they are taking is in the interests of the country. But hey are not representative. What caused the note of shrillness was

that the proposals of Cmnd. 1295 would have exposed as fallacious the idea that the United Federal Party Africans represented their own people. They might also have resulted in a coalition Government of Liberals and U.N.I.P., both of whom have expressed the view that the Federation must come to an end.

Here it is worth considering the advisability of making efforts to get into power the more moderate, from the point of view of the colonial Power, of two nationalist parties. The situation has arisen in India, and repeatedly in Africa. It is a dilemma of timing. If the revolutionary leader shows himself ready to co-operate with the colonial Power too soon, he will lose his followers They think that once they get freedom they will be better off in every kind of way They are sure to be disillusioned, but the revolutionary leader must not disillusion them until he is seen to be in a position of responsibility. He must not convey the impression that he has been bought by the colonial Power A moment comes when he can afford to say 'moderate', that is, disillusioning, things, because he has clearly arrived. He has won the battle for freedom. This has happened to Mr Julius Nyerere. It has not yet happened to Mr Kenneth Kaunda.

This suggests that it is wise for the colonial Government to hurry on to a position where it can give responsibility to the eventual leader. But, assuming that the Governor has spotted his Nehru or Nkrumah or Nyerere, for how long should he strengthen such a leader's hand by spells in prison, and how soon can that leader be made Prime Minister without being called a stooge? And in the meantime, is it wise to give power to someone more moderate? The morality of it is dubious, because the moderate party may lay itself open to reprisals when independence comes. Quite apart from that, the Governor may force the real leader into more and more violent attitudes, which he will adopt in the hope of keeping his followers' support, or he may lose control of his followers and be replaced by other devils worse than himself. Both these dangers are very real in Northern Rhodesia.

The proposals of the White Paper Cmnd. 1295 were referred back to Northern Rhodesia for discussion of the blanks left to be filled in. It is generally believed that the U.F.P. pressed for fewer National Seats and also argued that since there would be some Africans on the Upper Roll and no Europeans on the Lower Roll the proportion between the two rolls should not be 50 per cent to 50 per cent but 60 per cent to 40 per cent. Both these proposals were resisted and

o doubt that is why Mr Macleod felt he could say on 26 June[1] that ıe framework of his original proposals had been maintained.

But changes have taken place which may make a big difference to he result. The Asians and Coloureds are to be specially represented y one seat out of the national fifteen; they have protested against his communal representation and so have the Liberals and Mr Kaunda's U.N.I.P.—both of whom hoped to win votes from these ources, which are now concentrated in such a way that they cannot ıfluence fourteen out of the fifteen seats. These fourteen seats are ɔ make seven two-member national constituencies. Four of them re to return one African and one European member each; for three here is no provision as to race. In all seven, it is provided that a uccessful candidate must get:

(*a*) From each *race*, either 12½ per cent of the total votes cast or 400 votes, whichever is less.

(*b*) From one *roll* or the other, 20 per cent of the total votes cast.

These changes have been grudgingly accepted by Sir Roy Welenky and unhesitatingly rejected by Mr Kaunda and Sir John Moffatt; they are clearly more favourable to the U.F.P. than the first roposals. Apart from the concentration of Asian and Coloured otes, it is the minimum of 400 that most Africans regard as unfair. As a temporary measure, it was just possible to tolerate the averaging of percentages which would make the vote of 10,000 Africans core the same as, say, 3,000 Europeans. But in the Copper Belt a J.N.I.P. candidate can hardly hope for 12½ per cent of the European votes, or for 400; it would surely not be difficult for the U.F.P., with the full weight of Government prestige behind it, to secure oo African votes, which is much less than 12½ per cent of any African constituency is likely to be.

In fact, however, much still depends on how the constituencies re delimited. If the Europeans are concentrated in three areas on he Copper Belt and line of rail, and there are four purely rural or ribal areas—and this seems the natural arrangement in a delimitaion which will not be controlled by political parties—the Dominion Party and U.F.P. will be overwhelmingly strong in the three urban. Among the very few Europeans in the mainly tribal areas, who would include many missionaries and Government servants and ome eccentrics, a vote of one-eighth for Liberal, African National Congress, or U.N.I.P. candidates is possible; if there was some understanding between these parties, the four rural constituencies

[1] *Hansard*, Vol 643, No 134, col. 33

would be likely to return eight candidates in their interest, of whom seven would be Africans. Liberal, A.N.C., and U.N.I.P. candidates would be likely to be disqualified in the Copper Belt and the line of rail, where there would be likely to be six successes for U.F.P. or the Dominion Party, of whom three would be Africans. There would then be a division as follows:

	Upper Roll Seats	*National Roll*	*Lower Roll*	*Total*
Dominion Party or U.F P	15 (Eur)	6 (3 Eur) (3 Afr.)	—	21
A.N.C., U.N.I.P., Liberal	—	9 (1 Asian or Col , 1 Eur)	15 (Afr)	24

Or, considered on racial lines, there would be nineteen European members, twenty-five African, and one Asian or Coloured. Of the Africans, only three would be U.F.P.

This, however, is highly speculative. The proposals are so complicated that it is not easy to understand them and most European voters will be prepared to take Sir Roy's word for it that they are 'all right'. Whether he really believes this is perhaps less important than whether he can persuade the electors that he does. He is a master of political ringcraft and his Dominion Party opponents are, in comparison, inept. It appears, then, at the time of writing, more reasonable than it has for some time to hope that Sir Edgar Whitehead will win his referendum. If the delimitation of the constituencies in Northern Rhodesia and the subsequent elections do then produce an African majority and also a bare majority for parties other than the Dominion Party and U.F.P., then surely—it may be argued—much of the African objection to Federation would disappear. With African majorities in two territories out of three, it would be clear that the Federation itself would soon be African, and most African leaders see the advantages in some link between the three territories. By the time the referendum takes place, they may be too deeply committed to opposition to withdraw; sharply distrustful of white motives, their followers see political situations in terms of black and white—'Are you for or against us?'

Let me summarize the situation as it appeared to stand before the announcement of the latest proposals on Northern Rhodesia. The stability on which the prosperity of all depends is a delicate plant; but chaos due to European lack of confidence in the future is not more dangerous than the chaos which may arise if the Government has to use force *all* the time against *all* the people. The British Gov-

ernment was attempting the delicate task of persuading Africans that stability and the union of the three territories were worth preserving, while at the same time persuading the Europeans that they could only be preserved if startling changes were made. The good name of Britain in the world and her standing with the new African States were tied up with success in this task. And the faster we went within certain limits, the more likely we were to convince the Africans that we meant business. On the other hand, the more slowly we moved, the more likely we were to get co-operation from the Europeans, who were coming stage by stage and day by day to a more realistic appraisal of the situation.

It was a fine balance, and the new proposals are taken by both parties as a swing towards the Europeans. This may be interpreted as a change of policy in the British Government, brought about by right-wing pressure and perhaps by the fatigue of the more liberal. It may also be taken as a highly subtle calculation. It looks like a swing to the right and Sir Roy can be trusted to make the most of that, the more loudly Mr Kaunda protests, the better chance Sir Edgar has of winning his referendum. When the referendum is won, the constituencies will be delimited and it will then be seen that after all there is still a likelihood of an African majority and a U.F.P. defeat. So the Africans will call off their plans for non-co-operation and both dangers will be averted.

If this is really the Government's reasoning, it assumes that Mr Kaunda's following is extremely responsive to the tiller. It will not be difficult to keep his party for a month at such a pitch of agitation as to make the Europeans think the proposals are in their favour. But it will be very difficult to do this without losing control and surely almost impossible to swing them back after the referendum and persuade them to co-operate in any proposals based on the idea of parity.

The confidence of the Europeans we could scarcely have hoped to keep if we were to fulfil our true role in world affairs; it seems at the moment that we have also lost that confidence which Mr Macleod had begun to establish among Africans and which the Monckton Commission held to be essential if the Federation was to continue. On the best interpretation, our course, though consistently set on one mark, has not been held steadily and our wake looks a trifle devious. What we have done will no doubt be admired by some if it succeeds; it is unlikely to win commendation anywhere if it fails.

PHILIP MASON

Brazil: The Reawakening of the Giant

THERE was a time when Latin America was the sort of subject which even some more inquiring students of world affairs tended to put away in a pigeon-hole, perhaps with a scribbled note on the folder: 'Interesting, must investigate some time'. British business men have been doing this for years. Thanks to the Cuban revolution Latin America has been attracting a new interest, although notoriety might be a more apt term. Yet from much that has been written about the Cuban eruption and its effects on Latin American opinion, one fact emerges which, while understandable, is nevertheless alarming: in the Western world—even, so it would seem, in the American State Department—Latin America and the transformation that has been taking place there even in the past decade still seem to be a mystery

Despite some staggering obstacles, the speed and degree of progress in certain parts of Latin America have been remarkable. But it is not only in a material sense that this part of the world has been evolving: the mentality of Latin Americans has been changing radically. It is an evolutionary process which a great many foreigners have not bothered to follow or understand and it perhaps explains the undertones of bewilderment, often laced with exasperation, of so many attempts at interpretation of Latin American affairs today The 'experts' now face a new challenge in Brazil. In less than six months since the new President, Senhor Janio Quadros, took office, this, the largest, most populated, and potentially the richest of all the Latin American countries, has become a new factor, not only in what must be a new approach to Latin America by the Western bloc but also in Latin American thinking generally.

Brazil cannot yet claim to be the leader of the Latin American bloc, for these twenty republics are still, and often fiercely, individualistic. Although they are beginning to take an interest in each other and to think in terms of mutual interests, the concept of a 'Latin American Union' is still a long way off. But the manner in which Latin Americans have taken the Cuban drama so much to heart does show that Latin American unity is becoming a reality. If the Cuban situation had arisen twenty-five years ago most other Latin Americans would probably have looked on as disinterested spectators. As recently as 1954, when the Arbenz Government of Guatemala was overthrown—largely because it had incurred Washington's displeasure because of its left-wing tendencies and for attempting reforms such as Fidel Castro introduced in Cuba, even

hough they were on a far more modest scale—the rest of Latin
America witnessed the spectacle of United States intervention in
Guatemalan affairs almost with apathy. What Senhor Quadros is
loing is setting patterns for domestic policies which could revolu-
ionize Brazilian political and economic thinking and also as regards
elations with the outside world generally and with the Western and
Communist worlds in particular. Unlike Fidel Castro, so far he does
not claim to be setting examples of behaviour for Latin America.
What he consistently maintains he is trying to do is to forge policies
o fit the needs and the interests of Brazil, and Brazil only. Neverthe-
ess, other Latin American countries, particularly the larger ones,
ire watching Brazil closely. They have very much the same prob-
ems, and if Senhor Quadros's policies and attitudes, however revo-
utionary, start producing results, they will have no hesitation in
idopting them.

Senhor Quadros is not an isolationist, and he believes the only
vay that Latin American countries can make their mark in the world
s to do so collectively. But he evidently feels that Brazil is not yet
eady to offer leadership, and at the moment he is absorbed in one
of the biggest house-cleaning operations which Brazil has ever ex-
perienced. His staggering task is to unite this sub-continent of a
country with already over 70 million people and to give Brazilians
a new sense of values He must somehow direct Brazil's anxiety for
progress along more modest and rational lines without incurring the
charge that he is holding the country back, which would be political
suicide. Economic development at any cost has become a mania
with Brazilians, and the previous Government of President Kubit-
check, with its slogan of fifty years' progress in five, cannot be held
entirely responsible for this. What it did do was to provide an outlet
or this bursting impatience for progress, which is not peculiar to
Brazil. All Latin America is seething with it. Latin Americans have
ost much of their former docility; even the apathy of the forgotten
nillions of the interior is disappearing. Today the clamour of pro-
est against the brazen disparity of lot which has always been a
eature of Latin American life can be heard even in the more remote
reas of Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Venezuela, and throughout Central
America to Mexico. Of Latin America's almost 200 million people
in forty years' time they will have increased to 500 million) about
ialf do not earn a living wage. Confronted with the prospect of
heir countries becoming disorderly economic slums, Latin Ameri-
ca's impatience for progress is understandable, however extrava-

gant it often is and however many new problems it has created.

The material achievements of the Kubitscheck administration, for instance, are certainly spectacular: entire new industries, some of the largest development projects in the world including a brand new capital, Brasilia, are impressive monuments to the man's drive. But Senhor Kubitscheck handed over to his successor a country which on paper was bankrupt. Nor was that the only problem which Senhor Quadros inherited. Corruption, and on a variety of levels, thrived in the atmosphere of free spending during Senhor Kubitscheck's five years in office. The extent of this corruption which has been unearthed by committees set up by the new Government to investigate the affairs of government agencies shocked even those Brazilians who had come to regard graft with cynical detachment as being as uncontrollable as the weather. One government agency could not account for over 20 per cent of funds allotted to it between 1956 and 1960. Another, which received 3 per cent of Brazil's annual Budget, yielded such a crop of scandal that the investigation committee described it as the instrument of the most lavish misuse of public funds ever heard of in Brazil's history.

Senhor Quadros has declared open war on corruption even down to such traditional practices as tipping policemen. His new anti-graft rules warn sternly that it is as much of a 'penal offence' to give as it is to receive. But Senhor Quadros has gone further and trampled on even more sacred institutions. Scores of civil servants, for example, who owed their appointments to political string-pulling or simply to the fact that they had relatives in high places, some of whom had never even seen the inside of their departments, have been given the choice either to report for work or be dismissed for absenteeism. Many of these government employees, who work full time at other jobs, had come to regard their 'civil service salary' as a cost-of-living allowance. Such ruthless stamping on tradition has obviously earned Senhor Quadros a great many enemies. But the great majority of Brazilians are solidly behind him. Senhor Quadros has always been known for his revulsion from corruption of any kind, and a great many Brazilians were stunned and revolted by the spectacle of all the dirty linen he has produced out of even some of the key government agencies, including those dealing with development and relief work in distressed areas, and which was carefully wrung out in public. It was precisely the reaction he wanted, for Senhor Quadros is also a showman who knows how to get his effects.

A harder problem he faces, however, is how to induce Brazilians,

'ho have become conditioned to the idea that progress could be
chieved on the basis, which Senhor Kubitscheck made popular, of
build now and pay later', to accept the fact that 'progress' cannot
lways be achieved regardless of the cost. Senhor Quadros is not, as
ome of his opponents suggest and many Brazilians fear, about to
ut his foot down hard on the brake of Brazil's development.
razil's economy has expanded to the point where too drastic a
old-down could be disastrous. He has announced that he will carry
n the Kubitscheck development programme but at a slower pace
nd with more concern for the immediate effects on the country's
nances and resources. He plans, for instance, in the next five years
increase the extent of Brazil's highways, particularly into the in-
rior, from the present 19,000 miles to almost 30,000 miles; almost
double power and steel production and to encourage more new
idustry, essentially with the help of private enterprise, including
reign, and particularly basic industry such as petro-chemicals,
rtilizers, and the manufacture of farm machinery, machine tools,
nd heavy equipment. He also plans agrarian reform, but not on
uban patterns, and big health and education programmes. The
revious Government tended to devote more attention to the uni-
ersities than it did to secondary and primary schools. The Quadros
Government plans to reverse this and also to carry out a more inten-
ve campaign on illiteracy: over half the population is still illiterate.

Senhor Quadros earned, and deservedly so, the reputation of an
dministrator when he was mayor of São Paulo, and even more so
iter as Governor of the State of São Paulo when he had to cope
ith very much the same financial problems which he now faces on
national scale. Some of his critics compare him to a provincial bank
ianager who ran his branch brilliantly; but how, they ask darkly,
ill he fare now that he has been transferred to Head Office? One
dvantage he has over many of his predecessors is the faith of his
eople. I have seen four Brazilian Presidents come to office during
he past sixteen years. But I have never seen such confidence as
enhor Quadros has inspired. President Gaspar Dutra, an uncon-
roversial army man elected in 1945 after the overthrow of the Var-
as dictatorship, succeeded in arousing confidence that he could at
east maintain political peace, but no more. Getulio Vargas, who
eturned to power again five years later, this time as an elected
'resident, aroused, as no other Brazilian had done before him, the
opes of the lower classes. His regime dissolved in a cloud of un-
avoury dust and Getulio Vargas committed suicide before his five-

year term was up. Juscelino Kubitscheck came to office in 1956, also in an atmosphere of great expectations, but again only on the part of a section of Brazilians and certain business and other interests who had been associated with the Vargas regime.

The respect and the confidence which Senhor Quadros enjoys are shared by every class of Brazilian; his main support comes from the growing middle class and is not restricted to any part of Brazil. Brazilians in the north talk just as enthusiastically about him as they do in São Paulo in the south where they have had personal experience of Senhor Quadros's administration. Most Brazilians one talks to are convinced that somehow 'Janio', as he is known throughout the country, will perform the miracle which will put Brazil on her feet; and Brazilians are supremely confident that in forty or perhaps even in twenty years' time Brazil will be a new power, not only in Latin America, but economically a power of world status. To hear all these expressions of confidence nevertheless makes one feel uneasy. So far, even the working classes are heeding Senhor Quadros's exhortations and are holding back on wage claims even though they are being pinched hard by inflation. What will happen, one wonders, if Senhor Quadros does not succeed in performing the 'miracle' that everyone expects of him, or at least satisfy Brazilians that the miracle is on the way? Brazilians are not particularly patient now, for over the past sixteen years since the reinstatement of democracy they have become very impatient indeed with politicians. But it is a category from which they still exclude Senhor Quadros who, during all his political life, has kept aloof from traditional political factions.

Although Senhor Quadros claims to be completely engrossed in the task of spring-cleaning Brazil's domestic affairs, it is quite evident that he is already thinking of Brazil in terms of the international scene, not only economically but politically. What sort of position does he envisage Brazil, and Latin America, taking up in the world? He denies patiently, but at times with a trace of impatience, suggestions that Brazil is heading either towards neutralism or into the fold of the Soviet bloc. But he denies with the same warmth that Brazil is in any way committed to the Western bloc. When he sends emissaries to Russia, Eastern Europe, and Communist China, and delegates or observers to conferences of neutral nations, he does so, he explains, merely to keep himself and Brazil abreast of world trends. Brazil is also beginning to be interested in African affairs.

Recently Brazil received new credits and extension of repayment terms from the United States and, to a lesser extent, from Western

;uropean countries, including Britain, which all told amounted to ıe equivalent of about $2,000 million. This will give Brazil a des- erately needed breathing spell, for some heavy repayments of trade ebts and other credits which were due in the next five years have een postponed for periods of up to twenty years. Yet simultaneous- r, Brazil was negotiating with the Communist world and secured t least promises of trade agreements almost entirely on a basis of arter amounting to the equivalent of over U.S. $1,500 million. To dd touches to what already seemed to be a masterly exercise in con- ›rtion in being able to look in two directions at once, soon after the ew American credits were announced Brazil's Foreign Minister 'ent before the Brazilian Congress to state that there would be no hange in Brazil's policy towards Cuba, which is to let the Cubans 'ork out their own destiny, or downfall, for themselves and to con- emn any interference with this process. (Brazilians, while admiring 'astro, are not so starry-eyed about him as they were.) Furthermore, ; the Minister implied, Brazil had no real evidence that Cuba was Communist State or a danger to Hemisphere security.

The right wing in Brazil was aghast. In all the circumstances it :emed such an 'inelegant' snubbing of the United States. Mr Adlai tevenson, during his recent visit to Brazil, experienced something f the same sort of snubbing when he talked about Cuba as he did, ıd he fared even worse elsewhere in South America, although ıanks to his personal popularity it was nothing like the rebuffs that ›me other of Mr Kennedy's special emissaries had to face. But the razilian extreme left wing is not happy either. Communist China, ›r instance, has talked enticingly of trade agreements and credits nounting to $500 million, providing Brazil was willing to consider ıplomatic recognition. Russia, who offered $200 million worth of arter trade in addition to the $800 million agreement signed less ıan two years ago, also talked hopefully of a resumption of diplo- ıatic ties which Brazil broke off over fifteen years ago in the hey- ay of United States-Brazilian relations. But so far neither the ussians nor Communist China seem to have made much progress. enhor Quadros's spokesmen have emphasized that while Brazil is nxious to trade with any country, such matters as diplomatic recog- ıtion must await a more opportune moment. It is very likely that razil will resume relations with Russia and in due course may even :cognize Communist China for, as Senhor Quadros has said time ıd time again, Brazil's new foreign policy is a strictly independent ıe and will not be dictated bv anv other consideration than Brazil's

own interests. These are the sort of statements which make other Latin Americans prick their ears, for they ring with the note of sovereignty—a word which also implies defiance of Washington's nannyism—so dear to Latin American hearts today.

Senhor Quadros is a master of the art of snubmanship. He never hesitates to put anyone in his place, and publicly, as he did his Vice-President, Senhor Jango Goulart, a paradoxical, uncomfortable figure in the Quadros administration, for Senhor Goulart is a direct offspring of the Vargas regime. As President of the Brazilian Labour Party he was included in the Quadros ticket as a measure of political compromise and a sop to the lower working classes, and has never been allowed to forget it. Senhor Goulart had complained about the manner in which the President's investigating committees were going about their work. In the scathing public retorts over the incident Senhor Quadros not only cut his Vice-President down to size but cut him to pieces; and far more Brazilians than one might have expected applauded gleefully.

While it is obviously too soon to venture even a prophesy as to the direction in which Brazil is going, either economically or politically, it is certainly not too soon to ask what Senhor Quadros's intentions are in this respect. These are questions which are beginning to worry some Brazilians, including some of his supporters, because no one can really answer them. Is Senhor Quadros merely trying to play off the United States against the Russian bloc? Is he taking snubmanship perhaps too far as regards the United States, particularly in view of the very strong anti-American feelings which exist in the country? However much Senhor Quadros may talk about an independent foreign policy, Brazil's destiny, thanks to her sympathies and traditional ties, would seem to be inevitably linked with that of the Western world and the United States. Yet anti-American feeling has never been so widespread, although it is not of the flag-burning and stone-throwing kind that exists in other parts of Latin America. Events in Cuba have certainly fanned it, but it goes much deeper; and even Brazilians find it hard to explain it. Suspicion of American capital strengthened by events in Cuba, doubts about some of Washington's foreign policies and perhaps jealousy of American prosperity, coupled with the feeling that Americans have taken Latin American loyalty too much for granted and that the United States has done little to help Brazil without, so Brazilians feel, ulterior motives, are some of the contributory factors. When the Eisenhower welfare plan was announced, and even when the

ecent American credits were made known, Brazilians commented cidly: 'We should thank Cuba, of course, not Washington.' A oung Brazilian student of an upper middle class family remarked o me casually just before the Wimbledon finals that it was a pity here was not a Brazilian challenger for the championship. 'Now,' he explained, 'we will have to back the English or the Australians.' When I asked her why not the Americans, she replied primly: 'We ould never cheer for an American.'

Senhor Quadros seems supremely confident that he can not only ontain his critics at home and neutralize any extremists, including nore presumptuous Castro sympathizers, but also steer Brazil on zig-zag international course, taking advantage of all currents and vithout any risk of going aground anywhere or, for that matter, taying longer than necessary at any particular port on the way. (Yet ne country which seems to arouse feelings of genuine affection and espect in Senhor Quadros is Britain.) Confidence is the keynote of Senhor Quadros's character and it is the butt for Brazilians' often rreverent sense of humour. They tell the story of the Governor of he state of Guanabara, Senhor Carlos Lacerda, who is not lacking n confidence or political ambition either, who went to see the Presi-lent and had himself announced as 'Emperor Carlos'. Senhor Quadros remonstrated with him gently. 'Really, Lacerda, aren't ou being rather absurd, styling yourself Emperor? Anyhow, who reated you Emperor?' 'God Almighty,' answered the Governor imply. Senhor Quadros looked at him sternly. 'That is not true,' e thundered. 'I did nothing of the sort.'

How far will this confidence in himself, and in the support of the najority of Brazilians which Senhor Quadros undoubtedly has, in-pire him to go in his spring-cleaning of political and democratic nstitutions also? Senhor Quadros belongs to no political party, and iow long can he expect to govern merely with popular support and vith the sympathy of a majority in Congress but without the back-ng of a political machine? Some Brazilians are quite sure that if his olicies are ever obstructed by Congress, or if he is faced with labour rouble or any other kind of sabotage which some of his opponents –which include the traditional political cliques—are trying, so far nsuccessfully, to foster, he might take some even more revolution-ry steps. Then even Congress might risk a trampling. Senhor Quadros is not a dictator in embryo, so some of his closer supporters vill assure you earnestly. But, as he has said himself, nobody is go-ng to stop him doing what he thinks is best for Brazil; nor is he

going to allow traditional ties and sympathies with the West to be taken for granted, for Brazil, like all Latin America today with its impatience for progress, is an open market not only for trade and investment but also for ideas and friendships.

ANDREW MARSHALL

The European Economic Community and the Associated African States

Partnership in the Making

WITHIN the wider framework of this and future decades' greatest human problem—that of the relationship between the rich industrialized nations and the poor countries starting from scratch the process of economic development—the relations of Western Europe with black Africa pose by far the most acute and delicate questions; the basic need for economic aid is overlain by the psychological legacy of colonialism, by close cultural and spiritual links, and by the implications of the political uncommittedness of the newly independent States. Moreover the problem is further complicated by the existence of two economic systems, extending to Africa the purely artificial division existing in Europe. This problem, which has been an object of concern and study recently in the Council of Europe, in Western European Union, in the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,[1] and in G.A.T.T., adds urgency to the need for a settlement in Europe, and makes it, moreover, inevitable that whatever form of association the Six may work out with the African States and Madagascar will sooner or later have to be adapted or fitted into a wider scheme.

Aware of this though they are, the Six and their associated countries face an immediate practical problem, with a statutory time-limit, the solution of which cannot wait on a wider settlement: the association of the various overseas countries and territories with E.E.C. is laid down in the Rome Treaty, but the Convention defining the terms of the association runs only for five years, and ex-

[1] Cf. Colin Legum, 'Economic Commission for Africa: Progress Report', in *The World Today*, July 1961.

›ires on 31 December 1962. Moreover, since the Convention came nto force all the associated African territories and countries (with he sole exception of the Belgian-ruled territories of Ruanda-Jrundi), and Madagascar, have attained independence. It is there-'ore not merely a matter of renewing the Convention, but of creat-ng an entirely new instrument of association, on a basis of equality ınd partnership between sovereign States, to take the place of the Convention from 1 January 1963. It is with the efforts to elaborate his new relationship that the present article is mainly concerned.

The Eurafrican Parliamentary Conference which took place at he Maison de l'Europe in Strasbourg from 19 to 24 June, with a ıundred delegates from the parliamentary assemblies of sixteen African States and of Madagascar sitting side by side with the same ıumber from the European Parliamentary Assembly, and with Hans Furler and M. Lamine Gueye of Senegal presiding alternately, was almost certainly the most striking manifestation of the new re-ationship which is beginning to be built up, but that meeting con-stitutes only one aspect of the work being done on the basis of the ıew association. As for all matters of policy within the Common Market, the many-sided mechanism provided for in the Rome Treaty is coming into operation. Firstly, the European Economic Commission has the task of elaborating practical proposals, and in order to do so is consulting all the interests involved: it in fact hopes o present these proposals in detail in September to the Council, ınd the Economic and Social Committee will also probably examine hem. Secondly, the member States themselves have to arrive at a common position, and their representatives in the Council of E.E.C. ıave to take the necessary decisions on the basis of the Commis-sion's proposals. Thirdly, the European Parliamentary Assembly ıas, as in most fields of Community activity, been acting as a driving 'orce, and it too will pronounce on the Commission's proposals. At all three levels the views of the associated States themselves are being ascertained and taken into account.

THE PROBLEM

Before examining the pattern of recent deliberations at these dif-erent levels it is well to outline the scope of the change that has to be brought about, and of the new association to be created. The present system, as defined by the Convention annexed to the Rome Treaty, covers essentially a preferential system, a development fund, ınd the extension of the right of establishment in the overseas coun-

tries and territories,[1] whose relations with E.E.C. are conducted through the member States with which they have special links. In the past eighteen months eighteen former dependent countries have become independent.[2] To bridge the gap until a new form of association could be worked out it was agreed that each country on attaining independence should be free formally to request the continuance of its association with the Common Market, and this procedure has been generally followed. Moreover, several of them expressed the desire to establish diplomatic representation with the Community as such, and two of them have already done so, namely Senegal, which is represented in Brussels by M. Gueye, and Gabon, represented by M. Damas.[3] Institutionally, therefore, the former relationship of E.E.C., through the member States, with the various countries has to be replaced by a series of bilateral agreements, on a basis of equality, creating a multilateral Eurafrican Association.

From the economic point of view, the new arrangement must cover trade, technical assistance, and development aid. The most delicate problem, in view of its wider implications, is that of maintaining the existing preferential system, or rather of adapting it. So far the overseas countries have continued to enjoy their former preferences in the markets of their metropolitan States (this applies of course above all to the former French territories): but with the advent of free circulation within the Common Market, and the abolition of bilateral quotas, this preferential position is endangered, even without the reductions in the common external tariff of E.E.C. which are being vigorously sought by third countries and are on the cards as part of the G.A.T.T. tariff negotiations. The economies of the associated States have been built up on the basis of this preference, and the problem which has to be faced was clearly expressed in the resolution of the Eurafrican Parliamentary Conference, which drew attention to 'the present structure of the economy and foreign trade of the associated States, the close ties which linked them with

[1] Cf J J van der Lee, 'The European Common Market and Africa', in *The World Today*, September 1960.

[2] Senegal, Mauretania, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Niger, Togo, Cameroun, Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), Centrafrican Republic, Tchad, Somalie, and Madagascar (all formerly French: Guinea's relationship with E E C. is still not clear, and Guinean representatives were at one point expected to attend the Parliamentary Conference); Somalia (formerly under Italian Trusteeship); and Congo (Léopoldville), formerly Belgian. There are certain other territories, in particular the Comores, New Caledonia, and Polynesia, not due for independence. The Netherlands are seeking association under a separate agreement for the Dutch East Indies and for Dutch New Guinea.

[3] Togo, Ivory Coast, Somalie, and Mauretania have already submitted the names of their future ambassadors, and Niger is to do so also

he former metropoles, and the blow which these nations would uffer if, within the association with the European Community, hey could not retain support at least equivalent to that which they ıave hitherto enjoyed and which is essential for the maintenance of heir national income'.

However, as M. Lemaignen, the member of the E.E.C. Commission dealing particularly with these questions, told the African and Madagascan delegates to the Conference, 'Neither for us nor for ou is it a matter of consolidating or reconsolidating an existing ituation, or patching up difficulties or inadequacies, but rather of ıelping you to build a renovated, dynamic economy. . .' In other vords, the associated States must be helped to diversify and develop heir economies, to make them less dependent upon preference and rotection. To achieve this, a whole range of measures is envisaged, uite apart from the direct financial aid to be granted through the Development Fund.

The Fund itself, whose activities, growing in scope after a laborious start, constitute at present the main practical expression of the resent association, will itself have to be recast, again on a basis of artnership, and its scope widened. At present it makes outright rants, from funds contributed by the member States, for investnent projects of a social or economic character (a rather dubious listinction being made between the two kinds) in the various assoiated countries (by the end of 1960 the Fund had entered into comnitments to spend $227 million to cover 239 projects accepted out f 372 presented: of this total 78 per cent was for the ex-French ountries and territories). Its procedure, which has been criticized s being too complicated, will need to be made more flexible, and a vider range of activities made possible—and again suggestions are ıot lacking. Not least, some form of African participation in the unning, if not in the financing, of the Fund will be needed. Lastly, he new relationship of equality between States finds a natural exression in the parliamentary contacts already initiated.

Whilst the system is still in the melting pot, the prospect of the hanges to be made has already had two important repercussions n Africa. Firstly, the new States, acutely aware of their economic lependence, see in the Common Market a source of aid which they an accept without fear of political dependence: the Community an be trusted, and has succeeded in keeping itself free from any aint of neo-colonialism. Secondly, it is acting as a powerful unifyng factor in Africa. The new States (whose total population is only

some 47 million in an area exceeding that of Communist China) are already aware of the need to co-operate—the President of Togo, for example, in his Independence Day speech in April 1960[1] referred to 'an O.E.E.C. for Africa'—and it is already clear that Common Market aid will only be forthcoming if there is an assurance that it will be effectively used, as it can only be if there is co-operation and joint planning amongst the recipient countries. There can be little doubt that the invitation to attend a ministerial conference with the E.E.C. States was one of the factors encouraging the twelve States which, at a Conference at Yaoundé in April this year, set up OAMCE (the Organisation Africano-Malgache de Coopération Économique) to organize their future economic co-operation.

THE ACTIVITY OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

From the start the European Parliamentary Assembly followed closely the development of relations with overseas countries and territories, and these have also been the concern of one of its permanent Committees. As early as December 1958 this Committee decided in principle to undertake a series of 'information visits' to the associated areas. In May 1959 the Assembly debated the first of a series of detailed and penetrating reports dealing with the institutional and political, economic, and social aspects of the future Association. (In keeping with its traditions, concern with the social situation in the associated countries, and steps to be taken to improve it, has been a permanent feature of the Assembly's interest.) In November 1959 the Association was one of the topics on the agenda of the annual colloquium at which the Council of Ministers confronts the Assembly; and at the close of its debate on the subject on 31 March 1960 the Assembly passed resolutions calling on the one hand for a governmental conference with the new States, and on the other for a parliamentary conference; it was from this initiative that sprang the conference held this year. Meanwhile a series of information visits—to West Africa and the Belgian territories in July 1959, to Madagascar and Somalia in 1960, and to the eight ex-French States in West Africa in February 1961—served a double purpose: on the one hand the members of the E.P.A. Committee gained a first-hand knowledge which made their reports to the Assembly realistic and valuable, and on the other the parliamentarians and authorities in the new States were convinced of the genuine interest of the Assembly in their problems.

[1] Quoted in Professor van der Lee's article, *op cit.*

In June 1960 the President of the European Parliamentary As-
mbly, Herr Hans Furler, sent a letter to the Presidents of the
ırliamentary assemblies in all the associated States already inde-
ndent or expected to become independent in the course of the
ar, inviting them to send delegations to take part, on a basis of
uality with members of E.P.A., in a conference to discuss the
oblems of the Association. By November, the idea having been
elcomed by almost all the States concerned, the Assembly was
le to discuss the form the Conference should take, and a prelimi-
ıry meeting took place in Rome on 24–26 January 1961, with a
nited number of African and Madagascan M.P.s, to decide on the
enda and procedure, and a permanent committee was set up. A
rther meeting of sixteen African and sixteen European M.P.s was
ld in Bonn on 3–5 May. At its May session the Assembly debated
ıd approved four reports including detailed proposals for the re-
wal and development of the Association, and these were sent to
e African Parliaments.

The Africans, meeting in Ouagadougou (Upper Volta), also made
ll preparations, drawing up four reports of their own, in the pre-
nble to which they emphasized, significantly, their own unity of
ıtlook and their determination to set up an Institute to study the
oblems of their economic development.

Apart from the detailed recommendations which were agreed
on, several things were particularly noteworthy about the Stras-
urg Conference. The first was undoubtedly the cordial atmo-
here of the proceedings, and the complete respect for the equali-
of the participants, irrespective of nationality, observed both in
e procedure and in the attitude of all taking part. A second feature
as the practical nature of the debates, with a reasonable minimum
high-sounding declarations and appeals to general principles, and
ı the contrary a real analysis of the institutional and economic
oblems and suggestions for solving them. Thirdly, there was a
riking and generally successful effort on the part of the African
legates to present a united front, based on what they had agreed
nongst themselves at Ouagadougou—though there was no hiding
rtain divergences between the OAMCE States and Mali, which,
one of its delegates indicated, has chosen a State-controlled
onomy closely resembling that of Guinea and whilst willing to co-
erate with E.E.C. and with the other African States cannot accept
ıy provisions which would involve interference in its internal
fairs or infringe its neutrality. Lastly, the problem of the economic

division in Europe and Africa, though not directly debated, was constantly present. Herr Furler referred to the possibility of British adhesion, and many African speakers emphasized the need to keep any Association open to other African States which might wish to join: the latent contradiction between the desire to continue the preferential system with E.E.C. and to widen the association to include other tropical producers was not resolved.

After five days of debates, in which the differing views and assessments of priorities on the European side contrasted with the African unity, the Conference voted four resolutions dealing with the institutional aspects of the Association, the trade aspects, the Development Fund, and technical assistance. The essence of the ideas expressed can be summed up as follows:

The new Convention should provide for a joint Council of Ministers, with one Minister from each associated State, for a Parliamentary Assembly meeting once a year, and for a Court of Justice to settle litigation These aims should be achieved by the end of the transitional period.

Trade between the associated countries and E.E.C. should be intensified. The E.E.C. countries should rapidly abolish all internal taxation on the consumption of the products of the associated countries; present margins of tariff preference should be maintained according to the letter and spirit of the Rome Treaty and no reduction in the common external tariff on the products of the overseas States should be made without consulting them and without granting compensatory advantages; the associated countries should receive priority in the event of increased consumption in E.E.C. member States.

A stabilization system should be set up for commodity prices within the Association; and there should also be guaranteed markets and support prices for tropical products; stock-piling of tropical products should be financed; and E.E.C. should co-operate over economic planning.

The Development Fund (to be called the Joint Development Fund) should be run on an equal footing, with more flexible regulations for approving or rejecting projects, bigger resources, and a greater range of activity, including medium- and long-term loans and guarantees.

Technical co-operation and assistance, leaving the initiative to the associated countries, should cover pre-investment studies, teaching (both training on the spot and scholarships), training of essential personnel, and cultural co-operation (including annual quotas of African students in the future European university).

A Eurafrican-Madagascan Development Institute should be set up.

PLANS FOR THE FUTURE ASSOCIATION

The recommendations of the Eurafrican Parliamentary Conference will serve merely as a useful guide to the Governments and to the E.E.C. Commission, which is now working out both immediate

ractical measures for the temporary adaptation of the Association nd the outlines of the new Convention. The Commission, like the ıssembly, has had continual direct contact with the associated tates: its officials have travelled widely, and so has M. Lemaignen ımself: the Commission has often received delegations from the arıous associated States, and a number of African *stagiaires* (trainees) have worked in Brussels. In June the Commission sent the 'ouncil a first Memorandum on the subject, and it is due to submit detailed plan in the autumn.

The most important aspect of the Commission's plans, as so far evealed, concerns trade between E.E.C. and the associated coun-ıes. The policy envisaged is three-sided, involving the setting up f a free trade area, certaın specıfic forms of aıd for tropıcal pro-ucts, and steps to expand trade. The creation of a free trade area ould mean that the member countries of E.E.C. applied to trade ıth the associated countrıes the same system as to trade amongst hemselves: in addıtion, the Commissıon ıs proposing a special peedıng-up of the tariff reductıons and abolitıon of quotas and a uicker *rapprochement* to the common external tariff for a certain umber of products (coffee, cacao, tea, tropical wood, bananas, loves). The member countries should brıng to an end, by 1 January 963, their quota restrıctions on ımports from other member coun-ries or associated countries (but an extension of a year would be ranted for French coffee and banana ımports, and of sıx years for talıan restrıctıons protecting the economy of Somalia). The asso-ıated countries would remaın free to set their own tariffs *vis-à-vis* hırd countrıes, and to take particular measures to further their conomıc development.

To compensate for the loss of theır special position in the metro-olıtan markets, there would be special aid for tropical products, in he form of cyclıcal loans, price stabilization measures, and dırect ıd (financed by E.E.C. contributions or by levies on E.E.C. im-orts) for products not competing with Community production; llowance wıll be made ın the common agricultural policy for the nterests of those products which do compete (sugar, rice, tobacco, nd oıl-bearing products). The sum of aid to be gıven would be set nnually by the E.E.C. Council of Ministers, and has been esti-nated at $20 million per annum for coffee, $7·5 million for bananas, nd $4 million for cotton.

There would also be a Joint Production Fund (*Caisse*) which ould finance development studies (intended to set the agricultural

economies of the associated countries on a sounder footing) and a
any direct or indirect aid to producers. It would have available sc
$50 million, plus a further $50 million from the Development Fu
for anti-trade cycle operations.

Lastly, the Commission would hope to see trade in tropical p
ducts encouraged, above all by a 50 per cent reduction in the c.
duties on cacao, unroasted coffee, and bananas (bringing them do
respectively to 5·8 and 10 per cent). As far as can be judged fr
the views expressed in Strasbourg, this would not in itself b
popular measure, but the Commission would propose to comp
sate for it firstly by the reduction of taxation on consumption
coffee and cacao by 50 per cent on 1 January 1963 and its abolit
on 1 January 1965, and secondly by changes in the tariff quota re
lations for unroasted coffee and bananas.

The E.E.C. Commission's plans for the Development Fund
clude an extension of the scope of its activities to cover the grant
of medium- and long-term loans, according to normal banking
teria, as well as gifts. In the technical field the Commission propo
increased efforts in the field of education and training, and it
just drawn up an expanded programme of scholarships and stu
grants for 1962.

VIEWS OF THE MEMBER STATES

The Commission's proposals, when finally elaborated, will h
to be approved by the member States, and their passage is unlik
to be an easy one, for the Council debates will as usual be a sea
for a Community compromise between conflicting national int
ests. Indeed, the Federal German Government has already stron
criticized, in a Note of 30 July to the Permanent Representative
Brussels (who prepare the Council's decisions), the Commissio
proposals on the stabilization of commodity prices, which it fe
will discourage tropical producers from trying to widen the basi
their economies, hitherto dependent on one major commodity.

Before they come to take any decisions, the member States
have had occasion to learn in detail the wishes of the associa
countries. The idea of a diplomatic conference, launched by
Assembly in March 1960, was taken up by several of the new Sta
and backed by the French Government, and in February 1961 in
tations were issued. A preliminary meeting took place in Brus
on 1–3 June 1961, with the Six represented by their Perman
Representatives with the Communities, and sixteen African Sta

by Ambassadors or Ministers. Officially limited to a first exchange of views, the meeting dealt with the practical problems of speeding up the operation of the Development Fund in its present form, the drawing up of programmes of economic development, and the details of the special customs acceleration which forms part of the Commission's proposals. A further meeting, due to take place on 11–12 July, was postponed as the Council of Ministers was not to discuss the policy of the Community until later in the month, and the Six did not want to meet the Africans without definite proposals to make. The Conference at ministerial level with the associated countries was due to be held in September but may be postponed.

Whilst there is clearly much still to be decided—and indeed it may prove hard to solve all the problems in the relatively short time before the present Convention expires—it is already possible to sketch in the form of Association that will link the European Economic Community with at least fifteen independent States in Africa, and with Madagascar. It will be based on a series of parallel and similar bilateral agreements between E.E.C. and the African States, and will take the form of a free trade area. Decisions will be taken by a Council of Ministers, in which the E.E.C. Commission (or the single Executive of the Communities) will be represented. There will also be regular parliamentary meetings, and possibly a Court of Justice.

Its main features will be a Joint Producers' Fund or similar institution intended to help to stabilize the export earnings of the associated countries and contribute to their efforts to diversify their economies, a Joint Investment Fund giving economic aid and loans, and wide-ranging technical assistance schemes. The European Coal and Steel Community is likely also to be associated (E.C.S.C. has already financed prospecting for iron ore in several territories, and its wish to co-operate was expressed on behalf of the High Authority at the Strasbourg Conference), and also Euratom, which should be able to give invaluable aid to countries for which a lack of traditional fuel resources will make nuclear power an economic proposition.

Although, as was stated at the March session of the Economic Commission for Africa,[1] the creation of E.E.C. and of E.F.T.A. seems not to have had any effect so far on the trade of the African countries, a solution to the problem of the two preferential systems will have to be found, and is indeed a prior condition of Britain's adherence, in view of her Commonwealth commitments. A recent

[1] See *The World Today*, July 1961, p. 292

British Government Memorandum to the E.E.C. Commission on the subject (30 June 1961) has received only an interim reply on the ground that the question has to be seen in the wider context.

Of the possible solutions, an 'exchange' of preferences—extension of Commonwealth preference on tropical products to the associated countries, and of E.E.C. preferences to Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone—can be ruled out since it would amount to discrimination against the sole remaining group of tropical producers, the Latin American countries, and would be indefensible in G.A.T.T. As has been suggested by Mr Kitzinger,[1] the best solution might be for both Britain and E.E.C. to abolish all duties on tropical products from whatever source: this is likely to be acceptable to the associated countries—who would thus lose their preference—only if all industrial countries acted in unison and if a reduction of internal taxation on consumption ensured that it was not rendered ineffective. A U.K.–E.E.C. agreement would be likely to give added stimulus to the schemes for commodity price stabilization on a wider plane (perhaps under the auspices of D.A.G., the Development Assistance Group)—though such schemes have hitherto proved unfruitful.

What effect a healing of the split in Europe would have on relations between the Commonwealth countries and the African countries associated with E.E.C. is difficult to foresee. Whilst the present division has not prevented the purely formal link-up between Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, the language barrier, lack of communications, and the absence of any established trade links between the two Africas are formidable practical obstacles. Nigeria, one of the richest and most advanced of the African countries, cannot be expected to be enthusiastic about economic ties with the economically feeble States of the French Community. The division between the Six and the Seven in Europe is an expensive economic luxury, which can be ended at will: the deep and wide gap between the French-orientated and British-orientated economies in Africa is a legacy which it will take the Africans some considerable time to overcome.

It is thus not clear whether British adherence as a full member of E.E.C. would result in the creation of an even bigger free trade area embracing the enlarged E.E.C. (and its European associates) and all the African countries in the two preferential systems—a move which, as has been suggested, would not be well received in the rest of the world. Some parts of both schemes might have to be

[1] See 'Britain and the Common Market', in *The World Today*, June 1961, p 251

absorbed into a wider plan—but there is no reason to think E.E.C. would abandon the whole idea of a Eurafrican association. Britain would therefore have to choose in what way to be associated with it. In the meantime the Community goes ahead with elaborating its scheme, and once again (as in other fields—agriculture in particular) an early declaration of her intention to adhere to the Common Market might enable Britain to have a say in the making of the new policy before it has been finally settled amongst the Six. Inevitably, in view both of her commitments in other parts of Africa and of her experience in the fields of aid and co-operation, she would have an important role to play in this new venture in co-operation between the two continents.

J. R. LAMBERT

Too Many Foreigners in Switzerland

THREE years ago[1] a six-year fiscal programme was put through in Switzerland whereby direct taxes imposed by the Bund, or federal authority, were made palatable by reductions in the rates and incidence of taxation At the time it was believed that the near future would see prosperity contract so that this opportunity of lowering taxation would be unlikely to recur. Since then, however, prosperity has continued to grow indomitably, thanks above all to the importation of foreign labour, the availability of which has hitherto acted as a notable check upon inflation. In fact in June 1961 over 20 per cent of the total labour force in Switzerland—over half a million out of 2½ million—was non-Swiss.

It is true to say that building and work on the land and in the hotels are performed almost exclusively by foreign workers, still mainly Italians. Among the vineyards of the Canton de Vaud one finds that the peasant owners are left with nothing but Italian labour because the younger generation has deserted to industry and the towns. In German-speaking Switzerland it is not very different. The number of properties has often been reduced in recent years and the work rationalized, but the summer's tasks on the land require the labourer from abroad. A train from Milan to Zürich in June seems

[1] See 'Democratic Vicissitudes in Switzerland', in *The World Today*, October 1958

to drop an Italian worker or so at every stop from the Gotthard tunnel northwards. Down on the Italian-Swiss frontier at Brissago Italian building labour streams in in car-loads or on motor-bicycles every morning for the day. Italian is the language to use to one's waiter or chambermaid in any Swiss hotel if it is important to establish real contact.

It is something of a cherished myth among the Swiss themselves that the foreign workers form only a seasonal invading army to fill temporary gaps in farming, building, and the business of serving the tourist. One is constantly told that they come with work permits only for six or nine months—at most for twelve—without their families, and then go back home. It is true that the Swiss Cantonal authorities who issue labour permits have hitherto thought in these terms, and to a great extent the permits have been of this kind. Indeed in January 1961 the Cantonal authority of Geneva, which had been less exclusive, decided to join the rest and refuse to foreign workers in general the right to bring their families with them: the fact was that housing was still so short in Geneva that poor foreign families had been accommodated in conditions which had become notorious.

If, however, after hearing the claim that the foreigners are only seasonal workers or *Grenzganger* (people working across a frontier), one examines the statistics published by the Swiss Federal Office for Industry and Labour (*Bundesamt fur Industrie, Gewerbe und Arbeit*, B.I.G.A. for short), one finds that the number of short-term foreign workers in two or three of Switzerland's leading skilled industries has steadily increased in the last couple of years, regardless of the season. The numbers of foreigners with short-term permits engaged in various branches of industry over the past two years were as follows:

	Textiles	*Clothing*	*Metal and Machine*	*Watch- and Jewel-making*
Aug. 1959	17,421	21,216	50,240	1,098
Feb. 1960	19,496	23,054	52,778	1,556
Aug. 1960	23,906	26,434	66,460	2,753
Feb 1961	25,462	28,124	77,366	3,998

The high figures for foreigners employed in the important metal and machine industry are especially remarkable, while it is interesting to note that even in the characteristically Swiss craft of watch- and jewel-making a similar tendency appears to be at work. The majority of the foreign workers in every case were Italians.

Since all these figures, supplied every six months by the B.I.G.A.,

include only those foreign workers with temporary permits, they offer a serious understatement. It is estimated that there may be up to 100,000 foreigners in Switzerland (an exact figure based on last year's census should become available some time soon) who have received permission to settle in the country; these are people who cannot apply for Swiss nationality until they have resided in Switzerland for five to ten years, according to agreements with the countries of their origin; they are often specialists and have usually been allowed to import their families after a year or so. According to the statistics published by the federation of employers in the Swiss machine and metal industry for the year 1960,[1] it emerges that at the end of last year 25 per cent of their employees were foreign; of this 25 per cent, 67 per cent were Italian and 17 per cent German. (Three years earlier, at the end of 1957, there had been 60 per cent Italian and 26 per cent German.) At the end of 1960, 48 per cent of the foreign metal-workers had been at work in the industry for less than one year, though the same people might of course have worked in Switzerland much longer. In fact during 1960, 12,000 more workers were engaged in the machine and metal industry, but since 1,000 Swiss workers dropped out, mostly moving up into the engineer or manager category, this meant that 13,000 more foreign workers were taken on. The increase was partly accounted for by an hour's reduction in May 1960 in the working week in this as in some other industries. Among the office-workers, engineers, designers, and managers, also, 20 per cent were foreign, the majority of the foreigners in this case being German—in view of the common language it is not altogether surprising to find a preponderance of Germans among the foreigners, but rather that only 80 per cent of this category should be Swiss.

While the average Swiss citizen overlooks the growing dependence of his major industries upon foreigners, and the effect which this is having upon the supply of unskilled foreign labour, he prefers to complain about *Ueberfremdung*—too many foreigners—among recent purchasers of Swiss land. It is now about three years since a popular outcry, echoed in the press, began against the foreigners who were said to be buying up the Italian-speaking Canton of the Ticino; it was believed that they were predominantly Germans from the Federal Republic. Precise information about this is elusive, but there seems little doubt that West German buying has not been on

[1] See 55th Annual Report of the *Arbeitgeberverband Schweizerischer Maschinen- und Metall-Industrieller*

so great a scale as the buying of property here by Italian citizens. The latter have invested on a considerable scale in villas and blocks of flats in the Ticino, as well as in acquiring villas in the Engadine and other Swiss districts famous for their natural beauty; Italian investment in Switzerland has several times augmented after Communist electoral successes in Italy. The West German invaders tend to concentrate in or near Ascona, just south of Locarno on Lago Maggiore, a place which has been known as the 'new Berlin' for many years. But Ticinese peasants have mostly sold their land since the war not to foreigners, but to German-speaking Swiss. This process has gathered momentum with the growth of Swiss prosperity which, in the Ticino particularly, challenges a peasant way of life; while the younger generation is drawn away into industry, the older peasants have pocketed good money for poor land. It is the German-Swiss who have long been responsible for developing the Ticino: it is they who endanger its *italianità* by their purchases and the staff they import.

In the Canton of Geneva much indignation has been generated against American acquisitions of property in the last three years. In the main these have served for the installation of administrative, not productive, organizations concerned with the American interest in the integration of Europe. In reply to complaints from the local metallurgical industry about overcrowding in Geneva, the Cantonal authorities stated early last June that there were only eighty-nine foreign companies of any significance in the city of Geneva, and that these employed only 2,200 people of whom 1,350 were Swiss and 200 American.[1] In the whole of Switzerland there appear to be over 400 American holding companies.[2] They do not compete with the Swiss or occupy a noticeable expanse of Swiss territory, but by paying higher salaries and providing lavish living-quarters they add to inflationary pressure. Their influence may be illustrated by the fact that U.N. officials in Geneva, who until recently seemed privileged people, now find themselves living at a secondary level.

Measures to curtail foreign acquisition of landed and other property in Switzerland have been under consideration since 1959; they have been difficult to frame, partly on account of the many Swiss with property abroad. On 1 April 1961 a Swiss Federal decision came into force according to which people living outside Switzerland are obliged to obtain the consent of the local Cantonal authority

[1] *La Tribune de Genève*, 6 June 1961.
[2] Bulletin of the Swiss Bank Corporation for June 1961.

before they may buy Swiss land. Their application must be refused if the land they want is near some important military position, but cannot be refused if they are the direct descendants of former owners or if they wish to build a factory. The last point, in particular, was necessary on account of the number of Swiss who own, or hope to construct, factories in other countries.

The matter of foreign investment in Switzerland is closely related to that of the acquisition of land by people from abroad. It is even more difficult to handle, partly on account of the large amount of Swiss capital invested abroad, an amount which hitherto has probably far exceeded that of foreign capital invested in Switzerland.

The new wave of prosperity was bound to attract increased foreign investment from 1958 onwards. The first measure of defence was to attempt to identify the foreign investor. In order to do this the Aluminium Company of Chippis in the Valais converted its bearer into registered shares in January 1959, and in that same year Nestlé Alimentana Ltd raised capital by an issue of registered shares. During 1960 the great machine firm of Brown, Boveri of Baden, the Swiss Locomotive and Machine Works of Winterthur, and the Bally shoe concern of Zurich did the same sort of thing. This made it possible for these firms to refuse shares to foreigners.

Notwithstanding these beginnings there was, between 12 July and 4 August 1960, an influx of over $2 million worth of foreign capital into Switzerland, and by the middle of August 1960 the banks were discussing what action they should take. It was at first the Swiss National Bank which made a so-called gentlemen's agreement with the 'Big Three' banks: in this the other Swiss banks subsequently acquiesced. It was agreed that three months' notice of withdrawal should be required and a bankers' commission of ¼ per cent charged on money brought into Switzerland for a very short time.

No one is prepared to say how effectual this agreement may have been: it seems that some foreign investors were willing to be penalized because they believed that the value of the Swiss currency, like that of the *Deutschemark*, was likely to be increased. In any case the continuing boom in Switzerland and the weakness of sterling have again increased foreign investment during this year and especially in March. There is no doubt that the Swiss economy is now 'overheated': too much capital invested, notably in building, and clear signs of a shortage of labour are creating a now irresistibly inflationary situation. Owing to Swiss investments abroad and the tourist industry, Switzerland normally expects a deficit in her foreign trade.

but the adverse balance had by the end of May this year grown to quite unprecedented dimensions which help to aggravate the whole position.[1] It looks as if the Swiss are importing some of the manufactured goods they no longer have the labour to produce.

Already various Swiss commentators have lamented that their nation is becoming a *Herrenvolk* unwilling, perhaps soon unable, to do work that soils the hands. Such a state of affairs is the very negation of the Swiss tradition, and, it is added, in the long run master-races always come to a bad end. If the flow of foreign labour to Switzerland should dry up, people wonder how the land would be cultivated, the wine-harvest brought in, the tourist industry continued, the patients nursed in the hospitals—one is reminded a little of our own lesser independence upon West Indian and Irish labour.

A shortage of foreign labour is no longer a mere hypothesis: the flow began to diminish last year. In the first place industrial development in northern Italy notably reduced the number of unemployed Italians. In the second the German Federal Republic began to draw off Italian workmen. If Western Germany was further from home, the German employers offered accommodation for the workers with their families. The deflection of Italians to Western Germany was further encouraged by Italian and West German membership of the Common Market within which, by 1970, labour is to circulate freely, regardless of internal frontiers. Against such pressure an E.F.T.A country like Switzerland is at a disadvantage. Within Switzerland it has become noticeable that foreign workers—again mainly Italians—are beginning to exchange unskilled labour on the land for better-paid work in the factories.

In reply to this development the Swiss federal authorities are looking further afield. On 2 March 1961 they made an agreement with the Spanish Government which has increased the flow of Spanish labour into Switzerland, and quite a number of Greek workers and a few Turks have arrived. The federal authorities, as well as many Swiss employers, are trying to influence the Cantonal authorities to change their policy and allow more Italians to bring their families with them. While Geneva has felt itself compelled by its housing shortage to move in the opposite direction, the building boom has bridged the housing gap in other Cantons, and a few em-

[1] See a circular letter from the Swiss National Bank to the other banks in June 1961, discussed in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 28 June 1961. See also 'Betrachtungen zur Konjunkturlage', *ibid.*, 9 July 1961.

ployers have begun to build hostels for the foreign workers they wish to employ.

This whole situation has created a series of problems which are particularly grave for a small and heterogeneous multi-lingual society with a political system peculiar to itself. In the eighteenth century Swiss society was static and inbred; its decadence was destroyed by the French invasion of 1798. In the early years of the twentieth century just before the first World War, on the other hand, a liberal attitude towards foreign residents had allowed a disconcerting number of them to settle in Switzerland. Today, if over 20 per cent of the labour force is foreign, this only makes about 12 per cent of the whole population, whereas in 1914 15·4 per cent of the whole population was foreign. The majority of these foreigners were citizens of the German Empire who showed no intention of becoming Swiss: on the contrary, their attitude was often more like that of conquering heroes preparing the way for Switzerland to be absorbed into the Hohenzollern Reich. The recollection of the *Ueberfremdung* of those days, particularly in Zurich, is still alive. It is fortified by memories of the period, a generation later, when Fascist Italy frankly coveted the Ticino and the Nazis often referred to *Gau Schweiz*. Between the wars the economic depression sent foreign workers back to their homes, but the political ambition of Hitler and Mussolini caused the organization of the Germans and Italians who yet contrived to live in Switzerland into fifth columns which threatened the country's political survival.

Recollections of the 'thirties go far to explain the shortsighted attitude of the Cantonal authorities and of many individuals who support their policy by treating foreign workers as outsiders: it is easy to do this by insisting upon speaking local German dialects which are hard for foreigners to understand or to learn. The largely mistaken outcry against the buying of land from peasants in the Ticino can best be understood against the inter-war background. But as the eminent jurist, Professor Hans Huber, wrote in the *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* last March, 'Do we not tend to revenge ourselves on Ascona for what we ourselves are unable to do in the factories, the hotels, the bakeries and butcheries, in the building trade and agriculture of the whole country?' Moreover, at the back of many Swiss minds there lurks the thought of a third World War and a third exodus of resident foreigners, so why should one bother to look further ahead?

A country with, say, 50 million inhabitants who speak the same

language can absorb some hundreds of thousands of foreigners, but the problem of assimilation is far harder for Switzerland. According to the census figures of 1960 her population was not yet up to 5½ million. Although three-quarters of the population is German-Swiss, it would be misleading to describe Switzerland as a German-Swiss State with a large French-speaking and a small Italian-speaking minority: it is more of a United Kingdom. Races, languages, religions are precariously balanced through the relationship of the Cantons. So precarious was the balance earlier in the century that many would say that only her neutrality prevented Switzerland from falling apart during the first World War. It is symptomatic of the present state of affairs that quite well-informed Swiss people have a way of deploring the influx of Italian workers because, as they tell one, the Italians are giving Zurich and Geneva, the cities of Zwingli and Calvin, a Roman Catholic majority. This is quite untrue since very few of the Italians have become Swiss citizens The proportion of Catholic citizens in Zurich has increased thanks to the incursion mainly of German-Swiss Catholics from the mountain Cantons such as Uri and Schwyz. It appears probable that the majority of the citizens of Geneva is by now Roman Catholic, mainly on account of the arrival of French-speaking Swiss from Fribourg and the Valais. But Geneva, with a majority of foreign students at its university, is an international phenomenon from which no Swiss conclusions can be drawn.

Apart from common interests, the forces which hold the Swiss together are relatively obscure—the principle of international neutrality, possibly the federal principle, and certainly that of the direct sovereignty of the people exercised through the Referendum and the Initiative.[1] It is more difficult for Switzerland to assimilate foreigners into the sovereign people than it is for a parliamentary democracy to absorb foreigners into the body of its electors. The Swiss like to speak of themselves as a *Willensnation* (a nation because it wishes to be one—but are not all nations defined as such?), and they insist that Swiss civilization, with no language of its own, is political rather than literary. Indeed, even in Switzerland it is a matter for dispute whether a Swiss literature exists: are not Max Frisch and Friedrich Dürrenmatt, it is often asked, essentially German writers rather than Swiss? It is clearly easier for France or the United States to assimilate outsiders than it is for multi-lingual

[1] These vital provisions of the Swiss Constitution are described in 'Democratic Vicissitudes in Switzerland', in *The World Today*, October 1958, p. 452.

Switzerland. In the case of her neighbours there is a tug in each direction, but the Swiss assimilation of Germans, French, and Italians is a process which at least does not start from scratch.

In the present situation most Swiss employers—they have an interest in doing so but may nonetheless be right—recommend a more hospitable approach to foreign workers: they favour the acceptance of foreigners by absorbing a fair number of them into the Swiss way of life. The federal authorities have relatively little to say in the matter, while it has been seen that the Cantonal authorities tend to hold back, partly on account of old suspicions. There is, however, only one recent case on record of the formation of a Communist cell by Italian workers in Switzerland, and it proved simple enough to expel the men concerned. It should be added that the Swiss police have powers to expel any foreigner, including one who owns property in Switzerland. Interestingly enough—for they have often collided over other issues—the Swiss trade unions are on the side of the Cantons against the employers, for they regret the extent of foreign labour in Switzerland as having restricted the increase of wages. Trade union leaders blame the employers for over-investment (Swiss *entrepreneurs* plough back their profits more than ours do) and thus for the 'overheated' economy of the country.

Ultimately the question which disturbs the political leaders of Switzerland when they contemplate the various aspects of *Ueberfremdung* is, should one accept the present drive, enrol more workers from wherever one can, and allow Switzerland to be integrated into a highly industrialized Europe? Or should one hold back, put the brake on further development, try to absorb a part of the foreigners politically, and remain something different and apart? Here the long-drawn-out argument of Common Market versus E.F.T.A. comes to the surface again. Cynics may be heard to say that Switzerland will, as usual, do the same as the rest of Europe with twenty years' delay. The election in June of Hans Schaffner as a new *Bundesrat* or Federal Councillor to succeed Max Petitpierre did honour to a champion of E.F.T.A.: Monsieur Petitpierre's last official speech, however, made an unexpected concession over sovereignty to the principles of the Common Market. At all events the reduced availability of foreign labour may provide an automatic and salutary limitation to Swiss economic expansion.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN

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Note of the Month

New Government in the Congo

THE formation in the Congo of a Government of national union under the leadership of Cyrille Adoula, and its acceptance by the Congo Parliament, is the result of a long and hard series of negotiations in which the United Nations representatives have played a much bigger part than is generally realized.

Since December 1960 the Congo has had three centres of power: Stanleyville, where the rump of the old Lumumba Government under Antoine Gizenga has claimed legal authority over the whole Congo; Elizabethville, where Moise Tshombe has fought hard to maintain the independence of Katanga, and Leopoldville, where Joseph Kasavubu, the Head of State, has tried to keep some control over a group of politicians ranging from Lumumba sympathizers to outright secessionists. For some time it has been clear that a firm alliance between any two of these groups, particularly if supported by the U.N., would have a good chance of absorbing the third. Since an alliance between the Tshombe and Gizenga groups was unlikely, the key question has always been the orientation of Mr Kasavubu and his various associates.

In February it seemed likely that Mr Kasavubu and Mr Tshombe would unite against Mr Gizenga. Both were threatened by Stanleyville troops and both bitterly resented the resolution of the Security Council which gave the U.N. the right to evacuate foreign advisers and which urged that Parliament should be reconvened. The climax of these negotiations was the conference in March in Tananarive, which Mr Gizenga refused to attend, and at which it was agreed to organize the Congo as a confederation of small sovereign states with Mr Kasavubu as President but with no central Government or assembly. When Mr Kasavubu returned to Leopoldville he realized, however, that he had been out-manœuvred by Mr Tshombe, that he had agreed to balkanize the Congo and curtail his own power, and had in return been given no assurance that Katanga's wealth would be shared with the rest of the Congo. Mr Gizenga in the meantime

declared his support of the Security Council resolution, being shrewd enough to realize that he, with virtually no foreign advisers and a probable majority in Parliament, had nothing to lose by its application.

From then on Mr Kasavubu increasingly turned towards Stanleyville and the United Nations. Contact was made with Mr Gizenga, and on 17 April Mr Kasavubu signed an agreement in which he asked for U.N. assistance to reorganize the army. When Mr Tshombe refused to agree to a federal rather than a confederal system he was arrested by Congolese troops at Colquilhatville and charged with high treason by Mr Kasavubu. Meanwhile Mr Gizenga made it clear that he was prepared to negotiate, but only if Parliament was reconvened and if the United Nations guaranteed the security of each deputy. On 19 June an agreement to this effect was signed, and Mr Tshombe was then released on the understanding that he would co-operate. But once back in Elizabethville, he stated that to call Parliament would be premature and that Katanga's independence must be maintained 'at all costs'. It was clear, however, that his position was weakening. Changes of Government in Belgium and the United States made less likely even tacit support for him; the U.N. had 10,000 troops in Katanga and had deported some of his key advisers. Most important of all, the directors of the big Katanga firms were beginning to see that with Mr Lumumba out of the way it would be to their advantage to reunite the Congo.

Parliament met on 25 July. Lovanium University was taken over and the entire area 'neutralized' and guarded by U.N. troops. Mr Gizenga did not attend himself but sent a delegation of sixty parliamentarians led by Christopher Gbenye, who succeeded Mr Lumumba as President of the Mouvement National Congolais. No deputies attended from Upper Katanga but the northern part of the Province, which, under the leadership of Jason Sendwe, has always opposed Tshombe, was well represented.

After negotiations the Gizengists, who had a small majority in Parliament, agreed to recognize Mr Kasavubu as Head of State and Cyrille Adoula—a trade unionist with Socialist sympathies—as Prime Minister. Mr Adoula quickly drew up his Cabinet, offering the two Vice-Presidencies to Mr Sendwe and Mr Gizenga and the Ministry of the Interior to Mr Gbenye. This Government was confirmed by both Houses of Parliament on 2 August.

For the first time since September 1960 the Congo has a legal

and properly constituted Government, recognized by the United Nations and ready to co-operate. The battle is, however, by no means over. Mr Gizenga has not yet come to Leopoldville,[1] though he has formally accepted the post of Vice-President. Short of using force, some way still has to be found of incorporating Upper Katanga in the new regime and saving Mr Tshombe's face. Only then can the Adoula Government lay claim to the shares and revenue from Union Minière without which no central Government can easily function. Once these problems are settled the Parliament will still have to thrash out the details of a Constitution and settle once and for all the balance of power. Nevertheless in Mr Adoula the country has a leader who is strong without being controversial and who with luck and international goodwill has a chance of bringing stability to the Congo.

[1] At the time of writing, 21 August

CORRIGENDUM

In the Note on the Berlin crisis in *The World Today*, August 1961, p. 319, line 1, the date of publication of the Western Powers' Notes to Moscow should be 18 July, not 19 June.

The Soviet Troika Proposals

THE Soviet 'troika' proposals may be said to fall into two categorie
which, while having a measure of affinity, are based on premisse
which have no necessary connection with each other.

There are, in the first place, those proposals which have to d
with the membership of international bodies. These are founded o
the contention that the world is divided into three groups of States
those which are 'socialist' in character, those which are members o
the Western military alliance system, and States which fall int
neither of these camps—the neutralists. The Soviet Union claim
that, in view of this analysis, the composition of international organ
or institutions which are not exclusive to any one or two of thes
groups, and in which not all States are represented, should be base
on the principle of the equal representation of each of the thre
groups. Thus, at the Fifteenth Session of the U.N. Genera
Assembly, which opened in September 1960, the Soviet Union pu
forward a draft resolution providing for the reorganization of th
Security Council on the basis of parity between the three groups
Nothing has yet come of this, nor of another Soviet suggestion mad
at the same Assembly which would have added to the Ten-Powe
Disarmament Committee (made up of five Communist and fiv
Western States) five neutralist States.[2] A further proposal designe
to implement the same principle was that of the Soviet expert on
Committee set up to review the activities and structure of the U.N
Secretariat, which reported in June 1961. He took the view that al
the posts in the Secretariat which are filled with a regard, in accord
ance with Article 101 of the Charter, for geographical considera
tions should be refilled as necessary so that nationals of the thre
groups of States were employed in equal numbers at all levels.[3]

On this question of the composition of international bodies, ther
is general agreement that they should reflect, as faithfully as pos
sible, the group they are designed to represent. Even in the case o
international secretariats, the members of which are supposed t
act impartially in the service of the institution which employs them
it is accepted that recruitment must needs take place on a basi
which pays some attention to the composition of the institution i
whose name the secretariat acts. It is the case that the endeavour t
mplement the principle of fair representation may give rise to con

[1] U.N. Document A/C1/L 249.
[2] U.N. Document A/4509.
[3] U.N. Document A/4776.

siderable difficulties. But on these issues there is room for negotiation, and while the validity of the Soviet Union's classification of States into three watertight compartments may be disputed, it is not to be denied that it has a foundation in the actual international situation, and may therefore provide a basis on which to construct or reconstruct those international bodies with a limited membership which are intended to represent the whole of the international society. It is not, however, proposed to consider further here this first category of troika proposals.

The manifestations of the troika principle which fall into the second category are different in both character and significance, and call for a more extended examination. They relate to the nature of the chief administrative or executive office of international institutions, proposing to reorganize it in accordance with the troika idea. So far such proposals have been made in two contexts, the first being the United Nations. Mr Khrushchev was a delegate at the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly, and towards the end of his first speech to it he turned his attention to the structure of the U N. Secretariat which, he contended, had, under the guidance of Mr Hammarskjöld, shown partiality over the Congo question. He granted that the United Nations was 'useful and necessary', but regretted to observe that its executive machinery was 'constructed in a one-sided manner'. This had the result that 'it often approaches the solution of questions from the standpoint of a particular group of countries', and he commented that 'this is particularly true of the activities of the United Nations Secretary-General'. To remedy this Mr Khrushchev proposed that the post of Secretary-General be abolished and in its place established 'a collective executive organ of the United Nations consisting of three persons each of whom would represent a group of States'—the Communist States, States members of the Western military alliance system, and States falling into neither of these categories. Such a three-man executive would have to be unanimous for it to take any action, for the purpose of the proposed reorganization was to 'provide a definite guarantee that the work of the United Nations executive organ would not be carried on to the detriment of any one of these groups of States'.[1]

This proposal was reiterated on several other occasions by Mr Khrushchev, and echoed by the delegates of the other East European members of the U.N. But it secured no other support in the

[1] This and the preceding quotations are taken from the Official Record of the 869th Plenary Meeting of the U.N. General Assembly, paras. 273–85.

Assembly, and when, in November, the Administrative and Budgetary Committee took up the question of the organization and work of the Secretariat, the U.S.S.R. agreed that, instead of pressing its proposals, it would wait for the report of a committee of experts on the Secretariat, due in May 1961. This did not prove to be the first sign of a quiet abandonment of the proposal, however, for it was returned to with some vigour early in 1961 after the death of Mr Lumumba, considerable responsibility for which was laid by the Soviet Union at Mr Hammarskjold's door. It was also introduced into the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, which resumed on 21 March 1961 after a three-month break.

That Conference had opened on 31 October 1958, and two years of intricate and hard bargaining had produced a substantial measure of agreement upon a draft treaty. A number of most important issues remained outstanding, but it was widely felt in the West that all three parties to the Conference, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, wanted to reach agreement on this question. The West therefore looked forward to the resumption with cautious optimism, the more so as it had agreed to concede a number of points to the Soviet Union.[1] This optimism was dissipated, however, as soon as the resumption took place, for the leader of the Soviet delegation at once indicated that his Government had had second thoughts about the agreement which had been reached concerning the chief executive office of the Control Organization which was to be set up by the treaty to supervise its observance. In the Soviet view, he said, 'experience has shown that one-man executive control of international organizations is used by the Western Powers in their own interests and to the detriment of peace and international co-operation.'[2] He therefore suggested that instead of a single Administrator there should be at the head of the control organization's secretariat an administrative council of three members, one from each of the groups of States into which the Soviet Union saw the world as being divided, who would have to agree unanimously before the council could take any action. Mr Walter Lippmann, in his report of an interview with Mr Khrushchev, quoted him as saying that such a council was essential because 'I will never entrust the security of the Soviet Union to any foreigner.'[3]

[1] See 'Nuclear-Test Negotiations', in *The World Today*, June 1961.
[2] *Soviet News*, 23 March 1961.
[3] *New York Herald Tribune* (European edition), 17 April 1961.

It might be argued that there is a third category of troika proposals, one which concerns the decision-making process of international bodies other than secretariats, and which arises out of a Soviet proposal concerning the procedure of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, made at the Geneva Conference on Laos which was proceeding slowly during the late spring and the summer of 1961. The Commission, consisting of India, Canada, and Poland, was established by the Geneva Agreements of July 1954 which provided that the Commission should take some, but not all, of its decisions by majority vote; the Soviet Union now proposes that it should take all of its decisions on the principle of unanimity. This has been seen as another instance of the troika idea, on the ground that, like the proposals for the U.N. Secretary-General and the Administrator of the Nuclear Tests Ban Control Organization, it provides for rule by unanimity or no rule at all. However, unless one regards the Commission as akin to an independent, international secretariat, in which case the proposal would fall within the second category of troikas, the suggestion concerning its procedure can only be included with the troika proposals, as a third category, if the troika principle, with its threefold connotation, is thought to comprehend any appearance of the quite distinct procedural device, not uncommon in inter-State arrangements, of unanimity. It is difficult to see the justification for this. It is true that the Commission is constructed on what is now called the troika basis, but that is no argument for labelling the new proposal concerning its procedure with the word troika; it simply shows that the formula on which the Commission was composed, although only now declared to be an immutable principle of Soviet policy, drawn from the objective condition of the world, has for some time been a working rule in matters such as this.

It is therefore suggested that the troika proposals fall only into two categories. They have in common the fact that the reorganization they propose is based on an analysis of international society into three groups of States. But whereas the type of proposal mentioned first is a direct consequence of this analysis, and raises no important issues of principle, the other type, which is the product of dissatisfaction with the activities of the U.N. Secretary-General, and has as its premise the assertion that it is impossible to find men to head international secretariats who will be regarded as satisfactory by all three groups of States, breaks with a forty-year tradition, and is much more serious in its implications. It is to pro-

posals of this latter type that reference is being made when, in th rest of this article, the word troika is used.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE TROIKA

An international secretariat headed by a troika would be differer in three most significant respects from the concept of an inter national civil service which has been generally accepted since th establishment of the League of Nations. In the first place, it woul substitute a committee for the single head of the secretariat. Second ly, that committee would have to be unanimous for it to act on be half of the institution in question. And, thirdly, each of the thre members of the committee would be in his post to ensure that th interests of the group of States which he represented were nc jeopardized. In sum this reorganization would constitute an out right rejection of the idea and ideal of a body of international officia serving the institution which employed them rather than th interests of their own States, and so organized as to permit the rapi execution of the decisions of their employer.

Such had been until recently the structure, agreed in broad out line, of the Control Organization to supervise a Treaty bannin nuclear tests.[1] The Parties would meet annually in Conference fc purposes of discussion, recommendation, and the settling of mat ters concerning the internal running of the Organization. The executive committee would be the Control Commission, comprisin permanent and non-permanent members, organized so as to b able to function continuously, and charged with the establishmer and supervision of a Detection and Identification System. Thes two bodies might be described as political, in that they would b made up of States. The third part of the Organization, the secre tariat, would also reflect the nature of international society: th appointment of its head, the Administrator, would require agree ment between Britain, America, and Russia, and other staff woul be recruited with an eye to preserving a balance between nationals c Communist and Western States. But it would be fundamentall different in character from the other two parts of the Organizatio in that the Administrator and his staff would be international civ servants, responsible to and receiving instructions from no on other than the Organization. It would be the Administrator responsibility to certify events which, on the basis of agreed criteri: were eligible for on-site inspection, and to publicize data about suc

[1] See Cmnd 1397

events within seventy-two hours of their occurrence. If requested to do so in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty he would have to arrange for the speedy inspection of the area which had been certified by him as eligible for inspection.

To replace the Administrator by a troika, as the Soviet Union proposes, would entirely change the previously agreed character of the Control Organization's executive office. In place of a system based upon independence and impartiality, designed to administer a Treaty, and geared to speedy action, would be one whose members conceived their primary job to be the defence of partial interests, and who would have the means of ensuring that those interests were not put in jeopardy. In the Western view this would not constitute a control system at all, in that it would be an assurance of impotence at crucial moments rather than the provision of a threat to potential malefactors that they might be detected. The Soviet Union, however, has argued that to see its proposal in this light is to misinterpret it; it claims that while the troika is necessary in order to ensure the impartial implementation of the decisions of the Control Commission, it does not prejudice the control system which, in the essential matter of inspection, would operate automatically. In his *aide-mémoire* given to President Kennedy in Vienna on 4 June, Mr Khrushchev said that 'on-the-spot inspections within the limit of the agreed quotas must be effected at the request of the side interested in the inspection without any voting in the control commission or any other agency. All that is needed are objective readings of instruments at control posts indicating that a phenomenon has taken place at some part of a given country which might be suspected of being a nuclear explosion. . . Hence no obstacles to inspection, to which the United States' representatives refer in speaking of the so-called "veto", can be created by the administrative council.'[1]

The West has been unimpressed by this argument. In its reply of 17 June, reiterated in a further Note of 15 July, the United States pointed out that, given a troika at the head of the Control Organization's secretariat, any member of it could, by failing to agree that the criteria had been met, block certification of events which the others thought eligible for on-site inspection, or could obstruct or delay the dispatching of an on-site inspection team, and hence render it ineffective. Western suspicions of the intent behind the Soviet suggestion have been fanned by Soviet reluctance to elaborate upon its

[1] *Soviet News*, 13 June 1961.

proposal and by its unwillingness to indicate precisely which of tl
Administrator's proposed powers now cause it concern. On th
point the Soviet Union has limited itself to saying that: 'Of cours
there are other questions too, and many of them are bound to aris
in the course of carrying out the treaty on the discontinuance (
nuclear weapon tests, on which the executive agency [i.e. tl
Administrator or Administrative Council] will have to take de
cisions. A situation cannot be tolerated in which unilateral decisio
would be taken and conditions for arbitrariness created.'[1] In view (
the Delphic quality of this section of the Soviet reply it is not su
prising that the Western position, as stated in the most rece
American Note on the subject, should be that 'the effects of this pr
posal would be the paralysis of the entire control organization an
would surely make a mockery of effective international inspection.

It has been argued[3] that the Western position would not b
greatly harmed if it accepted a troika in this context, because tl
execution of control measures depends on the assent of the Stat
concerned. If one of them wants to discontinue control, and, henc
the Treaty, it can do so, and, the argument runs, it matters n
whether it does it by blocking the passage of an inspection team (
by vetoing the proposal for its dispatch. This argument th
assumes that the occasion for bringing the Treaty to an end woul
be equally clear-cut in both cases. But whether disagreement amor
the three top administrators, or time-wasting obstruction on tl
part of one of them, is a cover for an evasion of the Treaty is likel
to be less obvious than a refusal by a Government to allow an inspe
tion team to visit an area which it had a right to visit. And witl
drawal from the Treaty obligations on the ground of administrati
obstruction, or disagreement expressed in the manner provided f
by the Treaty, might not make an obviously convincing case. Tl
West is therefore unlikely to accept a troika here, for it would e
danger the achievement of a control system which would be fr
from internal obstacles in the way of its operating speedily, effe
tively, and impartially, and it would also blur the responsibility f
any interference from outside with the operation of the system, bot
of which eventualities the West is determined to avoid.

Similarly the question of a troika in the Secretariat of the Unite
Nations raises apprehensions concerning the possibility of par
lysis because of disagreements within the three-headed Secretar

[1] *Soviet News*, 13 June 1961. [2] Quoted in *The Times*, 17 July 1961.
[3] See the *Observer*, 14 May 1961.

General. This might happen with regard to matters concerning the internal administration of the U.N. It would, in view of the circumstances which have given rise to the troika proposals, very possibly occur when there was any likelihood of the U.N. taking a hand in the relations of States, for it would be unusual if the three men comprising the troika, and representing the interests of three groups of States, agreed upon what to say or do. Given such a structure the U.N. action in the Congo would not have got far. Different views as to what should be said by the Secretary-General in the Bizerta issue would have resulted in a troika saying nothing at all as a corporate body. As it is only the Soviet bloc which is anxious that the U.N. should be stultified in this way, the troika proposal in this context is unlikely to prosper, quite apart from the practical difficulties with which it is surrounded, difficulties which relate to the representation of and the determination of policy by each of the three groups, and which, with the Communist Chinese Government not far from membership in the U.N., may affect the Communist bloc no less than the others.

It is likely that the word troika will frequently be heard at the U.N. General Assembly which begins its Sixteenth Session on 19 September. The West has placed on the provisional agenda an item concerning the need for a controlled ban on nuclear tests—a sign, perhaps, that, in face of Soviet unwillingness to negotiate further, it has given up hope of a Treaty and is anxious to rally opinion behind its position in case it should decide to be the first to resume tests. The question of the composition and organization of the top levels of the Secretariat will also be discussed as a number of proposals regarding them have been made. Indonesia has suggested[1] that all U.N. Under-Secretaries (the grade immediately below Secretary-General), and other top advisers of the Secretary-General, be drawn only from neutralist States, a proposal which is unlikely to be greeted with wide acclaim. The majority of a Committee of Experts appointed to review the activities and organization of the Secretariat has proposed that the number of Under-Secretaries at U.N. headquarters be reduced from thirteen to eight. The minority of this Committee, the Indian, Ghanaian, and United Arab Republic experts, proposed that three Deputy Secretaries-General be appointed by the Secretary-General with the main political trends in the world today in mind, to be concerned primarily with political and diplomatic functions. Three past Presi-

[1] *New York Herald Tribune* (European edition), 21 June 1961.

dents of the General Assembly have suggested that the number c Under-Secretaries for Special Political Affairs be increased fror two to five.[1] The Secretary-General has commented on the las three proposals, and made his own:[2] that there be five Assistan Secretaries-General and nine Under-Secretaries-General, all of th same rank, the distinction being that the Assistant Secretaries General would deal with political matters; three of these five woul be nationals of neutralist States, one would be an American, and th remaining one a Russian.

All these proposals, and also those concerning the make-up c the forum for disarmament talks, relate to and affect only the com position of international bodies, and therefore, to the extent t which they are based upon the threefold division of the world, fa into what has here been called the first category of troika proposals A proposal regarding the top level of the U.N Secretariat below th rank of Secretary-General may be put to the Soviet Union as compromise to meet its proposal concerning the office of Secretary General, and it may be that the Soviet Union will be pleased t accept it as such. But it is important to realize that there is really n middle ground between this and the other type of troika proposal which, on the premise that 'while there are neutral countries ther are no neutral men',[3] would radically alter not only the compositio but also the character of the chief administrative or executive offic of international institutions.

ALAN JAMES

Politics in Portugal and her Empire

'Whatever the difficulties in our path and the sacrifices we must make to overcome them, I see no other attitude save the decision to continue.'

António de Oliveira Salazar, 30 June 1961

PREMIER SALAZAR'S words reiterated the firm stand of a dedicate ruler determined to overcome the Angolan crisis at the risk of th downfall of his own regime as well as of his colonial empire. In wha

[1] This and the previous two proposals are made in U.N. Document A/4776

[2] U N Document A/4794

[3] Mr Khrushchev, quoted by Mr Lippmann in *New York Herald Tribun* (European edition), 17 April 1961.

might have been moments of reconciliation to appease world-wide condemnation of his efforts to crush the revolt in Angola, Dr Salazar, blinded by his personal concept of destiny, has chosen to attack both the United Nations and the United States. He has accused the U.N., which by the overwhelming majority vote of its members has sought to investigate the Angolan crisis, of mob rule; and the U.S. of aligning itself with the Soviet Union to condemn Portuguese rule in Angola, a policy designed to win U.N. votes in the cold war, but which served Communist subversion in Africa. Portugal, who has used her ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a leverage to rule her overseas possessions, today stands alone as the Western allies muster together the strength to face a mounting Berlin crisis. Her only enthusiastic backing comes from '*apartheid*' South Africa and Spain's General Franco, and it seems improbable that the latter will fully honour his special Portuguese alliance, the Iberian Pact, by giving Dr Salazar effective military support in Africa.

Many domestic problems remain untouched. Direct suffrage in presidential elections was denied the voter after General Humberto Delgado's surprising campaign of 1958, in which he obtained 22·5 per cent of the popular vote. Now the President is elected by an electoral college consisting of members of the National Assembly, the Corporative Chamber, and municipal officials of each district or province of Portugal According to the Constitution, Premier Salazar is faced this autumn with an election for the 130 seats of the National Assembly.[1] Elections for the Assembly are held every four years. In the last election, of 1957, several opposition candidates withdrew and only one faced the candidates of the single legal party, the *União Nacional*. Voting requirements are strict and allow only about 15 per cent of the nation's 9 million population to vote. Although criticism rarely escapes the rigid press censorship, the *Diário Popular* recently advocated reforms that would allow municipal administrators to be freely chosen and elected by the people.

Within Portugal opposition to the Salazar regime has become quite active since the seizure last January of the *Santa Maria* by Henrique Galvão, and particularly since the outbreak of riots in Angola in February, although some recent reports indicate that some of these critics have decided to side with Dr Salazar at least

[1] Although not officially announced, a reliable source indicated that at a meeting between Dr Salazar and the Council of Ministers in late July it was decided that the elections should be 'postponed indefinitely'.

temporarily. The most significant contribution is a 20,000-wo document entitled 'Programme for the Democratization of t Republic' which is supported by the leaders of the main oppositio This well-defined programme was signed by sixty-one conservati republicans and liberal democrats on 31 January but was not r leased to the press until May. One section of this opposition, callir itself the *Directório Democrata Social*, is led by old-guard republ cans and liberals such as former Minister of Agriculture, Már de Azevedo Gomes, and Helder Ribeiro. This group, whi prefers negotiation to force in achieving its proposals, split abo five years ago from a second section of the opposition, named t *Seara Nova*. The latter, which sponsors a magazine with the san title, is composed of socialists led by Luís Câmara Reys and includ a few Communist sympathizers. One element of the *Seara No* advocates sweeping reforms and is led by Arlindo Vicente, a form presidential candidate, who believes that the 'Directório' expec too much from arbitration.

The 'Programme for the Democratization of the Republic' important because it represents a summing-up of proposals su gested by the opposition during past years and has the unified bac ing of groups often divided in their thinking. It comprises thirte parts which call for the restoration of democratic order with t establishment of basic freedoms (an electoral law, an amnesty f political prisoners, etc.); the liquidation of the corporative organiz tion; the reform of local administration; and proposals for a Churc State relationship, an overseas policy, a revision of the juridic system, education and culture, the economy, labour and welfar housing, national defence, and foreign policy. Immediately aft the press release of the 'Programme', three leaders of the oppositio Acácio Augusto Cardoso Gouveia, Gustavo Garatão Soromenh and Mário Alberto Lopes Soares, were arrested, followed in ear June by the detention of two leaders in Oporto, Arnaldo Vei Pires and Artur Andrade, and the arrest in mid-July of Eduardo Figueiredo. At least five more members of the opposition we arrested on 26 and 27 July, including Dr Luís Dias Amado ar Homem de Figueiredo.

The Salazar regime has generally ignored the protests of t opposition; nevertheless it is worth noting the manifestations whi have occurred during the past months. Early in February a letter President Américo Tomás was signed by thirty-nine Social Dem crats reiterating their unanswered demands of the precedir

November for two political concessions: permission to hold a congress to draw up an opposition party and permission to publish a weekly newspaper. On 7 February President Tomás received three members of the opposition, Mário de Azevedo Gomes, Eduardo de Figueiredo, and Acácio Gouveia. On the same evening a manifesto was issued to Portuguese democrats which, in discussing the meeting, referred to a lapse in the colonial administration during the past few years and urged that the President should 'at once appoint a government capable of inspiring confidence in the country . . . and restoring to the Portuguese the fundamental liberties promised in the Constitution which have shamefully been a dead letter among us'. In late February 160 professors, journalists, lawyers, students, and business men asked President Tomás to allow political opponents to take part in the November elections for the General Assembly.

On 13 April Premier Salazar forestalled a *coup d'état* by announcing a Cabinet reshuffle in which he assumed the post of Defence Minister. Apparently the Minister of Defence, General Botelho Moniz, and other military leaders, desiring to avoid a prolonged and bloody conflict in Angola, had issued an ultimatum to Dr Salazar asking for his resignation. Dr Salazar countered by dismissing these adversaries from their posts. Dissension in the Army, a vital element in Dr Salazar's support, had been evident, centring round disagreement between Moniz and another former Minister of Defence, Colonel Santos Costa. Some political observers had even considered Moniz as Dr Salazar's possible successor, though it is believed that the former President, Marshal Craveiro Lopes (1952–8), was a more likely candidate.

Another letter, this time signed by ninety-nine journalists, was handed to President Tomás on 21 April. This group, headed by Raul Rego and including many well-known journalists who held opinions somewhat in opposition to the regime, demanded the immediate suppression of the censorship and a new press law permitting the public to be properly informed. A student manifesto appeared in the newspapers of 30 April pressing for educational reforms both in Portugal and in her overseas territories, as well as for new laws allowing the integration of indigenous inhabitants, free economic regulations, decentralization of administration, and a complete revision of all international pacts. On 9 May some 500 dissident farmers of the Alentejo province met at Evora and urged the Government to take measures to alleviate the agricultural crisis

caused not by climatic conditions but by 'the directed economy which we are submitted'.

Some 20,000 monarchists support the pretender to the crow Dom Duarte Nuno. Officially Duarte Nuno is backed by the 'Cau Monarquica' led by Guilherme Braga da Cruz, Rector of the Ui versity of Coimbra; these monarchists strongly support Premi Salazar. Right-wing monarchists are led by Jacinto Ferreira ai with their newspaper, *Debate*, are very critical of the regin Liberal monarchists, led by Professor Vieira de Almeida of t University of Lisbon, back the *Directório Democrata Social*. T Catholic-monarchist newspaper, *A Voz*, also lends support to t pretender.

The Portuguese Communist Party, founded in 1921 and bann since 1926, is small but presumably well organized and for a nui ber of years has run two monthly publications, *Avante* and *Militante*. It appeals to the Portuguese youth, with some small i fluence in the universities and among lower-class workers. T Portuguese Government's tendency to blame the Communists f all opposition to the regime indirectly serves to enhance and pu licize the Party's activities Radio Moscow broadcasts two sh programmes each day to Portugal, and curiosity among the peo has been aroused. During the first six months of this year fifty-fo persons were tried by the Plenary Tribunals for subversive acti ties, presumably most of them for Communist activities, and or three were acquitted.

Since 1910, when the Republic came into existence, the Catho Church has been separated from the State, although in 1940 Concordat was signed closing the gap. Dr Salazar has depend upon Church support to maintain power; he and Cardinal Patriar Manuel Gonçalves Cerejeira were once fellow members of the n defunct 'Centro Católica' party, but their relationship cooled ma years ago when Salazar introduced his own fascist-styled you movement, the 'Mocidade Portuguèsa', and ordered the Church stay out of politics. Today there is little criticism from the Chur hierarchy, and the bishops lend considerable support to the regin The liberal wing of the Church is led by the Bishop of Opor António Ferreira Gomes, who voiced his discontent with soc economic, and political conditions in 1958 and is now in Spain as exile. Nearly all the priests of the Oporto diocese have support their bishop's position, and throughout the country, particularly Lisbon, many young priests are dissatisfied with the regime.

The 'Acção Católica' comprises a youth movement, the 'Juventude Católica', and an adult movement, the 'Liga dos Homens de Acção Católica'. The 'Juventude Católica' has been the most active politically, but its few criticisms have been quickly suppressed. The 'Opus Dei' is slowly infiltrating Portuguese economic and social life but has not permeated politics to the extent that it has in Spain. It is believed to have small influence in the universities. Marcelo Caetano, Rector of the University of Lisbon, a former Minister who is often mentioned as Salazar's possible successor, is believed to be at least a sympathizer, as is another former Minister and now professor of law, Manuel Cavaleiro Ferreira. The 'Opus Dei' controls the magazine *Rumo* and some small commercial firms as well as the Banco de Agricultura and possibly the Banco Português Atlântico.

Dr Salazar has attempted to build his state around a rather ineffective corporative structure established in the 1930s. Only recently was legislation enacted creating the first eight corporations. In this system each corporation is composed of employer and employee associations engaged in the same or affiliated classes of economic, social, or professional activity; the employer associations are called guilds (*gremios*) while the employee associations are known as syndicates or labour unions (*sindicatos*) Theoretically the goal of a corporate state would be achieved when all guilds and syndicates have been organized into corporations in their fields of activity. However, membership in a guild or syndicate is optional except for industries dealing with the necessities of life (bread, canned fish, etc.), and it has been found impracticable to organize agricultural labourers and fishermen (the largest groups within the working class) into syndicates; instead, Casas do Povo and Casas dos Pescadores have been established.

Perhaps the chief threat to the regime comes from a small and wealthy group of monopolists who today seem uncertain about the system which they have supported for so many years and which in turn has favoured them with key concessions and allowed them to consolidate their power. One observer has noted that not more than eleven families control most of Portugal's domestic and overseas industry. Clearly, the Government's attention has concentrated on the industrial sector, and progress, though limited by restrictions on foreign capital and credits, has undoubtedly been made there; agriculture, on the other hand, has noticeably fallen behind. A Second Six-Year Development Plan (1959–64) is now being undertaken, and last year £53 million was expended, of which 12 per cent was

allocated to agriculture. Of the originally scheduled expenditure only 73·7 per cent of the allocation for agriculture was carrie out, whereas 127·5 per cent of the planned total was expended i the fishing, mining, and transforming industries. The Banco d Fomento Nacional (National Development Bank) was establishe in 1959 to aid private industry, and only 18 per cent of its credi in 1960 went for agricultural projects. According to the Bank recent annual report, Portugal's gross national product has ir creased by 3·7 per cent annually during the period 1952–9, yet th agricultural sector, which occupies nearly half of the active popula tion, increased by only 1·1 per cent in the same period. Amon noteworthy industrial accomplishments is the establishment c Siderurgia Nacional, Portugal's first iron and steel works, at Seix near Lisbon, the works entered full production in mid-July with a annual capacity of 230,000 tons of pig iron. An important chemica manufacturing plant, Nitratos de Portugal, was recently inaugurat ed at Alverca; in April Portugal's first atomic reactor began to func tion, and in July the second of three phases of the important Dour River hydroelectric project was completed. The first section of modern super highway which will eventually stretch from Lisbo to Oporto has been terminated, but the newspaper *O Seculo* ha vigorously criticized other roads and highways as being a 'nation shame'.

The plight of the Portuguese worker (which will worsen with th inevitable increase in cost of living caused by expenditure in Angol is revealed by the Banco Nacional Ultramarino. Based on averag daily earnings of 24 escudos (6*s*.), it is estimated that the Portugues farm labourer must work sixty-eight minutes to earn one kg c bread, thirty minutes for one kg. of potatoes, and five and a hal hours for one kg. of second-grade beef, twenty-five hours for a pai of shoes, and more than 166 hours for a woollen suit of appropriat quality. The farmer's wife and daughter, earning 15 escudos dail (about 4*s*.), must work nearly 109 minutes for their bread In con trast, the ordinary Lisbon labourer must work forty-six minutes t earn one kg. of bread. A recent Government decree taxing luxur items such as beer, soft drinks, tobacco, etc. only partially affect this class of workers, and any further taxation or price rise of neces sary items is certain to increase discontent.

When Portugal joined the European Free Trade Associatio (E.F.T.A.) she was given special concessions but was called upon t reduce her tariffs to 70 per cent by 1963. Several branches of in

dustry include numerous small and inefficient firms which are incapable of competing with E.F.T.A. once tariffs are eliminated; to counter this problem, reorganization commissions are studying how the firms and industries might be linked together and improved. The visit to Portugal last May of the West German Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Economy, Ludwig Erhard, bolstered hopes that the country's large trade deficit (£22·9 million in 1960) with its most important trading partner would be decreased.

Full-scale war rages in Angola today.[1] The Army offensive during the summer dry season appears to be producing results, and the rebels' plan now seems to be to withdraw slowly and await the wet season, more suitable for guerrilla warfare. The population of northern Angola has almost entirely evacuated the area, more than 10,000 natives having fled to the Congo Republic and several thousand European settlers to Luanda. By July probably more than 1,000 Portuguese settlers and soldiers and many more thousands of natives on each side had been killed.

From the economic standpoint Angola is the most valuable of the overseas territories. Resources are practically untapped; there is a large diamond industry and some oil production. A contract with the German steel monopoly, Krupp, allows exploitation of important manganese and iron-ore deposits. Coffee is the principal export (amounting to a value of £15 million in 1960), and although Portuguese officials claim that most of the crop is not grown in the rebel-held area, it is estimated that a hastily formed volunteer force has some chance of saving half of the predicted record crop of 150,000 tons. However, in 1960 Angola recorded an unfavourable balance of trade for the fourth consecutive year owing to a surge of rising imports.

After four centuries of rule, statistics reveal that Portugal has provided Angola with less than 250 miles of paved roads; African wages average about £26 per year, more than 95 per cent of the population is illiterate, health facilities are very limited outside the main towns, and working conditions resemble those of forced labour. Because of rigid requirements the assimilation policy has been an admitted failure, having produced only 35,000 'assimilados' from Angola's 4½ million population. Dr Salazar, in a recent interview with the *New York Times* correspondent Benjamin Welles, declared: 'something has to be done in this respect, even though it may mean abandoning the basis of the system...' But the 'winds of

[1] See 'Background to the Angola Crisis', in *The World Today*, July 1961

change' have swept Africa. Assuming that total assimilation coul be achieved within a few years, could Africans become loy Portuguese citizens? After 400 years of little progress and a fe months of being bombed, hunted, and slaughtered, and assuming Portuguese victory, will the native return to compulsory labour an wait patiently to be moulded into a racially homogeneous societ Racialism alone is a serious obstacle to Portugal's presence i Africa. Angola's white population has grown from 45,000 to 160,oc in the last twenty years and the social pattern has begun to follo segregated patterns. Even in Portugal isolated instances of racialsi have appeared: a negro soccer player was given protective custod by the police as he travelled through a city; an African nurse coul not attend a white patient in a Lisbon hospital; vicious attacks extremist newspapers such as *Agora* carefully delineated the raci conflicts for an ignorant and gullible public, and a congenial lan lady, who in the past had never known racial strife, expresse vehement detestation of the African

Many reforms have been hastily and belatedly introduced i Angola. The Governor-General has been authorized to borrow u to £6¼ million in local currency, presumably for civil constructio the Development Plan is to be amplified to the extent of some £1 million. Funds have been appropriated to assure the stability coffee prices; a fund of £1 88 million has been established for agr cultural and breeding developments; cotton and corn sales ha been liberalized; and a recent decree aims at permitting a wid establishment of municipal authorities and giving the peop greater opportunity to participate in local administration.

Protestant missionaries have both in the past and today bitter criticized Portugal's administration in the overseas territories. may be beyond doubt that some of the natives schooled by the mi sions are rebel leaders today, but the fact remains that the missio aries' purpose in Angola has been dedicated to the insurmountab task of educating the poor, illiterate masses, not to stirring u political agitation. The response of the educated and civilize African quite naturally has been to struggle for his independenc Nevertheless, the Protestants have suffered severely. The Meth dists have indicated that of 165 African ministers and pastors i Angola before the March uprising, seventeen have been killed an thirty are in prison. Most of the British Baptist missionaries ha been forced to leave their missions situated in the heart of the rebe controlled regions. The Government's attitude has been that tl

Protestant organizations are more directly engaged in the campaign against Portugal than in the success of their evangelical activities. The Catholic Church was struck hard by the arrest in March of Monsignor Manuel Mendes das Neves, Vicar-General of Angola, respected throughout the province and well known for his outspoken sermons advocating African rights. He was accused of political activities and aiding the rebels; thereafter another four priests were arrested. The Angolan hierarchy retorted with a pastoral letter on 17 April which clarified their position: 'The Church is entirely within the limits of its mission in advising citizens to unite among themselves for the moralization of laws and institutions and for the formation of a more perfect social situation...'

At home, the Portuguese press, supported by the Government and some reactionary elements of the Catholic Church, has responded quite critically to Protestant activities. In mid-July the Ministry of the Interior issued a communiqué stating that a clandestine organization headed by a Protestant parson helped forty-one African students studying in Portugal to leave the country (unofficially, a greater number of students was estimated to have fled the country to escape arrest and interrogation by the secret police). Subsequently, on 19 July, Dr Cecil W. Scott, the well-known and respected leader of the Liga Evangélica Missionaria in Portugal, was arrested. Earlier the Igreja Evangélica de Deus in Parede was closed, a university non-denominational group, the *Movimento Académico Cristão*, was ordered to suspend its activities; and the *Juventude Evangélica Portuguêsa*, an organization operating for over thirty years in Lisbon, with its own library, magazine, and social centre, was shut down for 'technical reasons'.

Angola is not Portugal's sole colonial problem. Agitation has already begun in Mozambique, and although Portuguese troops have reinforced the military garrisons, there would be little hope of stopping a full-scale rebellion. With a 'peacetime' strength of 34,000 permanent and 2,000 reserve troops, the Army is encountering difficulty in mobilizing enough men to contend with Angola. In April a letter to President Tomás, signed by more than 1,500 Mozambiquans and supported by the *União Democrática*, demanded self-determination for that overseas province with the establishment of a multi-racial state within a Portuguese 'commonwealth', elimination of censorship, free elections, and the granting of citizenship rights to all the population; the document also asked for increased military support to defend the borders against foreign

intervention. Two of the signatories of this letter, Nunes c Carvalho and Francisco Saraiva Barreto, were immediately arreste and accused of incitement to revolt. The Bishop of Beira, Doı Sebastião Soares de Resende, is perhaps the most outspoken crit of Portuguese rule. Author of a book on the exploitation of tl African in the cotton and rice industries, the Bishop is the publish of the only liberal daily newspaper, *Diário de Moçambique*. Africa political movements are reported in Inhambane (*Partido Socialis Católico*), in the Manica and Sofala region (*União Progressiva* in Zambezia (*Movimento Democrata Africano*), and in Port Amelia (*União Mukana de Moçambique*). Exile groups, said t be supported by 500,000 Mozambiquans living in Tanganyik Kenya, Nyasaland, and the Rhodesias, include the *União Nacion alista Africana de Moçambique* (UNAM) and the *União Democrat Nacional de Moçambique* (UDENAMO) located in Dar es Salaan

On 21 July Portuguese news agencies reported an incident ne the Guinea–Senegal border where fifty Africans attacked the Po tuguese military outpost of São Domingos; six of the invade were killed and four Portuguese wounded. Three days later some 2c Africans burned the administrative post and several other buildin at Suzana, and the following day Senegal broke off diplomat relations with Portugal. Three political movements are active in tl Cape Verde Islands as well as in Portuguese Guinea: the *Partic Africano da Independência da Guiné e de Cabo Verde* (PAIGC), tl *Movimento de Libertação da Chamada Guiné Portuguesa e das Ilh de Cabo Verde* (MLGC), and the *Movimento de Libertação das Ilh de Cabo Verde na República da Guiné* (MLC).

In India, the Portuguese enclaves of Dadrá and Nagar-Avel seized in 1954 by Indian nationalists, appear to be lost despite la year's Hague Court ruling which acknowledged Portugal's sove eign rights to the areas. Mr Nehru recently encouraged the noı violent National Congress of Goa (supported by most of the Goa nationalists) with the words: 'liberty has to be worked for, it does n appear automatically.' In late June *The Guardian* reported sever hundred arrests after a document demanding self-government f Goa was discovered. Extremist groups are known to be active withı the 1,500-square-mile territory and armed attacks were reporte during March and April at Querim and Betim. Portugues Indonesian relations were strained by a meeting in July of tl Indonesian Commission for Afro-Asian Solidarity which w attended by the Indonesian Foreign Minister who advocated h

support for a 'fight of the Angolan people until they have reached victory'; this group discussed colonialism in the Portuguese province of Timor and approved a motion sent to the Indonesian Government asking that diplomatic relations with Portugal be severed. A Committee for the Liberation of Timor is said to be active in Indonesia.

For the moment, patriotism has inspired the Portuguese to back the leader who has given them thirty-three years of autocratic and quiescent rule but who has left their country stagnant and underdeveloped (the annual *per capita* income is less than £86). Struggling with their many domestic problems and beset by health and educational deficiencies, the people, gradually awakening to the reality of their predicament, see their men taken from jobs to enter a seemingly endless battle against wild bands of African rebels. With workers' wages at a minimum new taxes have been imposed and more are surely to come. The average Portuguese is neither prepared nor willing to face a long struggle. Added to this, Dr Salazar has chosen to meet the Angolan challenge with force alone, and he is squeezing to the limit Portugal's few human and financial resources. If necessary he will presumably carry the battle to his other overseas territories to save Europe's last colonial empire. He is confident of succeeding in a policy which such major Powers as Great Britain and France have abandoned. Even if he somehow wins the immediate struggle, will time allow him to regain, as he has so aptly indicated, 'the work of a century, overturned in a month'?

Portugal's destiny has fallen into the hands of one person whose resolute will and firm leadership have perhaps become over-rigid after so many years of dedicated service. Almost inevitably Premier Salazar will be forced to come to terms with the rebel Africans who have never advocated more than moderate reforms, and he will probably discover that the only sensible course will be to build up a programme of social and economic advance and to prepare for the eventual autonomy of Angola and the other overseas possessions.

RONALD H. CHILCOTE

French Thoughts on Britain and the Common Market

'AN elephant cannot get into a bath-tub. However sincerely s
might wish to, Britain by definition cannot enter the Comm
Market. It will be a totally different thing once she is in.' To a great
or lesser extent those are the thoughts at the back of many peopl
minds, in Paris even more than in Brussels, as their first reaction
Britain's candidature. Of course Britain's move was bound to
welcomed officially; of course broad trends of continental opini
are glad of what they regard as a logical development of their su
cessful venture; but while the holiday season has delayed a
crystallization of negotiating tactics, officials in Paris in particul
are worried that what the Community may gain in extension
will lose in intensity. And with that preoccupation the Briti
negotiators will have to reckon this autumn.

FRENCH HEGEMONY

No one knows what President de Gaulle's own attitude is. But
looks as if he has been caught in a dilemma by refusing to beli
that the British would actually join. His European policy has be
one of inter-governmental consultation, of purely confede
arrangements: yet once the Irish and the Danes, the Norwegia
and the British take part, what remains of the Europe that was
bolster France's position in the world? How will these confede
consultations differ in intensity and effectiveness from the hu
dreds of others going on every year all over the world? De Gaull
conception of Europe made Europe easier for the British Gover
ment to accept. Now British adherence may not only put an end
hopes of French hegemony in Europe, but even dilute Europe
the point of emptying it of significance for world power politi

There is, however, less talk in Paris these days of French leade
ship than there was a year ago. The President's prestige among t
élite of French civil servants and intellectuals has suffered, and pa
ticularly since the events of last April even Gaullists of long stan
ing, disappointed in the President's leadership of France, are aski
themselves how hard they should work to secure his leadership
Europe as well. But there are still some who believe in playing t
game for the same stakes as they played it in and after the Fr
Trade Area negotiations: they would like to by-pass the Briti

application if they could, to annul a victory over Britain which they never wanted, which some of them tried to prevent, and in which up to the last some of them had hopefully refused to believe.

How far they will determine French negotiating policy it is too early to say. But one can imagine what their tactics would be. Nobody wants the negotiations to fail. The free world cannot afford ill will in Western Europe, and the Community itself would be severely threatened if France were seen obviously to reject British membership on any terms.

But the negotiations could perhaps be diverted. French officials have already sought to play some Commonwealth countries against Britain as Britain has played Germany against France. By insisting that the Commonwealth's future is at stake, the French could now try to secure fairly direct Commonwealth participation in the negotiations and over the vital question of foodstuffs Britain, as the chief consumer, may find herself faced by a producers' front in which France and Holland, Commonwealth exporters, and perhaps even third exporting countries could unite.

Again, Britain's immediate economic incentives to join might also be reduced if world measures could be initiated to stabilize the pound sterling. Perhaps the Community could be induced to pay in cash for measures that would in effect keep Britain out. Once more, as in 1958, the tactics could be the drowning in Atlantic or world economic discussions of Britain's particular concern to find a settlement with the Six. The negotiations would not break up as did those of 1958: but they would result in Britain being bought off economically to preserve the Community's political framework for France.

THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMUNITY

More important now perhaps are those who regret Britain's application because they fear that, whether the negotiations fail or succeed, the Community's character will be transformed. If they fail, the Dutch and the Germans, while they would hardly renounce the Treaty, might well cease to implement it in the spirit of loyalty and goodwill without which it becomes unworkable. But if Britain joins? Mr Macmillan has spoken of guiding the Community from the inside. It is hardly surprising if French and Community officials feel that they have done sufficiently well without British guidance and against British opposition, and that guidance ill becomes those who have just landed themselves in an unenviable economic situa-

tion. Indeed there is talk of having to take responsibility for 'a bigg
and more expensive Greece', and those who built the Community
a racing car to keep up with the Eastern bloc are unhappy that
should now be thumbed as an ambulance to pick up the Briti
invalid.

There are several aspects to the problem of British membersh
Some federalists, and notably such dynamic Europeans as M. Je
Monnet, have wholeheartedly welcomed the British candidatu
because they have always believed Britain to be essential to th
enterprise and because they believe that, however grudging Britai
acceptance of the political implications of the Treaty may be tod
she will play the game once she is in: all the positive reasons whi
make her join will make her realize that she, too, requires a Co
munity with strong institutions. But even for them, in one way
another, Britain will have to make it clear that she is negotiating r
to settle an old quarrel, but to engage in a constructive effort for t
future, in which the Community undertakes a positive role in t
world.[1]

It is thus only in so far as the Community increases the disposat
social product that it is of real significance: the mere intensificati
of commerce is not enough. This means in particular that Brita
will be asked to accept not a treaty of 'trade disarmament', but
system of common policies which are not yet defined: the Ror
Treaty, while precise on the removal of trade barriers, sets out or
a framework for harmonization and positive action. Britain cou
contemplate signing the Treaty and leaving her particular intere
to be safeguarded by the Community's institutions once she is i
but she prefers to safeguard them before joining. If therefore Brita
asks for guarantees for her agriculture and for the Commonwealt
it is only fair that France too should ask for guarantees on soc
policies, on a common agricultural policy, common transpo
policies, common monetary policies, before Britain joins, instead
relying on the working of the institutions after Britain is in.

The French Europeans have in fact to foresee the internal ins
tutional problems created by British and Danish, Irish and No
wegian adherence. Hitherto the Germans have tended to give a litt
more than they took in Franco-German compromises: and the
in turn, have rarely encountered serious opposition from the rest
the Six. This process will be upset by the new membership, an

[1] Cf U. W. Kitzinger, *The Challenge of the Common Market* (Oxford, Blac
well, 1961), to be published on 4 September

majorities will become more unpredictable and less easy to handle. As a result the common policies may take longer to formulate and may go less far unless British membership is preceded by further guarantees. The West does not have much time to overhaul its economic structure and intensify its productive efforts: it could be disastrous if all the plans of the Community were held up for months or years before and after British adherence by attempts to fit too many countries into a looser mould.

Then there is the complication of the Community's commercial weight in the world. A Community including Britain will look a totally different and far more menacing animal to the rest of the world. The trade problems of third countries, posed already, will focus intensely on the Community once this does more than half the free world's international trade. External commercial policy is thus likely to come under closer surveillance and will need to become more considerate than ever of third countries. And however the problems of the Commonwealth may be settled in the negotiations, Britain will thereafter continue to find the interests of the Commonwealth pulling her in a direction different from that of the other members, so that Community preference will be subject not only to the world pressures towards non-discrimination, but to the pulls of Commonwealth—i.e. anti-Community—preference as well.

FRENCH ECONOMIC INTERESTS

To some extent the reservations felt by the French civil servants and diplomats are shared by French business circles. French employers had from the beginning insisted on a dual balance within the Treaty: the liberalization of trade in agricultural produce must keep step with that in industrial goods, and progress towards harmonized internal policies must keep step with progress towards Community free trade. In principle the *Patronat* would thus like to see another acceleration of the Treaty; but only if agricultural and common policy measures are accelerated alongside tariff disarmament. The swiftness of the British application has really taken the *Patronat* by surprise. They fear that decisions on common policies may now be held over until Britain is in—and this fear is shared particularly by French agriculture. (The peasant riots of the early summer, painted by some British newspapers as a revolt against the Common Market, were of course if anything, on the contrary, a protest against the delays in implementing it.) Both agriculture and industry fear that concessions might be made which would give

special privileges to the Commonwealth and thus restrict the outle
for French agricultural production and give British industry acce
to cheaper food and raw materials than the French can obtain.

If the conditions are satisfactory, however, only particul
branches of French industry—tractor-producers threatened b
British, paper-producers threatened by Scandinavian competitio
—might seriously feel opposed to an enlargement of the Communit
British competition would be appreciable, but the British mark
would also become easier of access, and on the whole French in
dustry, having virtually doubled its exports in two years, is conf
dent enough. Only if the pound were devalued (as the franc was o
the eve of the first tariff reductions) would French industry real
feel insecure.

Overall, it would in fact be wrong to believe that British membe
ship will be openly opposed from Paris: it is more likely to b
accepted now as inevitable. But it is as well to realize the spirit i
which the French are liable to start the negotiations and the rath
narrow margin of manœuvre that British negotiators are likely t
find open to them. Negotiations could be concluded quickly
Britain asked for few derogations from the Treaty: but if she ask
for many, they may well drag on. No one wants the negotiations t
break up: but in the last resort it was Britain who asked for them t
begin. Certainly public opinion on the Continent, probably even i
France, is overwhelmingly in favour of British adherence to th
Community: but on the precise conditions there is little public di
cussion. The basic fact is that Britain is negotiating from econom
and tactical weakness. It is not that the Six have failed and hav
asked Britain to rescue them: the Six have been conspicuously suc
cessful, and Britain, after disdaining membership for so long, is no
asking to be let in. It is Britain, therefore, and not France, who wi
be asked to pay the price: and on the whole it is France, and no
Britain, who can afford to wait for the price to be agreed.

UWE KITZINGER

New Departures in Yugoslav Economic Planning

YUGOSLAVIA'S economy is once again in process of readjustment. This year a new Five-Year Plan (1961–5) is being put into operation and a series of economic reforms is being launched which represents a further step towards freeing the economy from rigid State control, in so far as this is possible in a Communist system. This trend has developed since Yugoslavia's break with the Cominform, and has been accompanied by remarkable economic progress.

FULFILMENT OF THE 1957–61 PLAN

The lessening of Soviet-Yugoslav tension in the mid-'fifties enabled Yugoslavia to reduce her expenditure on armaments. This, as well as the lessons learned from the Hungarian revolt, gave the Government an opportunity and an impulse to continue the process of consolidating the economy. The 1957–61 Plan was launched with the aim of eliminating as far as possible the greatest weaknesses of the Yugoslav economy by the following means: (i) improving the balance of payments position and so reducing the existing substantial deficit; (ii) in connection with this, developing export-boosting and import-saving industries; (iii) increasing agricultural production, which substantially lagged behind industry, in order to reduce food imports and to turn Yugoslavia once more into an agricultural exporter; and (iv) developing light industry in order to raise the standard of living, which was one of the lowest in Europe.

Apart from the two or three years when it was affected by the Cominform economic blockade, the Yugoslav economy has developed at a rate which for several years was recorded as the highest in the world; between 1954 and 1960 the annual rate of growth of the national income averaged 12·9 per cent. In industry the average annual rate of growth during that period was no less than 14·5 per cent, but agricultural production has also expanded at a greater rate than in any other Communist country. In addition, Yugoslavia has succeeded in achieving a more balanced economy than hitherto and the standard of living of the population has risen.

The 1957–61 Five-Year Plan was fulfilled in four years, and the annual rate of growth of the national income during 1957–60 exceeded by 3·8 per cent the rate of 9·1 per cent envisaged in the Plan. The balance of payments remained, however, the weakest

point of the economy. In fact, the trade deficit, instead of being reduced, increased again in 1960 to 78,100 million dinars, the equivalent of 46 per cent of total exports. (Invisible exports play a relatively small part.) Industrial production in that year showed a striking expansion (15 per cent), due especially to the fact that imports of raw materials and semi-finished goods for industry were more abundant than ever. In addition the relative stability of prices and the cost of living which had been achieved during the period 1957–9 was disturbed in 1960 as a result of an increase in investment greater than that foreseen in the Plan. This was particularly true of industrial investment, for investment in agriculture still lagged behind. The pace at which the standard of living should have developed was inevitably affected. The Statistical Office has not yet released definite figures on this subject. The economic journal *Ekonomska Politika* has, however, corrected some earlier optimistic data and stated that the average real earnings of employed persons rose by 2–3 per cent in 1960; it added that substantial improvement could only be achieved by increasing productivity.[1] The housing programme is also lagging behind the Plan, and this is to be regretted since the housing problem in Yugoslavia is one of the most difficult in Europe.

DIFFICULTIES OF DECENTRALIZING A PLANNED ECONOMY

It was not only the Plan, however, but also the endeavour to create a specific brand of Communism, more flexible and humane than in other Communist countries, that characterized developments in Yugoslavia during these years. The Yugoslav Government was able to maintain better contact with its own people than did any other Communist regime, and also to win support from the West, which has for more than ten years played a very important part in helping to finance the Yugoslav experiment. All this is reflected in a set of measures which formed the basis of the Government's economic policy during the last decade and served as a springboard for the new economic reforms.

[1] According to officially published figures, *per capita* national income was supposed to be 90 per cent higher in 1960 than in 1939, reckoned in 1959 prices. It is difficult to deduce how this affected the personal income of employees. An inquiry conducted by the Trade Union Council established that real wages and salaries of Yugoslav employees in 1955–6 were on an average at the pre-war level. Since 1955 nominal wages and salaries have increased by 70 per cent, but the cost of living index has also increased by 30 per cent. At the same time the number of wage earners has been augmented through farmers in new industrial areas finding part-time employment in industry.

First, a more decentralized and flexible way of planning the onomy has been achieved. On the federal level the national pro- uct is divided into its main components and targets are set for a w important products only. More responsibility in detailed plan- ing is given to the republics, the local authorities (communes), and idividual enterprises. The general goal of the Plan is achieved by ieans of contracts and business deals, between factories themselves s well as with other producer and consumer units, which deter- ine the quality and the range of products. Market forces are thus laying a more important role than before.

Secondly, a specific form of management called 'workers' ma- agement' is being developed in Yugoslavia, in accordance with hich factories are run by workers' committees. Wages no longer onstitute the total personal income of the workers since they are ow entitled to a share of the firms' profits. Wages are based on idividual output and the share of profits is determined by the suc- ess of the respective factories. All this stimulates the workers and production is increased. Local government organizations and usiness concerns are given the opportunity of establishing and icreasing their own funds, and they have therefore been able to ieet many of their needs more independently than before, when ey relied completely on funds from the central Government, iainly in the form of credits.[1]

Thirdly, in agriculture measures have been taken for the abolition f compulsory collectivization, for the introduction of free co- peratives for individual farmers, for the modernization of State irms and the introduction of a system of co-operative contract irming with guaranteed prices for individual farmers, and for the beralization of marketing policy in order to increase production.

Fourthly, substantial help from Western countries, particularly e United States, Britain, and France, in the form of grants and redits has been used to purchase industrial equipment and food, hich was badly needed, particularly during the Cominform lockade and the droughts which followed.

These measures have differentiated Yugoslavia from other Com- iunist countries. Nevertheless, since she is in fact a country where tate ('social') ownership and Party control are in existence, it has

[1] For example, 38 per cent of total investment now comes from central funds, per cent from business concerns, and the rest from the communes Firms, id particularly agricultural organizations, have, however, been left short of orking capital by the central authorities, and they have had to draw special edits ('turnover credits') from the banks to replace it.

not been possible to eliminate strong centralizing forces. In addition, the remains of the 'old' system, when Yugoslavia was closely following the Soviet pattern, were increasingly seen to clash with the needs of a modern economy, which aims to become competitive and to attract the consumer. The old multiple-rate currency system, for example, made it absolutely impossible for firms to work out the real cost of production or to establish the comparative cost of domestic products; the distribution of credit was entirely in the hands of the National Bank and its branches, which resorted to bureaucratic allocation of money in fulfilment of the Plan, but without due regard for economic or business criteria; the system of supporting exports and subsidizing imports operated against the Government's aim of ceasing to protect inefficient factories and producers which have become a burden to the whole nation There was increasing danger that idleness and bureaucracy, largely eliminated in central offices, would continue to reign in local government and in most of subsidized heavy industry. Local government organizations and business concerns had been using their funds recklessly for investment in new plants, thus creating overcapacity of production even in heavy industry. Meanwhile in the interests of the current Plan they continued to draw on the banks, regardless of any other considerations, in order to cover the 'gap' in working capital. As a result the Government has had difficulty in finding markets for some existing 'outsize' industries inherited from the period of over-industrialization. In short, these centrifugal forces jeopardized the central Plan's objective of retaining ultimate control of the redistribution of the national product. The problem of how to cleanse these Augean stables arose as direct physical control was withdrawn and new and more subtle forms of control were not yet established.

THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1961–5) AND ECONOMIC REFORMS

It was not enough therefore to set out the main principles governing the new Plan and its targets; at the same time it was necessary to act immediately in introducing economic reforms. As far as the main principles are concerned, the Yugoslav leaders believe that the economy, particularly industry, has become strong enough to allow of increased personal consumption and an improvement in the standard of living whilst at the same time obtaining a relatively high rate of investment. In order to achieve a more balanced economy the following guiding lines were to be adopted. First, priority should be

given to schemes which give a quick return and which make use of the raw material resources of the country. Secondly, production of goods in strong demand both at home and abroad should be developed. Thirdly, self-sufficiency should not be the aim, because the present structure of the economy calls for a rising level of foreign trade.[1] Lastly, the cost of production should be as important a factor as the quantity and quality of goods produced. This is in fact the most significant feature of the new Plan and makes it different from earlier plans as well as from the plans of other Communist countries.

According to the Plan targets, by 1965 national income should be 50 per cent higher than in 1960.

The main emphasis has been placed on building and industrial production. These should increase by 87 and 84 per cent respectively over their 1960 values. Agricultural production is to be increased by only 42 per cent. Personal consumption and 'social investment' (housing and social welfare etc.) are to constitute 55·2 per cent of total national expenditure in 1965, compared with 56·9 per cent in 1960. Personal consumption should decline from 46·5 per cent to 43·5 per cent. In value, the sum spent on personal consumption should be 52 per cent higher than in 1960, whereas total investment is to increase by more than 80 per cent. The main boost to the standard of living is planned in a big housing programme (100,000 flats per year, which is substantially more than in recent years) and an expansion of the production of durable consumer goods.

As the main goal of the Plan is to make the economy of Yugoslavia more competitive and to link it more closely to the world economy, its most important feature is the establishment of a sound foreign exchange system. Instead of an unrealistic official rate of 840 dinars to the £ and a series of tolerated 'free' rates, it has been decided to determine a more realistic single rate of 2,100 dinars to the £ for all commercial transactions. As the Yugoslavs are very much in favour of the multilateral payments system, their ultimate aim is to establish the dinar as convertible currency. They could not achieve this without financial backing, and they are now obtaining

[1] From the earlier period of industrialization Yugoslavia inherited industries which produced more than her domestic requirements, especially in shipbuilding and engineering It was necessary to export this surplus production. A sum of 50,000 million dinars was reserved in the last Budget for subsidizing Yugoslav foreign trade, and the bulk of this money is being used to boost exports of industrial goods. This sum is equivalent to almost one-third of the total value of Yugoslav exports. Industry has become a very important instrument in establishing closer ties with uncommitted countries, and plays a significant role in strengthening the international position of Yugoslavia.

$275 million from Western Governments, with the help of the International Monetary Fund, in order to be able to carry out their monetary reform. This sum is larger than the 1960 trade deficit. Linked with the currency reform, tariffs have been introduced, which are, however, not as protective in their effect as was the previous system, based on a multiple exchange rate. The new system will enable Yugoslavia to become a member of G.A.T.T.

Once it was decided that a more direct contact with the international economy was to be established, it became necessary to enable individual firms to act more independently in the economic sphere. A new tax system has been set up in order to help firms to increase their funds, particularly those which may be used as working capital. The system also aims at encouraging firms to rationalize their work and economize their resources. It allows them to share their income with the federal Government, the communes, and their own employees under more favourable terms than hitherto This gives both firms and employees a greater incentive to work The banking system is also being reorganized. The communal bank will be the main commercial bank, the only one with branches all over the country. The National Bank will become a central bank in the usual meaning of the term, and will authorize a limited number of banks to deal in foreign currencies.

In spite of the fact that firms were given more freedom of decision over prices and wages than before, price control has been introduced for some important products because it is feared that any increase in the price of these products might cause a general rising spiral of prices.

DIRECTING A DECENTRALIZED ECONOMY

Up to the beginning of this year, price control had been the only important centralizing measure introduced. Previously, the general trend had inclined towards giving more freedom to local authorities and business concerns. The Yugoslav leaders were reluctant to introduce too many directives from the top, particularly in the form of measures of physical control, not only because of their fear of bureaucracy but also because they believed that business concerns, being run by workers' councils and controlled by the Party, could be persuaded to carry through common-sense economic policy.

But things have not been developing completely according to the Plan. Much more money than was scheduled has been spent on investment, to the concern of the central planners. To quote a recent

speech of Vice-President Kardelj, centralization should not be looked upon as an absolute evil, nor decentralization as an absolute good. Kardelj hinted that the existing banking system should be controlled in such a way that total advances would be kept within the limits of the national credit plan, and also that advances made should be in line with the requirements of both national and local investment plans. In future, he said, the investment activities of local organizations and of the republics should be to some extent reduced and be concerned more with the modernization of industry, whereas investment in new plants should be the responsibility of the federal organs Since firms now have more freedom than before, laws will be introduced to prevent waste and misuse of funds and to counteract tendencies contrary to socialistic common sense.

Mr Kardelj's speech was a signal for a tide of new measures which are now being introduced in order to discipline local government organizations, business concerns, managers, State organizations, and also banks in their spending. For example, banks are ordered to increase deposits with the National Bank, and business, local government, and State organizations are requested to create reserve funds. Most of these measures are in the field of monetary and credit control. The Yugoslav planners foresaw a more modest rate of development for the first two years of the new Plan, as they realized that some readjustment would be necessary after the introduction of economic reforms. Up to now, however, the rate of growth has been slower than was anticipated. The question arises whether it will be possible to maintain a high rate of investment and at the same time eliminate the balance of payments deficit and increase the standard of living.

PROBLEMS AHEAD

Which of the basic elements of the new Plan is most likely to suffer?

The Yugoslav economy has for years had an overdraft with some Western countries. Up to now imports have been substantially higher than exports. According to the new Plan the percentage of agricultural exports should be increased. During recent years, however, agricultural exports have not developed as rapidly as industrial exports, and in the new Plan agricultural investment is modest compared with investment for industry. In fact, agriculture has again become a problem for the planners. It has been established that State farms will continue to work at a loss unless yields are more than

doubled, which would mean obtaining extremely high yields of, for example, 80–110 quintals per hectare in the case of maize. To achieve this will take longer than the Plan's scope. It would also mean overtaking the advanced American farmer who does not need to take advantage of subsidies when he produces maize with a yield of 60 quintals per ha. It also reveals the relatively high cost of Yugoslav agricultural production under the existing system. Agricultural organizations argue that industry is allowed to make higher profits than agriculture and that a change in policy could eliminate the losses of the State farms.[1] A prominent Yugoslav agricultural leader stated recently that individual farmers have nothing more to learn at present from the State farms, particularly concerning the proper use of existing means of production. Individual farmers are not much interested in the higher forms of contract farming which involve pooling of land etc., since this kind of 'co-operation' could only be profitable for them if substantially higher yields (unrealistic under existing circumstances) were obtained.

Last year's harvest was not very good and this year's may be even worse. For this reason Yugoslavia has again asked for wheat from the United States. The unsolved problem of fodder shortages is also jeopardizing further expansion of the livestock programme, which is important in the export drive. All this threatens to make the existing payments deficit even worse and it seems to be causing the Government great concern. In addition to subsidies granted to export industries, credits are given to importing countries in order to boost industrial exports. The most striking example of this is a five-year credit of $120 million given to Brazil.

The immediate problem, however, is to stop excessive investment which puts pressure on the whole economy. It is likely that the Government has come to realize that it will not be possible to deal with the other problems unless the rate of investment is moderated and investment itself more equally distributed among the various branches of the economy. There is no doubt that in due course, thanks to the currency reform, Yugoslav planners will appreciate more clearly than before how high a price the country has been paying to maintain an industrial production of so wide and variable a range. This may help them to develop an even more realistic economic policy.

B. K.

[1] Recent regulations have entitled farm organizations to claim special credits in order to cover their losses, but only under certain conditions Hence this problem has remained unsolved.

The Indian Problem in Guatemala and Bolivia

THE population censuses of the Latin American republics showed that in or around 1950 some 15 million out of their total population of 150 million were Indians. Only two countries, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic, were reported to have no Indian population. In the others the number of Indians varied between 40,000 in Costa Rica and 3 6 million in Peru. The proportion of Indians to the total population varied between a fraction of 1 per cent in Costa Rica and 63 per cent in Bolivia, followed by Guatemala with 60 per cent.[1] The populations have since increased and if anything the proportion of Indians has become even larger because in several countries with large Indian populations their rate of increase is higher than that of the non-Indians.

THE INDIANS IN LATIN AMERICA

For an understanding of the Indian problem in Guatemala and Bolivia it is best to discuss the problem first in the broader context of Latin America, where the term 'Indian' is not used in the ethnic sense but as a cultural term. With the exception of a very small 'white' minority and a few other small groups, most of the inhabitants of Latin America are the descendants of the original Indian inhabitants of the continent at the time of the Spanish Conquest, although most of them show a varying admixture of foreign blood. But most of the large mixed population which now dominates Latin America—and even some people who are Indians of pure blood—would not be considered, or consider themselves, Indian. In Latin American parlance Indians are people who have preserved their cultural traits and traditions and cling to them in a non-Indian society. They do not speak Spanish at home but their native tongue, one of the several dozen languages spoken by the different Indians in Latin America. Converted to Catholicism, their religion became and remained a mixture of elements of their new faith and ritual and their old pagan beliefs and practices. Even when they adopted some elements of the clothing, the implements, and the ways of their conquerors and white masters, they retained much of their traditional costume and their old traditions and way of life. Even when

[1] Mario Arce Vargas, *Monografía Estadística Indígena de Bolivia* (La Paz, Bolivia, Edición 1954), p. 6.

they submitted to the political organization of the State, they preserved, sometimes openly sometimes underground, their own traditional communal organization.

The censuses base their definition of the Indian on language, dress, or some other easily distinguishable characteristic. Depending on the characteristics employed and their more or less rigorous application, the Indian population appears to be smaller or larger. Some estimates put the number of Indians in Latin America in 1950 at 30 million, and it was believed that in Guatemala and in the three Andean countries, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, the majority of the population was Indian, irrespective of what the statistics said. The people themselves are conscious of the distinction between Indians and non-Indians—who in the different countries have different names such as *mestizo*, *ladino*, *cholo*, etc.—and they would profess to be or would protest against being called Indian without doubt or hesitation. The number of marginal cases is relatively small.

The existence, 400 years after the Conquest, of large Indian communities as enclaves in non-Indian societies is one of the strange phenomena of Latin America. The explanation lies in the nature of the Conquest and of Spanish rule, the large size of the Indian populations found by the conquerors, and the character of these populations. The Indians suffered badly in the initial onslaught of the Conquest. Later their lot improved somewhat and they found protectors in the Church and the Crown. But the Court was far away and the Royal Edicts made little impression on the policy and attitude of their local masters. Conscious of a threat to their existence, the Indians, in order to preserve their way of life and traditions, withdrew in some areas to the less hospitable regions and everywhere into themselves. Thus the measures which isolated the Indian communities only strengthened a mood and a move which originated with the Indians themselves. Their isolation was as much self-imposed as it was forced upon them.

The republics which emerged from the wars of liberation of the nineteenth century arose out of a revolt of the *criollos*—the whites born in Latin America—against their Spanish overlords. The mixed population, then very much smaller and lower in social and economic status, supported the *criollos*, while the Indians stayed out of the fighting. In the new republics the 'mixed' slowly rose to positions of power and prestige at the expense of the *criollos* and they became the dominating group. Their attitude towards the Indians was even more uncompromising than that of the *criollos* and under

the new regimes the lot of the Indians, instead of improving, became worse. The spirit and the words of the Constitutions were liberal enough, but in guaranteeing the rights of citizens a citizen was understood to be a man who spoke Spanish. The Indian was not accepted as Indian and was debarred from participation in political life. In their desire to transform the economic organization of their countries in keeping with the liberal principles of the age, the new rulers did not recognize the existence and rights of Indian communities and institutions. The Indians were lost in the, to them, unintelligible world of liberal laws and became an easy prey for those who were bent on building up their fortunes by taking the land and generally by exploiting them.

In spite of their large numbers, the Indians were powerless and were not a political force. They survived the Conquest, but as their leaders and leading groups were liquidated their societies disintegrated into small communities living in isolation from each other. Loyalties seldom extended beyond the community and did not even encompass communities speaking the same tongue. Indians could only acquire the knowledge and skills which leaders must possess in a modern State by learning Spanish and going to non-Indian schools in the towns—in short, by giving up being Indian, even if only temporarily. This change might be more apparent than real, but their new outlook separated them from their uneducated brethren and from their communities even when they had the desire to identify themselves with them. The champions of the cause of the Indians were non-Indians. The whole scene was strangely reminiscent of the situation of the peasants in Central and Eastern Europe, the descendants of serfs, who in many ways experienced a similar fate, although in their case the complicating factors of race and language were often absent.

Slowly the Governments of the republics with large Indian populations began to realize that the situation of the Indians was harmful to the long-term interests of the State. A large reservoir of human talent remained untapped. And those who were less concerned with human values had to admit that the fact that a large proportion of the population of their country lived in a subsistence economy and was very poor reduced the size of the national market and hampered economic development. Attention began to be focused on the need to integrate the Indians in the national society, and sporadic efforts were started to raise their standard of living and to integrate them. More recently integration became the official

policy of the Governments. The problem varied according to the size, state, and characteristics of the Indian societies involved. There was also great variation in the intensity of effort. Even where it was successful, the integration of the Indians remained a far-off goal

THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA

In Guatemala, out of a total population of 3 million, 1·8 million are reported to be Indians. They are concentrated in the highlands where the rugged topography, the harsher climate, and the poverty of the soil are often unfavourable for agriculture. They speak some two dozen tongues, many of them mutually unintelligible. Most of them are engaged in agriculture. Often the farms do not provide adequate livelihood for the family and the people have to undertake seasonal agricultural work. The harvesting of coffee regularly draws some 300,000 Indians from the highlands to the coffee farms According to the statistics, in 1950 the size of the 225,000 Indian farms varied between 1·5 and 5 hectares (3·8 and 12·3 acres), the average size being 3·5 hectares (8·6 acres). The *ladino* farms numbered 124,000 with an average size of 24·2 hectares (round 60 acres) Many of them were also small, although larger than the Indian farms, but the large coffee farms and big estates and ranches in the lowlands pulled up the average. Many Indians were engaged in crafts or trade and would walk long distances to peddle their wares on the weekly markets.

Because of the small size of the farms and the unfavourable conditions for agriculture, or the small scale and inefficiency of the operations of the craftsmen, most Indians are poor, and many of them very poor. But they must not be thought of as primitive people without imagination or inventiveness. There are few implements on the farms, and farming methods could be improved. But in favourable areas the Indians grow vegetables and flowers under irrigation for sale in the towns or even for export. One can decry their implements and methods but no trained non-Indian agriculturist has tried to make a living out of an Indian farm. In his view so small a plot of land would not make an economic unit, such steep slopes ought not to be cultivated at all, the land would be too poor for farming, and nothing could profitably be grown on it. The Indian craftsmen may not use the potter's wheel, their looms may be crude But the pottery they make is often very beautiful and the fabrics have exquisite design and are a riot of colours. Visiting Indian markets in Guatemala is an experience. One of their striking fea-

tures is that even in places frequented by tourists the Indians take no notice of strangers and pursue their activities unconcerned. They live in a world of their own.

The *ladino* attitude to the Indian is characterized not so much by ndifference or incomprehension as by contempt, if not hostility. The efforts of the administration were concentrated on the urban and *ladino* areas. The Indians were used to build roads and work he coffee farms but little was done for them. In the 1950s there were signs of a change, and Guatemala became the scene of a emarkable experiment in a new approach to the Indians. The Government asked the I.L.O. to send an expert to advise on labour egislation in order to improve the working conditions of the nigratory workers on the coffee farms who, as has already been nentioned, were Indians. The expert studied the situation and ollowed the people up to their villages in the highlands. His con-lusion was that labour legislation might do some good but did not go far enough because the root of the trouble was in the villages, in what was being done to, or rather what was not being done for, the ndians. He conceived the idea of an Indian project which, how-ver, was launched as a Guatemalan project with a Guatemalan hief, with the expert acting as his close associate and adviser.

The approach was based on a high respect for the cultural auto-nomy of the Indians. Instead of the 'integrated approach' which alls for a simultaneous attack on a wide front and the 'pilot project' ystem which concentrates funds and efforts on a few selected laces, the plan was to follow the line of least resistance and start vorking unobtrusively in a number of places, never attempting nore in one place than could be done elsewhere. Agriculture was the ife of the Indians, so efforts were directed towards improved agri-ulture, trying not to interfere with practices which come within the *ostumbres*, the deeply rooted, hallowed traditions of the Indians. One or two Indians in a village were persuaded to plant improved eed and use fertilizer, insecticides, etc., all to be repaid in kind from he crop. When the demonstration convinced others, seed, fertilizer, nd insecticides were made available to them on the same terms. Operating from the centre of an Indian area, one agent could cover everal small villages which he would visit periodically. The Guatemalan chief of the project and his I.L.O. adviser spent much f their time in the field visiting the villages with the agents, direct-ng and supervising the operation.

The project proved a great success, but its expansion presented

problems of organization and principle. Enlarging the radius of action of the agents required that young Indians should be trained as their assistants. Much depended on the method of training, which might easily have alienated the trainees from their communities. It was essential for the success of the scheme to retain the simplicity and informality of the organization. The close relationship which exists amongst all activities in an Indian community caused the project to embark on fields other than agriculture, and to try to improve handicrafts and deal with home economics. Here it ran into difficulties. One cannot improve techniques in the abstract. The technician concerned with pottery-making or weaving inevitably tried to improve form and design, often with sad results. The productivity of the Indian craftsman may have improved greatly, enabling him to turn out a greater yardage of cloth or a larger number of knitted goods or pottery. But in comparing the new, 'technically superior' products with the old ones, one wonders if the improvement was worth the price. Another trouble was that the international experts sent out to work on the Indian project often could not understand why they should devote their talents to teaching 'backward' Indians when they found ready pupils amongst the Spanish-speaking *ladinos* with whom work seemed to be easier and more promising; or they would refuse to accept the limitations imposed on their work by the feelings existing between different Indian language groups. As the project was a Guatemalan venture, it was able to overcome these difficulties. It was not quite so successful in coping with some of its other problems, notably those of organization and training methods. But in spite of the difficulties, in five years it succeeded in covering a large proportion of the Indian communities of Guatemala.

THE SITUATION IN BOLIVIA

In Bolivia, once again according to statistics of 1950, out of a total population of 3·2 million, 1·7 million were reported to be Indians Over 600,000, living mostly on the Altiplano, spoke Aymara, while nearly 1 million, living mostly in the sub-tropical hilly country between the Andes and eastern tropical lowlands of the country, spoke Quechua. The number of forest-dwelling Indians was less than 100,000; they are a group by themselves and their problems are very different from those of the Aymaras and Quechuas.

Most of the Indians were engaged in agriculture. Some lived on the large estates, some in free Indian communities, and some were

nallholders. Until the Revolution of 1952 the Indians on the large tates lived in a state of virtual serfdom. Legally they could leave ie estates if they wished, but in practice this was difficult if not im- ›ssible. Instead of being paid a wage, they were given a small plot of nd on which they built a hut for themselves and another plot of nd on which they could grow crops for their own consumption, ıd grazing land was made available for their livestock. In exchange e family had to supply a number of hands on appointed days to ork on the landlord's property, tend his livestock, and do whatever her work was needed on the estate in processing products, con- ructing and repairing buildings and roads, and providing personal rvice in the landlord's house. Attempts were made to restrict by atute the unpaid services demanded but in practice they had little fect.

Some 60,000 Indians lived in the mining centres. Working con- tions there were miserable and wages low. But the miners had the lvantage of living concentrated together in the mining areas, and ıder aggressive leadership they became the spearhead of the volutionary movement in Bolivia

The Indians of Bolivia were very much worse off than those of uatemala. On the Altiplano the physical conditions of life were ırsher and more difficult; because of the great distances, isolation as more complete, and the attitude of the non-Indians towards the ıdians went beyond the indifference or contempt characteristic of ie non-Indians in Guatemala. At the same time, due to the fact ıat the Indians supplied the labour force for the large estates and ie mines, they were even more indispensable for the national onomy in Bolivia than were the Indians in Guatemala, where the ıdian and non-Indian economies existed side by side and the ›ntacts were more limited.

The Revolution of 1952 marked a turning point in the history of ie Indians of Bolivia. Suffrage became universal without any strictions based on literacy in Spanish, which before had barred ie Indians from participation in political life. The nationalization the mines brought considerable benefits to the Indian miners. ocial services in rural areas became concentrated in a single Minis- y of Indian Affairs, and a radical land reform was introduced— ieasures which were intended to change the status and life of ie much larger rural Indian population. A cult of the Indian be- ıme the official attitude of the revolutionary Government, even ıough in everyday life and at the lower levels of administration

the old attitude towards the Indians remained largely unchanged.

Shortly after the Revolution, a mission composed of experts of five international agencies—I.L.O., F.A.O., U.N., Unesco, and W.H.O.—visited Bolivia and also Ecuador and Peru to study the situation and problems of the Indians and to plan an international action programme to help the three Andean countries in integrating their Indian populations.

The proposed programme represented an integrated approach, a simultaneous attack on a broad front—agriculture, education, health, housing—and it was to be launched by establishing pilot projects, one on the Altiplano and one in the tropical lowlands of Bolivia. The purpose of the former was to improve the life of the Indians on the Altiplano and provide a testing ground for the land reform, while the latter was to promote the migration of the Indians from the densely populated Altiplano to the vast, empty Bolivian lowlands.

The Altiplano project was launched in the spring of 1954 on a large estate which was divided up soon after the project began. Previously the owners of the estate had given their lands to a private Bolivian Foundation, and the project was established on the estate as the guest of the Foundation on condition that it operated one of the several farms of the estate, which the owners excluded from the donation, for the mutual benefit of the Foundation and the owners. When the Land Reform Law was applied to the estate, all the lands were divided up, including the farm which the owners excluded from the donation. The project found itself in an embarrassing position because the nature of its tenure made it suspect in the eyes of the Indians whom it was expected to help. Until 1956, when the redistribution of the lands of the estate was made final and the 80 hectares which the owners had been allowed to retain were expropriated, the project operated under a cloud of suspicion which handicapped it in its efforts to enlist the co-operation of the 500 Indian families living on the estate. Schools and a health service were started and co-operatives were organized to cultivate the lands reserved for co-operative production, which represented about one-fourth of the area given to the Indians in the form of individual holdings. But the results were small in comparison with the funds spent. The project brought benefits to the Indians living on the former estate and, later, to some of the neighbouring communities, but it failed to set off a chain reaction or lead to the establishment of smaller replicas operating under its guidance; it remained an iso-

ed venture. This was to some extent due to the fact that the inter-ional agencies assumed a major role in the operation and the livian authorities and most of the Bolivian staff did not feel ponsible for its success. Bad planning, frequent changes of per-nnel, lack of funds, and bad administrative arrangements added the difficulties of the project.

The colonization project in the lowlands had an even more diffi-t task because the Indians of the Altiplano showed great re-tance to settle in the lowlands. A large organization was estab-ied and about a hundred families were settled. At first things med to go well and very few of the settlers were obliged to leave lowlands for reasons of health. But bad planning and personnel l administrative difficulties soon led to trouble, and in the third ir most of the new settlers left the project.

In 1956 another project was started on the Altiplano. The costly son of the first Altiplano project did not pass altogether un-iced and the second project had a more auspicious start than the t and was more successful in operation. But the expectations of Andean Indian Programme, of which these projects were a t, proved to be too optimistic; five years were too short a time which to make the programme sufficiently well established within national administration and to enlist enough support from the lians for it to become self-liquidating.

CONCLUSIONS: THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATING INDIANS

Raising the level of living of the Indian populations of Guatemala l Bolivia, and for that matter of Ecuador and Peru and to a lesser ent Mexico, is a formidable task because of the numbers involved l their poverty. The problem exists in most other Latin American ublics, but where the Indian population is smaller it is of a differ-dimension.

Admittedly, the aim of the efforts to improve the lot of the lians is to integrate them in the national societies. When anthro-ogists speak about integration, they think of raising the level of ng of the Indians as Indians, respecting their cultural autonomy. ey think of making a theoretically self-sufficient Indian society organic part of the national society, allowing for reciprocal in-ence. But few countries and few people in Latin America think of egration in these terms. Political thinking in most of the re-olics insists on the countries being essentially non-Indian. They prepared to admit the Indians if they give up their identity as

Indians; in short, they think of assimilation rather than integration. They want to change not only those elements of Indian culture which are a hindrance to the economic progress of the Indians, but also all elements which are in conflict with the thinking and habits of the now dominant non-Indian societies. Typical of this thinking is their attitude towards language. Even in countries where the Indians are in the majority, the language of instruction in the schools is Spanish and the Indian language is not taught or even used in the rural schools. This uncompromising attitude on the part of the non-Indians jeopardizes the success of otherwise well-meaning efforts to help the Indians. A frontal attack touches the Indians on sensitive points and puts them on the defensive. Flank actions hold out a greater hope of success because there are fields in which the Indians are prepared to accept change. Given time, changes accepted in these fields could gradually bring about the transformation of the Indian way of life, although perhaps not always along a pattern acceptable to the dominant non-Indian minorities. From this point of view the efforts in Guatemala and Mexico will be interesting to watch.

In Guatemala, the existence of a large number of Indian communities speaking different languages and suffering from linguistic isolation has worked against the emergence of the Indians as a powerful political group. In Bolivia there are only two major Indian languages and the use of the two languages is permitted in political life if not in the schools. The Indians of Bolivia now have the opportunity to organize themselves as a political force, and if they could find leaders of national stature they might exert a decisive influence on developments in that country. Experience since 1952 has shown that they have a greater interest in politics than the Indians of Guatemala. They became conscious of their power. But the use they made of this power was not always in the national interest and the Government found it difficult to assert its authority over its Indian supporters.

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Notes of the Month

The Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned Nations

In the days before he died, Mr Hammarskjöld, wrestling with the trials and complexities of the United Nations commitment in the Congo, must have drawn encouragement from one major aspect of the conference which opened in Belgrade on 1 September: the almost universal concern of leaders of the non-aligned nations for the strengthening and extension of the United Nations influence in the world. On the personal level the conference marked a welcome end to the estrangement between Mr Hammarskjöld and certain important African and Asian leaders. His strivings after a just solution in the Congo were praised by no less a person than the Congo leader, Prime Minister Adoula. Of greater consequence to world opinion, and no doubt to Mr Hammarskjöld himself, was the conference's firm rejection of the Soviet 'troika' proposal, President Bourguiba producing a neatly turned refutation of the Soviet justification for the troika in these words: 'It is said that a man cannot be neutral. But he can very well be honest and apply the United Nations Charter impartially and in a spirit above narrow national considerations.' But neither the President of Tunisia nor the great majority of the heads of Government were entirely satisfied with the structure of the U.N. Secretariat and the distribution of responsibility within the Organization. Some obviously felt that the empirical methods for broadening the basis of representation in the Secretariat already adopted by Mr Hammarskjöld would go a long way towards meeting their criticisms; others, like Ghana, recommended a more radical approach, the establishment within the constitution of a team of three advisers selected on the troika principle, to guide the Secretary-General in the interpretation of the will of the Security Council and General Assembly.

This very anxiety to reform the United Nations and draw the dangerously self-sufficient China into the fold is a feature of the universal concern on the part of the non-aligned for the strength and efficiency of the Organization. Time and again Heads of States would refer crises and problems, from disarmament and Berlin to

the channelling of technical and financial aid, to the attention of the United Nations. This feature of the conference now takes on an added significance in the light of the Ndola tragedy. The loyalty of the Uncommitted, so recently and unequivocally expressed, is a vital and, surely, hopeful factor in the present crisis of the United Nations leadership.

By comparison, such aspects of the conference as the evolution in the concept of non-alignment, the hardening definitions of neo-colonialism, the suggestions and counter-suggestions for Berlin, disarmament, and the demise of colonialism appear as somewhat specialized interests. Noteworthy however was a trend, remarked by a number of delegates, for the conference to think in terms of a north–south division in the world transcending the rivalries between East and West. Mr U Nu of Burma warned of the bitterness and dangers inherent in such a division, and urged that the conference should not further this division by the venom and bigotry of its resolutions. Other delegates took the matter little further than deploring the 'have, have not' character of the division.

Pundit Nehru's contribution to the conference requires little further emphasis. His speech for a single-mindedness on the issue of war and peace gave a welcome sense of purpose to a very disparate gathering. In his contention that the fear and suspicion between the East and the West are the prime threat to world peace he took all but the most dedicated anti-colonialists with him. Most valuable of all his contributions was perhaps his insistance that the conference should know its own strength and weakness, and speak to the great Powers in a language appropriate to their position in the world; with conviction, but with courtesy. For, at the outset of the conference, it was by no means certain that a realistic attitude to these matters would prevail, despite the statesmanlike quality of much of President Nasser's speech and President Tito's opening address.

Already, even before the Heads of State assembled in Belgrade, the conveners were carefully disclaiming any intention to build a third bloc—on grounds of feasibility, no doubt, as well as principle Yet, particularly among certain African leaders, there was a strong inclination to impose on the meeting a certain discipline and unity. President Nkrumah of Ghana, whose tendencies towards closely unified action can be seen in the shaping of the Casablanca grouping of African States, appeared as the principal protagonist of this view In putting forward his seven resolutions President Nkrumah sought

to ensure, as did Mr Nehru, that the conference should not smother itself with a welter of unremarkable resolutions, but his attitude in the framing of these resolutions sounds an imperious note, little in tune with Mr Nehru's ideas of non-aligned diplomacy. The seven clear-cut proposals are to be presented to the great Powers as the requirements, almost demands, of the conference. Their tone indicates that the great Powers are expected to concur. Perhaps it is possible to distinguish in this approach an echo of policies used with success by Dr Nkrumah and other nationalist leaders; the firm, precise demands, the purposeful overbidding, are familiar features of their contest for independence with liberal colonial Governments. The style was familiar, too, and attractive, to a number of leaders at Belgrade whose countries are very new to nationhood. The basic weakness of the approach, suitable and effective though it may be in circumstances where the tide of independence is running strongly in favour of a nationalist leader, was underlined by Mr Nehru, speaking with the wisdom of twelve years' experience of the eddies and cross-currents of international affairs; speaking in fact as a statesman.

The final emergence of a peace appeal on the Nehru line as the conference's principal document cannot of course be represented simply as a triumph of this statesmanship. The 'Casablanca' approach contained the basic weakness that it demanded a close measure of detailed agreement on highly controversial and complex topics. This was clearly not forthcoming from the twenty-six or so delegations with widely differing backgrounds and social and political systems. It became equally clear during the course of the drafting sessions that the less influential States, holding, perhaps, minority views on Berlin or Germany, were most unwilling to come into line and thus facilitate the detailed and unanimous resolutions sought by some leaders. The peace appeal was much less controversial, and thus a majority of States, some of whom might even have been mildly irritated by Mr Nehru's cavalier treatment of the subjects on the agenda, particularly colonialism, nevertheless found in the lead he gave the most practical and dignified course of action for the conference.

The Brazilian Puzzle

An uneasy peace has settled in Brazil after weeks of tension which followed President Quadros's sudden resignation on 25 August.

The President's announcement, after only seven months in office,

that he could no longer carry on in the face of what he implied was not only domestic but foreign sabotage seems to have stunned his opponents as much as it did his supporters, and it set off a chain reaction of events and emotions which might well have erupted in civil war. Peace in Brazil today, however uneasy, is one more encouraging sign of the growing restraint which more and more Latin Americans are showing in coping with their political business. Had this crisis happened twenty years ago, it is doubtful whether peace and reason would have prevailed.

But Brazil is not out of the wood yet, and what happens next in Brazil to some extent concerns all Latin America. The United States, which has just launched its 10,000 million dollar Alliance for Progress—Latin America's Marshall Plan—counts on Brazil to set the pace of the social and economic reforms of this plan. The next few months are going to be critical, for the Brazilians have been forced into a political experiment. They have abandoned the presidential system of government which basically Brazil has had since 1889, and adopted a parliamentary form of government. Brazilians are not entirely happy at the change, not only because they feel that it is a makeshift arrangement and not suited to the Brazilian temperament but also because they realize that it has brought back to power parties and political figures which a great majority of them thought they had at last succeeded in rejecting in last year's presidential election.

There are also the feelings of the armed forces to be reckoned with. The new President, Senhor João Goulart, although he is now largely a figurehead President, is highly unpopular with a very big section of the armed forces; he was Vice-President in the Quadros administration, and under the Constitution he should have automatically succeeded Senhor Quadros. This strong objection to him was the added danger in the recent crisis, and the adoption of a parliamentary system, in which the powers of the President were severely restricted, was designed to overcome it. But it is not only among the military that Senhor Goulart is disliked.

A great many Brazilians have some very deep feelings about him. He was bred by and has become an uninhibited symbol of the discredited Vargas regime. His political support comes almost entirely from the more militant left-wing elements in the trade unions and among the lower working classes, and he is also backed by the Communists. He is forty-three years old and an extremely ambitious man who must feel acutely humiliated by his position of President

virtually without powers. No Brazilian can really believe that he will accept this figurehead role and in fact he has already shown that he is out to exercise his influence. He succeeded, for instance, in virtually forcing Congress to accept his choice of Brazil's first Prime Minister, Senhor Tancredo Neves.

Senhor Neves is also closely identified with the Vargas regime and was Minister of Justice in the last Vargas Government. A business man and a Federal deputy, his heart has always been in politics, but when he attempted to widen his political activity by standing for Governor of the prosperous and politically influential but conservatively inclined state of Minas Gerais—incidentally, his home state—he was unquestionably defeated.

Another aspect of this new system which troubles Brazilians is that Senhor Neves's party, the Social Democrat Party (P.S.D.), which is also the party of Senhor Kubitscheck, the former President, and Senhor Goulart's party, the Brazilian Labour Party (P.T.B.) which was founded by Dr Vargas, together hold 186 of the 342 seats in Congress. Although this is not an exactly decisive majority, Brazilians do have the uneasy feeling that a great many old faces are cropping up in the political scene again.

Senhor Quadros ran for the Presidency as an independent and he was the first Brazilian ever to beat the government and party machinery in an election; he received the biggest majority that a Brazilian President has ever had. Consequently today a great many Brazilians who had voted for him because of his independent line and aloofness from purely party politics feel cheated. They regarded their election of Senhor Quadros against the old power oligarchy as a revolution by the vote; and the revolution seems to have failed after all—the old power oligarchy has won again.

Something else which must puzzle the onlooker is why, despite all these feelings against Senhor Goulart and doubts about a parliamentary system, did so many Brazilians and almost the whole of Congress reject the army's solution, which was to impeach Senhor Goulart and hold another election. The reason is that Brazilians, like a great many Latin Americans with experience of military Governments, dislike the thought of soldiers in politics. They apparently felt that if the army was able in effect to tear up the Constitution by preventing Senhor Goulart's legitimate succession, it might be inspired to exercise its influence further in the country's political affairs. But above all Brazilians have acquired almost an obsessional respect for the Constitution, for they feel it is the only

real guarantee of the continuance of their democratic system which they have not had very long. A parliamentary form of government at least preserved the principles of the Constitution. Whether it will work or not is something which is open to a good deal of doubt.

Nevertheless, such a system might be the best form of government for Brazil. Personalities play such a predominant part in Brazilian politics that a President was usually elected not so much because of the policies he advocated but because of his purely personal appeal. It could also mean the beginning of a much needed overhaul of the whole Brazilian political party system, which is so confused in its loyalties that it often confounds even Brazilian political experts. Here again, it is personalities, not policies, which dictate a party's aims. The trouble is that personalities already seem to be playing far too big a part in the new parliamentary system.

The big question hanging over Brazil today is this: has Senhor Quadros, who played such a tremendous role in his country's affairs and had inspired so many hopes, really withdrawn from the Brazilian political scene? The answer is probably no.

Senhor Quadros, who is at present in London, refuses to discuss, at least in public, either his plans or the reasons which made him take a decision which has caused perhaps the biggest political crisis Brazil has ever known. When he resigned, he said that his efforts were being 'hampered by reactionary forces, including forces from abroad', which a great many Brazilians instinctively took to mean the United States. Certainly Washington was not always happy with Senhor Quadros's independent foreign policies and his friendly approaches to the Soviet bloc and Cuba, which did seem to go much further than his policy of 'benevolent neutrality' warranted. On the other hand, the United States seemed to regard his domestic policies with approval; so much so that the Quadros Government had recently received the biggest credits that the Americans had ever given to a Latin American Government.

Certainly, Senhor Quadros was being attacked by the right wing in Brazil, particularly in Congress, and he is a person who is impatient of criticism. But he has never run away from it before. The implication is that he may have felt that by resigning in this spectacular manner he would arouse such a wave of popular support that he would be swept back into office with even greater power than he had before, thus soundly snubbing his critics and Congress Senhor Quadros is a master in the art of snubmanship. But this time he seems to have miscalculated the temper of the Brazilian people

Brazilians felt either that he was abusing the tremendous popularity which he undoubtedly had, and in the process gambling with the country's political security and its democratic institutions, or that he was betraying his supporters in a fit of pique and impulsiveness by not standing up to his critics. But angry and disillusioned as Brazilians may be with Senhor Quadros, they have not forgotten him. It could be that if tensions in Brazil mount, or if the parliamentary system does not work, and there are a variety of other possibilities, Senhor Quadros's gamble may pay off and he may be called back, for he is the one Brazilian leader who could still unite the country. The danger is that in such an event his return might be prefaced by the wringing-out in public of a lot of dirty linen, some of it purposely soiled, which could embarrass a great many people, and not only Brazilians.

Commonwealth Finance Ministers at Accra

THE Commonwealth Finance Ministers' discussions held in Accra between 12 and 14 September were not widely reported in the London press. All accounts expressed surprise at the strong line taken by the representatives of India, Canada, and Australia and at the fact that the communiqué, approved only after many hours of discussion, took the form of a warning to the United Kingdom by all the other Commonwealth Governments. *The Financial Times*, which naturally gave more space to a conference of this nature than the other newspapers, had ventured the opinion on 1 September that 'Britain does not anticipate a full-scale debate at Accra' on the Europe–Commonwealth question. On 13 September it announced that Mr Harold Holt, the Australian Federal Treasurer, 'startled at least some of his colleagues by raising the Common Market issue during the formal and public opening statements'. Whatever may have been said at the private sessions there was no doubt about the trend of the public statements by Mr Holt, by Mr Fleming of Canada, and especially by Mr Desai of India. In the well-informed view of Mr Colin Legum (*The Observer*, 17 September), 'there can be no disguising the shock' given to Mr Selwyn Lloyd and Mr Maudling. Mr Fleming spoke of Britain being 'on a slippery slope'. Mr Hees, the Canadian Minister of Commerce, suggested that the Commonwealth might continue to 'survive in name only', and Mr Desai rejected with scorn the suggestion that India might accept associate status. On the other hand, all countries, and notably Dr Nkrumah in his complimentary message to the meeting,

stressed their desire to maintain the Commonwealth connection

It may be noted that the proceedings were described as a meeting of the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council, not as merely a meeting of Finance Ministers. The published communiqué, which was short and clear, made the following points:

> The Council noted with satisfaction that measures had been taken by the Government of the United Kingdom to strengthen the position of sterling, it welcomed the determination of the United Kingdom Government to maintain the stability of sterling as one of the world's two reserve currencies.
>
> It was felt that a responsibility rested on the more highly industrialized countries of the world to respond sympathetically to constructive proposals for stabilizing commodity prices... It was urged that the objective of world-wide long-term stability could not be achieved without securing a better balance in the trade between the developing and the developed countries.
>
> All other Commonwealth representatives expressed grave apprehension and concern regarding the possible results of the initiative taken by the United Kingdom [to apply for membership of the E.E.C.] ... they reaffirmed the value and importance they attach to traditional Commonwealth trading arrangements.
>
> Several representatives stressed the danger that if the United Kingdom succeeded in negotiating special benefits in the E.E.C. for only certain Commonwealth countries the result could be damaging to Commonwealth solidarity.
>
> Because of the inseparable nature of economic and political relationship within the Commonwealth and because of the political and institutional objectives of the E.E.C.... it was feared by the other Commonwealth countries that United Kingdom membership of the E.E.C. ... might weaken the cohesion of the Commonwealth as a whole.
>
> It was emphasized by the United Kingdom delegation that there would be continuing and close consultation with all Commonwealth Governments at all stages in the negotiations.

It has since been announced that bilateral discussions, which will hardly suffice to allay the anxieties raised in the Accra communiqué, have been begun between the United Kingdom and the various Commonwealth countries. These anxieties and the forthright expression of them at Accra may be expected to influence the negotiations for Britain's admission to the E.E.C. in two ways. Those European statesmen who desire British participation must now be convinced of the reality of the obstacles which must be surmounted; those who prefer that Britain should be excluded can claim that the Commonwealth makes conditions which render the British participation unacceptable.

A Difficult Start for President Kennedy

ĮEITHER Congress nor the world allowed President Kennedy the
aditional honeymoon period in which to get settled into his work
nd to find out what it was about. No new President has had a more
ifficult or a more dispiriting beginning, both at home and abroad,
ı what is the hardest job in the world. And now Congress is
djourning until next January after giving Mr Kennedy extra-
rdinarily little of what he wanted while, after a series of setbacks in
'uba, in Laos, in space, and in Berlin, he is embroiled with the
ussians in a more serious international crisis than any since the
.orean war.

At least this crisis is giving Mr Kennedy what he needs most—
opular sympathy. Elected with no great enthusiasm and by a tiny
ıajority, he must himself rally public opinion in his own support,
specially when dealing with an unco-operative Congress. The in-
:llectual approach of his television addresses, his 'take-it-or-leave-
' attitude, does little to help him in this respect, but Mr Khrush-
hev's bellicosity has done a great deal. After the shutting-off of
ast Berlin and the resumption by the Russians of the most noxious
ype of nuclear testing, Americans are much more willing to do all
ıat their President asks of them, to spend more on defence, to be
ılled up as reservists, to build shelters against atomic attack. In-
eed, they are perhaps too ready. Mr Khrushchev has put them into
ı aggressive mood which may make it difficult for the President to
ɔntinue his patient stalling, his postponement of a show-down with
ıe Russians. This, he has decided, is the wisest course for the
resent and he is pursuing it with a firmness and a refusal to be
ustered which show how much he has learnt since the Cuban
asco.

That, while it was undoubtedly his responsibility, was not wholly
is fault. He found the plans for the invasion of Cuba by exiles with
merican backing well advanced when he came to office, and to have
ɔandoned them would not only have had a disastrous effect on the
ıorale of the Cuban refugees but would also have laid him open to
ıarges from the Republicans of cowardice and of being content
ith the present state of affairs in Cuba. Nevertheless Mr Kennedy's
ecision to go ahead with this obviously unsatisfactory affair sug-
ests a readiness to accept military opinion somewhat uncritically—
though, to be fair, some of his military advisers opposed the Cuban
peration. Military matters are, of course, those about which he

knows least: they had been almost entirely outside his experience until he became President.

The same weakness is also suggested by his resumption of nuclear testing so quickly after the first Russian devices had been exploded, when many people felt that the propaganda value of delay was worth more than any tests. But here again Mr Kennedy had justification: once they had finished a series of tests the Russians might have announced a further moratorium which it would have been worse propaganda for the United States to break. Yet the Americans had a whole series of untested weapons—notably the warhead for the Polaris missiles fired from submarines—on which their defences depend.

Time may show whether or not President Kennedy is over-subservient to his military advisers. It may also show whether the deficiencies in the organization of his government, which became so clear at the time of the Cuban invasion, have been overcome. So far the way in which policy has been developed over Berlin suggests that they have; the process has been slow, but that has been due largely to the hesitancies of America's allies and in any case slowness in these circumstances has been no bad thing, even though it did allow Mr Khrushchev to take the initiative. What the Cuban affair revealed publicly—it had already been much discussed privately—was a lack of co-ordination between the White House and the State Department and a tendency for the President to listen to the amateurs on his own staff rather than to the experts in the established agencies. To avoid the unfortunate effects of this in future, various new arrangements have been made, notably the setting up of special groups to watch particularly pressing situations. But perfect organization is unlikely in any Kennedy Administration, since the President is a man who dislikes fixed procedures and one who always wants to sample a wide range of views before making up his mind.

If Mr Khrushchev has been tough with Mr Kennedy so has Congress, particularly the House of Representatives, in spite of the nominal Democratic majority there. The frustrating coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans has been in control again Clever as the President's assistants have been at handling Congressmen—dangling promises of judgeships for their friends and defence contracts for their districts over their heads at critical moments—and hard as Mr Kennedy has worked at Congress himself, with flattering telephone calls and regular consultations, this

as not been enough. Part of the trouble has been that Mr Rayburn, ie Democratic Speaker who manages the House of Representatives ; no one else can, is getting old and ill. More than once the support n which the Administration could count seems to have been mis-ilculated and on several occasions, notably on foreign aid, the [ouse has got completely out of hand.

Foreign aid has been Mr Kennedy's biggest defeat this year, ,en though he is getting an adequate amount of money to spend on . What he wanted was not only advance authority to make loans ,er a period of five years but also permission to draw the money irectly from the Treasury instead of having to ask Congress for it ich year. This was essential if the advance authority was to have iy real meaning, since Congress almost inevitably refuses to give a resident as much money as he wants for foreign aid. The point of eing able to promise loans in advance was that by this means under-eveloped countries could be encouraged to make long-term, and ierefore more efficient, plans for improvements—for building ams, reforming the civil service, and so on—which would take veral years to complete. This is a particularly important part the Alliance for Progress, the co-operative scheme for Latin merica which has been dealt a severe blow by the Congressional :tion.

If foreign aid could be put on a long-term basis there would be iuch less waste of American dollars than there is at present. Yet ie reason why Congress refused to give the President the power to raw on the Treasury—he did get the five-year authorization—was ecause members argued that the money was bound to be wasted nless it was subject to regular Congressional scrutiny. Congress so feels, with some reason, that the economic side of the foreign d programme has been mismanaged at the Washington end and in ie field; to meet this criticism the International Co-operation dministration is being reorganized into an Agency for Inter-ational Development (A.I.D.). Many Americans are bored with reign aid and with the lack of recognition shown abroad for the illions of dollars which have been sent overseas since the war. That ie 'neutral' countries acquiesced in the Russian resumption of omic tests instead of reacting disgustedly against this seemed to mericans to be especially disappointing. Finally, and perhaps most nportant, the House of Representatives dislikes, justifiably, any icroachment on its constitutional power over the purse and is par-cularly reluctant to allow this at a time like the present when the

majority of the legislators are more conservative financially than is the President.

But financial conservatism had little to do with his other big defeats. The most striking of these was over the Bill which would have provided federal funds to help local communities build schools and pay teachers. Under the constitutional division between Church and State such federal funds cannot be given to parochial schools and thus the Bill, which had good prospects of success at first, was embroiled in controversy between Roman Catholics and Protestants—with the Roman Catholic President firmly on the side of the Constitution and against his co-religionists. This controversy, fostered by those who object to federal help for schools on the ground that this would infringe the rights of the states to manage their schools independently, finally strangled the school Bill for this year and probably for next as well.

In 1962 the main struggles are likely to be over health insurance for old people, which the President did not press this year once he saw that he had no chance of victory, and over tariff policy, since the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act must be renewed. Next year may also see an effort to rewrite the tax system which could be made, by a thorough overhaul, to yield substantially higher revenues without any increase in the rates of taxation. But this is where special interests come into their own, as was seen this year when the President attempted without success to obtain a few modifications in the tax laws which would have encouraged business men to spend less abroad, for the sake of the American balance of international payments, and more on industrial plant at home, for the sake of the country's economic expansion. The President's other major defeat this year, but one which he did not make much effort to avoid, was over his proposals for a new approach to the problem of farm surpluses, an approach which would have taken them almost entirely out of Congress's control and thus perhaps have permitted them to be curtailed effectively.

Mr Kennedy's two big successes since he took office have been achieved mainly without Congress. Largely through the efforts of the Department of Justice, negotiating tactfully with recalcitrant state officials and acting firmly when necessary, noticeable progress has been made towards guaranteeing Negroes their civil rights in the southern states, although of course equality is far from being established there yet. In comforting contrast to the violence of previous years has been the way in which public opinion in several

southern cities, notably New Orleans, Dallas, and Atlanta, accepted the introduction of racial integration into various schools without protest and indeed almost with relief. The number of Negro children attending classes with whites is still infinitesimal but the hard core of resistance to this seems to have been broken.

The other great success in the last six months has been the change-over from economic recession to incipient boom. Although this was mainly the result of natural economic trends Congress did help somewhat by passing various measures for relieving unemployment, by expanding the coverage of the minimum wage regulations, and by approving increased outlays for highways and housing. All these Bills gave, or more often will give, the public more money to spend and thus helped to speed the upward turn in the economy; oddly enough, however, retail trade is still lagging, perhaps because many people are still concerned about the scarcity of jobs. But unemployment must drop soon to more tolerable levels, especially now that reservists and conscripts are being called up and defence industries are expanding again.

For the moment there are reserves of manpower and of industrial capacity to fall back on, but before long there is a real danger that inflationary pressures will become serious once more, particularly since the increased outlays on defence, which have been forced on the Government by Mr Khrushchev, mean that the deficit on the current year's Budget will be greater than was estimated earlier. The President hopes that by next year rising economic activity will have pushed up tax yields enough to make a balanced Budget possible. Meanwhile, however, he is doing what he can, short of imposing the direct controls which are unacceptable to Americans except in war-time, to hold down both prices and wages. His only real weapon is exhortation, to business men and trade unionists alike, and it is resented by both.

Mr Kennedy's chief fear is that inflation, making foreigners once again doubtful about the dollar, may bring a renewal of the drain on the American supply of gold which he succeeded in checking very effectively early this year. This would be even more serious now because, with mounting prosperity in the United States, American imports are going up, putting a fresh strain on the country's balance of payments.

Although this story of President Kennedy's first months in office is a disappointing one, it is not entirely depressing. The new frontiersmen may seem to have turned back to old ways almost before

they charted their course towards the vast possibilities which they saw ahead when they took office. The President himself may seem to have provided little of that leadership and inspiration on which the Western world was counting when he came to power. But at least he now realizes what he is up against—Mr Khrushchev shocked him into understanding that at Vienna—and at least he has shown that he cannot be stampeded into acting rashly. The man in the White House in 1961 has a far firmer grasp of the real needs of today than had his predecessor and a far greater readiness to use the enormous power which is his. And so far, apart from the Cuban mistake which he recognizes as clearly as does everyone else, Mr Kennedy has given no indication that he is likely to use that power badly.

NANCY BALFOUR

Ghana since Independence

IN a pre-independence survey of events in the Gold Coast (as it then was) a number of questions were posed;[1] they arose from the very sombre picture drawn of the general Gold Coast scene at the beginning of 1957. It was questioned whether the State would survive all of a piece, whether the economy would support the burden of development, and whether society itself would ever achieve a common patriotism and a 'Ghana nationality'. There seemed enough evidence to justify these gloomy reckonings. Ashanti was threatening to secede, the cocoa price was falling, the army was an enigma, the stability of the public service uncertain. Nkrumah was thought to be a 'unifying force', who had tried to turn his back (too resolutely perhaps) on the old ways; but the writer detected, still, a 'lack of continuing effort' which he thought might result in the new State achieving stability at a level intolerable in more advanced communities. Such was the picture presented of the dying colonial state and of its prospects as an independent nation.

How different is the Ghana scene today! The Ashanti movement has been crushed, the State has not merely held together but is in

[1] See 'Gold Coast Independence. Prospects and Problems of the New State of Ghana', in *The World Today*, February 1957.

process of extending its boundaries in a wider union, Accra has become an important centre in pan-African affairs, a single party holds the country in its grip, and Nkrumah rules over a radical party-controlled republic defined as 'socialist at home, neutralist abroad'. Indeed, those who entertain fears for the new republic are uneasy not that the Government may be unable to govern, but that its rulers will rule only too well. What has happened to bring about so drastic a change in the political scene? And who is responsible?

In the first place, of course, there was the fact of independence on 6 March 1957, and the final decision which this signified in favour of the Convention People's Party in a hitherto uneasy distribution of power between the C.P.P., the opposition parties, and the United Kingdom Government drew wide support after it. Nothing succeeds like success, and since absolute power tends (in some circumstances at least) to attract absolutely, the new Government set about increasing its authority by every means possible.[1]

It is worth noting at the outset the continuation of certain features, even certain attitudes, carried over into the new State from the colonial period. One of the distinguishing features of a colonial regime, for example, is the curious blend of personal and executive authority which runs from top to bottom: from the Governor to the Assistant District Commissioner in the bush. The Convention People's Party had not been long in absolute control before it, too, appointed, in November 1957, Regional and District Commissioners They filled the seats (still warm) occupied by the colonial officials so that, in every region and district, party commissioners—paid for out of public funds, but elevated because of their devotion to the party—maintain law and order, listen to complaints, coordinate development plans, and keep an eye on the local chief (and the local 'malcontents'). Periodically, they render account to the relevant Minister in Accra, either as Minister or as a party boss. To anyone who travelled formerly in the colonial Gold Coast, a visit today to a district headquarters or regional capital is an uncanny experience. It is not that the former District Commissioner's bungalow or the Chief Commissioner's office is haunted by ghosts from the past: far from it. All too solid party officials are very obviously in control, and one signs the visitors' book, or pays one's respects to the political head of the area, with the feeling that, superficially at least, *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.* It is often re-

[1] See 'Ghana: Developments since Independence', in *The World Today*, October 1958.

marked, too often perhaps, that Nkrumah as President of the Republic or as life chairman of the party has some of the characteristics of a Paramount Chief. Has it ever been noted that he holds a position comparable with that of a 'strong' Colonial Governor? The result, at least, is very similar: a hierarchical structure of authority built around, or stretching down from, an active Head of State[1] who works through a subordinate array of loyal officials. Thus today, in the Ghana of 1961, a web of party authority has been spun over the country just as in earlier times a web of officialdom held the country within its grasp.

Another characteristic of the early colonial period is noticeable in the country: the dislike of any formal opposition to those in power Arguments in support of the usefulness of an Opposition are criticized by party leaders often enough in terms of reproach, as being not merely irrelevant but a hindrance to good government and the urgent needs of the moment. Very often, this dislike of a formal Opposition is thought to be a natural development from pre-colonial society: it is pointed out that there is no word for opposition in the Akan language, which has to use the circumlocution 'enemy'; there is a liking (it is said) for uniformity in African tribal society Thus the rush of opposition M.P.s to the Government side after March 1957, the peculiar form of the Republic of 1960, and the ramification of the ruling party through society—controlling the trade unions, the co-operatives, farmers' groups, the 'young pioneers', women's associations—all this, it is argued, is the way in which an African society will behave if left untramelled by the outside world. This may be so in very general terms (there is no space here to do more than point out that it is a very superficial view): but it is also the way in which colonial society in its heyday liked to work, and the central committee of the party, *mutatis mutandis*, has at least something in common with the old colonial secretariat which liked to have a controlling hand on everything that moved in the colony.

Who is responsible for the present pattern of government, and the attitude of the ruling party? Perhaps the right answer is no one: no single person, and neither the colonial past nor the pre-colonial past, but the circumstances of the time. The new State was born inauspiciously, following the general election of July 1956 when the C.P.P. won 72 of the 104 seats,[2] and the opposition parties—the

[1] *De facto* of course in colonial times, as the representative of the Crown.
[2] Increased in June 1960 to 114 with the election (by the existing Members of Parliament) of ten women M.P.s.

Jational Lıberatıon Movement in Ashanti, the Northern People's 'arty, and the Togoland Congress—each won a local majority in its wn area. Although disheartened by the over-all results of the lection, the opposition alliance continued its demands for changes n the 1954 Constitution; violence continued in the latter half of 956 between armed party gangs in Ashanti and Akim Abuakwa, here was an ugly and serious outbreak of rioting in the Ewe-speak- ıg districts of southern Togoland shortly after independence, and was never very easy to see how Dr Busıa, R. R. Amponsah, S. D.)ombo, or Joe Appiah, for the opposition, would work easily with)r Nkrumah, K. A. Gbedemah, Kojo Botsio, or Krobo Edusei, for he Government, given their vilification of each other and the total ack of goodwill that existed on both sides.

In the end, on the eve of the grant of independence, the opposi- ıon leaders put theır trust (mistakenly, but the fault stemmed from he curıous 'intelligentsia' quality in its leadership) in the paper afeguards of an 'agreed Constitution'. The 1957 Order in Council rovıded for interım regional assemblıes and houses of chiefs, re- trıctions on the machinery of constitutional change, and entrenched lauses governıng the rıghts of chiefs and the liberties of the indi- ıdual. It was a cumbersome, difficult piece of machinery, hastily lrawn up and (on the C.P.P. sıde) reluctantly accepted. There were urther riots after independence, in the mid-summer of 1957, in Accra, where the Ga people suddenly protested violently against heır minority position in the capital—parading the streets in groups f tough young men known as Tokyo Joes, complaining that they vere being discriminated against in their own trıbal area, that a ıumber of ministers had corruptly acquired government estate ıouses in the suburbs, and that lıvıng costs were higher than they ıad ever been. Nkrumah was away, attending a Commonwealth 'rıme Mınisters' meeting, and returned to boos and jeers as he lrove through Accra. Kumasi was still hostile, the ex-servicemen hreatened to 'march on the castle' (as they had done in the 1948 ıots), one of the northern M.P.s joined the opposition (he soon went ›ack again to the C.P.P.), and a widespread strike of motor drivers ›aralysed the main market centres.

It may be accepted, therefore, that in the early months of inde- ›endence the Government felt insecure—it certainly looked it— ınd, in these circumstances, it hit out at its opponents. Using argu- nents based on the need to defend the achievement of indepen- lence and to suppress violence, it now began to reward its friends

and injure its enemies. 'The king's wrath is as a roaring lion; but his favour is as dew upon the grass.' The truth of this was now to be seen. Party members were appointed regional and district commissioners, or to dignified and lucrative positions in a party-controlled centralized trade-union structure, the Ghana Farmers' Council, public corporations, and a growing number of embassies abroad. On the other hand, meetings of the Ga Shifimo Kpee[1] were banned, a Deportation Act removed the two leading Muslim opposition figures from Kumasi, there was talk of a Preventive Detention Act, and the tough Kumasi leader Krobo Edusei became Minister of the Interior.

A number of strong-arm measures followed later in 1957 and early in 1958. A Commission of Inquiry was appointed into the conduct of a number of important opposition chiefs; an Avoidance of Discrimination Bill was passed which forbade the existence of parties on a regional, tribal, or religious basis; a state of emergency was declared in Kumasi, where the C.P.P. Muslim leader was made 'Zerikin Zongo';[2] two members of Parliament from the former Togoland area were tried in connection with the post-independence riots; and, in July 1958, a Preventive Detention Bill was passed which enabled the Minister to 'name' an opponent and detain him for five years on the general ground that his conduct was prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order. The Act was used in November to detain a number of leading opposition members in Accra, and in December to detain R. R. Amponsah and M. K Apaloo, both opposition members of Parliament—one an Ashanti, the other an Ewe. If, therefore, insecurity breeds suspicion, and suspicion magnifies what evidence there is of subversion, the Ghana Government stood as witness to this progress after 1957. Seldom has the belief been so readily accepted that the safety of the people (and their rulers) must be the first charge on the State.

The opposition tried to draw together under this attack. The various sectional parties joined together as a 'United Party' a little while before the Avoidance of Discrimination Act, there was a determined effort to challenge the Government's acts in the law courts, and by mid-1958 the United Party general secretary, so it was alleged later, had engaged in the mysterious purchase of minor pieces of military accoutrement.[3] None of these measures brought

[1] The 'Ga Standfast Association'.

[2] i e., leader of the Muslim community.

[3] See the *Report of the Commission appointed to Enquire into the Matters disclosed at the trial of Captain Benjamin Awhaitey before a Court Martial*, and the

he opposition any success, and the last ended in disaster. The parliamentary opposition, which at independence had thirty-two members, was down to thirteen by July 1960, actually losing twelve of ts number to the Government side, while three of its members vere held in detention. It would be a remarkable opposition to have veathered such adverse conditions. The United Party lost control f the Kumasi municipality in February, boycotted the regional ssembly elections in October 1958, and won less than 10 per cent f the votes in the April 1960 plebiscite and presidential elections. It as not, however, vanished entirely. Although denied the use of the erm 'Opposition' in Parliament, it continues as a small anti-C.P.P. roup of determined individuals led by Joe Appiah and S. D. Dombo in the Assembly, and by Dr J. B. Danquah outside Parliament.

The desire for security and the liking for complete control also ed the ruling party to dismember the 1957 Constitution. Once the C.P.P. Government had gained control of the regional assemblies it vas able to enact a Constitution (Repeals of Restriction) Bill in December 1958 which removed all limitations on the machinery of onstitutional change. The way was then open for the passage of a Constitution Amendment Act in March 1959 which, *inter alia*, bolished the regional assemblies and the Judicial Service Commission. In the following month a Chiefs' Recognition Act was passed, all traditional members were removed from the local government authorities, and an Act divided Ashanti into two egions, Ashanti and Brong Ahafo; each of these measures still urther strengthened the authority of the ruling party. By the middle f 1959 the C.P.P. appeared to be in total control of Ghanaian political life, and early in 1960 it began to put forward its proposals for a new republican Constitution.[1] Approved by a plebiscite on 19, 23, and 27 April, the new Republic was inaugurated at midnight on 30 June 1960. Nkrumah became both Head of State and Head of Government, with wide powers over the whole machinery of government. Nkrumah was elected President at the same time as he plebiscite took place, but future Presidents will be chosen by

Ghana Government's *Statement* on the report (Ghana Government W.P. No. 0/59) See, too, the United Party's reply *In Defence of Ghana*. The Commission ound that R. R Amponsah and M K. Apaloo had since June 1958 'engaged in conspiracy to carry out at some future date in Ghana an act for an unlawful urpose revolutionary in character'. It was shortly after the Government's White Paper with its very strong language about the opposition that Dr K. A Busia, the United Party leader, went into voluntary exile

[1] See 'Proposals for a Republic in Ghana' in *The World Today* April 1960

members of the National Assembly at the time of their own election. The first Parliament of the Republic was also that elected in July 1956; its life is now limited to a maximum term of five years, dating from 1 July 1960.

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

The ability of the C.P.P. to consolidate its hold on the country derived not only from its ready use of the advantages of power; it came also from its position as the 'party of the common man' in control of considerable funds. The Budget presented by Mr F. K Dra Goka (who replaced Mr Gbedemah as Minister of Finance when the Office of the Budget was taken over by the President) totalled £128 million, of which £81½ million were for recurrent expenditure and £46½ million for expenditure under the 1959 Development Plan. The economy may be in danger of being overloaded, and last July's Budget was unprecedentedly harsh, leading to a widespread strike of railway, harbour, and bus workers in September.[1] But, in the long term, the wealth of the country has been reflected in its social and economic progress, with free and compulsory primary and middle school education, a big expansion in secondary education, and an increase in the number of university places. (A Commission appointed to review university education reported early in 1961, one of the unexpected by-products of its Report,[2] and contrary to its recommendations, being the abrupt termination of the contracts of six senior members of the university staff.) Economic development has been conducted on a grand scale: a new harbour at Tema, eighteen miles east of Accra, due to come into full commercial operation in 1962; the giant Volta River Scheme to be financed (at last) by the World Bank and the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ghana; an oil refinery; new roads, railway extensions, hospitals, State cocoa farms, a northern rice scheme, and so forth, based on a Development Plan of £243 million for the five-year period July 1959 to June 1964. The goal of this impressive programme is said to be that of an 'African socialist State', by which is usually meant the bringing of the economy under the control of State buying and trading organiza-

[1] The main grievances were the increased taxes on consumer goods under the 1961 Budget and, in particular, the additional levy of 5 per cent of the salary of those earning more than £120 a year, the amount deducted to be repaid in 5s Lottery Bonds to be realized in ten years' time at 6s.

[2] *Report of the Commission on University Education, December 1960–January 1961* (Accra, Ministry of Information, 1961).

tions, assisted by the party-dominated trade unions and co-operatives, with limitations restricting the place of overseas companies in the economy (although not to the extent of frightening away foreign capital) and the active discouragement of private Ghanaian business enterprise.

Of more immediate significance, perhaps, for the long-term planning of the economy have been the interim results of the detailed census of population taken in March 1960 showing a total and regional population as follows:

Accra capital district	541,378
Western Region	1,348,844
Eastern Region	1,038,525
Ashanti	1,108,548
Brong Ahafo	588,724
Northern Ghana	1,282,164
Volta Region	782,547
Total	6,690,730

Despite the growth and vitality of the economy, it is still dominated by cocoa sales Industrialization is still in its infancy, with a State-managed match factory, tyre-retreading plants, fish-canneries, furniture workshops, and so forth; and there are, as well, the beginnings of overseas industrial enterprise, with a large plywood factory in the Western region and a new car-assembly plant at the new Tema township. Exports of gold, timber, diamonds, and manganese have become increasingly important, but it is still cocoa which shapes the yearly pattern of the economy, with the lean months falling before the main crop season in October to December. The epidemic of the virus disease Swollen Shoot has at last been checked, with the cutting out of nearly 100 million trees over the past fifteen years; capsid disease has been held back through the regular spraying of the farms with 'kumakate' insecticide. These measures, together with the use of fertilizers, have resulted in record crops, reaching 410,000 tons in 1960–1. The world price of cocoa has been falling, however, and the Ghana Government is concerned about it. It is proposed to make the cocoa farmer contribute an extra amount to the development programme by imposing on him during the 1961–2 main crop season a compulsory savings scheme of 6*s.* in every £3 paid by the Cocoa Marketing Board for a load of 60 lb. of cocoa.[1] A similar muzzling in 1954 of the ox that treadeth out the corn produced the violence of the Ashanti

[1] Again, the 6*s.* will be paid in non-transferable Bonds realizable in ten years' time at 7*s.* 6*d.* The economic fortunes of the cocoa producer depend as much on

National Liberation Movement, but whether this will repeat itself it is impossible to foretell.

The Ghana Government is also worried about the effect of the European Common Market on Ghana exports, with a possible discriminatory 4½ per cent tariff against cocoa from the non-associated territories. This is part of the general charge brought by the C.P.P. against the forces of 'neo-colonialism'.

FOREIGN POLICY

Ghana was the first of the colonies of tropical Africa to attain independence, and she has had since then a leader enormously influenced by pan-African ideas absorbed during his student days in the United States and London. A passionate desire that Ghana should assert an 'African Personality'—an expression developed out of the writings of Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, and George Padmore—runs side by side with a belief that Ghana should follow a 'neutral course' in world affairs. What does this double strand in Ghana's external policy amount to in practice? There is no clear exposition of what is (perhaps necessarily) a cluster of ideas, but they include the belief that Negro Africa must, at last, have its independent say in the world, that the independence won in 1957 will be precarious and incomplete unless protected by constant vigilance against the former colonial Powers, that Africa will always be poor if it remains divided ('Balkanized'), and that the status and influence of any State are intimately associated with its size. South and Central America stand as melancholy examples of the effects of division, North America as a shining example of what can be done by ex-colonial states if only they join together. A shifting amalgam of these beliefs has shaped Ghana's efforts (not always welcomed by her neighbours) to save Africa by her exertions rather than by her example. Hitherto fortunately placed by her early lead in the movement towards independence, Ghana may not always be able to retain her initiative in the manœuvres that take place among the African States, but at least she can claim to have been the initiator of the pan-African conference movement, with the holding in Accra of the first Conference of Independent African States in April 1958 and the first All-African Peoples' Conference in the following December.[1] Since these early meetings, the pace of events has been

the size of the crop as on the price per load paid by the Cocoa Marketing Board, and it is almost certain that the forthcoming main crop will be smaller than it was in 1960–1.

[1] See 'The Accra Conference of African States', in *The World Today*, June

lmost too much even for the new rulers of Africa, but the events iemselves have seemed (in Ghanaian eyes) to justify the country's idical pan-African stand. The growing harshness of the South frican scene, the Algerian war, the Bizerta episode, the French tomic detonations in the Sahara, the Congo imbroglio, the Anolan revolt, the disturbances in Central Africa, and, on a different lane, the association of the former French and Belgian colonies in frica with the European Common Market: all these events, it is id, show that imperialism and its offspring 'neo-colonialism' are ill abroad and at work in Africa, and that they need to be combated y joint effort on the part of the independent States.

In September 1958 and again in 1960, therefore, Ghana opened er frontiers to a wider union with Guinea and Mali (the former rench Soudan). A Charter constituting the three countries a Jnion of African States' was signed in Accra by Dr Nkrumah, M. ekou Touré, and M. Modibo Keita in May 1961. The Union is of ie loosest kind possible, finding expression at best in a concert of olicies conducted by each member State as a sovereign Governient. The policy followed, in general terms, is that enunciated in the frican Charter drawn up at Casablanca in January 1961 by Ghana, Iorocco, the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Libya, Mali, the Proisional Government of Algeria, and Ceylon. It included such olicies as 'non-alignment' in world affairs, the liberation of the maining colonial territories in Africa, the discouragement of reign bases and troops on African soil, the promotion of intimate -operation between the signatory Powers, the creation of an frican Consultative Assembly and co-ordinating committees on ecific problems, and a joint Africa High Command.

Ghana's foreign policy has not been uniformly successful. It is nbitious—it is expressed, for example, through some forty Misons abroad—and sometimes overreaches itself; wishing to unite frica, the Ghana Government has sometimes appeared in practice deepen its divisions. This has probably been true in part of its olicy towards the Congo, in which too close an interpretation of the ist and amorphous Congo scene in Ghanaian terms led to a misidgment of the feasibility of a unitary system of government under Ir Lumumba and Mr Gizenga. On the other hand, the conduct of ie large contingent of Ghanaian troops in the Congo, and the adiness of Dr Nkrumah to work through the United Nations,

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'58, and 'Nationalism in Africa The Two Accra Conferences', in *The World oday*, April 1959.

have been of immense practical benefit. An unfortunate dispute has however grown up between the Ghana and Togo Governments over the eastern Ghana–western Togo border which divides the Ewe-speaking communities in the two countries. At worst, it is possible to see the West African States as being engaged in a Balkan-like conflict between the 'radicals' of the Casablanca group and the 'reformists' led by the Ivory Coast. If this is the case, then the Ghana Government achieved what looked like a notable victory in June 1961 when President Nkrumah and President Yameogo of the Republic of Upper Volta jointly agreed to the abolition of the customs frontier between the two countries. The significance here is that Upper Volta is one of the four countries of the Conseil de l'Entente, based on the Ivory Coast, and is geographically placed as a cross-roads between Mali and Ghana in one direction and the Ivory Coast and Niger in another. This division between the radicals and the reformists may however be too simple a conception; the era of independent States is still very new in Africa, and judgment may well be suspended for the present on the relationship between Ghana and her neighbours.

Finally, in considering the nature of the party regime in Ghana, it is noteworthy that the country is a well-managed State. Travel is relatively easy by air or road, and things work well—the customs and airport controls, telephones, telegraphs, motor repair shops, appointments to meet ministers and officials, the reliability of clerks and secretaries. This is partly due to a well-ordered public service, now almost entirely staffed by local officers, as can be seen from the following comparative figures:

Senior Civil Service Posts

	Ghanaians	*Europeans*
1952	520	1,322
1957	1,581	1,138
1961	2,883	66 on pensionable appointment 660 on contract

(In effect, this has meant that, whereas in 1952 there was only one Ghanaian head of department, by 1957 there were twenty-two, and by 1961 there were fifty-nine Ghanaians and eight expatriates. By 1962 it is expected that the executive charge of all Ministries and Secretariats will be in local hands, although this does not mean that there will be no overseas officers as expert advisers, army commanders, and so forth.)

Alongside this public service, there is the distinctive radical flavour of the party itself. It is radical because the leaders are engaged in what amounts to a triple revolution: the achievement (and preservation) of independence, the creation of a single Ghanaian

ationality, and the consolidation of power in the hands of an en-
rely new social group. Independence was won in 1957 and demon-
rated to the leaders' satisfaction in 1960. It is probably too early
:t to say whether movements such as the Ashanti N.L.M. in 1954
ıd the Ga Shifimo Kpee in 1957 were the last serious expressions
' a simple struggle for power in a tribal setting: such emotions go
ɜep and are rarely ever finally eradicated. The third aspect of the
volution—the transfer of power within Ghanaian society itself—
equally difficult to assess, but the C.P.P. undoubtedly reflects the
ɜeds and attitudes of a broad section of local society which has had
ımething more than primary and something less than secondary
lucation. We might call the party the expression of an 'uninformed
dicalism' which helps to explain the language of the C.P.P.
vening News and *Ghanaian Times*, the attraction of simple anti-
ılonial ideas, and the urgency behind current plans of social and
:onomic reform. (Perhaps it should be added that the comfortable
rcumstances in which the party leaders live, and the corruption
ıat is said on all sides to exist, do not necessarily mean that the
aders have ceased to be radical merely because they are not vir-
ıous.) It is this radically based and radically led party that for the
·esent dominates the political scene, although the regime is also
ɜcoming more and more a personal one, dependent—within the
nits of the party—on the Leader's own will. The strain on Dr
krumah as President, life chairman of the party and secretary of
s central committee, Chancellor of the University, and responsible
ır the Budget, for economic development and planning, the armed
ırces, broadcasting, pan-African policies—for everything that
ıoves within the State and the party—must be enormous; and it is
ɔt always easy to see how much longer the burden can be carried
this way.

DENNIS AUSTIN

ˀhe U.S. 'Colonial Experiment' in Haiti

HE Republic of Haiti rarely gains the attention of the general pub-
:. When it does, the news is frequently bad: a hurricane, famine,
udent strikes, *coups d'état*, a decline in the price of coffee, a slow-

down of development projects, the farcical re-election of a Presiden
Especially since Castro's advent to power in Cuba at the beginnin
of 1959, Haiti has faced threats of invasion from Cuba or th
Dominican Republic. The best-known—and least accurate—imag
of Haiti is a Voodoo ceremony. Only occasionally does one rea
about the literary and artistic 'Renaissance' in Haiti; even less fre
quently does one have the opportunity to study a sober analysis o
the reasons for Haiti's under-development.

This article explores those reasons, with special emphasis upo
the responsibilities of the United States. For Haiti has been a part o
the 'colonial empire' of the United States.[1] America's colonial ex
periment in Haiti did not last as long as did the British, French
Belgian, and Italian empires in Africa. Since, however, it is fashion
able to assess 'colonialism as a school for democracy' in Africa,[2] it i
fair to evaluate the plight of a nation that was for nineteen years
1915–34, an American protectorate and is still a 'client State'.

Few nations began their independence under more inauspiciou
circumstances than did Haiti, which occupies the western third o
the island discovered by Columbus on his first voyage in 1492
When Spain surrendered this part to France in 1697, it had only
few inhabitants, largely freebooters. But less than a century late
Saint-Domingue had become the richest of all the French colonies
richer even than Canada. A few thousand French planters and slave
holders enjoyed a fastuous life which compensated in part for the
absence from France. A few thousand mulattoes, who owned abou
one-third of the land and one-third of the slaves, copied the moral
and manners of the rich whites (the *Grands Blancs*). The latte
scorned the wealthy mulattoes, the white workers (the *Petits Blancs*)
the poor mulattoes, and the half-million slaves, nearly all of whon
were 'black'.[3] The wealthy mulattoes hated the wealthy whites wh
denied them social equality; they scorned the white workers, th
poor mulattoes, and above all the slaves, constant reminders of the
African ancestry. The slaves brooded and attempted a few abortiv
insurrections; some hid out in the mountains.

[1] See especially Julius W Pratt, *America's Colonial Experiment. How th United States Gained, Governed, and in Part Gave Away a Colonial Empir* (New York, Prentice Hall, 1951).

[2] Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion o Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass , Harvard University Press, 1960) pp. 227–37.

[3] After four trips to Haiti, one to West Africa, and acquaintance with man Africans and West Indians in France, Britain, and the United States, the write has become increasingly aware that 'blacks' may be blue-black, black, black brown, dark brown, brown, copper brown, and light brown.

The French Revolution of 1789 ignited this potentially explosive situation, a smouldering 'volcano' as Mirabeau described it. When, in 1791, the slaves realized that Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity did not mean emancipation, they launched their own revolution against the white and mulatto slaveholders. After almost thirteen years of war which involved Britain, France, Spain, and the United States and a bitter struggle between the former slaves and their former masters, Haiti proclaimed independence on 1 January 1804. A mocking and incredulous world looked aghast at this first Negro republic of the modern age, the first Latin American nation, the second nation in the Western hemisphere.

The long war had destroyed most of the machinery used in the production of sugar and other agricultural products; it had devastated most of the mansions of the planters and the public buildings; Cap Français, 'the Paris of the Îles', lay in ruins. Most of the French settlers had been killed or forced to flee; bitterness between the blacks and the mulattoes had increased. The hostility of the principal slave-holding powers—Britain, France, and the United States—necessitated a large standing army and led to a policy which, with few exceptions, denied white men access to the island.[1] When France recognized Haiti in 1825—she was the first country to do so—she imposed an indemnity of 150 million francs, payable in five years. Haiti had to borrow from France 30 million francs to pay the first instalment. Since Haiti received only 24 million francs, the balance had to be paid out of her own scant funds. The 'double indemnity' of a French loan to pay the French indemnity necessitated the issue of paper money to meet Haiti's domestic expenses. Although France in 1838 reduced the indemnity to 60 million francs payable in thirty years, this onerous debt further retarded the social and economic development of Haiti and aggravated her political instability.

Historical comparisons are dangerous, especially between events separated by more than 150 years. None the less the post-independence chaos in Congo (Leopoldville) bears some similarities to that in Haiti after 1804. Dessalines, Christophe, Pétion, and Rigaud[2] fought among themselves as have Lumumba, Tshombe, Kasavubu,

[1] The most notable exception was the acceptance by Christophe of a few teachers from England. See *Henry Christophe and Thomas Clarkson: A Correspondence*, edited by Earl Leslie Griggs and Clifford H. Prator (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1952), especially pp. 53–4, 62, 64, 276.

[2] Toussaint Louverture, the principal leader against France, had been captured by the French in 1802 and sent to France where he died in prison in 1803.

Mobutu, and Gizenga. For most of the period prior to 1820, Hai
was divided into the north ruled by the black Christophe and th
south ruled by the mulatto Pétion. Haitian historians have con
tinued to emphasize this theme of the clash of colour. The presen
President of Haiti, François Duvalier, is the co-author of a boo
which declared that, with few exceptions, every Haitian Head of th
State 'always considered himself not only the Head of the Natio
but first and above all the first of his class'. As the book made abun
dantly clear, class meant colour.[1] Between 1843 and 1915, when th
United States began its military intervention, Haiti had twenty-tw
rulers. Most of them came to power as a result of revolutions led b
politicians of different colours.[2]

Renewed rivalry among Britain, France, the United States, an
Spain for control of the Dominican Republic, Haiti's eastern neigh
bour, confronted these rulers with a difficult dilemma. If Britain
France, or Spain gained control of the Dominican Republic, the
might threaten the independence of Haiti. If the United State
gained control (prior to the American Civil War), it might seek t
restore slavery in Haiti. The other horn of the dilemma require
invasion of the Dominican Republic by Haitian troops in order t
avert these threats. From 1847 to 1855, Haiti pursued the latte
policy. The 'Tripartite Intervention' of Britain, France, and th
United States in 1851 only temporarily halted the invasions. Fou
years later Dominican forces inflicted an overwhelming defeat upo
a larger Haitian army, and a new Government in Haiti underto
the task, aggravated by Haiti's dilemma, of internal reforms.[3]

The United States did not recognize the independence of Hai
until 1862, thirty-seven years after French recognition and som
thirty years after recognition by the British. Periodically, durin
some twenty years after the American Civil War, Haitian contende
for the Presidency made offers of coaling stations to the Unite
States in return for military aid against their opponents. Thes
rivals for power in Haiti also invited the support of leaders of oppo
ing factions in the Dominican Republic. But the United States di

[1] Lorimer Denis and Dr François Duvalier, *Le Problème des Classes à trave l'histoire d'Haïti* (Port-au-Prince [?], 1948), p. 3.

[2] H. P. Davis, *Black Democracy* (New York, Dial Press, 1928), p. 338, lists t rulers, their terms of office, and their colour Haitian historians disagree, how ever, as to the colour of some of these rulers and, indeed, as to the terms used identify a colour.

[3] See Rayford W. Logan, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States wi Haiti, 1776–1891* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1941 pp. 236–92.

not intervene by force in Haitian affairs until 1890–1 when the consummate skill of the Haitian Government and of its Minister in Washington, aided by President Harrison's aversion to the use of force, resulted in an almost unbelievable fiasco.[1]

In 1915, however, the United States, alleging a threat by Germany to violate the Monroe Doctrine, took advantage of the murder by the President of Haiti of more than 160 political prisoners to establish a military protectorate that lasted until 1934. Under the terms of treaties signed in 1916 and 1917 the United States promised to 'aid the Haitian Government in the proper and efficient development of its agricultural, mineral, and commercial resources and in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a firm and solid basis'.

An unfortunate incident in December 1929, in which United States Marines killed and wounded several scores of Haitian peasant men and women, led President Hoover to name two Commissions to report on conditions in Haiti. One Commission, headed by W. Cameron Forbes, a former Governor-General of the Philippines, reported that Haiti, 'under the control of the American Occupation, has made great material progress in the past fifteen years'. On the other hand, the Commission was 'not convinced that the foundations for democratic and representative government are now broad enough in Haiti'. The Commission also questioned the wisdom of the payment of several millions of dollars on the principal of the public debt 'in excess of the amount called for by the amortisation plan' agreed to by the Governments of the United States and Haiti. Most importantly, the Forbes Commission regretted the continued existence of 'poverty, ignorance, and the lack of a tradition or desire for orderly free government'.[2] The report of this Commission invalidates, as far as Haiti is concerned, the overall conclusion of Professor Julius W. Pratt about the results of America's colonial experiment, namely, that American intervention had unquestionably strengthened the financial positions of most of the Governments concerned. His conclusion that American intervention 'had made no appreciable change in political attitudes or habits',[3] on the other hand, is correct, especially with respect to Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Although as a result of recommendations by the Forbes Com-

[1] *ibid.*, pp. 411–57.
[2] Publications of the Department of State, Latin American Series, No. 2, *Report of the President's Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions in the Republic of Haiti* (Washington, 1930), pp. 1–9.
[3] Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

mission the United States withdrew the Marines in 1934, a fis representative of the United States retained control of Haitian cu toms until American bondholders were paid off. This fiscal repr sentative also exercised a degree of control over the Haitian Budg until the 1940s, which irked even many Haitians who were frienc to the United States. Reforms in administration and the eliminati of a corruption which had characterized many of the Haiti Governments prior to 1951 did not sufficiently compensate f Haiti's right to manage her own affairs. On the other hand, ma feasance and misfeasance by Haitian Presidents during the pa twenty years cannot be laid at the doors of the United States. brief, the United States has had to confront the dilemma encou tered by the European metropolitan Powers in the period of 'd colonization'. A hands-off policy has sometimes given a free rein African leaders who have had little experience in fiscal and financ responsibility. On the other hand, attempts on the part of the form metropolitan Power to offer guidance have evoked charges of 'ne colonization'. The United States has had no more success in resol ing this dilemma in Haiti than have some former metropolit Powers in Africa.

It is thus not easy to assess the degree of responsibility for t failure of the United States to fulfil the obligations freely unde taken by the treaties of 1916 and 1917 and continued in a measu difficult to determine to the present time. This difficulty is all t more apparent because the United States is so powerful in Haiti, well as in other Latin American countries, that, in this write opinion, non-intervention may be tantamount to intervention. Th non-intervention enabled Batista in Cuba, Trujillo in the Domir can Republic, Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, and other dictators remain in power. The fiasco of half-way intervention against Cast in April 1961 further points up this dilemma. Opponents of Pres dent Duvalier who live in the United States are unable to fatho United States policy in Haiti. There is a small contingent of Unite States Marines in Haiti, ostensibly and perhaps veritably for t purpose of serving notice on Cuba and the Dominican Republic n to use Haiti as a staging area for attack on one another. But Haitia exiles in the United States may stand on firm ground when they in terpret this small contingent as United States support of Duvalie

The United States must be absolved of responsibility for t failure to develop the mineral resources of Haiti. With the exceptio of bauxite, these are virtually non-existent. Development of agr

cultural and commercial resources was a blithe commitment undertaken without sufficient knowledge of the magnitude of the problems.

A geological survey published in 1924 suggested the basic elements of those problems. 'Haiti is very mountainous,' the report pointed out. 'Towering mountains are visible from the sea in front of any of the open ports of the Republic, and at many ports steep mountain slopes extend down to the coast. The traveller who is accustomed to wide plains can scarcely believe that a population so large as that of the Republic can live in a country so rugged, yet the exports from which the Republic largely derives its revenue consist principally of agricultural products.'[1]

A census conducted under the supervision of the United States in 1950 revealed for the first time an accurate count of Haiti's population. This, incidentally, was one of the more important contributions during the period of 'decolonization'. This census enumerated a population of 3,097,000. An estimate in mid-1958 showed an increase to 3,424,000, or 319 per square mile. This was the highest density population of any of the twenty Latin American Republics. El Salvador, the second highest, had 316, the Dominican Republic 148, and Cuba 145. None of the other Latin American countries had as many as 60 per square mile Haiti's population density was somewhat less than that for the West Indies Federation, namely, 391 per square mile. It was much less than that of Barbados, 1,412 per square mile, and somewhat less than that of Jamaica, 352 per square mile.[2] But Haiti has no safety valve for the export of some of her surplus population such as the British West Indies have had in Britain and in Canada. Haiti's most natural potential outlet, the Dominican Republic, has been virtually closed since President Trujillo caused the massacre of several thousand Haitian workers in 1937.

Haiti's population density is even more meaningful in terms of persons per square mile of arable land. Haiti had the highest number among Latin American countries: 2,396; the next highest were Peru, 1,528; El Salvador, 1,158; the Dominican Republic, 1,064. Barbados had 839, and Jamaica 945. By contrast, of the Latin American countries, Haiti had the smallest percentage, 4·3, of the

[1] Wendell P Woodring, John S. Brown, and Wilbur S. Burbank, *Geology of the Republic of Haiti* (Port-au-Prince, Republic of Haiti, Department of Public Works, 1924), p. 34.

[2] Center of Latin American Studies, *Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1960* (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1960), p. 4.

total population in localities of 100,000 or more. The Dominic Republic had 8·5 per cent, El Salvador 8·7 per cent. Jamaica, t only one of the British West Indies for which this statistic was give had 21·2 per cent.[1]

Irrigation of the Artibonite Valley seems to be the most practi able solution for the increase of arable land in Haiti. In recent yea Haiti, with the aid of the United States Government, has tackl this problem about which French planters had hopeful plans. Hai prior to the American Occupation, had neither the funds nor t technical knowledge to undertake the project. During the early yea of the American Occupation the concept of a Colonial Welfare ai Development financial contribution had not emerged. After t second World War the United States deemed the reconstruction Western Europe more important than the economic and soc development of Latin America. During the fiscal years 1946–5 the United States Government provided credits and grants to Ha to a total sum of $76,925,000. Of this amount, $26,605,000, or little more than one-third of the total, consisted of grants under tl Mutual Security Programme. Only $3,145,000 (something less tha $1.00 *per capita*) was for technical assistance. Of the total $45,017,000 in credits,[2] some $30 million has been advanced for tl construction of dams, canals, irrigation works, and drainage of tl Artibonite Valley Agricultural Project.[3]

The Haitian part of the basin of the Artibonite river, which h its source in the Dominican Republic, consists of 1,581,500 acre or about one-fourth of the entire area of Haiti. The Project coı templates the irrigation of 95,750 acres, of which 59,300 acres ha been irrigated by mid-1959. The Haitian Government was unab to reach an accurate evaluation of production, seven-eighths (which consisted of rice. Other crops were sugar cane, cotton, grain fruits, and, more recently, tomatoes; there is also some livestocl Unfortunately, irrigation has been impeded by the reverse flow (water from some of the canals.

The greatest disappointment of this Project has been the abaı donment, temporary perhaps, of the construction of a hydro-electr plant. The cost of construction, which would bring the total cost t some $100 million, has been a principal factor, since neither th

[1] See the reference cited in the preceding footnote.

[2] *Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1960*, p. 35.

[3] The information about the Project is based upon a release of the Haitia Government, dated 21 May 1959, and materials furnished by the Haitia Embassy in Washington, 9 August 1961.

United States Government nor the Haitian Government believes that the increased production and the sale of electric energy would suffice to amortise the loans in the thirty years agreed upon between the two Governments. According to reliable sources, opposition to the construction of the hydro-electric plant has been voiced by an American company which holds a franchise for the sale of electric energy to Port-au-Prince until 1971. The company has expressed the fear that electric energy from an Artibonite plant would lower the price paid by consumers and, hence, reduce its profits.

Unless desalting of sea water can be made available in Haiti at a much lower cost than that at the most modern plants in the United States, and unless the United States Government includes the Artibonite Valley Agricultural Project in its 'Alliance for Progress' policy enunciated at the Punta del Este (Uruguay) Conference in August 1961,[1] the most promising plan to ameliorate the plight of Haiti may eventually constitute an additional disillusionment for this under-developed country.

Not many Haitians believe, however, that the Artibonite Project will be as colossal a failure as was the natural rubber 'catastrophe' during the second World War. The seizure by Japan of the vast rubber plantations in Malaya and Indonesia necessitated an almost frantic search for rubber elsewhere. Exaggerated hopes that natural rubber could be grown in Haiti led to the utilization of land previously planted to food crops. The 'catastrophe' thus involved not only disillusionment for the Haitians but bitterness because of even the temporary reduction in the amount of food available for a people who were already undernourished.

Disillusionment resulted also from the failure at about the same time to make bananas an important cash crop for export. Despite wide experience in growing bananas in Central American countries, an American-owned and managed company could not prevent the spread of blights which led to the abandonment of the project. The writer witnessed in 1942 an appalling illustration of the over-supply of labour. At one of the principal banana ports, Haitians from the age of six to sixty were pushing and shoving one another in order to gain two-fifths of one cent for carrying banana stems from the trucks to the warehouses. (The manager of the company gave the writer the information about the wage scale.) On the sidelines stood an even larger number of less aggressive workers. A full day's work might amount to a salary of 30c. Attempts to develop a better

[1] See below, p. 445.

grade of poultry and livestock have been in large measure defeat by the climate.

The United States has not measurably aided the development Haiti's commercial resources. Haiti still suffers an unfavourab balance of trade with the United States, her principal customer. 1956 the value of exports from the United States was $36·7 millio that of imports from Haiti only $14·9 million; in 1957, $24 million and $18·3 million respectively. A year later the values we almost equal: $24·9 million and $22·7 million. But the famili pattern reappeared in 1959 when exports dropped to $23·5 milli while imports to the United States plummeted to $16·2 millior The principal exports to Haiti, according to latest available repoi were cotton fabrics, wheat flour, iron and steel products, lard, ar soap.[2]

This unfavourable balance of trade results from the inability the United States to diversify Haiti's agricultural productio Haiti's principal export is coffee, as it was prior to the Americ Occupation. For the year ending 30 September 1957 (Haiti's fisc year begins on 1 October), coffee constituted 73·8 per cent Haiti's exports and more than one-half went to the United States The United States is not to blame, of course, for the glut of coff on the market, a glut which has increased in recent years as a resu of the steadily growing production in some of the West Afric countries. Haiti's lamentable financial situation would be even wor were it not for the fact that the American Occupation helped Haiti coffee brokers to export a standardized and cleaner coffee bean.

Since import and export taxes constitute about 60 per cent Haiti's total revenues, expenditures are obviously inadequate f the assault on poverty, illiteracy, and disease. In the fiscal year 195 Haiti's total receipts amounted to $30 million and expenditures $29·2 million. Of this amount, service on the public debt requir 8·1 per cent; education received 13·4 per cent; public health ar welfare, 10·8 per cent; public works, 13·3 per cent; defence, 19 per cent; other expenditures, 35·3 per cent. Only one other Lat American country, Bolivia, had smaller receipts—$6·9 million- than did Haiti.[4]

[1] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Wo Trade Information Service, *Statistical Reports*, Part 3, No 60–11. Haiti's tra with the United Kingdom is negligible, a total of $2·4 million in 1958 S *Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1960*, p. 39.

[2] *Statistical Reports*, Part 3, No. 56–35.

[3] *Statistical Abstract of Haiti*, p. 38. [4] *ibid.*, p 32.

One of the more lamentable failures of the United States 'colonial experiment' was in the field of education. Haitian illiteracy prior to the American Occupation was perhaps as high as 97 per cent. In 1950 it was still 89·3 per cent, and it is probably still higher than 85 per cent. Both Haiti and the American Occupation must share the blame for the small progress made. American authorities had the commendable idea of emphasizing vocational education; but they tactlessly implied that most Haitians were incapable of a higher degree of intellectual training, and these authorities allocated a disproportionately large sum out of the Haitian Budget to the vocational schools. Many of the Haitian *élite*, on the other hand, insisted too strongly upon the continuation of the French classical traditions in education. The second Commission appointed by President Hoover, headed by Dr Robert Russa Moton of Tuskegee Institute (founded by Booker T. Washington), made sensible recommendations for a more balanced distribution of funds from the Haitian Budget,[1] and some of these have been adopted.

Haiti's plight is evidenced by other factors. In 1951 the number of persons per physician was 10,500, and per dentist 33,158—the highest figure of any of the Latin American countries. Haiti also had the highest number of persons, 1,500, per hospital bed. It is not surprising, then, that Haitians had the lowest life expectancy, 32·6 years.[2]

Haiti ranked last in important aspects of economic development. She had the smallest number of motor vehicles, 3 per 1,000 persons in use in 1957. Even Bolivia had 11 per 1,000 persons, but Haiti's rich neighbour the Dominican Republic had only 5, as did Honduras and Paraguay. (Although the comparison is meaningless, the United States had 392 per 1,000 persons.) Haiti had 1 telephone per 1,000 persons; Guatemala and Honduras 3; Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic 5; and Bolivia 7.[3]

Some Haitian officials, like some in other Latin American countries, are sceptical about the implementation of President Kennedy's 'Alliance for Progress' which Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon developed in considerable detail to the Inter-American Economic and Social Conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay. Dillon

[1] Publications of the Department of State, Latin American Series, No. 5, *Report of the United States Commission on Education in Haiti* (Washington, 1931).
[2] *Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1960*, pp 6, 13. Although the years on which the statistics are based vary, the disparity between Haiti and that of the other countries is so great that the overall conclusion seems justified.
[3] *ibid*, p. 28.

stated on 7 August 1961 that the world's developed nations wou
invest 'at least' $20,000 million in Latin America over the ne
decade to help to raise the masses from poverty. But Dillon al
stressed the fact that the amount of aid to a given nation wou
depend upon sweeping social changes such as realistic land and t
reforms, the construction of homes, schools, and health faciliti
Hence, some of this scepticism may be attributed to unwillingne
by those in power to inaugurate large-scale reforms. But there we
also sound bases for scepticism. Dillon did not indicate the amou
of American participation by either Government funds or priva
capital. Congress will have to authorize and appropriate pub
funds.[1] Above all, the United States cannot make commitments f
the developed nations such as Britain, France, West Germany,
Japan.

Without large-scale aid from United States public funds, the ou
look for Haiti is bleak. Even such large-scale aid would have to
supplemented by United States participation in an Internatio
Coffee Agreement as a buyer of coffee and by the newly indepe
dent coffee-producing countries of West Africa.

Finally, Haiti is a police state. President Duvalier has prevent
serious opposition by the 'jeunes intellectuels noirs' whom
accuses of looking to Moscow for guidance Duvalier is a sick ma
If he is unable to maintain a tight rein, the United States might fe
impelled to take vigorous action in order to prevent a long period
confusion. Even now, Haiti still lacks the strong traditions for dem
cratic rule which, the Forbes Commission reported, had not be
developed after fifteen years of United States military occupatio

The basic indictment of America's colonial experiment in Ha
rests upon the initial failure to recognize the magnitude of the ta
and subsequent failure to provide the necessary funds and techni
assistance to achieve a modest amelioration of Haiti's plight.

RAYFORD W. LOGAN

[1] At the time this article was written, Congress had not approved Presid
Kennedy's request for a five-year appropriation for foreign aid

African Trade Unionism in Transition

AT the International Labour Office's first African conference held in Lagos in December 1960, Mr J. M. Johnson, Nigeria's Minister of Labour, had this to say: 'The problems we are about to discuss stem from Africa's transition to modern industrialization—a transition which is unavoidable if our aims of progress are to be realized; but a transition which is also of necessity a painful one.'

Far too many of Africa's trade union problems derive from a failure, on the part of Africans as well as Europeans, to understand and digest the fundamental relevance of that statement. Trade unions in Africa today cannot function as perfect replicas of unions in Europe—even if it were possible to postulate an absolute ideal, which it is not. In general, the consequences of failure to understand this truism are twofold. Among Europeans there is a tendency to despair of 'healthy' trade union growth and/or to try to mould the union movement to their own image and—not to put too fine a point on it—for ideological ends. Among Africans there is the equally dangerous tendency to invest clear imperfections in the movement today with a special validity deriving from its African roots. Instead of facing the temporary difficulties as transitional, the tendency is to defensive justification of abuses in terms of a vague 'Africanism'.

Thus it is necessary to begin, as always, with a recognition of the essentially revolutionary nature of African society today. The processes not only of gaining national independence but also of reconstructing the African economy and social structure are necessarily to greater or lesser extent revolutionary processes. The consequences are the same as those in any revolutionary society, though the institutional forms they adopt may vary widely.

Thus certain overall characteristics emerge. First, the trade unions are almost everywhere to some extent drawn into the political arena. It is naive to expect an exclusive concentration on purely industrial aims. Secondly, the real differences of approach to African issues solidify easily into rigid doctrinal conflicts. The familiar 'either you are with us or against us' attitude takes easy root in a revolutionary situation; and angry stigmatization as 'stooge', 'imperialist', or 'Communist' finds frequent and damaging expression. Thirdly, these differences of approach, thus frozen into divisive ideology, are inevitably reflected in the trade union movements. They cannot avoid reflecting and even magnifying the Pan-African political divisions. Fourthly, the African situation is con-

stantly in a state of flux. What is true today, both within and b tween African unions, may be totally different tomorrow.

Throughout Africa the basic trade union problems are much tl same. With the exception of South Africa, only a small proportion the population works in industry or commerce. And even amoı those who do, migrant labour—a notoriously difficult and shiftiı foundation for unionism—claims considerable numbers. The drı to the towns, a universal symptom of transition to industrializatio creates unemployment and with it the difficulty that union leade are not easily able to show immediate results in terms of high wages. Inexperience and a straightforward lack of training accountancy leads to the widespread phenomena of weak financı structures, corruption, and officials absconding with funds; whi low incomes militate against regular payment of dues. It is one thı to enrol members at a mass rally but quite another to collect regul dues and see that they reach the union coffers and stay there. Lack communications and vast distances complicate all these difficultie

All these problems were of course experienced, in some degre in the early days of trade unionism in Europe. The difference Africa arises from the speed of political and economic change, whi is both inherent and receives impetus from outside interest in aı assistance to Africa. Inevitably the unions, such as they were, we engaged in the political struggle for independence. Their leade frequently used their influence in the unions to achieve prominen in the political parties, and brought the unions with them. This is universal characteristic of a revolutionary popular movement.

Since the war African unions have been assisted from outside. first such help came largely from the World Federation of Tra Unions (W.F.T.U.). In the French territories the trade unions we affiliated to French unions and received assistance from France well as directly from the W.F.T.U. When the International Co federation of Free Trade Unions (I.C.F.T.U.) was formed in 19 in reaction to Communist domination of the W.F.T.U., there bega tentatively at first, an era of competition for affiliation and suppo among African unions. But it soon became clear that the W.F.T was losing ground, largely because of the effective encourageme of trade unions at a local level by the colonial administrations wı the direct help of metropolitan unions affiliated to the I.C.F.T.

The turning point came in 1956. M. Sekou Touré, now Preside of Guinea, united French West African trade unions in the pr cursor of the *Union Général des Travailleurs d'Afrique No*

(U.G.T.A.N.). U.G.T.A.N. broke all affiliations with the W.F.T.U., which thus lost the bulk of its African membership, and has since withdrawn from direct recruitment in Africa. The W.F.T.U. then correctly divined the direction of the political wind, and has backed, morally and financially, the emergence of Pan-African union co-operation, without outside affiliations. U.G.T.A.N. was in fact the first intra-national neutralist African trade union, and as such the precursor of the All-African Trade Union Federation (A.A.T.U.F.) formed in Casablanca in May of this year. It is significant that of its original constituent parts only Guinea and Mali remain, while Ghana had left the I.C.F.T.U. to join U.G.T.A.N. in 1959.

Meanwhile the I.C.F.T.U., in contrast to the W.F.T.U., has multiplied its efforts in Africa. It has consistently supported the independence movements both financially and morally; and its voice has been amongst the most vociferous in condemnation of colonialism in all its forms. Much of its International Solidarity Fund, which it describes as 'a freedom fund in its broadest sense', is directed to building up African unions and providing technical assistance. At Kampala, in Uganda, an African labour college, on the Ruskin model, was opened at a cost of £130,000 in April 1961; and there are plans for a similar French language college in West Africa. Large grants of money are made to the I.C.F.T.U.'s African affiliates. By May 1961 these were to be found in almost every African territory other than Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the U.A.R., and some of the French Community territories where unions are affiliated to the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (I.F.C.T.U.).

The third regional conference of the I.C.F.T.U., held in Tunis in November 1960, saw the culmination of its efforts. The conference established an autonomous African regional organization with entirely African officers and a Secretariat in Lagos. This represents an attempt to retain the affiliation of African unions, and at the same time to satisfy the Pan-African dynamic. The main political resolution concludes thus: '[The delegates] reaffirm their confidence in the I.C.F.T.U. and are convinced that it will give them all the support needed. . . They insist, however, that in the first place all African workers should rely upon themselves and that they spare no effort to secure a genuine inter-African co-operation.'

But for all its apparent success the effect of I.C.F.T.U. aid has not been altogether gratifying to its donors. If the aim has been

the development of strong unions, democratically controlled ar
independent of Governments, the outcome has been somewh
different. Large-scale gifts of money and resources concentrated c
trade union centres and single individuals have the same effe
whether they come from Communist, Western, or local goverı
mental sources. They tend to create strong centres with leaders ın
position to dominate through financial patronage. They discouraş
growth from below and distort the democratic processes.

This danger is at the root of the current controversy between tl
British and the Americans within the I.C.F.T.U. The Britis
T.U.C. accuses the Americans of using I.C.F.T.U. funds for pu
poses of the cold war; of offering assistance not necessarily where
will be most useful to the union purposes, but where it will be mo
effective against Communist influence. A subsidiary accusation
that American anti-colonialism, which takes the form of discoura
ging union-to-union assistance, is a cover for the attempt to replac
British influence by American through the I.C.F.T.U. This feelin
is so strong that the British T.U.C. has this year refused to contr
bute to the I.C.F.T.U. Solidarity Fund.

For their part, the Americans accuse the British of enslavemer
to old-fashioned fuddy-duddy doctrines. It would be very nice, the
say, if African unions had time to develop in classic fashion from th
grass-roots upwards. But in the 1960s events are moving too fast
and if the unions do not receive help from the I.C.F.T.U., they wı
get it from the Communists. It is unrealistic to expect decentraliza
tion in Africa today, whether within each union or in associations a
the centre. Strong national centres are inevitable. Moreover, th
Americans add, the time has passed when African nationalists wil
allow British unions to influence directly their own unions througl
paternalistic advice and technical aid. The only acceptable assis
tance must be indirectly given through the I.C.F.T.U., and th
method of its spending must be left to African union leaders them
selves.

Both points of view—here of course much exaggerated to high
light their differences—have a measure of validity. The paradox i
nicely illustrated by the reaction of most African trade unions t
I.C.F.T.U. aid: on the one hand, they frankly do not like being
dependent on Western, and particularly American, aid; on the
other hand, like many others, they would far rather accept large
sums of money than the more limited, undramatic technical aid and
advice which the British would prefer to offer. In practice of course

there is no need to opt for one or other of these attitudes. They are not entirely mutually exclusive; and only a pragmatic approach can succeed. As the unions gather strength within themselves, their dependence on I.C.F.T.U. funds will diminish, and their relationship with it will become less artificial. To this end, there are strong moves to establish wherever possible the 'check-off' system whereby employers dock union dues at source. Even this expedient is —somewhat priggishly—disapproved of by British trade union purists. Also doing useful practical work to strengthen union structures at the local level are the International Trade Secretariats, which provide technical assistance in the form of overseas advisers.

Thus, partly as a result of the very success of its aid, the I.C.F.T.U. faces at least a possibility of diminishing influence within its affiliated centres as the need for funds decreases. On the Pan-African level the challenge is even greater. At the All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra in December 1958, unanimous agreement was reached on the formation of an All-African Trade Union Federation (A.A.T.U.F.), in line with other moves for African unity. The idea was militantly taken up by the 'Casablanca Powers' —Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the United Arab Republic, Morocco, and the Algerian Provisional Government—and spearheaded particularly by Mr John Tettegah, General Secretary of the Ghana T.U.C.

Despite unanimity of African opinion on the principle of establishing the A.A.T.U.F., conflicts have nevertheless arisen over whether union centres affiliated to the A.A.T.U.F. should be allowed to retain membership of other internationals. Total neutrality was pressed by Mr Tettegah, speaking for Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and the U.A.R. Mr Tom Mboya of Kenya, strongly supported particularly from Nigeria and Tunisia, asked that each union should be allowed to make its own decision on international affiliation. In November 1960 the issue seemed to have been decided in Mr Mboya's favour; for a joint declaration signed between Mr Mboya and Mr Tettegah after talks in Nairobi ended with these words: 'It is agreed that the A.A.T.U.F. should not be affiliated to any of the international trade union centres—I.C.F.T.U., W.F.T.U., or Christian International.' But the agreement went on: '[It is agreed to] recognize the right of each national centre to decide on its international relations.'

However, before these issues could be decided on a Pan-African level, the conflicts were making themselves felt within most of the territories themselves. Mr Arthur Ochwada led a splinter move-

ment away from Mr Mboya's Kenya Federation of Labour, and dedicated it to the Ghana conception of a neutralist A.A.T.U.F. The official T.U.C. of Nigeria (T.U.C.N.) of Messrs Borha and Adebola is violently opposed by Mr Michael Imoudu of the Nigerian T.U.C. (N.T.U.C.), with moral and financial support from Ghana. In Senegal and the Ivory Coast pro-U.G.T.A.N union leaders have been expelled or their movements banned. Nyasaland labour has been divided between a pro-I.C.F.T.U centre and a breakaway centre; though moves to reunite them may succeed under the impetus of the Malawi Congress Party's victory in the recent elections. Ghana has suppressed an I.C.F.T.U.-affiliated centre, and supports what amounts to a one-man union in Uganda in reaction to the pro-I.C.F.T.U. Uganda T.U.C. The position in Morocco is rather more complicated. The *Union des Travailleurs Marocains* (U.T.M.) is at present affiliated to the I.C.F.T.U., but its leader, Mr Mahmoud Ben Saddik, chaired the A.A.T.U.F. Conference in Casablanca in May. The U.T.M. is opposed by a Government-sponsored movement, the *Union Général des Travailleurs Marocains* (U.G.T.M.), which is not, however, affiliated to the I.C.F.T.U.

The situation in the Rhodesias and South Africa calls for a digression. It is complicated by the existence of substantial numbers of white workers with an interest in preserving an industrial colour bar. The position of European workers has been secured over many years partly by legislation, partly by traditional and social practice, and partly by failure to provide training facilities for African workers. Thus although discrimination is no longer legally entrenched in the Rhodesias, the problems involved in reconstituting trade unions along multi-racial lines are legion, and can only be briefly mentioned here. In Southern Rhodesia, for instance, opposition to union integration comes at present largely from the Africans themselves. For under the terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act, votes within the union are valued according to the industrial status of the worker, which in practice gives Africans much less power than their numbers warrant. While this may be good trade union practice elsewhere, it is easy to understand why Africans feel their interests might be better served in powerful, purely African unions, which they control themselves.

In Northern Rhodesia, despite the European Mineworkers' Union's recent agreement to throw open all grades of job to workers of any race, obstructions to African advancement are still effective.

The unions are still racially divided, and only the European union is represented on the Joint Industrial Council with the employers' organization. Apprenticeship and training are still in effect limited to Europeans.

In South Africa African trade unions are illegal. Most of those which exist despite the ban are allied with a few small left-wing European unions in the South African Congress of Trade Unions (S.A.C.T.U.). But since S.A.C.T.U. is linked to the African National Congress, one of the two African Congresses, the other, the Pan-African Congress, has recently sponsored a breakaway African trade union centre. The conflict between them derives almost entirely from the different attitudes of the two political Congresses to the emancipation struggle in multi-racial South Africa.

Thus it would be generally true to say that in the industrialized territories in which white workers are a significant factor, African trade union divisions are geared to the national racial divisions at least as much as to the Pan-African issues. In general, however, the Northern and Southern Rhodesia T.U.C.s, both affiliated to the I.C.F.T U., are in favour of preserving their membership; while S A.C.T.U. has strong links with the W.F.T.U., supports the Ghanaian approach to the A A.T.U.F., but is still affiliated to the I.C.F.T.U.

The Preparatory Committee for the A.A.T.U.F. consisted entirely of union leaders from the militant 'Casablanca Powers'. After several false starts it convened the constituent Conference of the A.A.T.U F. in Casablanca in May this year. The Conference was a failure, though it is too early to say whether its mistakes are redeemable. Certainly it provoked more inter-African dissension and bad feeling than any Pan-African congress which had gone before.

The Congress foundered for two main reasons. First, its sponsors made the mistake, both before and during the Conference, of pressurizing the delegates by irregular and undemocratic measures to accept their own point of view. Unrepresentative anti-I.C.F.T.U. unions were invited, no credentials committee was established, the sponsors' own delegations were given preference, controversial items were not properly discussed, and the agenda and rules of procedure were arbitrarily adopted by the Preparatory Committee. Second, Mr Tettegah, backed by his 'Casablanca' colleagues, went back on his earlier agreement with Mr Mboya and demanded that all unions affiliated to the A.A.T.U.F. should repudiate membership of the I.C.F.T.U. The final resolutions were adopted by

'acclamation'—without a vote—and after most of the delegations from East and Central Africa, Nigeria, and Tunisia had left the Conference in protest. So far the only union centre which has disaffiliated from the I.C.F.T.U. in response to the Conference's call is that of Zanzibar. Even the Moroccans and the Algerians retain their affiliation, despite their support in principle for the Conference decisions.

After the Conference recriminations were bitter. Mr Tilili of Tunisia described the organizers as 'fellow travellers'; Mr Tettegah retaliated by dismissing Mr Tilili as an 'imperialist puppet'. Mr Mboya issued a long reasoned statement which on the whole avoided invective but in which he stated his 'refusal to be coerced or bullied'. He called for respect for the 'autonomy of our national trade unions' but made no direct reference to the I.C.F.T.U. as such. Finally he expressed strong and continued support for an A.A.T.U.F., properly constituted. Mr Tettegah's statement after the Conference was the strongest of all. He called for 'total war' on African unions refusing to disaffiliate from the I.C.F.T.U. within the ten months stipulated by the Conference. He went on: 'We shall isolate them and enter their countries and form A.A.T.U.F. unions there', adding that the Ghana T.U.C. was already active in various independent countries helping to 'create unions'.

Since the Congress in May, two conflicting moves have been undertaken. The I.C.F.T.U.-affiliated centres decided to hold a Pan-African trade union congress in Dakar early in August in order to establish their own conception of an A.A.T.U.F.; but it was postponed owing to the Bizerta crisis, and may be convened in December. Meanwhile a behind-the-scenes attempt is being made by the secretariat of the A.A.T.U.F. to heal the Pan-African rift. It is spearheaded by the Moroccans, who, though supporting the outcome of the Conference in Casablanca, were unhappy about its conduct Their task will be difficult but not, in the present state of African politics, impossible.

Despite this severe setback, for which the sponsors of the A.A.T.U.F. themselves are clearly responsible, the tide in Africa is certainly running strongly in favour of Pan-African trade union unity. It is probable that when assistance from the I.C.F.T.U. is no longer so urgently required it will lose at least some of its affiliates, whose support at present is tactical rather than ideological. It is sometimes mistakenly supposed that the contending blocs within Africa are divided not only on the issue of international

iliation but also on that of trade union independence of govern-
ent control. To some extent this is true, but there are important
ceptions. President Bourguiba makes no secret of his claim that
'unisia has chosen the policy of complete cohesion and . . . unity
tween the trade union movement and national policies.' Mr
yerere constantly describes the Tanganyika Federation of Labour,
I.C.F.T.U.-affiliate, as a 'wing' of the Tanganyika African
ational Union, a condition he justifies by reference to the early
ations between the British T.U.C. and the Labour Party.
though it is true that nowhere outside the Casablanca nations do
overnments formally and constitutionally control their unions,
ere is little reason to hope that in the short run at least indepen-
nt unions will be a feature of the African scene. The most that can
expected will be a voluntary alliance between Governments and
ions in the revolutionary period ahead. Trade union indepen-
nce, for all that it is much used in the battle of words, is not yet a
ndamental principle which divides African nationalists in any
il sense.

On the other hand there are those, of whom Mr Mboya is one,
io sincerely believe in the value of international affiliation regard-
s of the financial benefit it provides. Many of them are likely to
ntinue to give their support to national autonomy in this respect,
ing the argument that the I.C.F.T.U., being a workers' organiza-
n, is not a weapon in the cold war. Whether this view prevails
ll depend very much on the future behaviour of the I.C.F.T.U.
elf.

MARGARET ROBERTS

CORRIGENDUM

In the article on 'The E.E.C. and the Associated African States', in
e *World Today*, August 1961, on p. 346, footnote 2, line 2, for 'Soma-
read 'Mali'; and on same page, footnote 3, for 'Somalie' read
malia'.

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Note of the Month

Tunisia, Bizerta, and the Sahara

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA'S action at Bizerta last July came as a shock to Western opinion which was not prepared for it. It seems indeed likely that the President underestimated the probable vigour of General de Gaulle's reaction and that he overestimated the probable strength of Anglo-Saxon support after the success of his American and English visits earlier in the year. He may also have wished to rehabilitate himself in view of the collapse of the Franco-Algerian negotiations which he had done so much to bring about.

When France promised the independence of Tunisia in 1956, she did so by a unilateral statement of a few lines. There were no annexes specifying the stages of implementation; obviously, however, independence carried with it the right to demand the departure of French troops at a mutually agreed moment. The Algerian fighting led the French to wish to maintain their troops longer than might otherwise have been the case and the Tunisians to wish to hasten their departure. In 1958 President Bourguiba made use of the bombing of Sakiet and the subsequent Anglo-American good offices to mobilize international support for the demand for evacuation; and when General de Gaulle came into power a few weeks later one of his first actions was to withdraw such French troops as were not concentrated in Bizerta. Another unilateral French declaration stated that negotiations concerning the future of the base itself would be initiated within four months. These, however, failed to take place, the Tunisians insisting on recognition of the principle of eventual evacuation while the French proposed to negotiate terms for the indefinite retention of the base. In January 1960 President Bourguiba, on the occasion of the All-African Peoples' Conference in Tunis, delivered a sort of ultimatum, demanding evacuation, or agreement to it, by 8 February. But, characteristically, he then accepted a compromise whereby France gave up some barracks and outlying positions. But when, eighteen months later, extensions to the airfield denoted France's intention to make a prolonged stay he organized a blockade similar to that which had proved successful at the time of Sakiet. French reinforcements flown in through undoubted Tunisian air-space were fired on, fighting broke out, and the strong

French reaction inflicted nearly 1,000 casualties in face of a coura
geous but hopeless resistance by Tunisian troops and civilia
volunteers. President Bourguiba thereupon appealed first to th
U.N. Security Council, which brought about a cease-fire, and the
to a specially convened General Assembly from which Tunisi
received an overwhelming vote supporting the demand for Frenc
evacuation. France was completely isolated, and in his subsequen
broadcast of 6 September 1961 General de Gaulle specificall
recognized, as no French spokesman had done before, that eventua
French evacuation was inevitable, though the world situation, h
said, did not permit this for the time being. President Bourguib
seized the opportunity of this admission to agree to measures de
signed to reduce tension, pending negotiations to settle how an
when the principle of evacuation was to be implemented. For thes
negotiations, which are not likely to prove easy, he is now pressin
from a position of greater strength than before the Bizerta affair an
General de Gaulle's statement. Nothing in this, except the possibl
miscalculation, was inconsistent with the previous theory an
practice of *bourguibisme*.

President Bourguiba also sent troops to the southern desert are
in July, having achieved agreement on this issue with the Algeria
Provisional Government, if not with France. As regards the wester
frontier with the Sahara, the Tunisian Government agreed t
negotiate its claim only with an independent Algeria. This refers t
an area allotted to Algeria during the protectorate by the decision o
two bodies of French delegates, one representing Algeria, the othe
Tunisia. On the other hand the Algerian Provisional Governmen
recognized as Tunisian a few square miles of territory lying betwee
the existing southern frontier post at Fort Saint and the post a
Gharat al Hamal 25 kilometres further south. This area wa
defined as Tunisian by agreement between Franco-Beylical an
Ottoman-Tripolitanian delegations on 18 May 1910, but seems t
have been retained by France as Algerian when the other garrison
were withdrawn. In his press conference on 5 September, Genera
de Gaulle suggested, without expressly stating, that Presiden
Bourguiba's action at Bizerta and in the Sahara was due to pique a
the failure of the Algerian negotiations and at the unwillingness o
France to yield to Tunisia any Saharan territory which might hav
facilitated an eventual claim to the oil-bearing regions further south
from which she already profits in a limited way owing to the pipelin
passing across her territory. Tunisia made no official comment.

The Barrier Across Berlin and its Consequences

THE occupation of East Berlin by the army of the German Democratic Republic marks a break in the post-war history of Europe. By destroying the quadripartite status of Berlin—the last link of German unity as founded on international law—and closing the last gap in the barbed-wire fence between Lubeck in the north of Germany and Hof in the south, the division of Europe becomes complete.

But by this policy of a *fait accompli* in Germany Mr Khrushchev aims not only to make effective the expansion of Soviet power to Eastern and parts of Central Europe but also to change in his favour the ratio of power in world politics that emerged from the second World War. He is attempting to achieve this by ousting the three Western Powers from Berlin and asserting that they no longer have the right, acquired as victors in the war, of co-determination in settling German and European questions.

The occupation of East Berlin by the East German regime is a breach of international agreements. By this step an area of over a million inhabitants has been incorporated into the Communist bloc, an area which by law is a component part of the special zone covering the whole of Berlin which was placed under the joint administration of the four Powers. For the first time since the Prague *Putsch* of 1948 the Soviet Union has once more effected the annexation of a piece of European territory through the medium of one of its satellites.

The West replied to the *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia by setting up N.A.T.O. and to the Soviet blockade of West Berlin in 1948–9 by the airlift. During those nine gloomy months of the blockade it was not only the freedom of West Berlin that was successfully defended but also the legal position of the Western Powers in Berlin as a whole, that is to say the co-responsibility of the West for the inhabitants of the Soviet sector. It is therefore a serious matter that the present aggression of the German Democratic Republic supported by the Soviet Union and its military power has been *de facto* accepted by the Western Powers. For the first time since the war an act of Soviet aggression carried out by an agent on the European continent has not been answered by Western countermeasures.

BACKGROUND TO THE BLOCKADE

The Soviets and the East German regime repeatedly tested attitude of the Western Powers before they went ahead with annexation of East Berlin. For years they successfully attempte curtail the four-Power status of Berlin and the original rights of Western allies there. They attempted to distort and undermine four-Power status of Berlin, the legal basis for the military prese of the Western Powers in the city. Bit by bit this contractually fi legal position was weakened. The Communists used every mean this process of erosion of Western rights, hoping that the basis of four-Power status would gradually be whittled away and that W Berlin would fall prey to psychological and political decay.[1]

Meanwhile, the people of West Berlin came to realize that a s tion of public opinion in the West was often ready to regard So and East German encroachments on the status of Berlin as relati minor changes which it would not be worth the risk to correct. Khrushchev was no doubt banking on such an attitude when he Herr Ulbricht tamper in what seemed to be a small way with four-Power status while simultaneously asserting his will for pe and his readiness to give to a 'free city of West Berlin', at Mosco discretion, all guarantees for regulating its internal affairs and freedom of access in all directions. In the course of this policy East German regime, after the creation of the National Peop Army on 18 January 1956, set up military machinery of its own in Soviet sector of Berlin and regularly held military parades on M Day, thus violating the four-Power agreements on the demilitari tion of Berlin.

Mr Khrushchev was making use of the same tactics which St had used long before when he deliberately started the Berlin cr in November 1958. The process of curtailing allied rights in Be had already made considerable progress in Stalin's time. When Soviets, in May 1952, refused transit to the Western allied court patrols which supervised traffic on the Autobahn between Be and West Germany the Western Powers simply liquidated this stitution, which had been an important psychological secu factor for members of the allied garrisons as well as for Germ travelling through the Soviet zone of occupation. In previous ye

[1] See 'The Breakdown of Four-Power Rule in Berlin', *The World To* August 1948; 'Berlin since the Signing of the Contractual Agreements' (Not the Month), *The World Today*, August 1952, and 'Berlin and the So Recognition of East German Sovereignty' (Note of the Month), *The W Today*, January 1956.

the British and Americans had maintained checkpoints of their own on the Autobahn, and these gave this most important land connection between West Berlin and West Germany something of the nature of a corridor. These checkpoints too were quietly given up.

Even after November 1958, when the aims of Soviet policy in Berlin became clearer than ever, the Western protecting Powers permitted a further deterioration in their position. Under the pressure of Mr Khrushchev's offensive they accepted to all intents and purposes the Soviet claim that planes using the three air-corridors to Berlin should not be allowed to fly over 10,000 feet.

The first major test of the Western attitude in relation to what was going to happen on 13 August 1961 was made on 8 September 1960, when the Government in East Berlin issued an illegal decree on the entry of West German citizens into the Soviet sector. It thereby claimed for itself rights which belonged only to the four occupying Powers. Herr Ulbricht has not the right to carry out controls on the movement of persons within the special zone which Berlin represents, a zone which was inaugurated in the final phase of the war by Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union (France was called in after Hitler's defeat) and which was placed under the joint administration of the four victors. The Western Powers and the West German Government counteracted Herr Ulbricht's decree by instituting a general travel embargo for East German officials and cancelling the German inter-zonal trade agreement. But these retaliatory measures gradually came to be applied very liberally and in the end they were lifted altogether. Bonn put the inter-zonal trade agreement into force again although the G.D.R. had not revoked its decree concerning entry into the Soviet sector—it merely modified the way in which the decree was applied. Herr Ulbricht had thus *de facto* won his claim that he could act as he pleased in East Berlin and regard the sector border as the frontier of a State.

On the basis of their experience after 8 September 1960, the Communists had to expect Western counter-measures after 13 August 1961, and they were in fact surprised when no retaliatory measures were taken. The immediate target of the action of 13 August was to block the outlet for refugees—in other words, it was a measure directed against the East German population. It soon became clear, however, that this sealing-off was only part of a comprehensive programme. Its factual acceptance by the Western Powers led to a torrent of new violations of law. The Communists began to set up a concrete wall along the sector border, and passed a

number of decrees which kept the West Berliners out of East Berlin. Moreover the East German regime does not permit the British and French to enter East Berlin from their respective sectors: in order to get there the British and French city commandants have to drive through the American sector, where there is the only crossing-point for the Western allies. The German agents of the Soviets in Pankow work towards one goal: to abolish the last remnants of the four-Power status in order to take further measures before negotiations on Berlin begin, and one of those remnants is that the Western allies have the right to move freely in East Berlin. Western military personnel have been repeatedly subjected to interrogation by the Communist People's Police when driving through the Soviet sector.

EFFECTS IN EAST BERLIN AND EASTERN EUROPE

We must now consider the consequences of the blockade of 13 August for the populations of East Berlin, of the Soviet zone, and of Eastern Europe. On that morning 16 million Germans in East Berlin and the Soviet zone of Germany were shut off behind the Iron Curtain. Simultaneously, the gate to freedom was closed for citizens of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other European States of the Soviet bloc. Before 13 August, West Berlin, thanks to its four-Power status, could be more easily reached by Eastern European citizens than the territory to the west of the strictly guarded borders of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, worse than the steps taken by the Communists on 13 August was the impact of their factual acceptance by the West. The population of the Soviet zone, the majority of whom are anti-Communists, now feels a hopeless resignation. There has thus been a great loss of confidence in the West and in its prestige The Western Powers' failure to react may even lead to the development of positive anti-Western trends.

When the number of East German refugees went up by leaps and bounds before 13 August, some experts already considered this as a negative vote for the West. The reports of many refugees showed clearly that they no longer believed in Western intentions to defend the four-Power status of Berlin at all costs and feared that the gate to freedom would not be kept open. Visitors to the Soviet zone were repeatedly asked the same question: Will the West keep access to West Berlin open? The question of access from the Soviet zone to Berlin dominated their thoughts. The pessimistic assessment of the West was confirmed for many East Germans by the fact

ıt the Western Powers had not protested in July against the turn-
; back of refugees at stations along the Berlin sector border, nor
ıinst tightened Communist controls within the city.

What are the consequences for the East Berliners? Their mood
ıce 13 August has been near to freezing point. The inhabitants of
st Berlin had gone to sleep as usual the night before with the
ling that they were relatively free cıtızens and not entirely under
grip of Herr Ulbricht. When they woke up they found them-
ves locked ın a concentration camp. True, before 13 August they
d not enjoyed a free way of life; but for 20 Pfennig the elevated
ın could take them to West Berlin in ten minutes. During the
t weeks after 13 August many East Berliners were stunned. Now,
wever, they realize the full extent of the political and human
astrophe which has overcome them. Before, they shook their
ıds over Ulbricht's vision of a Germany marchıng under red
gs. When the West Berlın cabaret 'Dıe Stachelschweine' (the
rcupınes) ridıculed Communist boasts, Berlıners in both parts of
city used to laugh. And when the Communist Party set up
sters on the Friedrichstrasse border station saying, for ınstance:
on't expose yourselves to the slave-traders', the East Berliners
ıled sardonıcally as they stepped on to the train taking them to a
est Berlın cinema. All this changed on 13 August.

EFFECTS IN WEST BERLIN

For West Berlın too the consequences of 13 August are grave. A
ıcrete wall with barbed wıre on top runs straight through the
y. Thousands of fellow-citızens from the East, who for decades
d to show up daıly among their friends, in their homes, in the
ps, in the factorıes, have disappeared behind this wall. But not
ly the so-called *Grenzgänger*, or border-crossers—East Berliners
East Germans who had worked regularly ın West Berlin factories,
ny of them for decades—are now mıssing; also missing are the
ıs of thousands of Germans from the Soviet zone who vısıted
est Berlin every day. The cinemas and the shops along the sector
rder are half-empty. In the big department store on Tauentzien-
ısse no visitor from the East can be spotted admiring the Western
adise for consumers while purchasing for himself such odds and
ls as elastic, straws, bicycle chains, buttons, nails, and needles,
scarce in the East. Now only West Berliners can go to the West
rlin theatres, the cultural institutes, the museums, and the
ormation centres of the Western Powers.

West Berlin's purpose as a meeting-place for Germans from East and West radiating far into the East has been almost entirely lost through the events of 13 August. The city has lost its function not only as a gateway to freedom but also as a show window. In previous years 9 million cinema and theatre tickets were sold annually to East Berliners and East Germans. Since 13 August the pulse of life in the Soviet zone can no longer be felt directly in West Berlin. Newspaper correspondents in particular notice this, and their job of watching developments in the G.D.R. has become more difficult

One part of the city has been literally amputated. West Berliners, surrounded by concrete walls and barbed wire, have the feeling of struggling along in a ghetto. The city's self-confidence has suffered a severe blow. It would be illusory for the West to imagine that West Berlin is still in a position to play its former part with the same strength. Friendly Western assurances that Ulbricht's wall was nothing but a declaration of Communist moral bankruptcy are of no great help for the West Berliners; they need no proof of this aspect of Communist domination, for the continuous flight from the Communist regime afforded a daily demonstration of the misery there was in the Communist realm. What lasts in West Berlin is the impression that totalitarian power policy has scored a success and that the West has *de facto* accepted illegal and aggressive action.

Many West Berliners say that they feel themselves embarrassingly reminded of the atmosphere of the years 1938 and 1939. They think there is a danger that the Soviet leader, encouraged by his success, might succumb to a miscalculation and attempt to force the West to capitulate. This pessimistic approach may arise partly from the fact that, against the background of the changed situation, many a slogan from the East is now differently assessed. As long as the Soviets and their East German regime are continuously on the offensive in Berlin the impression will prevail in West Berlin that it is the East which calls the tune. As long as the West reacts only with verbal protests, no fundamental improvement of the precarious moral and psychological situation can be achieved in this exposed city.

The East German Communists are doing everything to promote an attitude of resignation and capitulation in West Berlin. On 13 August Herr Ulbricht had the flag of the G.D.R.—a black, red, and gold ground with hammer and compass—hoisted on top of the Brandenburg Gate, the symbol of imperial German history, and announced that the German Democratic Republic had occupied East Berlin and 'thereby switched the points of German history in

: capital'. The hoisting of this flag led to depression in both West
d East Berlin. People realized that Berlin was no longer the city of
ır-Power status but a divided body. The German Democratic
public had severed the old city, with its historic buildings, from
est Berlin and incorporated it into its sphere of sovereignty. By
ısting the flag Herr Ulbricht gave visible proof to Germans of
th East and West of the Communist Party's claim to the entire
pital.

Under the influence of the Communist war of nerves there is a
owing tendency in West Berlin to move capital to the West.
ivate individuals have been transferring their securities and sav-
gs accounts to West Germany and to foreign countries. Many
ıall and medium industrialists who have no branches in West
ermany are in a difficult position. Some skilled hands in branches
ısitive to political developments feel inclined to have a tentative
ok at jobs in the West. Herr Brandt, the Chief Burgomaster, was
t conjuring up a bogy when in his letter of mid-August to Presi-
nt Kennedy he pointed to the danger of an exodus from West
rlin; he assessed the situation in a realistic way.

Should the West continue to let matters drift, a development
ght take place that would leave little solid ground to be defended
West Berlin. The morale of the population, which was by no
eans shaken after November 1958, has now suffered a severe blow,
d many citizens are asking themselves whether their idea, care-
ly nursed for years, of a reunification of Germany on acceptable
rms was not a fallacy after all.

What is vital for the freedom of West Berlin is uncontrolled air
ffic in the three air corridors. The difficult political and psycho-
gical situation arising from the Western Powers' acceptance of the
st Germans' aggressive acts enabled Mr Khrushchev and Herr
bricht to make quite an impression in West Berlin with their
reats against the air communications. The shock was greatest
ıong those circles which for political reasons depend on un-
ntrolled air traffic between West Berlin and West Germany. The
oup which is potentially endangered includes not only those who
: on the East Berlin search list but also former refugees, as well as
liticians and journalists who are known for their anti-Com-
ınist attitude. It also includes business men who left the Soviet
ne after the passport law became effective, or who employed East
rliners or East Germans before 13 August, thus incurring the
mmunist accusation of being slave-traders.

As long as the West Berliners can seek refuge by air the controls on land communications are of no decisive importance; these controls have been carried out by East Germans for years, as far as German traffic is concerned. Personal security and freedom cannot be separated from the possibility of evading controls by using the uncontrolled air connections. Should this come to an end, West Berlin would no longer be a free city—in spite of all Eastern guarantees on paper. Should the Western Powers even appear to make concessions in relation to the control of air traffic the moral and psychological situation in West Berlin would quickly deteriorate.

EFFECTS IN EAST GERMANY

We must now consider the effect of the events of 13 August on the East German regime, whose leaders are under the spell of their successful *coup*. They act as though they were already the partners of the Western Powers in relation to Berlin, and as though the 'free city' of West Berlin was already a fact. The *de facto* acceptance by the Western Powers of East Berlin's occupation let loose all the aggressive instincts of the East German C.P. and its associated organizations. Before 13 August Ulbricht and his governors in the provinces had to consider the feelings of the population, and above all of the groups which are important for the national economy—because the escape route to West Berlin was still open. Now Ulbricht can go ahead as he pleases. Pressure on the East German population has become considerably stronger since 13 August. The optimistic idea of some observers that the Communist Party, once East Berlin was sealed off, would pursue a more liberal policy and open new safety valves to make up for the lack of possibilities to flee proved to be a fallacy. The industrial workers, in particular, are exposed to increasing pressure. The Party asks them to work harder for the same hours and the same pay, and the leaders of the State trade union insist that productivity must rise faster than wages. Herr Ulbricht seems to be determined to solve the tricky problems of work norms in his own way. Before 13 August he had to proceed carefully in this respect in view of the open road to West Berlin.

After 13 August the Communist Party formed an organization known as the 'worker's fist'. Its task is to involve citizens in political discussions: if they express opposition to the regime, they are beaten up. The formation of such gangs of *agents provocateurs* sharply reminds the population of the worst days of the Nazi regime. District and local courts constantly pass sentence against citizens critical of

e regime. Many opponents of the regime from industrial areas
ɔund Berlin and on the three-mile belt along the demarcation line
ve been deported. The Government has passed decrees on de-
rtation and forced labour. Members of the State youth organiza-
n tear down aerials adjusted to West German television. Brutal
ıguage is used by the local press of the Communist Party. There
e dozens of headlines such as: 'Hit the enemy with your fist',
'he enemy will lose hair and teeth', 'The worker's fist smashes the
ws of the militarist beast', 'We have the better rockets.'

The completion of the political control system runs parallel with
e enforced militarization of life. In view of the test of power in
rlin a partial mobilization is going on in the cities of East Ger-
any. The leading Communist officials attended parades of the
litary units as well as of the factory militia—the home guard of
e State party—and of the youth organization. In less than a
onth after 13 August close to 200,000 people were made to enlist
oluntarily'. An empowering Act was passed on 20 September by
e Volkskammer, the East German pseudo-Parliament. It makes
lbricht the sole master in the military field as well as in the econo-
ic and political spheres, and in effect provides him with the legal
nction to declare martial law, or a military dictatorship, should
wish to do so. Moreover, special Soviet units which had been
signed to ward off nuclear air attack from the West were moved
ter 13 August from Poland to East Germany. At the same time
arshal Koniev arrived in East Germany to take over the supreme
mmand of certain units of the forces in the Central European
eas of the Eastern bloc. The East German army is being more
osely incorporated into the military forces of the Warsaw Pact
ganization.

August 13 also had its impact on the East German churches. The
airman of the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany,
'ases Scharf, was expelled by a trick from East Berlin. The Com-
unists are concentrating their efforts on building up an evangelical
tate Church in East Germany, to be headed by Bishop Mitzen-
eim, leader of the Thuringian Church. The Communist Party is
sing a variety of methods from persuasion to direct physical pres-
ıre to compel church dignitaries to accept the policy of the regime.
nce the Evangelical Church is streamlined, the Catholic Church is
be forced to follow suit. What Herr Ulbricht has in mind is some-
ing like a Czechoslovak solution of the relationship between
hurch and State.

Herr Ulbricht is however unlikely to succeed in breaking the opposition of the population as long as his regime is not recognized by non-Communist States. He knows that the German question will remain in suspense, and that the Germans in East Germany will not give up hope of an improvement in their situation, as long as the German Democratic Republic is not recognized by the West. From statements of party officials it is clear that the Government in East Berlin attributes decisive importance from the internal political angle to this question of recognition. Every visit from a British M.P. means a gain in respectability for Ulbricht. British trade union groups are in close contact with the East German trade union federation, and there is a fairly regular exchange of delegations The political impact of such contacts is assessed highly: subjects of a dictatorship often do not realize that a Western parliamentarian can travel wherever he likes and that his personal decision to go to a particular country does not necessarily reflect any official policy.

POLICIES AND PARTIES IN THE G.D.R.

And here we come to the most significant issue of the German problem. It is misleading to consider the German question predominantly under the aspect of two different social and economic systems. The crucial aspect is that of the controversy between totalitarianism and relative freedom. The German Democratic Republic is the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, a component part of the Soviet bloc. The Communist Party and its numerous branches, first of all the State trade union, which has many contacts in Western countries, are the extended arms of the Soviet leadership. The G.D.R. is more closely incorporated into the Eastern bloc than the West German Federal Republic into the West. Communist East Germany today can be called the industrial workshop of the Eastern bloc. While paying lip-service to slogans about the reunification of Germany, the Soviets have gone systematically ahead with the integration of the G.D.R. into the Eastern bloc. The Communist thesis of a confederation between the G.D.R and the Federal Republic is also dishonest; what the Communist Party is hoping for in such a confederation is a favourable starting-point for undermining the West German State.

It should be realized that the Socialist Unity Party, the East German Communist Party, is the only party in the Soviet bloc that is active outside its own sphere, and this will continue as long as the Communists are masters over only one-third of the

:rmans. Its cadre of officials is convinced of the Communist doc-
ne and fully supports the changes going on. These people are
:rywhere in the Soviet zone. Party officials are found in district
uncils, on the lower administrative levels, in the collective farms,
State factories, in the universities, in public institutions; an
borate system of contacts connects them with the so-called mass
ganizations. Like an extremely narrow-meshed net the organs of
: party are spread all over the country; there are hundreds of
annels through which directives of party headquarters are passed
to all parts of East Germany. While the majority of the party
:mbers are in a kind of suspense, the groups of activists display
ertain amount of enthusiasm when tackling the assignments given
them by their leaders. Their work has in many respects become
ier now that East Berlin is sealed off and the escape route blocked.
The sector from which the Communist Party finds it most diffi-
lt to secure active support is the middle classes. More and more
bricht is making use of the 'pseudo-bourgeois' parties, all of
:m satellites of the Communist Party, to achieve this. The major
k of the East German Christian Democratic Union, for instance,
to bring the Christian churches under the control of the Com-
inist State. The National Democratic Party is, in my opinion,
: most important of the 'satellite' parties. It is a rallying ground
former Nazi officials and Wehrmacht officers. It was founded in
48 by the Soviet General Tulpanov, and enjoys a number of
ivileges. It has considerable funds and a publishing house of its
n. Its main external job is to propagate the ideology of Tau-
ggen and Rapallo,[1] that is to say, the idea of an alliance between
issia and Germany against the West. The party glorifies the
:rman uprising of 1813 and compares Napoleon's Treaty of
lsit to the North Atlantic Alliance Organization. It publishes
oks on Prusso-Russian comradeship of arms, in which Russia and
:rmany appear as the two 'serious' nations, with metaphysical
ots, which must join forces against the superficial rationalists in
: West.

The Soviets are pursuing a double-track policy. This is proved by
: fact that they have consistently supported the National Demo-
itic Party. On the one hand they proclaim the slogan of prole-
ian internationalism, on the other they play up the myth of
uroggen. Now, after 13 August, these Communist tactics need

The treaties of Tauroggen (1812) and Rapallo (1922) between Russia and
rmany.

to receive specific attention. The Communists have permitted the rumour to spread that the Americans, without telling Dr Adenauer, had been informed about the sealing-off of East Berlin, and had approved of it. In this way, a new 'Dolchstosslegende', the legend of the stab in the back, is emerging. By means of this whispering campaign the Communists strive to encourage the feeling of resignation among their own people; simultaneously, however, they want to work on the neutralists in West Germany who are sceptical of Germany's integration into the West, and to whom the idea of a German political seesaw between the blocs is more attractive.

It should not be forgotten that it is only relatively recently that West German foreign policy began to steer a straight course following the principle of solidarity with and loyalty toward its Western partners. That phase is only twelve years old. In view of the success which the Communists have scored by their military annexation of East Berlin, many Germans may feel inclined to fall back into old ways of thinking in terms of power politics and to favour the political seesaw, devoid of all principles. The temper of the German nation—as far as domestic politics are concerned—is likely to depend to a very great extent on the character of German foreign policy.

In this connection the safeguarding of Berlin's freedom is of decisive importance. The moral energy of the West Berliners scored a victory in the 1948 blockade. The Berliners who decided then in favour of freedom and against their own personal comfort became the first German allies of the Western democracies and Berlin's battle for self-assertion was the first turning-point in the approach of foreign countries to Germany. The collapse of a free Berlin would result in a serious crisis of confidence in West Germany's relations with the Western Powers and would conjure up the danger of a reorientation of German policy towards the East.

OTTO FREI

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The Break-up of the United Arab Republic

THE technique of the *coup d'état* has in Syria achieved a high degree of perfection. A standard drill exists for seizing power which all *Putsch*-ists since 1949 have followed: a tank column is sent on the capital shortly before dawn from Qatana, a camp twenty miles away; small detachments of two or three vehicles filter through the sleeping city arresting half-a-dozen key men and occupying the radio station, the central telephone exchange, the headquarters of the army, police, and *gendarmerie*, the airport, and the prison at Mezze. The populace hears the news at breakfast time.

On 28 September 1961 the United Arab Republic was destroyed by an army *coup* in Damascus. It is too early either to write a balanced obituary of the Union or to predict with any confidence the consequences of the rupture. Too many questions remain unanswered for its proper appraisal. A more pressing consideration for the immediate future is the calibre and political ambitions of the group of Syrian officers who led the break-away. The Syrian army, from its first intervention in politics in 1949 to the Union with Egypt in 1958, was for a decade the most important single force in domestic affairs. Sometimes its chiefs assumed direct power; more often they left the front of the stage to civilians. This is what the officers in Damascus have now done. But no one should be deceived. Short of a total change of heart, the Syrian army remains the final arbiter of the situation.

The army chiefs precipitated the Union three and a half years ago and it is they who have now dissolved it. The whole by-play of civilian politics—the tentative pre-electoral regrouping of former political parties, the manœuvres and tactical alliances of old stalwarts of pre-Union days, the pressure for restitution by sectional interests hard hit by the Union—cannot obscure the fact that the army is the main repository of power.

The question is not whether the army will now go back to its barracks. Its disappearance from the scene in the present uncertain interregnum is almost unthinkable, in spite of the address to the troops on 9 October[1] of Major General Abd al-Karim Zahr al-Din, the Commander-in-Chief. 'We have all returned to our barracks and duties,' he declared. 'After rescuing the ship, we handed it over

[1] B.B.C. Monitoring Report, ME/765/A/2, 11 October 1961.

to the people for them to pilot it. Politics are not our professio our ambition. Our profession is the defence of our homeland ag the aggressors, plotters, and subversive saboteurs.' But the next day, the Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command, in its as a military Cabinet behind the scenes, put its name, side by with that of the Council of Ministers, to an appeal for a decentral union of Arab States. The return to the barracks is evidently complete. Indeed, the army's role as the vigilant guardian of nation's welfare is likely to assume even greater significance as internal security forces—the police and intelligence apparat have been unsettled and dislocated by Egyptian–Syrian rivalry Colonel Sarraj's eclipse, and by the new Government's purge

In each Syrian *coup d'état*, the army has acted in tempo alliance with a number of politicians. Finance and broad p directives have sometimes come from outside the country. But army must not be thought of as a pliant tool in the hands of civ and foreign interests. It has had its own distinct motives for ac without which, as the September secessionist revolt well illustr the bankers, industrialists, merchants, landowners, and out work politicians, however disgruntled and victimized, would l been powerless. President Nasser's error, in crude terms, wa give the Syrian officers cause for revolt. What, in fact, were t reasons?

One of the first public statements by the Syrian Revolution Command, broadcast on 2 October,[1] outlines the army's grievan 'From the very first day,' the statement says, 'we wanted unity t represented by an exchange of officers from both regions. youths went, full of vitality and Arabism, to the South. What sent us from Egypt? All the evils and sins committed under name of unity started from this point. They sent us officers took up positions in the intelligence machinery before any o machinery. They came to us with the mentality of intellig officers and not with the nationalist spirit with which we faced th nor with the Arab brotherliness which inspires sincerity and fidence. These people began spreading like octopuses into various machineries, poking their noses into the various affairs imposing themselves on all occasions. . .'

Another major grievance was that the Egyptian officers sho little respect for the chain of command, but by-passed their se officers if these were Syrian, and made contact between themsel

[1] B.B.C. Monitoring Report, ME/759/A/8, 4 October 1961.

Soon, 'they dominated all the sensitive positions in the First Army Command and the unit commands, while our officers sent to Egypt were just filling wooden chairs without authority or power.' When the Syrians complained, they were accused of the crime of 'regionalism', of failing to take the broad view. It soon became apparent that the Egyptians had a plan for 'an organized collective liquidation' of Syrian officers: 'The number of those transferred from the army increased daily. Various means of transfer were used, such as transfer to the Foreign Ministry or the other ministries, or pensioning them off and thus burdening the Budget with retired pay.' 'What occurred in the army,' the statement adds, 'occurred on a large and subversive scale in the rest of the machinery of State.' These specifically military grievances must be placed first in any inquiry into the demise of the U.A.R.—even though President Nasser's authoritarian rule in Damascus and his unpopular economic policies may be judged contributory causes.

The army's own distinct motives for revolt have been emphasized here in order to place the events in Syria within the context of the current debate on the role of the army in politics. In Syria, whatever may be the case in Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, the Sudan, or in the half-dozen other countries where the army has seized power, the officers are neither radical soldier-reformers nor the docile instruments of sectional interests. If the first title gives them too much credit, the second does them too little justice. They cannot claim to have any considered solutions for the nation's ills, but neither are they the paid hirelings of capitalist reaction. What, in effect, spurred them to action was that their jobs and commands were in danger, and in any power game that is what counts.

The test of the coming months will be whether the army can find unity around a single chief who understands the limits of its role and is prepared to give the politicians a clear run; or whether, as in pre-Union years, ambitious young officers split into rival factions, each with its supporters among the civilian politicians. It was this sort of pattern in 1957–8, resulting in the paralysis of the Syrian army and the virtual breakdown of civilian government, which caused the young army chiefs, sobered by the threat of civil strife, to appeal to President Nasser. Has the lesson now been learnt and can this suicidal fragmentation be avoided in the continued absence of any dominant figure or group on the Syrian political scene?

These pre-election months will see the re-emergence of many a familiar figure. The sterile years of the Union have no doubt drawn

the venom from some old quarrels, but it is unlikely that men who in 1958 were locked in mortal combat should now work harmoniously together. Politicians such as Akram al-Hawrani, Khalid al-Azm, Sabri al-Asali, and the People's Party leaders, Rushdi al-Kikhia and Nazim al-Qudsi, cannot be expected to maintain the truce which their forced retirement and common opposition to the Union imposed on them in the last two years. The Communists can do nothing on their own, although their persecution under the Union and their record in opposing Nasser may have won them some popular sympathy. Their hopes, today as in pre-Union years, must lie in tactical alliances with the Ba'ath and with 'independents' such as Khalid al-Azm. The People's Party, still widely respected in the north, may once again be the rallying centre for the urban business class; but its leaders have seemed, in the past, to lack political courage, and the future may lie with the party's younger men, preaching enlightened and prosperous free enterprise in an independent Syria. Akram al-Hawrani, matured by his clash with Nasser in the first year of the Union but still enjoying peasant support, may have a second chance to show his worth as a national leader, while the more intellectual wing of the Ba'ath leadership, represented by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar, will no doubt resume its indoctrination of the young. To all these men the dissolution of the Union must seem like a reprieve and a real test of their statesmanship. It is the delicate task of Dr Ma'mun al-Kuzbari's interim administration to ensure elections at least as free as those which followed the fall of General Adib al-Shishakli in 1954. Dr Kuzbari, one of Shishakli's leading civilian associates, had a ring-side view of that last great upheaval in Syria's political life.

Time may show that President Nasser's rule gave Syria a salutary three-year breathing space from the turbulance of domestic politics. Problems of economic development were put into the hands of technicians. Land reform was carried through without the vindictiveness and bloodshed which might otherwise have accompanied it had the Hama peasant leader Akram al-Hawrani had his way unchecked. The Union coincided neatly with the end of a decade of rapid, and even spectacular, development in agriculture, due almost entirely to merchant enterprise in opening up to the tractor virgin lands in the north-east. Further expansion depended on State intervention to promote large-scale irrigation works, fertilizer production, and improved communications. Under the Union detailed plans were drawn up and foreign credits assured for

a vast dam on the Euphrates which will irrigate an estimated 800,000 hectares and for a railway which will carry Syria's grain and cotton from the Jazira to the Mediterranean port of Latakia. At Homs, in central Syria, an important industrial complex, including a 110,000-ton fertilizer plant, is springing up astride the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline. The Union's critics say that none of these plans are new, but the fact remains that the last three years have seen Syria's long-term development tackled with greater seriousness and purposefulness than ever before. Were it not for the drought which plagued the Union from its first year and to which many of the unpopular economic measures may be attributed (if not the last wave of drastic nationalization last July), Syria's prosperity might well have been the envy of her neighbours.

President Nasser's failure in Syria was in the political sphere, that of statecraft. He failed to devise a formula for government which would both satisfy the Syrians and encourage other Arab States to join the U.A.R. From first to last, his rule in Syria bore the marks of improvisation and uncertainty. No durable institutions were created and the Syrians were given no clear feeling of participation in the running of their own affairs. One of the first acts of Dr Kuzbari's secessionist Cabinet was to abolish the National Union, the Government-sponsored organization designed to channel popular grievances to the top of the pyramid and pass down directives. It died unregretted. To the sophisticated Syrian public, it was never an effective substitute for their dissolved political parties.

In 1958, Nasser inherited a country which had been for the twelve years of its independence the target of the rival ambitions of its neighbours. Syria had been at once the prize and the battleground in the inter-Arab feuds which opposed Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in pre-Union years. These outside pressures were reflected in the fragmentation of Syria's internal political structure. Too few Syrians believed in the durability and territorial integrity of their country; most politicians were committed to one or other of Syria's neighbours and saw political salvation in terms of an alliance or union with one or other camp. Nasser, authoritarian by temperament and perhaps insufficiently informed about the detail of the Syrian political scene, felt that under these conditions he could safely rely on none of the pre-Union political groups. Indeed, his policy appears to have been to destroy any centre of authority in Syria which might have rivalled his own. The result was that he was

left to run a country in which all indigenous political leadership been eliminated.

His solution was empirical, unimaginative, extremely cauti but, in the short run, safe. Government was conceived in term keeping order rather than as a constructive experiment in harnes Syrian talents and enthusiasm in the cause of the Union. Nasse effect if not in intention, instituted a police State under the direc of Colonel Abdel Hamid al-Sarraj, a taciturn, reclusive yo Syrian, of undoubted loyalty to himself and great organizati ability who, as chief of military intelligence since 1955, had b primarily responsible for thwarting the numerous plots to unseat Syrian Government in 1956–7. Sarraj was good at catching regime's enemies but not at encouraging its friends. A police c cannot easily turn statesman overnight. In time, Nasser himse thought to have seen that Sarraj was an obstacle to broader the base of the regime. But by then he had become indispens as the one man who could control the Union's many oppone At least half a dozen times in the last two years there have been p sistent rumours that the President was considering amending constitutional framework of the Union in order to attract new m and new member States. He was said to be thinking in terms looser federal structure which would allow each State a large m sure of internal autonomy and an opportunity to develop its o 'personality'. Regrettably, he never took the plunge. His fault se to have been an excess of political realism: he was reluctan sacrifice the relative security of Syria under Sarraj for a m nebulous formula of obvious danger and unpredictable polit benefits.

President Nasser sought to temper Sarraj's rule in Syria by vesting Field-Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer with special respo bility for Syrian affairs. Amer was sent on extended mission Syria both to keep Sarraj on his toes and to provide disgrun Syrians with an outlet for their grievances. He earned some l popularity in this latter role. But his grasp of Syrian affairs never firm enough to enable him either to curb Sarraj or to gov effectively himself. His open conflict with Sarraj last Septem ending in the Syrian's resignation, took the lid off the pressure ve and gave the rebellious officers their chance.

For advice on Syria, President Nasser has relied on one o Egyptian who must bear some responsibility for the final breakdo Mahmoud Riyad, the President's special adviser on foreign affa

knows the Syrian scene better than any other Egyptian leader. His skilful work as Ambassador in Damascus from 1955 onwards, explaining the nature and aims of the Free Officers' revolution to a Syrian public wearied of military regimes, did much to prepare the ground for the Union.

It is perhaps worth recalling how little the Egyptian officers knew of the world outside the Nile Valley in the first years of their revolution. From 1952 to 1954 they were too busy destroying their local opponents and consolidating their regime to give much thought to Arab affairs. But the continuing problem of Israel, as well as the threat of the Baghdad Pact to Egypt's status in the Arab world, caused Nasser to adopt a dynamic policy aiming at Arab solidarity under Egyptian leadership. If the Egyptian leaders knew little of Arab Asia, how much more ignorant and indifferent was Egyptian public opinion. In his campaign to make Egyptians feel at one with Arabs everywhere, President Nasser has had to fight a hard core of isolationism in Egyptian opinion. This tendency has now been strengthened by the sight of his Arab policy in ruins, in much the same way as it was stimulated after the Palestine war by the conviction that Egypt had been betrayed by her Arab allies. 'Egypt First', a slogan used by some Free Officers after their 1952 revolution, is likely to be heard once more. Cairo radio[1] recognized this danger in the first week of the Syrian *coup* by accusing imperialism of trying to isolate the Arab people of Egypt by 'pushing them towards disbelief in Arabism and hate for all that is connected with the idea of Arab nationalism'.

No one has been quicker than Nasser himself at sensing and combating these developments:

> Brethren (he cried on the morrow of the *coup*) there is no more important a time which calls us to adhere to our Arabism than now. I know that there is bitterness and pain here... Voices say that while we were fighting in Palestine in 1948... the army was stabbed from the back; at this time King Abdallah was negotiating with the Jews. However, this was not the first treachery and not the last... After the nationalization of the Suez Canal, what was Nuri al-Sa'id doing? Nuri al-Sa'id was telling Eden that it was essential to seize this opportunity to get rid of the revolution in Egypt. But have Nuri's steps affected us? Have King Abdallah's steps affected us? Never. These steps have made us adhere even more to our Arabism and our nationalism.[2]

But despite these brave words, there seems little doubt that the

[1] B.B.C. Monitoring Report, ME/765/A/5, 11 October 1961.
[2] *ibid.*, ME/757/A/4, 2 October 1961.

idea of Arab unity has received a setback in Egypt itself and t
popular revulsion against Nasser's Arab policy is to be expe
Nasser will find himself 'contained' on the Nile as much by
secessionists in Damascus as by the mood of his own people.

Within hours of the Syrian *coup* on 28 September, Nasser
facing its implications squarely in a live broadcast from Ca

> . . . What has happened today is an act which affects the targets w
> we have all demanded. It is an act which affects our long struggle fo
> Arabism and for our Arab Nation. It affects the call for Arab nation
> for which our fathers and grandfathers were martyred. It is an act w
> affects all the slogans we have issued. It affects our present and our f
> lives.

The loss of Syria means far more to Nasser than that of a di
and factious province. In Damascus, that 'throbbing hea
Arabism', he was acclaimed as the worthy successor of
Saladin and Faysal. It was from the foundation of the U.A.R., w
linked Arab Asia to Arab Africa, that he could proudly wri
King Hussain last March that 'our people . . . have been chose
destiny to be both the vanguard and the base of the Arab strug
It was in the U.A.R. that he hoped to build his model 'co-opera
democratic, and socialist' society. Nasser's hold on Syria wa
prime title to Arab leadership. It was also his title to world sta
His operations as far afield as the Congo must be seen as a functi
his power in the Arab world: his rule in Syria, by shielding
country from inter-Arab politics, 'froze' the whole region
thereby allowed him free play on a wider international stage.

In that same letter to Hussain of 13 March 1961—perhap
most memorable statement of faith—Nasser wrote that
believe in Arab nationalism, a real and profound current leadi
an integral Arab union of which the constitutional form is to
less importance than the will of the Arab peoples.' The admissi
significant as it was precisely on the poverty of its constituti
structure that the U.A.R. foundered. Few theorists of A
nationalism have bothered to give the aspiration for unity a pr
constitutional definition. It was felt to be a secondary prob
which would solve itself once the people had declared in favo
Nasser. So powerful was Nasser's appeal to Arab nationalists ev
where that his supporters were led to overlook the importanc

[1] B.B.C. Monitoring Report, ME/755/A/7, 29 September 1961.

[2] *Al-Ahram* (weekly supplement), 21 March 1961, translated in C
(Paris), No. 17 (1961), pp. 181–7.

robust institutions and constitutional safeguards if union was to work. The Syrian experiment has, in consequence, been highly instructive if painful. To Arabs everywhere it has been a lesson in the dangers of unfettered personal rule; it has brought home the profound differences between the various regions of the Arab world; it has split the Arab national movement into those who believed that Nasser should be given blind allegiance and those, like the Ba'ath, his first and closest associates in the Union, who came to see his policies in Syria as damaging to the Arab cause. The issue was not confined to Syria alone, but was debated in Iraq, Jordan, the Lebanon, indeed in all Arab nationalist circles. The Ba'ath, forcibly dissolved by Nasser, faced with the demolition of their early work in Syria, have in the last year pinned their hopes on an independent Algeria to check Nasser's dreams of hegemony and to provide an alternative focus for the Arab national movement.

Following Syria's secession, the immediate future is in fact likely to see a phase of what Arab theorists call 'polycentrism'—i.e. the existence of a number of rival nationalist centres, indeed almost as many as there are Arab capitals. 'I am confident,' Nasser said in his great speech on 5 October,[1] 'as confident as in my belief in God, that this first experiment in Arab unity will not be the last, but that it was a forerunner operation, from which we have benefited a lot, and what we learnt from the experiment will be useful for the Arab future. . .'

PATRICK SEALE

The Seven-Year Struggle in Algeria

Retrospect and Prospect

WHEN the Algerian rebellion broke out on 1 November 1954, few people inside or outside France would have predicted that it would lead to seven years of inconclusive warfare, during which the problem of Franco-Algerian relations would come to dominate France's political stage, threaten her future existence as a Great Power, and imperil the Western alliance. Today, when General de Gaulle has succeeded in bringing the problem nearer to a solution than it has

[1] B.B.C. Monitoring Report, ME/762/A/4, 7 October 1961.

ever been, when he states that it is, indeed, already settled in principle, the dangers are perhaps greater than they have been at any time during these past seven years.

Looking back, it is easy now to see why the Algerian problem should constitute the most difficult of all those that have had to be faced by colonial Powers during the relatively short history of 'decolonization'. To begin with, as Frenchmen of all parties have steadily maintained, Algeria did not fit into conventional colonial categories, geographically, administratively, demographically, culturally, or politically. She has a large, politically and economically dominant European population with its roots going back for generations, traditionally bound to France for prestige as well as economic reasons even when not linked directly by national and family ties She has a small Muslim *élite*, formed by France and sharing much of the European outlook. She has a large, mainly illiterate, poverty-ridden, backward Muslim population, increasing at an alarming rate, living in a basically non-viable economy, dependent on France and on the European residents for administrators, teachers, doctors, hospitals, and schools, and on work in France, or for European employers in Algeria, to ward off starvation for upwards of 2 million of its 9 million people. It was, until very recently, a population without its own political or trade union organizations, without any unified leadership, without any tradition of nationhood. These basic elements of the problem would alone have ruled out the possibility of any simple or short-term solution, once a nationalist movement had taken hold, even without the complications provided by the complexities and difficulties of French internal politics.

These were such that, for the first four years of the rebellion, successive Governments either neglected or mishandled the Algerian situation, until, by 1956–7, it was at one and the same time too early and too late for any reasonable settlement to be reached. It was too early because too few French minds had been brought to bear on the urgency of the need to take account of 'the wind of change' in dependent territories or, as General de Gaulle likes to put it, of the need for France to live in the present ('*épouser son siècle*'). The energies of French parties, and consequently of French Governments, were focused on their own divisions, on the immediate difficulties of forming Governments and keeping them in existence, and on whichever among the numerous urgent post-war problems forced itself inescapably upon their attention. From 1951 to 1954, the problem of Europe and European defence dominated

ıe political stage. During these years, the harvest of neglect of ıe problems of Indo-China, Tunisia, and Morocco was being ·epared. From 1954–5, the settlement of these problems in turn ecame the most urgent need and so prevented action and, more nportant perhaps, political education, in Franco-Algerian ıatters.

But, by 1956–7, it was also, probably, too late. An unprepared rench people and overburdened French Governments had to deal ıth European and Muslim communities already evolving along ›solutely incompatible lines, while the French State was too weak, ıd political parties too divided, to arrest the process. The French my, most of whose regular *cadres* were for long periods in Algeria, as smarting from the loss of Indo-China, Morocco, and Tunisia, ıd was being called upon to carry out in Algeria an impossible task 'pacification', which was both military and administrative. Some ıts officers were developing their own out-dated illusions, fictions, ıd consciousness of vested interests, and in 1958 these were, mporarily, to be combined with those of the majority of the uropean settlers, and of some French politicians, in the Revolution 13 May. The concept of *Algérie française* was a curious medley of -assorted fantasies, having in common little more than their relevance to twentieth-century possibilities. Delusions of Franco-Iuslim fraternization, of the possibility of restoring *'l'Algérie de ıpa'*, of restoring French military prestige by ousting incapable ›liticians in favour of the army or else of de Gaulle as the spokes-an of the army, and of defeating international Communism by reventing the triumph of the rebels in Algeria—all these combined produce a situation in which the Fourth Republic could not sur-ve. But a change of regime alone could not alter the situation. And for the first year of the Fifth Republic General de Gaulle was ›mpelled to refrain from taking any apparently decisive steps.

It eventually became clear, however, that General de Gaulle had ›t been marking time during this period. On the contrary, having een handed a problem which was by then insoluble, as he himself is ıd to have observed, he was patiently tackling the long job of ducing it to soluble proportions. During that time, the rebel ganization, with a simpler problem to solve, was not marking me either. Official pronouncements on the French side were, of ecessity, still avoiding any references to the possibility of Algerian ıdependence. At that time no French party, not even the Com-unist Party in so many words, was overtly contemplating such a

possibility. And the so-called 'activists', who had already made one revolution to keep Algeria French, could not, at that stage, have been prevented from making another with the same purpose. Yet in 1956 the rebel organization, the National Liberation Front, had already come out with a programme whose primary objective was total independence. From 1956 onwards F.L.N. leaders steadfastly refused to agree to any cease-fire or to any negotiations which did not begin with the recognition of their right to independence.

This was the beginning of an evolution of Muslim opinion which, proceeding as it did at the pace engendered by the fraternity of combat, left French official spokesmen, even including General de Gaulle, always several essential steps behind what the rebels considered as the only conceivable position for useful negotiations There were faults on both sides, but under the leadership of General de Gaulle the French did make unprecedented concessions to meet rebel requirements. These were never appreciated, partly because of the traditional formalism and juridical rigidity of French political bargaining attitudes, partly because General de Gaulle's concepts as well as his formulations of French positions were often both obscure and patronizing, and because his remoteness from the practical details of negotiations rendered it easy for his agents to misunderstand or distort his instructions, even if they did not actually sabotage them. But the main reason was the time lag, the lack of relation between what was being offered and what was being demanded. Concessions were interpreted by the F.L.N., a revolutionary organization with little aptitude for or experience of political negotiation, as weakness in response to Muslim intransigence and violence. This F.L.N. conviction is perfectly described in the words used by M. Mollet to condemn the Government's reactions to farmers' demonstrations in 1961. 'Concessions are made,' he said, 'only in response to violence, and so violence becomes a paying proposition.'

What rendered French official positions progressively out of touch with reality was the evolution of what, by 1960, had become an Algerian nation. In 1954, and even up to 1958, the French could understandably argue that Algeria was not, and had never been, a nation, that the rebels constituted, as General de Gaulle put it, 'a force', 'a tendency', but one among others, whose relative strengths would be known only when it was possible to hold free elections It was legitimate to hope for the emergence of a 'Third Force' of moderate nationalists, with whom France would find it easier to

ach a reasonable settlement. By December 1960, when Muslims ıme out waving F.L.N. banners in the streets on the occasion of eneral de Gaulle's visit to Algeria, this approach could no longer sustained. As Germaine Tillon put it:

> It is possible to argue as to whether Algerian nationality existed at such ıd such a period of history, but after six years of this kind of war, the lgerian nation is there before our eyes. We have created and consoli- ıted it with our own hands.[1]

When this point has been reached, experience of decolonization ıs shown that, however catastrophic the consequences are likely be (and have proved to be in the former Belgian Congo), it is im- ›ssible to turn the clock back. Under General de Gaulle's leader- ıip, French opinion moved, though too slowly, from a belief in the ›ssibility of some half-way house—the period, beginning in 1959, hen 'self-determination' was interpreted as a threefold choice and hen it could be hoped that Algerians would reject what was :scribed as 'secession' in favour of 'association'—to the realization, the end of 1960, that there would be only one choice, and that the :gotiations, when they came, would be about the conditions of rance's recognition of an 'Algerian Algeria', whose leadership ould be that of the F.L.N.

The strength of the 'activists', both civilian and military, and in rance as well as in Algeria, who refused to reach this conclusion is ırtly, though only partly, explained by the intransigence of the .L.N. leaders, by their habit of responding even to rumours of :gotiation by an intensified campaign of violence and terrorism. he really disastrous consequence of this F.L.N. assumption (some- mes apparently justified) that only violence paid was that it was a ıme that two could play. As the likelihood of Algerian indepen- :nce became stronger, the European extremists adopted this tech- que as well. The result was that, by the end of September 1961, in ldition to Muslim attacks there were, in Algeria alone, on an aver- ;e twenty-eight European terrorist attacks a day, mostly carried ıt by members of the Secret Army, using plastic explosives.

This development has had two results. First, it has intimidated ›me army officers or officials who were sitting on the fence, and so ıs weakened the authority of the French Government at a time hen it needed more than ever to be strong. And secondly, it has lded to the existing antagonisms a new and far more dangerous ement. Racial frictions and fears in Algeria are turning into real

[1] *Les Ennemis complémentaires*, Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1960, p. 206.

racial hatred, a situation which has not existed so far throughout these seven years of war. Any decisive step towards the speedy achievement of Algerian independence could be the signal which would transform hooligan lynchings on the one hand and barbaric atrocities on the other into a racial pogrom. If Muslim demonstrations in December 1960 made nonsense of the theory of *Algérie française*, the antics of the Secret Army (or rather armies, for several organizations are involved) may well make nonsense of the theory that has up to now been held by many enlightened Frenchmen and an unknown number of Muslims, to the effect that Europeans and Muslims could and should co-exist in an independent Algeria. If, in fact, they succeed in making co-existence impossible, then the European Algerians will have cut their own throats economically even if they manage to avoid getting them cut physically, the future of an independent Algeria, and with it that of much of Africa, will be threatened, and France's precarious political situation will be rendered even more precarious by the importation into France of some hundreds of thousands of embittered, Fascist, or potentially Fascist, European Algerians.

In this atmosphere of mutual incomprehension, intransigence, and fear, the seven years of Franco-Algerian war, including three abortive negotiations during the past two years, have seen three distinct phases in the evolution of French policy. And, as in a three-act play, only the third suggests (so far only in outline) a dénouement The first, up to the end of the Fourth Republic, for reasons already discussed presented no fundamental break with tradition. Hindsight may now indicate that it was already too late for M. Mollet's reforms of 1956–7 to succeed, but it was much less evident at the time, although M. Mendès-France criticized their inadequacy, typically preferring something more dramatic which might restore Muslim faith in France. In themselves, the measures M. Mollet proposed were a useful and, indeed, essential preparation for whatever future Algeria was to have. They provided for increased Muslim participation in local government and began the task of trying to raise Muslim living standards. General de Gaulle's Constantine plan, in 1958, did no more than carry this programme several stages further, without even then coming near the minimum that would have been required to make Algeria ready for self-government within a measurable future. There is evidence that, as time went on, the F.L.N. realized how useful such preparation would be to them, and as their prestige among the Muslims increased, more and more

uslims who agreed to participate in the organs set up, first under e Fourth Republic and later under the Fifth, took the natural pre-ution of securing their alibis by obtaining the tacit or explicit thorization of the local F.L.N. leaders.

The fact, however, that the French Government, like the French ople, was out of step with the movement of opinion in Algeria is bound to defeat M. Mollet. His concept of negotiations (which tried hard to bring about through a series of unofficial conversa-ns with rebel leaders) as a 'triptych', whose first stage must cessarily be a cease-fire, was unacceptable to the F.L.N., but at is stage French opinion would not have accepted any other proach. Even General de Gaulle, at a later and more favourable ige, did not succeed in obtaining a cease-fire before negotiations. . Mollet's alternative to a cease-fire was an outright victory in the ilitary campaign. This involved a serious underestimation of the ilitary difficulties, and one of which later Governments were also be guilty. M. Lacoste's frequently predicted 'last quarter of an ur', which never arrived, certainly effectively prevented any new proach, and so played into the hands of the Right. But, in any se, in the state of French political opinion at the time, the most . Mollet could have done would have been to resign. And, though is might have been good for the Socialist party, it would not have lped to advance the solution of the Algerian problem. His suc-ssors, indeed, took several steps backward, by spending over a ar in devising a new statute for Algeria even less in tune with ality than that of 1947.

The second phase of French policy came on 16 September 1959, th General de Gaulle's announcement that Algeria would de-rmine her own future by voting in a referendum either to remain th France, to secede, or to be more or less independent in sociation with France. It was followed by a period of great con-sion. First, the active opposition of *Algérie française* supporters lminated in two insurrections in Algeria (in January 1960 and pril 1961), and it was touch and go in April whether the revolt ould not also spread to France. Both insurrections were followed massive purges in the army and the police, by trials of senior ficers involved, and by the escape of some of them, either before after sentence. The most important of these, General Salan, aced himself at the head of the main forces capable of launching a ird attempt. Secondly, it proved in practice impossible for French d Muslims to agree either on the time when the referendum

should be held or on the conditions in which both sides could be guaranteed a complete absence of intimidation. In June 1960, pre-negotiations at Melun (the first time the two sides had met officially round a table) broke down, ostensibly over a number of matters essentially concerned with the status of the Muslims, and on which France's attachment to protocol and prestige was, as so often, excessive. Between May and July 1961 two full-scale negotiations broke down, mainly over inability to agree on the future status of the Sahara.

The differences and difficulties were in fact legion. General de Gaulle's original idea had been for an interval of up to four years between the virtual ending of the fighting and the holding of the referendum on self-determination. The temper of Algerian nationalism made this totally unrealistic, but the failure to achieve a cease-fire made it impossible in practice to hold a referendum, unless it were to be organized by the French authorities and supervised by the French army. Comprehensibly, these procedures were unacceptable to the F.L.N.

The French referendum of January 1961 gave *carte blanche* to General de Gaulle to set up a provisional Algerian Executive, probably to be chosen from among representatives of local authorities and certain Algerian advisory committees, but this, too, has so far proved impossible. Nor was France prepared to accede to Algerian independence until some agreement had been reached on future Franco-Algerian relations and, in particular, on the future of those Europeans and Muslims (mainly in the regions of Oran and Algiers) who would vote to remain French. The F.L.N. would not accept the partition of Algeria, and so there seemed no alternative except to repatriate them, a course of action which neither they nor the French desired. There was, too, the problem of defence and the question of France's right to remain in the great modern naval base of Mers-el-Kébir.

In spite of the disagreements and confusion, however, by the end of October 1961 the F.L.N. had received partial satisfaction on a number of cardinal points, though often too late, or too grudgingly, to ease the situation. The conversations at Evian nearly failed to take place at all owing to a French announcement that parallel negotiations would take place with the rival nationalist movement, led by Messali Hadj, the M.N.A. (*Mouvement national algérien*). This appeared to be a revival of the 1958 view that the F.L.N represented only 'a tendency'. Yet by the time the two sides

actually met on 20 May there was no doubt that the F.L.N. was recognized by France as speaking for Algeria. In spite of an apparent but not very clear denial by General de Gaulle,[1] the second negotiations (at Lugrin, 20–28 July) were generally held to have broken down over the question of France's recognition of Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara, where a separate administration had been set up by France in 1957 with the aim of ensuring that exploitation of the oil and natural gas would be for the benefit of all the African frontier States. Yet in his press conference of 5 September and again in his television broadcast of 2 October, General de Gaulle clearly stated his conviction that any Algerian State would claim the Sahara as part of its territory, and declared that France would not dream of contesting the claim. But he restated his intention to 'regroup' those Europeans and Muslims who wanted to remain French, and for Algerians 'regroupment' means partition. He added, however, that this would be followed by 'disengagement', a new word apparently meaning repatriation to France.

Having thus alienated still further the European Algerians, he repeated in even more blunt terms his previous warnings to the Muslims that, if Algeria chose independence without any agreement for co-operation with France (which was understood to refer to France's desire to remain at Mers-el-Kébir), then France would withdraw all aid, having no intention of throwing good money after bad. This alienated the left wing at home, who considered it to be a position too materialist to be worthy of France. It also made the resumption of negotiations with the F.L.N., which he proposed, even more difficult. For at the Belgrade Conference of 'unaligned' nations in September Algeria had definitely sided with those nations and so seemed unlikely to be willing to grant bases to France, particularly after M. Bourguiba's stand over Bizerta.

These two last pronouncements by the President of the Republic, along with much of his policy in fields outside that of Algeria, have combined at the outset of the third phase, that of the negotiation of independence, to reduce his prestige in France with the leaders of all political parties (not entirely excluding the Gaullist U.N.R.) to its lowest ebb since he came to power over three years ago. Where Algeria is concerned, he is blamed as a bad negotiator. As one commentator put it:

[1] At his meeting with the Socialist parliamentary delegation on 26 September 1961.

Inflexible when negotiations are in progress, the President of the Republic modifies his position in between negotiations. He will even accord generously then what he had previously refused obstinately to concede.[1]

All the same, the President has, so far, proved by far the best negotiator that the French have ever had. If one looks back now to the difficulties with which M. Mollet had to contend, it is at once evident how much real progress has been made. War-weariness, together with the President's patient and subtle campaign to educate the French public in the facts of life in the era of decolonization, has succeeded in dragging the majority of Frenchmen into the twentieth century, though some are still 'kicking and screaming' The third act of the Algerian drama (and up to now it has largely been a tragedy) will decide whether these are strong enough to drag their fellow countrymen back into the nineteenth-century dream of *Algérie française*, and so to start the whole sorry struggle again in infinitely more terrifying circumstances. General de Gaulle presents to the public an image of confidence in the achievement of an independent Algeria before the end of the year, in time to allow France to 'disengage' her troops before the Berlin crisis is expected to break. His offer on 2 October to create an Algerian force to assist the provisional Executive, if it is ever set up, to keep order and organize the referendum, would contribute to this end, as well as provide yet another concession to the F.L.N.

But a great many obstacles remain to be overcome in a very short time, and there are different dangers at every turn. The first danger is, of course, that the President may die, or may be killed, before he has achieved his aim of bringing an independent Algeria into existence. The return of weak, unstable, and quarrelling Governments, or their overthrow by a successful insurrection by the supporters of *Algérie française*, could still undo the work of the last years and turn Algeria into a centre of anarchy and conflict, beside which the events of the past year in the Congo would appear insignificant. The second is that, even if some settlement is reached in Algeria, perhaps even as a consequence of a settlement being reached, France may once again embark on a change of regime, with all the constitutional and electoral discussions that are usually involved, and so, once again, be virtually absent from the international theatre of operations at a time of world crisis. And the third is that the changes which will come in Algeria will be such as to pre-

[1] 'Libéralisme et Réalités', by Robert Gauthier (*Le Monde*, 4 October 1961)

vent the friendly co-operation of the North African countries with each other, with France, and with the African nations south of the Sahara. There are times when the possibility of an *Algérie algérienne*, independent, receiving aid from France and the technical co-operation of European Algerians, working out the conditions for the kind of North African Federation that has always been M. Bourguiba's dream, seems almost as much of a fantasy as *l'Algérie française*. But the memory of how impossible the achievement of M. Bourguiba's Tunisia looked in the early months of 1954 is at least a reminder that strange things do happen.

DOROTHY PICKLES

The West New Guinea Problem

ON 26 September the Dutch Foreign Minister, Dr Luns, put before the United Nations General Assembly what he called 'a new concept in the history of decolonization', namely, an offer on the part of the Dutch Government to give up all control over West New Guinea and to put the territory under 'the active supervision of the United Nations'. He pledged the continuance of the Dutch financial aid of $30 million annually for the Papuan population and also promised to urge Dutch officials to remain in their posts as international civil servants, and thereby make certain that a vacuum would not be left at the cessation of Dutch control. He reiterated his proposal made at the Assembly in October 1960 that a U.N. commission should be sent to investigate political, economic, and social conditions in the territory and suggested that it should consider steps for an early plebiscite. Such an inquiry commission he regarded as of prime importance in view of the novelty of the Dutch proposals. The Commission would then be able to consider the possibility of bringing the area under the administration of an international development authority, during the interim period, rather than of turning it into a conventional U.N. Trusteeship territory.

The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio, in reply told the U.N. General Assembly on 9 October that the Dutch plan for placing West New Guinea under U.N. authority 'could not solve the dispute' and reiterated the Indonesian claim for the transfer of

administration in West New Guinea from the Netherlands to Indonesia; though, he added, the Indonesian Government 'would have no objection if the United Nations should assist', and it also asked the U.N. to set up a commission of investigation.

On 25 April 1961 the newly formed New Guinea Council in Hollandia had unanimously passed a resolution which, among other provisions, requested 'an unconditional and unequivocal assurance' from the Dutch Government that the latter would 'continue its task' in West New Guinea, 'regardless of political pressures from at home or abroad', until such time as the Council might desire otherwise, and added that if the Government failed to give this assurance 'the Papuan people will be forced in due time to search for other ways' in order to achieve the 'realization of the right of self-determination'. This resolution was doubtless motivated as much by fear of renewed Indonesian attempts to persuade the Governments of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand that West New Guinea should pass to Indonesian control as by apprehension over a certain receptivity recently evident in some Dutch press and political circles to the idea of a speedy termination of the Dutch administration in the area, including possibly its transfer to Indonesia; but it provided unmistakable evidence of the entry into the complex Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West New Guinea of a new and probably decisive element, namely the emergent national self-awareness of the Papuan population. In its reply to this resolution the Dutch Government on 22 June 1961 gave the assurance that it would safeguard the Papuan right of self-determination and would continue to labour in West New Guinea in fulfilment of that right. In view also of the growing number of political parties that have appeared in the territory in the past year, and of the popular election and installation on 5 April 1961 of that region's first representative body (twenty-three of whose twenty-eight members are Papuans), it is clear that the decade-long dispute over West New Guinea has now entered an important new phase.

The origins of this dispute go back to the Round Table Conference of December 1949 at The Hague, at which the Dutch formally relinquished their sovereignty over their erstwhile East Indies possessions to an independent Indonesian Government, with the exception, however, of West New Guinea.[1] This area was to retain its *status quo* under Dutch control, but its future position was to be decided by mutual consultations within one year. The consultations

[1] See 'The Future of West New Guinea', in *The World Today*, March 1951.

re duly held, but the Dutch and Indonesians were unable to ree, the Indonesians insisting on a transfer of the territory to their clusive control, while the Dutch were prepared to allow sovegnty to rest with the soon to be dissolved Netherlands–Indonesian ion headed by the Dutch Queen, but with actual authority to be t almost entirely in Dutch hands. As the dispute developed over years, the Indonesians at first insisted that sovereignty over the a was in fact transferred to Indonesia at the Round Table Conence, leaving the *status quo* to the Dutch for only one year. But ce her abrogation of all Round Table agreements early in 1956, donesia has held that, in fact, her independence declaration of August 1945 also covered West New Guinea, and that sovegnty over that area has belonged to her since then. To buttress ir position the Indonesians also point out that West New Guinea s long been part of the Indonesian world, having been under the ntrol of the Java-based empire of Madjapahit in the fourteenth d fifteenth centuries, and that subsequently it was part of the adnistrative political unit once known as 'Netherlands India'. oreover, the Indonesians can cite authoritative Dutch spokesmen ring the Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch (1945–9) to the ect not only that the Netherlands intended to turn over the *whole* Netherlands India to a future independent Indonesian State, but o that it was not the Dutch Government's intention to exclude est New Guinea from such a future Indonesian State.

The Dutch, on solid scholarly grounds, devaluate the historic ties tween West New Guinea and the rest of Indonesia (for example, claims of Madjapahit) and have demonstrated that early in their volution the Indonesian leaders themselves either excluded, or nsidered excluding, West New Guinea from their projected lependent State. Taking a more formally legalistic position, they o argue that Indonesia agreed to the exclusion of West New inea in the Round Table Conference agreements and that noere in these agreements is Indonesian sovereignty over the disted area either recognized or necessarily implied for the future. ey also point out that in the various conferences throughout the volution a separate status for West New Guinea was clearly enaged, even by the very Dutch spokesmen now cited by Indonesia substantiate her case. Since, moreover, Indonesia unilaterally rediated the Round Table Conference agreements, and in Decemr 1957 expropriated Dutch properties in Indonesia and expelled itch nationals, there is no obligation from the Dutch point of view

to negotiate the dispute. Three efforts by Indonesia, in 1954, 195 and 1957, to win support for her claim from the General Assemb of the United Nations failed because the necessary two-thir majority could not be obtained.

But as contention over the area brought Dutch–Indonesi relations to their nadir and caused growing concern in various inte national quarters, notably in Australia, the internal development West New Guinea markedly accelerated. Prior to the second Wor War the region had been the forgotten outpost of the Dutch Indi empire, known primarily for the primitive culture of its Papu inhabitants and for the location of concentration camps for I donesian Communists and Nationalists along the Upper Dig River. Now, with the rest of their Indonesian possessions gone, tl Dutch mounted a new development effort in West New Guinea, e panding educational facilities and medical care, promoting c operatives and agricultural community development, fostering inc genous trade and industry, and gradually bringing under dire administrative control the area's population of more than 700,00 Territorial Budgets have steadily grown over the years (from 36 million florins in 1950 to 137·7 million in 1959), and since tl region cannot defray the cost of its own development the Dut Government has regularly paid for its growing budgetary defici (from 15·5 million florins in 1950 to more than 94 million in 1961 Elected regional councils in Biak-Numfor, Fak-Fak, Dafonsor Japen-Waropen, as well as a number of local advisory council provide experience in self-government from the ground up. I accordance with the Dutch Government's declaration of Ap 1960, providing for the creation of a central representative body the region and for the steady implementation of a vast ten-ye development plan, elections for a New Guinea Council were du held, and partisan political activity made its appearance. Tl Council's present powers are merely advisory, but the Governme has submitted the 1962 territorial Budget to it for consideration ar has given every indication that it means to widen the Council authority as rapidly as possible. Only recently the Governme again requested the Council to indicate, if so desired, a defini target date at which 'the right of self-determination of the inhab tants of West New Guinea would be realized'. All evidence poin to a rapidly accelerating Papuan political consciousness desirous independence for the territory, and existing Papuan political parti strongly reject Indonesia's claims on West New Guinea.

Against this background four aspects of the West New Guinea ıe today need to be examined more closely: (i) the reasons behind lonesia's insistence that the area be brought under her control, Dutch opinion on the future of West New Guinea and official ction to Indonesian pressures, (iii) the attitude of articulate ɔuans toward these two issues, particularly in the light of the relopment problems of the West New Guinea area, and (iv) policies of the principal Powers concerned with the dispute, ably the United States and Australia.

Tracing the history of the issue of West New Guinea (or West ın, as the Indonesians call it) in Indonesian public life, one ices that since 1954, when the Indonesian economy steadily gan to deteriorate, partisan political opinion became sharpened, l the tension between the central Government and the outlying as rapidly increased, the official demand for the 'return' of West w Guinea has grown more insistent. As it became clear that tch–Indonesian discussions were leading nowhere, the more ical nationalistic temper that pervaded various Indonesian binets since 1954 increasingly brought the issue to the attention he masses, and mounting impatience was clearly evident in the gressive dissolution of all ties with the Netherlands and the ex-priation of Dutch holdings. How much of this agitation was ntaneous and how much artificially manufactured by partisan itical interest searching for mass support among a nation still tively untutored in the ways of government is difficult to say, but quite clear that the unending barrage of denunciations and ex-tations about the West New Guinea issue, unleashed in press l Government statements and by political leaders generally, in-ned public opinion in favour of the aggressive and radical pro-mmes advocated by extreme political groups such as the Com-nists, who have always made capital out of the issue. As the lonesian Defence Minister and Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-neral A. H. Nasution, stated at a press conference in Bonn early uly 1961, 'I will not deny that there are people in Indonesia who e glad that you gave them the West Irian problem as a means of i-Western or anti-Dutch propaganda.'[1] But even so, and how-r artificial the issue may be, it remains true that the claim on st New Guinea has provided a badly needed rallying point of ty in a country beset by internal rebellion and armed dissident ions, which, along with the deteriorating economy, have brought

[1] *Antara Daily News Bulletin* (New York), 11 July 1961, p. 4.

the danger of a total national collapse into chaos sometimes perilously close in the past few years. It is for this reason that so many Indonesian political leaders, of widely different ideological persuasion, have helped to fan the flames, although a number of informed Indonesians with whom this writer has talked share the view of one informant that if 'Sukarno and Nasution stopped talking about Irian today, the people would forget about it tomorrow'.

Little credence can therefore be given to the view that agitation about West New Guinea is not a 'consciously chosen' policy of the Indonesian Government, but arises instead from 'spontaneous popular sentiments' based on national feelings of the unity and indivisibility of Indonesia that go back, presumably, to the early history of the national movement. This view wholly overlooks not only the regional and separatist aspects of the early national movement but also the operation of rebellious separatist groups today, which do not merely wish for greater autonomy for their areas, free from what they sometimes term 'Javanese imperialism', but which, like the 'Republic of the South Moluccas', for example, hold that there can be no peace in Indonesia until the whole archipelago is broken up into separate and independent States. While there is unquestionably much public awareness of the issue today, one should not overlook the fact, already mentioned, that Indonesian leaders at the beginning of their national revolution against the Dutch in 1945 still considered excluding West New Guinea (in sharp contrast to their attitude today) from the territory of their projected national republic, nor the fact that the official agitation notably increased after 1954, when domestic economic and political tensions created greater instability—both indications of a 'consciously chosen' policy. However, from the point of view of Indonesia's national leadership there is nothing blameworthy in promoting greater national unity in this time of crisis through the West New Guinea issue, not least because it is believed that Indonesia has valid and legitimate arguments sustaining her national claim on the area.

The fact is, however, that Indonesian leaders are not of one mind in implementing their claim. Some, like President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio, are noted for a more intransigent stand and are little inclined to seek mediation or compromise unless West New Guinea is first transferred to Indonesia. Since 1959 this intransigence has been expressed in an official policy of 'confrontation of the Dutch in all fields', which has included the breaking-off of all diplomatic relations, a military build-up, and the

doption of an aggressive and hostile tone suggesting that war over Vest New Guinea may be imminent. The 'confrontation' policy as also included an Indonesian press campaign against the Nether- inds, with stories of alleged 'massacres' of Papuans, terrorism, and isurrections for freedom from Dutch rule—most of which have ound no substantiation from other, including foreign, press repre- entatives in the area. On the other hand there are Indonesian aders, notably Defence Minister Nasution, who, while by no ieans abandoning Indonesia's claim, are more moderate in their pproach to the dispute, stressing the need for mediation and a eaceful settlement. Significant was the Nasution-inspired, but nsuccessful, effort of the Malayan Prime Minister Tengku Abdul ahman to mediate in the dispute in October and November 1960. ı April 1961 an emissary of General Nasution, the Bandung pub- sher Oejeng Suwargana, also contacted leading Dutch business kecutives in the Netherlands likely to be in favour of compromise, nong them Dr Paul Rijkens, a former chairman of Unilever orporation, for the purpose of mediation, and in Paris, on 23 June 961, General Nasution, then on a European tour, had a meeting ith Professor F. Duynstee, leader of a faction of the Catholic eople's Party in the Netherlands which has long been critical of utch policy in West New Guinea and wishes for a *rapproche- ent* with Indonesia. According to Professor Duynstee, General asution proposed that an informal Dutch-Indonesian study com- iission be formed to explore the possibility of a direct Indonesian ontact with the members of the New Guinea Council for the pur- ose of enabling Indonesia to explain her position on West New uinea. Professor Duynstee also declared that General Nasution as willing to abandon Indonesia's usual demand for an *a priori* cognition of her sovereignty over West New Guinea.

Since Indonesia had broken off all diplomatic relations with the etherlands on 17 August 1960, these efforts at mediation might ave been significant, but nevertheless they soon came to naught. he Dutch Prime Minister, Professor De Quay, made it clear that is Government dissociated itself from the views and activities of e 'Rijkens group', and shortly after his meeting with Professor uynstee, General Nasution denied that he had made any formal roposals, and declared that his position remained that of the ession of West New Guinea to Indonesia, while a spokesman at the idonesian Embassy in Paris repudiated the story that Indonesia ished to make contact with the West New Guinea Council.

General Nasution later affirmed that he regarded the recent informal talks with leading Dutchmen as of great importance, and that he expected that his contact with Professor Duynstee would continue, but subsequently President Sukarno, referring to the mediation efforts of the 'Rijkens group', categorically declared that there could be no question of Dutch–Indonesian discussions before West New Guinea had been transferred to Indonesia.[1] In the Dutch press the reaction to these mediation attempts by what the Dutch daily *De Volkskrant* called 'amateur diplomats' was almost wholly and sharply negative. In Indonesia reaction was somewhat more cautious, but the general impression was that General Nasution had failed, and that the path of reaching agreement through informal private contacts was unpromising. Certainly the possibility of Indonesia directly presenting her case to the members of the New Guinea Council was now given little likelihood of success, and the fact that, according to Professor Duynstee, General Nasution had even suggested such a possibility was interpreted in the Netherlands to mean that Indonesia was becoming aware that this 'puppet council'—as Indonesian news services have described it—was a new factor in the dispute which could no longer be ignored.

But the fact that General Nasution's moderate approach could find some Dutch sympathizers at all is indicative of the ambivalence in leading Dutch circles toward the problem. Recent polls of Dutch public opinion indicate only very minor support for an immediate transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia, while there is even still notable backing for a policy of permanent retention of the area. But the largest segment of opinion favours continuation of Dutch rule, with or without U.N. supervision, until the region can be independent. In the past year or so critics of the present policy seem to have become more vocal. In the left wing of the Catholic People's party, at present in power, in influential business and industrial circles, in the Dutch Reformed Church, and among leading intellectuals there is grave misgiving. Some urge outright transfer to Indonesia, others a joint Dutch–Indonesian Trusteeship under U.N. supervision, others again favour West New Guinea's independence but recommend the adoption of a definite target date in the immediate future at which the Netherlands will withdraw; still others maintain that West New Guinea lacks the economic means to be independent, and that her future interests, whether she becomes independent or not,

[1] Renewed mediation efforts by the 'Rijkens group', rumoured early in October 1961, were disclaimed by a Dutch official spokesman.

ll require close co-operation with neighbouring Indonesia, so at the Netherlands should now seek some kind of compromise th Indonesia in the Papuans' own interest, and so on. Some, too, ır for the Netherlands' developing economic interest in other 'ro-Asian countries, which have generally been sympathetic to donesia's claim. There appears, however, to be considerable pport for the policy of continuing Dutch control until the region n eventually express itself democratically on its own future po- ion, which, some Dutch observers contend, may well turn out be some kind of dominion status under the Dutch Crown.

Leading Dutch military and Government officials have also clared that they fear no large-scale Indonesian attack on West ɜw Guinea; the Prime Minister stated on 20 February 1961, for ample, that he saw no reason to alert the U.N. Security Council out the New Guinea situation, and that he considered the $400 llion purchase of arms by Indonesia from the Soviet Union, of January, and 'the publicity campaign with which this agreement s been surrounded', to be mainly designed to create an impression. Yet, clearly in response to Indonesia's 'confrontation' policy, the Quay Government has increasingly attempted to 'international-' its control over West New Guinea during the past year by iciting U.N. approval for its policies there. It twice asked the N. Secretary-General to send an impartial observer to West ɜw Guinea, and both before the 1960 U.N. General Assembly and the Dutch Lower House the Foreign Minister, Dr Joseph M. ıns, stated that the Government would welcome the 'scrutiny and dgment' of the United Nations in the area, for example by means a special investigating commission. Even an outright U.N. usteeship status would not in principle meet with Dutch objec- ns, according to Dr Luns: 'what the Government now has in nd,' he declared recently[1] to the Dutch Lower House, 'is to lure New Guinea the presence of the United Nations.' There have en no indications, however, that the Dutch invitation will be ken up in the near future, not least because it might aggravate the visions between U.N. members at a time of grave international sis. Moreover, Indonesia has opposed any control, inquiry, or ıtation under U.N. auspices which does not predicate the transfer West New Guinea to Indonesia.

But the jockeying of Dutch and Indonesians in the world arena

Handelingen Tweede Kamer, Vol. 1, session 1960–1, 23 February 1961, 600–1.

to win support for their stand on the question has, in the past year produced a reaction in West New Guinea herself, characterized by increased national self-consciousness and sentiments favouring eventual independence. While Indonesia's claims are categorically rejected by virtually all politically articulate inhabitants—save for a few hundred East Indonesian residents who recently founded two subversive pro-Indonesian organizations that were quickly discovered and dissolved—there has also been growing dissatisfaction and even anxiety, over recent Dutch doubts and self-criticism with respect to their policy in West New Guinea, and over the implications of the new 'internationalization' approach. For example, on 1 July 1961 the *Nieuw Guinea Koerier*, the area's only daily, published in Hollandia, carried an editorial stating that although since 1955 the Dutch-directed development of West New Guinea had rendered actual Dutch responsibility for the region much greater than in the past, the mediation efforts of the 'Rijkens group' and Professor Duynstee showed that in the Netherlands there was evident 'a marked lessening of the sense of responsibility'. And on 23 April 1961 the leaders of PARNA (the *Partei Nationaal* or National Party), perhaps the most important of the new Papuan political parties formed last year, resolved that by 1970 Dutch sovereignty would have to be transferred to an independent 'Republic of West New Guinea'. PARNA leaders gave as a reason for this demand the growing attention being given in the Netherlands and elsewhere to the possibility of placing West New Guinea under some kind of U.N. supervision, a move which, it was felt might actually delay the attainment of complete independence.

The trials in March and April 1961 in West New Guinea of a number of East Indonesians and a few Papuans who had been active in such secret organizations as 'The Army of the Heroic Bird of Paradise', which sought to overthrow the Dutch regime by violence and install Indonesian control, showed once again how little impact Indonesian claims have made, even on the articulate segment of Papuan society. And although Papuan political leaders have frequently criticized Dutch policies on the ground of discriminatory treatment of the Papuan, for example in the Civil Service, anti-Indonesian racial hostility, based on alleged Indonesian feelings of superiority, have also long been evident among Papuans. As Frits Kirihio, one of the Papuan leaders of PARNA, expressed it, 'The relationship with Indonesian inhabitants is not so good . . . the Dutch more quickly accept us as equals and fellow human beings.

There are Indonesians who even refuse to be cared for by Papuan nurses.'[1] At the same time it is realized that Indonesia is a close neighbour of West New Guinea and that friendly relations between the two are necessary. Precipitate haste in political relations and development is eschewed among virtually all Papuan political leaders. Many parties have stressed the need for economic independence before political autonomy can be granted, and it is noteworthy that the events in the Congo are generally interpreted in political circles as a warning to colonies that want independence too soon. Papuan leaders emphasize the importance of the speedy formation of *élites*, and the establishment by Papuans in November 1960 of the 'MAMTA' Study Fund Foundation, a private organization with funds to be provided by donations, the sale of ethnographica, and so on, will accelerate the sending of Papuan students for education abroad.

The West New Guinea economy, however, is far from viable and may well lead political developments in a more radical direction in the future. The region's balance of trade is deteriorating: exports declined from 509,805 tons in 1954 to 271,828 tons in 1960, with a corresponding drop in value from 31·1 million florins to 23·2 million. Imports rose from 75,716 tons in 1954, with a value of 75·8 million florins, to 92,087 tons in 1959, with a value of 80·0 million florins. The production and exports of wood products, copra, and hides are encouraging, but they can hardly offset the serious drop in oil production (from 550,000 tons in 1954 to about 245,000 in 1959). Moreover, although the population is beginning to grow, and by 1960 there were over 40,000 students in the various primary schools, the total labour force is not significantly increasing and has even decreased in important fields of employment. The low rate of private capital investment (about 16 million florins annually), the exodus of European and Eurasian middle-level technical personnel uncertain about their future in the area, and the very slow pace of Papuan entrepreneurial development raise the gravest questions about the economic future.

It is precisely at this juncture that some wider international implications of the West New Guinea problem emerge into view. Some critics of Dutch policy allege, for example, that the Dutch are fostering a spirit of self-determination in an area which has not got the economic means to sustain or implement that spirit. The answer is that—rightly or wrongly—the national self-awareness of

[1] *Nieuw Guinea Koerier* (Hollandia), 4 November 1960.

the Papuan is an irrepressible fact and a rapidly spreading phenc menon in West New Guinea, that the history of the world in recer decades shows that nationalism is not apt to be deterred in its sprea or its appeal by arguments about economic viability, and, finall that it would be difficult now to deny to the Papuan what was, fc example, so readily granted to the former French colonies in Afric areas which as States today find themselves in many cases in similar economic predicament to that of West New Guinea. No does it follow—as has also been argued—that, given the unde veloped state of the West New Guinea economy, its connection wit Indonesia would necessarily be an advantage. For one thing, th state of the Indonesian economy in the past few years hardly give promise that Djakarta could funnel into West New Guinea fo development purposes the annual half-billion Rupiah (50 millio florins) and more which the Dutch have been contributing on a average to the region's Budgets in the past few years. Moreover, a economic union with the Netherlands might be far more advan tageous to an independent West New Guinea, as might a union wit a Melanesian Federation, consisting of New Guinea and adjacen islands to the East, a possibility that has received increased atten tion in Papuan political circles of late.

The United States and Australia are especially placed in quandary. The U.S. is allied with Holland not only in N.A.T O but also in the South Pacific Commission. On 5 April 1961, at th official inauguration of the New Guinea Council in Hollandia, all th member nations of the Commission sent delegates, except the U.S Indonesia was highly pleased at this gesture of the new Kenned administration and there was speculation in the Indonesian pres that the United States might abandon her long-maintained positio of careful neutrality in the West New Guinea dispute, in line wit Washington's new support for the Afro-Asian struggle agains colonialism. In the Netherlands and West New Guinea the U.S move caused dismay, the Papuan leader and New Guinea Counci member Nicholas Jouwé declaring, for example, that doubt hac now arisen as to the willingness of the United States to support self determination for West New Guinea. But in subsequent weeks i appeared that speculation about a change in U.S. policy had beer premature. President Sukarno met President Kennedy in Washing ton on 24–25 April 1961, and although, according to Indonesiar spokesmen, the West New Guinea issue was undoubtedly dis- cussed, no mention of it appeared in the official communiqué at

the end of the talks. Even so, Indonesia claimed that the United States had now abandoned 'absolute legal considerations' in the dispute and was no longer arguing in favour of 'self-determination and a plebiscite for West Irian', while on 13 June 1961 the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mr Subandrio, declared that 'the United States would have no objections to the return of West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia.' But the next day a U.S. State Department spokesman, commenting on Mr Subandrio's statement, declared that the United States had appealed to both the Netherlands and Indonesia to settle the West New Guinea dispute peaceably, and that this remained the only American policy in the matter. It is evident that in the long run the United States would find it impossible to ignore the demand for self-determination now being expressed by Papuan opinion.

The countries of the Communist bloc have been unequivocal in their support of Indonesia's position, and Mr Sukarno even found it necessary to deny reports in the British press about the middle of June 1961 that the U.S.S.R. and China had encouraged Indonesia forcibly to annex West New Guinea. In the joint communiqués issued by Peking and Djakarta it has become virtually customary of late to insert a clause in which Djakarta supports Peking's claim on Taiwan, and the Chinese support the Indonesian demand for West New Guinea. The nations of the British Commonwealth find their position more difficult to define. Britain, anxious to expand her trade with Indonesia and to safeguard her oil and estate interests there (British rubber estates in Indonesia comprise some 290,000 acres, representing an investment of 45 million pounds sterling), has followed a policy of neutrality very similar to that of the United States. Mr J. B. Godber, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, declared in the House of Commons on 26 June 1961 that the Government had 'no direct interest' in the West New Guinea problem beyond the general question of the preservation of peace in South-East Asia.[1] But Dutch pressures and complaints about Indonesia's 'confrontation' policy have become more difficult to resist. While Australia's Conservatives, now in power, have indicated that they will not oppose an amicable settlement of the dispute between the Indonesians and the Dutch, their concern over a possible Indonesian take-over is no secret. The Australian press has viewed with unconcealed hostility Indonesia's recent arms purchases, the Sydney *Daily Telegraph* declaring, for example, that

[1] Hansard, Vol. 643, No. 134, col. 166.

'instead of wasting more than a third of Indonesia's income on armed forces, President Sukarno would do better to spend it o trying to raise the miserable standard of living of his country's in habitants.' The Australian Minister of the Territories, Mr Pau Hasluck, has said that Australian assistance in Eastern New Guine will be necessary 'for at least a generation',[1] and there has been con siderable concern that the Dutch emancipation programme in th western part of the island of New Guinea is outpacing Australia' in the east. Meanwhile Indonesia has continued to exert pressure on the Menzies Government to bring about Australian recognition o Indonesia's claims. During a visit to Australia last April, Genera Nasution in effect told the Australian Prime Minister that Australia' continued recognition of Dutch sovereignty was helping the Com munists to take over in Indonesia. In the Australian Labour Party potent forces support a change in Australia's policy in favour o Indonesia, but it is unlikely that Australia will abandon her ofter proclaimed recognition of Dutch sovereignty unless the Labou Party accedes to power.

As pronouncements of Indonesian army commanders seem to be come more and more hostile and rumours of an intended Indonesian invasion fill the Djakarta air (there have been several such rumours in the past) the West New Guinea question seems rapidly to be approaching its critical stage. In April and November 1960 groups of Indonesian infiltrators, some of them in army uniform, landed in West New Guinea, and although they were wholly ineffectual and were quickly apprehended, the feeling that they are a portent of things to come cannot be suppressed. Early in September 1961 according to a Government announcement from Hollandia, 'sever al scores' of Indonesians again infiltrated by boat into the area around Sorong, on the extreme west of West New Guinea. By the end of the month the Dutch Government claimed that vir tually all the infiltrators had been apprehended with the aid of the local Papuan population. The Indonesian Government has termed this Dutch report of Indonesian infiltrators 'misleading propaganda'. To keep the peace in the West New Guinea area may well require the much more active concern of some of the principal world Powers than is now the case.

JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF

[1] Australian Information Service press release, 18 October 1960.

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Russia and the Western Powers

A Chronology since the Vienna Meeting of 3 and 4 June

4 **June**—Two Memoranda handed by Mr Khrushchev to President Kennedy during their meeting in Vienna: (*a*) on *Germany*, proposing a conference 'without any delay' to conclude a German peace treaty and establish West Berlin as 'a demilitarized free city', internationally guaranteed. Such a Berlin settlement to take into consideration 'in every way' the sovereign rights of East Germany. Conclusion of such peace treaty not necessarily to be linked with the recognition of East or West Germany by all signatories nor with their 'immediate' withdrawal from N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Treaty; and if the Western Powers not ready to sign a single peace treaty with both German States, separate treaties to be signed with one or both. The four Powers to urge the two German States to agree on questions 'pertaining to a peace settlement with Germany and its reunification', and the four Powers to recognize any such agreement. A period not exceeding six months regarded as adequate for treaty negotiations; threat of separate Russian peace treaty with East Germany if the U.S.A. 'does not show an understanding of the necessity of concluding a peace treaty', such a treaty to record the status of West Berlin as a free city but with the occupation regime liquidated, and the question of access to West Berlin to be negotiated with East Germany; (*b*) on *nuclear test negotiations and disarmament*, suggesting that, failing acceptance by the U.S.A. and Britain of the earlier Soviet proposals,[1] the test ban treaty should be merged in negotiations for general and total disarmament.

17 **June**—U.S. Note to Russia rejecting Soviet proposal to merge nuclear test negotiations in question of general disarmament as this would prolong a situation in which the U.S. accepted an unenforced commitment not to test 'without the certainty that the Soviet Union had stopped its testing'. 'The national security and defences of the free world do not allow this risk to be assumed indefinitely.' U.S. urged Russia to modify 'troika' proposals for control and to sign an effective nuclear test ban treaty 'without delay'.

21 **June**—Mr Khrushchev's speech at Kremlin mass meeting on twentieth anniversary of German attack on the U.S.S.R., announcing that Russia would sign a peace treaty with East Germany 'at the end of

[1] See 'Nuclear Test Negotiations', in *The World Today*, June 1961.

this year' which would 'in no way threaten west Berlin' though 'in accordance with international law, the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic, through whose territory run the communications connecting west Berlin with the outside world, must be respected.' Announced that 'the moment the U.S. resumes nuclear tests, the Soviet Union will do so.' 'If the West agrees to complete and general disarmament the Soviet Union will agree to all controls' but would not agree to control without disarmament.

23 June—Russian delegate at Geneva nuclear test conference rejected U.S. Note of 17 June.

27 June—Mr Macmillan's statement in House of Commons: 'We and our allies have certain obligations in Germany and we do not intend to abandon them. Among these obligations is the preservation of the freedom of the people of west Berlin. The Soviet Government must . . . realize that we intend to defend this and that we cannot countenance proposals inconsistent with it.' On this basis only, Britain would be ready for discussions. (*Hansard*, Vol. 643, No. 135, col. 199.)

28 June—President Kennedy stated at press conference that unilateral action by Russia could not affect Allied rights in Berlin, that the Western Powers were ready to discuss 'any proposals which would give increased protection to the right of the people of Berlin to exercise their independent choice as free men', but that such discussion would be profitable only if Russia would accept 'self-determination in Berlin—and indeed in Europe'.

Mr Khrushchev's speech at Soviet–Vietnamese friendship meeting during visit of Vietnamese Premier to Moscow stating that Russia is 'against any nuclear explosions' and in favour of general and complete disarmament, and quoting U.S.–Japanese peace treaty of 1951 as precedent for separate Russian peace treaty with East Germany.

7 July—East Berlin authorities issued order enforcing hitherto unenforced ordinance demanding permits for East Berliners working in West Berlin.

8 July—Mr Khrushchev's speech at Kremlin reception for Military Academy graduates, announcing increased defence expenditure in current year of 3,144 million rubles to bring total to 12,399 million rubles, and suspending the reduction of the armed forces planned for 1961.

15 July—U.S. Note accusing Russia of sabotaging nuclear test conference by her 'troika' proposal and refusal to accept more than three on-site inspections a year. U.S. and British Memorandum to Mr Hammarskjold on 'urgent need' for nuclear test ban treaty to be put on agenda of U.N. General Assembly.

17 July—U.S., British, and French Notes to Russia rejecting the pro-

posals of 4 June. The Notes referred to Western proposals for a solution of the German problem put forward in 1954, 1955, and May 1959 (for reunification of Germany after free elections), rejected Russian claim of a dangerous situation if a peace treaty were not signed immediately, but affirmed that such a danger existed in proposed Russian settlement of Berlin question by unilateral action. Western Powers prepared to consider a freely negotiated settlement of the German problem in the light of the principle of self-determination and, in default of this, an interim arrangement to improve the Berlin situation, but they 'emphatically reject the assertion of the Soviet Government that the rights which they enjoy in Berlin in the interests of Germany and the whole of Europe can in any way be affected or terminated by unilateral acts of the Soviet Union'.

25 July—President Kennedy in television and radio speech announced proposed increase of U.S. armed forces by 217,000 men and increased military expenditure of $3,457 million, including $207 million for civil defence ($1,800 million for non-nuclear weapons) to meet 'world-wide threat'; said U.S. ready to negotiate on Berlin if the Russians seek 'genuine understanding' but Western presence in and access to Berlin 'cannot be ended by any act of the Soviet Government'.

3 Aug.—Notes from three Western Commandants to Soviet Commandant in Berlin protesting against restrictions on movement of East Berliners coming to work in West Berlin, which they described as violation of four-Power agreements, especially of Foreign Ministers' agreement of 20 June 1949 'to promote normalization of life in Berlin and facilitate movement between Berlin and the rest of Germany'.

Further Russian Notes calling on Western Powers 'to consider their negative position' and agree to negotiate German peace treaty.

6 Aug.—Russian launching of manned Vostok II spacecraft which circled the globe seventeen times.

7 Aug.—Mr Khrushchev's televised speech announcing Russia might have to call up reservists and move troops to her western frontiers in reply to U.S. 'carrying out measures in the nature of a mobilization and threatening to start a war'. Renewed call for German peace treaty.

8 Aug.—Declaration of N.A.T.O. Council that 'peaceful and just solution of the problem of Germany including Berlin is to be found only on the basis of self-determination' as expressed in the N.A.T.O. declaration of 16 December 1958; stated that Russian denunciation of agreements on Berlin could not rescind the rights of the other three Powers.

9 Aug.—Russian Note to U.S. again proposing linking of nuclear test negotiations with complete disarmament.

10 Aug.—Marshal Konev appointed Commander of Soviet troops in East Germany.

11 Aug.—Mr Khrushchev's speech at Soviet–Rumanian friendship meeting during visit of heads of Rumanian Government to Moscow; reference to warning he had given to Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during their visit to Moscow (2–5 August) and also warning to Greece of possible consequences of allowing N.A.T.O. bases on their soil.

12 Aug.—Decree of East German Government, in accordance with a statement issued by the Warsaw Treaty member States urging 'necessary security measures in the face of the aggressive aspirations of the reactionary forces of the Federal Republic of Germany and its N.A.T.O. allies', announcing the introduction of controls along the West German border, including the sector border in Berlin, of the kind 'usually introduced along the borders of every sovereign State'; these measures should not affect existing traffic and control on communications between West Berlin and West Germany and were to remain in force until the conclusion of a peace treaty.

13 Aug.—Berlin sector border sealed off: East Berliners need special pass to enter West Berlin, 'peaceful' citizens of West Berlin must submit identification papers when entering East Berlin, 'agents of West German militarism' forbidden to enter East Berlin, citizens of West Germany to continue to procure one-day passes after submitting their papers.

15 Aug.—Protest from three Western Commandants to Soviet Commandant in Berlin.

16 Aug.—Reply by Soviet Commandant to Western protest of 3 August stated that Kommandatura of Soviet troops did not interfere in 'the domestic affairs of the G.D.R. and its capital'. Referred to Russian Note of 26 September 1960 stating that East Germany was responsible for access to Berlin.

Mr Khrushchev's letter of 12 August to Japanese Prime Minister handed over during Mr Mikoyan's visit to Japan. Pointed out that conclusion of U.S.–Japanese security treaty and maintenance of foreign troops in Japan did not help to 'normalize' Japan–Soviet relations.

17 Aug.—U.S., British, and French Notes to Russia, protesting against the closing of the Berlin border as a 'particularly serious' violation of the quadripartite status of Berlin and of the four-Power agreement of 4 May 1949 and the four Foreign Ministers' decision in Paris on 20 June 1949, reiterating that they did not accept the boundary between East and West Berlin as a State frontier nor East Berlin as part of East Germany, nor did they admit the right of the East German Government to send armed forces into East Berlin, and observing that the recommendation of the Warsaw Treaty members to the East German Government was an intervention 'in a domain in which they have no competence'.

18 Aug.—Soviet Note rejecting Western protests and placing re-

sponsibility for inconvenience of divided Berlin on 'the occupation authorities and the Government of the Federal Republic'; reiterated that the measures taken were provisional, awaiting the conclusion of a peace treaty and the 'normalization of the situation in West Berlin'. Construction of Berlin wall begun.

Record U.S. peace-time Military Appropriations Bill ($46·7 million) signed.

19 Aug.—Extra battle group of 1,500 U.S. troops moved to Berlin from West Germany.

U.S. Vice-President Lyndon Johnson arrived in Berlin.

22 Aug.—Further restrictions on entry of West Berliners and members of Western occupation forces to East Berlin: only one crossing point left open for non-Germans, all persons to keep at a distance of 100 metres from sector border.

23 Aug.—Russian Note to Western Powers protesting against the abuse of their rights of access to Berlin; accused them of breach of 1945 agreement (under which air corridors were set aside for the use of the Western Powers 'on a temporary basis' for the supplying of their garrisons in Berlin) by carrying West German leaders to Berlin on these air routes 'for subversive and revanchist purposes of West German militarism'.

26 Aug.—U.S., British, and French Notes rejecting the suggestion that the purposes for which the Western Powers used the air corridors established by the four-Power Allied Control Council in 1945 were within the competence of the Soviet Union and stating that the Soviet Government would be held responsible for any interference with the safety of these corridors and with free access to Berlin.

Protest by Western Ambassadors to Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin against restriction to a single crossing point and against the 100-metre forbidden zone.

28 Aug.—Nuclear test talks resumed in Geneva. New Western proposals: (*a*) eleven-nation Control Commission has right to dismiss control organization administrator if either side considered him unacceptable; (*b*) personnel of inspection teams to be half Communist, half non-Communist, under chief from country to be inspected; and (*c*) to include a ban on small underground explosions below 4·75 threshold.

31 Aug.—Russian announcement of unilateral resumption of nuclear testing. **1 Sept.**—Russia resumed nuclear tests in Central Asia.

2 Sept.—Further Russian Note to Western Powers denying that latter have 'unrestricted right' of air access to West Berlin, since the agreements on which these rights are based, in particular that of 30 November 1945, referred only to use of the air corridors temporarily for supplying

the needs of the Western occupying garrisons, such agreements bein concluded during the period of occupation and before the establishmen of the sovereign German States and the ending of the occupation statute Russia therefore insisted that the Western Powers 'at present exercisin occupation functions in West Berlin' put an end to 'unlawful and pro vocative actions of the Federal German Republic in that city'.

3 Sept.—Joint statement by President Kennedy and Mr Macmilla proposing to Mr Khrushchev a voluntary ban on nuclear tests in th atmosphere.

5 Sept.—U.S. announced she would resume underground an laboratory nuclear tests. First test took place on 15 September.

7 Sept.—Communiqué issued after Conference of non-aligne countries in Belgrade,[1] 1–6 Sept., affirming belief in principles of peace ful co-existence and calling for complete disarmament and the pro hibition of nuclear tests.

8 Sept.—Mr Khrushchev's speech on Soviet–Indian friendship meet ing during Mr Nehru's visit to Moscow after the Belgrade Conference Rejected Anglo–U.S. proposal for suspension of atmospheric tests, an said Russia was ready for 'business-like' talks with President Kennedy i they would lead to a German peace treaty.

Western Notes to Russia claiming 'in most solemn terms' unrestricte rights to air corridors to Berlin.

9 Sept.—Russian Note rejecting proposal of ban on atmospheri tests and urging tackling of problem of universal and total disarmament Geneva nuclear test conference went into indefinite recession.

10 Sept.—Mr Khrushchev's speech at Stalingrad: said Russia read for negotiations but threatened Britain, France, and Italy with nuclea annihilation in the event of war; announced testing of Soviet rockets i Central Pacific area.

12 Sept.—Russian Note to Western Ambassador in Bonn stating tha all foreign citizens wishing to enter East Germany and East Berlin mus arrange this with the East German authorities.

U.S. State Department issued formal statement rejecting 'any uni lateral transfer by the Soviets of their responsibilities in Berlin to th puppet East German regime'.

13 Sept.—President Kennedy told President Keita of Mali and Presi dent Sukarno of Indonesia, during their visit in Washington followin the Belgrade Conference, that the U.S. would be ready to discuss th

[1] See 'The Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned Nations', in *The World Toda* October 1961.

German and other problems with Russia, possibly between their two Foreign Ministers at the time of the U.N. General Assembly.

14 Sept.—*Tass* announced Mr Gromyko would be ready to enter such discussions with Mr Rusk.

Two West German jet planes landed at Tegel airport in French sector of Berlin. **17 Sept.**—Russian protest against this 'gross aggressive act': threatened to destroy any West German plane straying in future. **26 Sept.**—Western reply stating that German planes lost their way, and pointing out that numerous aerial incursions by Russian planes had recently taken place over West German territory.

16 Sept.—Mr Khrushchev's letter, in reply to appeal to him and President Kennedy from Belgrade Conference, stating that a German peace treaty was inseparably bound up with the question of disarmament and that both problems could be solved simultaneously. Stated Russia was prepared for negotiations 'genuinely aimed at the fastest solution of urgent international questions'.

17 Sept.—Federal Elections in West Germany.

20 Sept.—Russian–U.S. joint statement to U.N. General Assembly (following informal bilateral discussions in Washington, Moscow, and New York in June, July, and September) on agreed principles for resumption of disarmament negotiations, though no agreement reached on composition of the negotiating body.

25 Sept.—President Kennedy's speech to the U.N. General Assembly, urging (i) a 'peace race' based on new U.S. proposals for 'general and complete disarmament', to start with the signing of a nuclear test treaty ban, and (ii) a peaceful agreement on Berlin which 'protects the freedom of West Berlin and Allied presence and access, while recognizing the historic and legitimate interest of others in assuring European security'.

U.S. programme for disarmament presented to U.N. in three-stage programme, initial stage to cover reduction in conventional armaments, halt production of material from which nuclear weapons can be made, and reduction in their means of delivery; new proposal to prohibit transfer of nuclear weapons from one nation to another.

27 Sept.—Russian memorandum to U.N. on total disarmament under eight heads, with additional memorandum to include prohibition of nuclear tests in total disarmament programme.

27–30 Sept.—Talks in New York between Mr Gromyko and Mr Rusk, and Mr Gromyko and Lord Home.

28 Sept.—Anglo–U.S. resolution put before U.N. calling for resumption of nuclear test negotiations.

17 Oct.—Mr Khrushchev's speech at 22nd Congress of the C.P.S in Moscow. Stated that he might not insist on signing a peace treaty Germany this year, since the impression gained by Mr Gromyko du his discussions in New York was that the Western Powers were show 'some understanding of the situation and were inclined to seek a solu to the German problem and the issue of West Berlin, on a mutu acceptable basis'. 'If the Western Powers show their readiness to s the German problem the limit for the signing of a German peace tr will not be so important.' He threatened to explode a 50-megaton bo at the end of the month.

U.S. appeal to Russia to stop further nuclear tests.

18 Oct.—Statement by Mr Macmillan in the House of Comm 'We cannot help concluding that the Russians wish to establish a f and irreparable division of Germany... We also accept that if we car achieve unification of Germany by peaceful means now, we cannot at same time be party to accepting as a matter of principle an impo division.' Any settlement on Berlin must be by negotiation and not unilateral imposition, 'but we must not be led too soon into too exten a negotiation, nor must we shirk discussion of wider issues than Be at the right time'. (*Hansard*, Vol. 646, No. 165, col. 308.)

U.N. Political Committee voted to consider nuclear test questi separately from the issue of total disarmament.

19 Oct.—U.S. warned the U.N. Political Committee that she wo resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere if test ban were not sig soon.

23 Oct.—East German Minister of the Interior declared that in fut all Western personnel in civilian clothes, including diplomats, must sl identification papers when entering East Berlin; this followed inciden 22 October when armed U.S. soldiers entered East Berlin for first tim escort a U.S. official stopped at Friedrichstrasse crossing point by I German police.

25 Oct.—British and U.S. tanks and infantry in battle order brou up to sector border.

26 Oct.—Russian tanks moved into centre of East Berlin.

27 Oct.—U.S. protest to Moscow about actions of the East Gern authorities in Berlin. Rejected and U.S. authorities in Berlin accuse 'provocations'. U.S. State Department issued statement welcom arrival of Russian tanks in East Berlin as 'a belated admission of responsibility of the Soviet Government for what goes on in that sect

29 Oct.—Soviet tanks withdrawn.

30 Oct.—Soviet officers stopped two U.S. military police vehi

rom patrolling the autobahn between West Berlin and West Germany.

Russian explosion of nuclear device of over 50 megatons in Arctic: wenty-sixth in series of tests.

Soviet Note to Finland calling on her under the mutual assistance reaty of 1948 to consult on defence measures against the threat of 'a nilitary attack by West Germany and allied States'; reference to Norway ind Denmark 'directly' participating in restoring and building up the nilitary potential of West Germany.

1 Nov.—West Berlin police began checking all Soviet and East European officials in civilian clothes coming into West Berlin.

2 Nov.—Statement by President Kennedy on nuclear testing. 'The J.S. does not find it necessary to explode 50-megaton nuclear devices o confirm that we have many times more nuclear power than any other ation on earth. . . In view of the Soviet action it will be the policy of the J.S. to proceed in developing nuclear weapons to maintain this superior apability for the defence of the free world.'

6 Nov.—U.N. General Assembly passed resolution calling for a noratorium on nuclear tests pending a treaty. U.S., Britain, France, and Russia voted against what the U.S. called an 'uninspected uncontrolled noratorium'.

8 Nov.—U.N. General Assembly voted by 71 to 11 in favour of immediate resumption of nuclear test negotiations.

11 Nov.—Finnish Foreign Minister arrived in Moscow for talks.

13 Nov.—U.S. and British Notes to Russia calling for resumption of nuclear test negotiations at end of month.

Federal Elections in West Germany

THE Federal Elections on 17 September marked a turning-point in post-war West Germany. Naturally, that vote only registered what had long been developing. It ended the domination of Dr Konrad Adenauer, even though he was later elected Chancellor for a fourth term. His party, Christian Democratic Union–Christian Social Union (C.D.U./C.S.U.), failed to win the absolute majority and was forced to form a coalition with the Free Democrats (F.D.P.), very largely on the latter's terms.

The electorate numbered 37,100,000. Of these 20,300,000 were women and 16,800,000 men. The proportion between the sexes did not change much from that at the previous election four years earlier, even though there were now 1,700,000 new voters. One person in ten was voting for the first time, either because he or she had come of age or because the voter was a refugee from East Germany. There were 1,521 candidates in 247 constituencies, and 1,991 further candidates on the sixty-eight state (*Land*) lists. For voting was according to two lists, the one for direct election and the other by proportional representation.

The Germans made good use of their right as citizens. The percentage of voters was as high as 87·4—higher than that in any of the previous three elections. Their support for the various parties was given as follows:

	per cent (1961)	per cent (1957)
C.D.U./C.S.U.	45·2	50·1
S.P.D.	36·3	31·8
F.D.P.	12·7	8

On this basis the new Bundestag is made up as follows:

C.D.U./C.S.U.	242 deputies	(279 in 1957)
S.P.D.	190 ,,	(170 ,, ,,)
F.D.P.	67 ,,	(42 ,, ,,)

(Women deputies number 43, as against 47 in the last Parliament.)

This makes a total of 499 (497 in 1957). To that must be added twenty-two more deputies from West Berlin. These are elected by the Senate there and have voting rights only in procedural matters in Bonn. In the previous Parliament, the Deutsche Partei (rightist) had six seats. But together with four other splinter parties it is not now represented, because it failed to win the 5 per cent of the total vote necessary for representation according to the Constitution.

These elections showed clearly that the vast majority of voters ıvoided political extremism of any sort and favoured a concentra- ıon of parties. Today there are only three parties. It may well be hat this trend will continue and reduce the number to two, if olitical and economic development is normal over the next two lecades.

The political party programmes differed from one another much ess than previously. In fact, such was their similarity that it was a ommon joke to say that the campaigners were only offering the ublic this platitude: 'What you do, we can do, but much better.' In 1957 the Government slogan was 'no experiments'. Everything was going so well economically that there was no need of change. This ime it was the same. The Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.) had ractically abandoned Marxism as the main plank in its programme it the Bad Godesberg Conference of October 1959. Its economic rogramme seemed to differ so little from the Government's that Professor Ludwig Erhard, Minister of Economics, ironically com- nented that the Socialist programme was 'mainly written by me, so I naturally consider it good. But when the German voter has before ım an original and a copy, I assume he will choose the original.'

As for foreign policy, the average elector had long realized that ıeither Government nor Opposition could have done much during he previous four years to solve the problems of Berlin and German eunification since they were matters for East–West agreement. These issues did, however, become of great importance after the West Berlin frontiers were sealed off by East German guards on 13 August.

But there was one very significant difference between the election campaign of 1957 and that of 1961. For the first time, Dr Adenauer's return as Chancellor was challenged by a strong S.P.D. candidate, Herr Willy Brandt, Lord Mayor of West Berlin. Adenauer's com- nent that had Brandt been Mayor of Bremen instead of West Berlin he would have made far less impression on the electorate contained some truth. Brandt certainly took advantage of this happy association and exploited it to the full; though it must also be said that he had been considered a strong candidate from the time he was chosen by the S.P.D. as its principal representative.

From the outset of the campaign, the issue between the old and young generations was emphasized. Dr Adenauer was rejected by many because of his age (he is eighty-five), and also because he was regarded as a hindrance to that co-operation between all parties

which was considered essential in view of the serious problems ahead in foreign policy. Dr Adenauer is an outstanding political tactician, but he made some serious mistakes during the campaign. It was for him a new phenomenon not to receive the respect due to his age and position. For the first time there was large-scale heckling at some of his election meetings. His rather cheap remarks about Herr Brandt's personal history brought protests from press and public, demanding higher standards in electioneering. The subject of Brandt's citizenship during the war was also raised by some Government speakers. It was however established that he had become Norwegian only after the Nazis had deprived him of his German citizenship on 5 September 1938. The Chancellor also made what was considered a psychological mistake in not visiting West Berlin until nine days after its frontiers were closed.

The campaign was fought on much the same lines as the presidential election in the United States. Propaganda specialists from the West German political parties had studied the methods of the Republicans and Democrats on the spot. They returned home full of ideas for applying modern advertising methods to the campaign in Germany. This partially explains why this campaign was the most expensive in German history. One reliable estimate placed the cost at DM.70 million (about £6¼ million), distributed as follows: C.D.U./C.S.U., DM.35 million; S.P.D., DM.28 million, and F.D.P., DM.7 million. All parties used radio and television services far more than before. Herr Brandt was particularly effective, although there was a tendency towards the end of the campaign for the S.P.D. to play up the personality cult a little too much.

The outstanding result of the elections, as already noted, was the failure of the Adenauer party to win the overall majority in the new Bundestag. That meant the C.D.U./C.S.U. needed an ally in order to ensure a strong workable Government. This could be achieved either through a coalition between the C.D.U./C.S.U. and the F.D.P. or by an all-party Government which also included the S.P.D. Theoretically, there was a third possibility that either of the bourgeois parties might form a coalition with the S.P.D.; but that was never seriously considered by Dr Adenauer and was decisively rejected by the F.D.P. from the outset. The only practical alternative, therefore, was a coalition between the two bourgeois parties, and even this was going to prove much more difficult than was at first imagined. In fact it took seven weeks to reach agreement between them.

Dr Adenauer was elected Chancellor for the fourth time on 7 November. The Bundestag voting was 258 for him, 206 against, and 26 abstentions. In order to win on the first ballot it was necessary for the candidate to get a simple majority of the total number of deputies. Dr Adenauer therefore needed at least 250 votes. He got eight more than the required number. (West Berlin registered nineteen votes, eight for Adenauer, ten against, and one abstention.)

As compared with the result in the first election for Chancellor in 1949, Dr Adenauer did much better this time. In 1949 he won by only one vote. There is, however, little doubt but that he would prefer the political situation of twelve years ago to that which now faces him. The C.D.U./C.S.U. and the F.D.P. produced a coalition Government after long-drawn-out negotiations in which the most outstanding fact appeared to be the strongest distrust on both sides. It is a coalition in which the Adenauer party has accepted a programme which it does not want, and the F.D.P. a Chancellor whom it had rejected throughout the election campaign and whom only some of its members were prepared to accept even after the two parties had announced their agreement.

In fact, it is generally admitted that much of the increased support for the F.D.P. in the elections came from former C.D.U. voters who wished to express in this way their desire for a new head of Government. The F.D.P.'s hands were bound. The party had made this one of its main electioneering promises, so that it was not surprising (although it was not good political tactics) to find Dr Erich Mende, chairman of the F.D.P., emphatically declaring at a press conference in Bonn two days after the election that his party would not serve under Adenauer.

There followed prolonged negotiations between the representatives of the two parties. Many times these seemed to be on the verge of breakdown. But ultimately agreement was reached early in November. Almost to the last minute, it looked as if petty intrigues and private wranglings would leave Dr Adenauer without the necessary support. At this time, the Federal President, Dr Heinrich Luebke, started consultations with the leaders of all the political parties, including the Social Democrats. Word got around that unless the negotiations then proceeding reached a satisfactory compromise very soon, he himself would take a hand in Government-building. The President has few powers under the Federal Constitution. But here is a case where he can have something definite to say. For it is he who must present to the Bundestag the name of the

new Chancellor; and he could refuse to nominate anyone who in his view had not sufficient support among the parties to be able to form an effective Government. At one time there was the possibility that the President might accept an all-party Government. This was something which the Free Democrats wished to avoid at all costs, and it undoubtedly hastened the compromise that was eventually reached.

In the final agreement between the C.D.U./C.S.U. and the F.D.P., the latter made an important concession in accepting Dr Adenauer as Chancellor; but his party was compelled to accept without alteration, or addition, the programme which the F.D.P. had presented on 20 October.

Dr Adenauer scored a victory in that he retained the Chancellorship. But, if the agreement of 20 October means anything, he is now bound by conditions which the F.D.P. have forced upon him. It had, for example, been reported before the election that Dr Adenauer would not continue in office throughout the next four-year period. But only in this agreement did the world come to know that he had already stated this in a declaration to his own party on 17 October and the F.D.P. now bound him to it.

Dr Adenauer has also lost a great deal of prestige, and his reputation as a great political tactician has suffered tremendously. He was forced by the F.D.P. to accept the resignation of his Foreign Minister, Dr Heinrich von Brentano. This, or the appointment of one of its own deputies as a Minister of State in the Foreign Office, had been a demand of the F.D.P. Actually, however, that party was not so much seeking to oust Dr von Brentano as to show its resentment at the Chancellor's personal conduct of foreign policy. Dr von Brentano by his resignation made what was probably one of the most popular decisions in his whole political career. The Chancellor's very cool and all-too-quick acceptance of that resignation was sharply criticized, as was his invitation to Professor Hallstein to resign from the Presidency of the European Common Market and take over Dr von Brentano's position.

The F.D.P.'s 48-point programme, as published in the press,[1] made some far-reaching demands which it was surprising to find the C.D.U./C.S.U. accept so easily, especially since the F.D.P. is a comparatively small partner, even though it is essential to give the new coalition a majority in the Bundestag. In foreign policy, the programme supports the French idea of a 'Europe of the Father-

[1] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 November 1961.

lands', wants Britain in the European Common Market, and wants the Federal Republic to have much greater influence in the N.A.T.O. command structure and in the decision regarding the use of nuclear weapons by the Bundeswehr. As for Berlin and German reunification, the programme follows the Government line, though the F.D.P. had been thought to favour a more flexible policy towards negotiations with the East European Communist bloc. In social and economic matters, a non-socialist policy is precisely laid down, and, true to its long-standing policy, the F.D.P. seeks guarantees of improved status for former Nazis and members of the SS (Hitler's Black Shirts).

The new Cabinet consists of twenty ministers, five of whom belong to the F.D.P. (those in charge of Justice, Finance, Refugees, the Federal Treasury, and Economic Co-operation). For the first time a woman is included, Frau Elizabeth Schwarzhaupt (C.D.U.), as Minister for Public Health. The personal change in the new Cabinet which is of greatest interest abroad is at the Foreign Office, where Dr von Brentano is replaced by Dr Gerhard Schroeder, formerly Minister of the Interior. The Chancellor will continue to dominate foreign policy, but the fact that he does not intend to continue in office throughout the four-year period[1] means that Dr Schroeder will gradually be able to strengthen his own position. The Minister of Defence continues to be Dr Franz Joseph Strauss, who also became Chairman of the Bavarian C.S U. some months ago.

The new Government was received with indifference, not to say scepticism and hostility, by both press and public in West Germany. The atmosphere of distrust and intrigue surrounding the discussions on the coalition have raised doubts whether it can effectively operate throughout the coming four-year period. It is regretted that there should be such a weak Government at a time when the Federal Republic and the Western Allies need all their concentrated strength to deal with the international situation.

Few people expect from it any greater flexibility in dealing with the Berlin and German problems, though there is a general realization that the present situation demands far closer co-operation between all political parties. The Opposition, the S.P.D., has long ago stated its willingness for a joint foreign policy. But one of its con-

[1] In letters to the Chairmen of the C.D.U./C S.U. and the F D.P, Dr Adenauer stated that he would retire 'in good time' to enable his successor to prepare for the next Federal Election in 1965 (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 9 November 1961). This is generally assumed to mean that he will leave voluntarily some time in 1963

ditions is that it should be kept better informed as to what is being deliberated, and not asked merely to approve ready-made decisions. The justice of this demand has been admitted by the other two parties, if for no other reason than that they, too, have not been officially informed except to the extent that the Chancellor decided to take them into his confidence. In this respect an improvement is therefore to be expected. The Opposition has kept itself apart from the coalition negotiations, and by a prudent silence the S.P.D. has enhanced its reputation among the public, and has shown that it is gradually evolving from a class party into a national party.

Few political reputations have not been tarnished among those who were responsible for the conduct of the negotiations on the coalition. Dr Adenauer was found to have failed as a political tactician and to have been willing, according to many critics, to sacrifice even party interests for the sake of holding on to office

'It is tragic that the outstanding figure in the Federal Republic should be entering his last term of office with reduced authority', according to one press comment.[1] But the writer went on to add that it was of almost greater concern to the nation that other politicians who had participated in the unhappy negotiations on the coalition, and whom the country hoped to call upon in the future, had also suffered a great loss of prestige. 'Adenauer's pyrrhic victory also owed much to a lack of civil courage on the part of other prominent politicians who had failed to stand up to him throughout previous years. The election marked an end of "chancellor democracy", but it is far from clear what will succeed it.'[2] That is the general view in the Federal Republic today. It raises for some people the old question as to how far this people has advanced along the road to parliamentary democracy. But the vast majority now seem convinced that with all its weaknesses this is the system which must still be followed.

J. EMLYN WILLIAMS

[1] Hans Katzer of the C.D U left wing
[2] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 November 1961.

Communists in Congress

The 22nd Meeting in Moscow

IT was expected that the central feature of the 22nd C.P.S.U. Congress which opened in Moscow on 15 October would be the adoption of the new Party programme, the blueprint for the Communist society published in draft at the end of July and subsequently acclaimed and eulogized in countless articles in the Soviet press. As it turned out, the flash of nuclear explosions, the bitter attacks on Mr Khrushchev's opponents inside and outside the U.S.S.R., and the unsavoury spectacle of the resumed post-mortem on Stalin and the removal of his corpse from the Lenin mausoleum overshadowed the glamorous vision of the Communist future.

The adoption of the programme was, in any case, a foregone conclusion. That its account of Soviet history and the operation of the Soviet political system cannot be squared either with the facts as known or with those that emerged from the speeches made from the platform is only of incidental interest. Programmes look to the future, not the past. What is surprising about it is the inflated platitudes, the tedious repetitiveness, and the absence of any solid theoretical content in the text.[1]

There is, of course, bound to be a certain sameness in all portraits of the golden age, past or to come, in which the illusion of human perfectibility is given an outline. Twenty years on, Mr Khrushchev said, the Russians would in the main have built a Communist society, in which man, living in material plenty, would 'harmoniously combine ideological integrity, broad education, ethical purity, and physical perfection' (but meanwhile the death penalty has to be imposed for minor economic offences). And, as an example of tautology masquerading as definition, one could take the assertion in the programme that 'harmony of the individual and society' would be achieved by 'an organic blending of personal and social interests'. There is no real attempt to come to grips with what is for Communists a cardinal question of the colonial revolution, the position of the 'national bourgeoisie', a concept that has haunted Communist theoreticians from the start and whose characteristics still perplex them; beyond a few familiar phrases that can be found

[1] The sections of the programme concerned with the national economy will be dealt with in a subsequent issue of *The World Today*. All quotations in this article are taken, unless otherwise stated, from the reports of the Congress given in *Soviet News*, published by the Soviet Embassy in London

in any Communist programmatic statement over the last forty years there is no analysis. Nor is there any discussion, for all the ranting about imperialism, of an equally hoary shibboleth, the use of the 'surplus profits of imperialism' to 'corrupt the upper strata of the working class', so creating a 'labour aristocracy', which explains the persistence of reformist instead of revolutionary sentiments among the working people of the metropolitan countries.

The old theory of the 'super-profits of imperialism' can no longer serve; the crumbling of empires, the successes of the anti-colonial movement, the emergence of new independent States, all of which Mr Khrushchev welcomed, demand a new explanation. By implication, this is provided in part in the profits made from assistance to under-developed countries. In one passage Mr Khrushchev dismissed this aid as 'a mere handful of dollars', but in any case it was only 'a fraction of the tremendous sums it extracts' from them Every dollar invested brought in a profit of two to three dollars. Altogether, the total profits came to $20,000 million.

As to politics in the narrower sense of the word, the theoreticians have at least been given clear instructions about the terms they are henceforward to use. At home the proletarian dictatorship is at an end; its function was to establish socialism and that has now been done; its place is taken by 'the State of the whole people', which is 'an all-important phase on the road from socialist statehood to Communist public self-government'. Since even the least well-trained Marxist knows—or at any rate should know—that the existence of a 'State' in a society where there are no antagonistic classes is a contradiction in terms, Mr Khrushchev had to explain that the State was retained because many tasks remain which can be solved only with the aid of the State. In the end, of course, it would wither away. Meanwhile, the Communist Party itself would grow stronger, permeating every nook and cranny of Soviet life.

Introducing the programme, Mr Khrushchev asked: 'What has capitalism given mankind?' He could of course have found the answer easily enough by reference to the works of Marx and Lenin, whose entire theory of revolution was based on the recognition that capitalism had created or would create the productive resources and the wealth which in the end would make it possible to dispense with the capitalist entrepreneurs themselves. The function of capitalism, they reasoned, was to prepare the ground for socialism. But Mr Khrushchev is concerned only with painting a hobgoblin portrait. There were endless gibes at the 'wretched handful of millionaires

and multi-millionaires' who control all the wealth and who see war as a source of profit. The welfare State meant 'suffering and torture for hundreds of millions of working men', the welfare itself being reserved for 'the magnates of finance capital'. Under their rule, the capitalist monopolies were 'intensifying the exploitation of the working class' and 'robbing the worker of his daily bread'; the 'standard of living is dropping' and 'the condition of the working class in the capitalist world is, on the whole, deteriorating'.

These assessments have been made in every major Communist statement since 1919, the year when the previous programme was adopted. That, despite this steady deterioration in their living standards over the past forty-odd years, these oppressed workers still have, as Mr Khrushchev admitted, a higher standard of living than the population of the U.S.S.R. implies a contradiction which none of the speakers at the Congress cared to analyse.

But it was in the part of the picture showing the West as thirsting for war that the paint was laid on thickest. 'The imperialists continue their attempts to aggravate the international situation and to lead the world to the brink of war', and this made it necessary for the U.S.S.R. to increase its defence expenditure 'and resume tests of new and more powerful weapons'. This was 'a sacred duty' forced on Moscow 'by the insane plans of the imperialist countries for the liquidation of the Soviet Union through war'. Since 1956 the official Soviet Communist Party line has been that war can be avoided, that the forces of the 'peace camp' are now strong enough to deter aggression, that the threat of annihilation makes the war-mongers pause. Imperialism was still strong, and found the successes of the Communist camp less and less tolerable, but 'the handful of millionaires' realized that war would involve their own destruction. It would seem therefore that he was contradicting himself in presenting them as avid for war, that is, bent on suicide; but Mr Khrushchev wants to have his cake and eat it. Did he expect his audience to be shocked by the assertion that the West 'maintains immense armed forces even in peacetime', when Marshal Malinovski's statement that all Soviet rocket forces were 'constantly on combat duty' was greeted by the Congress with applause? ('Soviet bombs good, American bombs bad.') True, the Marshal justified this on the ground of his 'realistic assessment' that the West was preparing 'a surprise nuclear attack on the U.S.S.R.'. Part of these preparations, apparently, consisted in the activities of Mr Kennedy's Peace Corps, which Mr Mukhitdinov described as an organization

for 'espionage, sabotage, and war'. Mr Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, saw 'little if any' difference between Adenauer's policy and Hitler's. Mr Shelepin, head of the State Security Committee, called on the Soviet people to display vigilance against spies cloaked as tourists.

There is, of course, more than this pseudo-Marxist and repetitive bombast to the programme Mr Khrushchev was introducing. For the nearly 5,000 delegates who attended, and for the millions in the U.S.S.R. who read their newspapers, there is pride and satisfaction in what has been achieved, and the confidence that better times lie ahead. The slogan of 'overtaking and surpassing the United States' was launched in 1928, and it is still the goal they set themselves, although it is only a few years since Mr Khrushchev promised that the Soviet Union would by 1961 outstrip America in *per capita* consumption of meat and dairy products (nobody reminded him of this), whereas the Congress underlined the failure of agriculture to reach its targets. ('Every figure of ours,' Mr Khrushchev said at the end of his speech on the programme, 'is computed and proved', though he did not explain how a figure relating to the 1980s could be 'proved', and he opportunely forgot the enormous discrepancies revealed by the recent exposure of 'cooked' production figures.) It might be deflating to hear Mr Khrushchev say, in reply to a proposal that night work for women should be abolished, that this was 'a big problem' which 'would take time'. The Russians may not know that children's allowances, university scholarships, free public health services, etc. were not invented by the C.P S.U. and are not exclusive to the U.S.S.R. The housing programme is certainly substantial, though in this respect their expectations are probably not very high. Not long ago a delegation of Soviet housing and town-planning experts visiting this country were shown over a new town 'And where,' they asked at the end, 'where do the workers live?' Nor can the Russian people be taken in by the promise that in their own lifetime there will be 'distribution according to need'—the classic definition of the state of affairs under Communism. The determination of who needs what, under the new concept of 'Communist consumption', will still be the province of the authorities. The abolition of taxes, it is claimed, will help to raise the standard of living; but since only half of earnings are to be paid out in cash—the other half to be received in the form of free social services—what is promised is tantamount in fact to a flat 50 per cent tax on all earnings—or is there another source besides 'the product

of labour' to cover the expenditure on services now met by taxation?

A detailed analysis of the programme on these lines would reveal many more inconsistencies, and even more platitudes, but it would not alter the fact that the country's industrial growth is very impressive, and that the standard of living in the U.S.S.R. has risen and will continue to rise. This may have been, understandably enough, the subject of most concern to the population at large, but it was not this which captured the attention of the delegates to the Congress or the world outside.

Three issues were involved in the controversies which broke out on the first day of the Congress—the 'Stalin personality cult', the 'anti-party group' (i.e. those senior members of the C.P.S U. who were disgraced and demoted in 1957), and the position of Albania within the Communist bloc—and these issues eventually became closely linked as the Congress took its course. It is nearly six years since Mr Khrushchev began to expose Stalin's misdeeds (his 1956 speech was not published in the U.S.S.R., though secretly it was widely circulated). At that time the C.P.S.U. central committee presented a united front—there was no outward sign that the decision to embark on de-stalinization was anything but unanimous. Now we learn that there had from the start been opposition to the decision. 'The central committee,' said Mr Khrushchev in his opening speech, 'decided to tell the truth about the abuses of power perpetrated at the time of the cult of the individual' (i.e. under Stalin), but this policy had 'to be carried out in the face of fierce resistance from anti-party elements, from zealous adherents of the methods and practices prevailing at the time of the cult of the individual'. It was opposed by 'a factional anti-party group consisting of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov, and Shepilov, who later joined them'.

Mr Khrushchev divided the group into two categories—the first four named were 'personally responsible for many instances of wholesale repression' and feared to have their misdeeds brought to light; they were joined by the others when Mr Khrushchev made his proposals about developing the virgin lands, reorganizing the national economy, and other administrative changes. Together, they had engaged in 'anti-party subversion' and 'clandestine and factionalist' activities. They had gained a majority on the central committee presidium (or, as one speaker ingenuously put it, 'an arithmetical majority'), but were defeated as a result of Mr Khrushchev's counter-measures at the central committee plenum in June

1957. Some of the crimes in which they 'feared that their role as accessories' would come to light were then listed.

Mass reprisals, Mr Khrushchev said, began after Kirov's assassination in December 1934: he made it clear that the assassination itself was a put-up job—Kirov's bodyguard had been removed at the time, and later killed, and his death was followed by the execution of the men who had been bringing him to Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov for questioning (the story recalls nothing so much as a gangster film of the 'thirties). 'Thousands of absolutely innocent people perished' (here Mr Khrushchev mentioned Marshal Tukhachevski and the generals shot in 1937). Many confessed to crimes with which they were not even charged, in order to put an end to the torture and die quickly.

The speakers who followed Mr Khrushchev added their quota of horrors told and retold. Individual members of the group were charged with personal responsibility for torture, with signing and approving death warrants for innocent people. But none of the speakers asked: How did it happen? How *could* it have happened in an omniscient party that justifies its monopoly of power by claiming to represent the vanguard of the proletariat (in a proletarian dictatorship), to be the only true spokesman of the interests of the working class, to have in its possession an infallible scientific guide to action which precludes error, and which exercises that power in a country held up as a moral example to the rest of the world? This infallible party, which Lenin warned against Stalin in 1922, ignored the advice for thirty years, and then calls the decision to accept it 'courageous' when Stalin is long dead. For Mr Khrushchev personally the decision was certainly a courageous one, though no member of his audience asked 'What were you doing at the time?' What guarantees can he offer that similar 'distortions of the Leninist line' will not reappear? Mr Khrushchev said in a later speech that a leader who forgot that he held his authority by the will of the Party and the people 'pays dearly for such mistakes'. But it was not Stalin who paid; true, in death he is dishonoured, and a monument is to be erected to the memory of his victims. The new programme and rules, Stalin's successor told his audience, 'preclude the possibility of a revival of the personality cult'. What was there, one may legitimately ask, in the programme and rules of which Lenin approved which did make it possible?

Granted the extreme improbability of a repetition of the monstrous crimes condemned in 1956 and again in 1961, and allowing

r the mellowing influence on rulers and ruled of the 'better life', pride in achievement and confidence in the future, the very virunce of the attack on the anti-party group, the refusal to give them a :aring, the sycophantic repetition from the floor of the phrases unched from the platform, and the unanimity with which every solution was acclaimed and passed, recall nothing so much as the ·ocedures made familiar by earlier C.P.S.U. Congresses domiited by Stalin's personality, and are bound to raise doubts about e Party's invulnerability to the 'cult' and its consequences.

What, in fact, lies behind this unexpected revival of an issue hich appeared to have been settled in 1957? Ageing, defeated, and scredited, the leaders of the group were badly placed to challenge [r Khrushchev personally or to organize (from Ulan Bator or ienna?) opposition to his policies, though the fact that the issue as raised suggests some support for them inside the C.P.S.U. or ie country at large, but support which Mr Khrushchev knows he in cope with. For all his statement that 'the central committee ould not possibly take the line of concealing or hushing-up past rors and distortions', there is more to it than that. The fields for eculation opened up are boundless. Is there a group within the .P.S.U. which supports Chairman Mao rather than Premier hrushchev, and how strong is it? Is Mr Khrushchev, by attacking is ex-colleagues, making another attempt to exonerate himself om all responsibility for the evils which he denounced and so to ear the slate? And if so, does this mean that there is genuine presire from below to set the record straight, to proclaim out loud what is so far been whispered, so that the revelation of the full horror of ie picture and its condemnation will discourage any copyist? Or— nce the younger members of the group did not occupy high posts the time—is there strong opposition to Mr Khrushchev's omestic policies, and the attack a warning to potential antagonists? oes the attack signify no more than a struggle for undivided and ndisputed power such as followed Lenin's death, and which, it :ems, is ineradicable in a society where there is no clear dividing ne between dissent and treason, and where the existence of sacred xts and the belief in a single, scientifically correct policy dictated y history itself necessitate the existence of a supreme authority to iterpret them?

Mr Shelepin (whose position gives him expert knowledge) said ie group represented no danger; they were 'political corpses'. 'heir exposure only 'strengthens the people's confidence that the

grave abuses during the period of the personality cult will never be repeated'.

It was in the speech made by Mr Mikoyan, first deputy Premier, that hints of wider implication were given. To the charges of sadism and degeneracy laid at the door of the group, he added, to Mr Molotov's particular account, his 'rejection of the policy of peaceful co-existence' which for him was a 'variant of the cold war'. Molotov's conception of international affairs was 'tantamount to actually recognizing the inevitability of war', and it is probably on foreign policy issues that the attack on the anti-party group merges into the dispute with Albania and, still in the background though more clearly visible than before, and much more important, with China.

Like the attack on Molotov and company, the attack on the Albanian Communist leaders was opened by Mr Khrushchev in his first speech. How far this was expected by the Albanians themselves is not known; they were not invited to the Congress, but sent a message of greeting which said that there was 'no force in the world' which could separate the Albanian Communist Party and people from the Communist Party and peoples of the Soviet Union.

The de-stalinization policy adopted in 1956 was, Mr Khrushchev said, 'applauded by the world Communist movement and by the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties', but it later transpired that it did not 'meet with due understanding from the leaders of the Albanian party' who began to oppose it, 'and have set out to seriously worsen their relations with our Party, with our country. . . This stand of the Albanian leaders is due to the fact that, to our deep regret, they are themselves using the same methods as were current in our country at the time of the cult of the individual.' The Albanian people, as a whole, he added, 'has to pay for the erroneous policy of the Albanian leaders'.

The first foreign delegate to speak was Mr Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier. He neither condemned nor excused the Albanians, but deplored the fact that the dispute had been made public. Mr Chou said that the socialist camp stretched from Korea to Germany, and from Vietnam to the People's Republic of Albania, an indivisible unit, in which the parties and countries supported each other on the basis of complete independence and equality. 'We must unite as closely as possible, guard our unity as the apple of our eye, and not tolerate any pronouncements or actions which harm this unity. Should disputes unfortunately arise between the fraternal

›arties and countries they must be patiently resolved, in the spirit ›f proletarian internationalism, the principles of equality, and dentity of views achieved by consultation. Open one-sided con-lemnation of a fraternal party does not promote unity, does not help o solve a problem' (*Pravda*, 20 October 1961).

This unusually sharp criticism was clearly an invitation to the Soviet leader to refrain from further attack, but Mr Khrushchev ıad no doubt anticipated Chinese hostility to this section of his peech. The policy laid down in 1956, he said, was a Leninist one, and we cannot make a concession on this fundamental point either o the Albanian leaders or to anyone else'. Nor did the Chinese inter-vention put an end to public discussion of the rift. Mr Mikoyan, peaking after Mr Chou, informed the Congress that the Albanian eaders were expelling those who wished to uphold Albanian-Soviet friendship, and Mr Kosygin, like Mikoyan a deputy Premier, aid that Albania was 'practically closed to the Soviet press and iterature'. Mr Brezhnev, the colourless Soviet President, viewed Albanian actions 'with anxiety and alarm'. The only way to prevent fatal developments' was for the leaders to return 'to the positions of internationalism'. Internationalism, it should be noted, is the ccepted phrase for submission to Soviet leadership, whereas ıationalism, according to Mr Khrushchev, 'whatever disguise it nay don, is the most dangerous political and ideological weapon mployed by international reaction to undermine the unity of the Socialist countries'. In his winding-up speech Mr Khrushchev re-erred again to the repeated attempts made by the Soviet central ommittee to thrash out their differences with the Albanians, but he latter had indulged in 'unbridled anti-Soviet calumny'—Messrs Hoxha and Shehu had 'perpetrated bloody atrocities' against loyal Albanian Communists.

It is more than thirteen years since the Yugoslav Communist eaders were charged with the heresy of nationalism and their party xpelled from the fold; Yugoslavia is now said to be the embodi-nent of 'revisionism', while Albania is the home *par excellence* of dogmatism'. Marshal Tito cannot fail to have some sympathy for he independence shown by a small country towards its powerful ›atron; on the other hand, he is bound to approve of the demolition ›f the personality cult, and—far more important—to welcome the liscomfiture of Albania, which has been persistently and bitterly ıostile to his country since the break occurred in 1948.

Not that, with Chinese backing, Albanian defiance of Moscow is

as heroic as it might otherwise appear. And China may not be th only ally. The repetitive ritual of Communist assemblies, whateve the underlying differences, is now established and recognized as sacred convention, and there is significance in any departure fron it. The spokesmen of the Communist parties of North Vietnam North Korea, Japan, Indonesia, and India, who brought greeting to the Congress, refrained from mentioning Albania at all. Such line-up may be partly geopolitical rather than political, and it ma be an index to the position of Outer Mongolia between its gian Communist neighbours that Mr Tsendenbal toed the Soviet line There were, even so, differences of emphasis; the Korean delegate clearly unhappy at having to make a choice, took out re-insurance b stating that unity with the C.P.S.U. and 'the principle of pro letarian internationalism' was the duty of all Communists of al countries. For his part, Mr Chou proclaimed Sino-Soviet friend ship 'lasting and unbreakable'; like the other speakers who did no condemn Albania, he referred to the 'unity of the camp' in terms o the 1957 and 1960 declarations.

There has been no ambiguity in the Albanian response. A state ment by the Albanian central committee broadcast on 21 Octobe accused Mr Khrushchev of 'brutal violation of the 1960 Moscov declaration', of 'serving the enemies of communism', of 'anti Marxism' (*New York Times*, 22 October). Stalin's name and deeds said Radio Tirana, 'will live for centuries'. He had been 'able courageous, and ever loyal to Marxism-Leninism' (*The Times* 22 October). A later broadcast referred to Mr Khrushchev's 'in trigues and provocations' (*The Times*, 4 November).

On 7 November General Hoxha made a full-dress statement Aggressive imperialist wars could be averted, but not by relying or the good intentions of imperialist leaders; they had to rely on 'th immense economic, political, and military force of the mighty socialist camp', on international working-class unity in the struggl against the imperialist instigators of war. 'Instead of following thi correct path, N. Khrushchev seeks to disarm a socialist country lik Albania, surrounded on all sides by enemies... We are not oppose to the principle of peaceful co-existence. But we do not agree wit some of the opportunist views of N. Khrushchev and his follower who... in the name of peaceful co-existence abandon the struggl for the denunciation of imperialism.' General Hoxha traced th course of the dispute back to June 1960, criticized some of th features of the new C.P.S.U. programme, and went on: 'It is no

our Party but the Soviet leadership that has deviated from the positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism in trying to impose its own policy on other Parties.' Mr Khrushchev had said that terror and injustice reigned in Albania: 'his sinister motives are revealed by the fact that he stooped so low as to mobilize public opinion against our Party by using arguments borrowed from the most hardened enemies of socialism and communism.' The Albanian leader paid high tribute to Stalin's theoretical and practical work, whereas Mr Khrushchev had 'done imperialism a service by representing it as having been rendered harmless to the socialist countries'. He had used the Stalin question 'to intimidate and, in the event of resistance, even liquidate anyone daring to oppose him; to impose silence on the other Parties and the various leaders who do not support his revisionist views'. The Soviet leaders were 'not shrinking from the most brutal pressure, blackmail and attacks on the fraternal parties and their leaders' who did not agree with them. 'Thus in the economic sphere all loans granted by the U.S.S.R. to our country... were cut, with the aim of sabotaging the economic plan of our country; without any reason, all the Soviet specialists working in Albania, whom our economy greatly needed, were withdrawn. . . Economic pressures were, moreover, accompanied by pressures and restrictive measures in the military sphere' (*The Observer*, 12 November). However, General Hoxha has not yet taken the decisive step of publishing the documents which would reveal the substance of these charges, as he has threatened to do. The revelation of intervention and intimidation would scarcely enhance Soviet prestige among the non-aligned countries which Moscow is so sedulously wooing.

The Soviet speakers linked the Albanians to the anti-party group in terms of their common opposition to de-stalinization, and the attack on Molotov and company, from this point of view, can be seen as a warning addressed to other waverers in the bloc who might be encouraged to follow General Hoxha's example if Mr Khrushchev fails to change Albanian policy. His writ does not run in Tirana, still less in Peking; to have gone as far as this towards a public break, which is bound to lower the prestige of the entire bloc, suggests that Soviet-Chinese differences on questions of foreign policy have now reached an acute stage. The emphasis, particularly marked in Mr Mikoyan's speech, on Molotov's errors in regard to peace and war was unquestionably intended also for the Chinese, who are known to share his views. In his last speech Mr

Khrushchev referred to Mr Chou's concern about airing the Albanian question in public: 'If the Chinese comrades wish to make efforts towards normalizing relations between the Albanian party and the fraternal parties, there is hardly anyone who could contribute more to the solution of this problem than the Communist Party of China.' By that time Mr Chou was back in China, having left the Congress a week before it closed to attend a meeting of the Chinese National People's Congress.

Nevertheless, almost in the same breath, Mr Khrushchev cheerfully stated that 'the socialist camp has again demonstrated the monolithic unity of its ranks.' Defied by the smallest member of the camp, and at loggerheads with the largest, Mr Khrushchev appears to have gone too far to retreat, however grave the consequences, for, in the camp as in his own country, there can be only one arbiter when vital issues are at stake. Communism may be polycentric in regard to the number of roads to socialism, but history, for Leninists, can move in one direction only.

Mr Chou's attempt to sidestep the dilemma did not come off. For the Chinese to have abandoned the Albanians would have involved them in an admission of serious ideological error; to continue to champion them, with the implication of hostility to the C.P S U., would also have serious consequences. Apart from the Albanian question, Soviet disagreements with China did not come to the surface. There was an unmistakable pointer to Peking when Mr Khrushchev said that 'some people attack us by accusing us of simplifying or softening the appraisal of the international situation when we stress the need for peaceful coexistence in the existing conditions. We are told that those who put the emphasis on peaceful coexistence underestimate the essence of imperialism in some way, and even contradict Lenin's appraisal of imperialism.' At another point in his speech he declared that 'the fact that it has been possible to prevent war . . . must be regarded as the chief outcome of the activities of our party.'

It is of course undeniable that, according to Lenin's own writings, peaceful coexistence with imperialism is impossible; all that could be hoped for was intervals, breathing spells in which forces could be gathered for the inevitable conflict. Mr Khrushchev is unwilling to allow anyone to outdo him as a true Leninist, but he thought his hearers should 'take into consideration the big changes which have taken place' since Lenin tackled this question. Imperialism had not changed, but only 'hopeless dogmatists' like Molotov failed to

understand that the balance of forces had changed. If the imperialists had understood that any attempt to start a war would be the end of capitalism, why could not the dogmatists also bring themselves up to date? Pospelov, head of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, attributed to Molotov the belief that 'it is precisely by war that we should win hundreds of millions of people over to Communism. Yet this is precisely what our opponents impute to us. This is precisely "the big lie" of imperialist propaganda.' It was 'putrid, anti-Leninist, factional'.

The Chinese reaction to the events at the Congress was slower than the Albanian, but enough has been said to show that there is little immediate prospect of the breach being healed. Since the Congress closed, the Chinese have continued to support General Hoxha, while not ignoring the importance of solidarity with the U.S S.R. (though Party, as distinct from State, relations are clearly too delicate to be mentioned in public). At the customary Soviet Embassy reception in Peking to celebrate the anniversary of the Russian revolution, the Chinese Foreign Minister said that the Chinese 'have always taken it as their loftiest internationalist duty to safeguard and strengthen the unity of the Chinese and Soviet peoples'. They would spare no effort, in the future as in the past, 'to safeguard and strengthen this unity'. 'The twelve fraternal countries [i.e. including Albania] forming a big socialist family have the same destiny.' The Soviet Ambassador, replying, asserted that 'No force will be able to shake the eternal indissoluble friendship of our peoples.'

On the same day the Chinese central committee sent to the central committee of the Albanian party its 'warmest fraternal greetings'. The Albanian party was 'a militant Marxist-Leninist party' with a 'correct leadership'. The Chinese Communists and people 'admire from the bottom of their hearts the heroic and revolutionary spirit' of the Albanian party and people. The editorial in the Peking *People's Daily* said that the Albanian party, 'headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha, the long-tested leader of the Albanian people . . . has always been loyal to Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism. . . It has resolutely safeguarded unity with the Soviet people and the people of the other socialist countries.' Friendship and unity between China and Albania would 'grow steadily in our common struggle for our common cause. . . Their close unity can be shaken by no force on earth' (*New China News Agency*, 8 November).

In 1956, Mr Khrushchev took an immense risk in starting t
anti-Stalin drive, and at one moment the repercussions threaten
to disrupt the entire Soviet bloc. He has gambled again, and t
further repercussions, at home and abroad, will be awaited wi
interest.

JANE DEGRAS

The Commonwealth and the Common Market

THE subtle change that has already begun to occur in the relatio
ship between Britain and the Commonwealth, as a result of t
British approach to the Common Market, became apparent on t
very first day of the formal negotiations, when Mr Edward Hea
presented Britain's case to the Six in Paris on 10 October. M
Heath's statement was not shown to any of the Commonweal
Governments either before or after it was delivered. There is
doubt that they wanted to know what was in it, and some of the
have been trying to obtain copies of what he said from the Europe
Ministers and officials to whom he spoke. The whole incident ha
predictably, left a feeling of chagrin in the Commonwealth, and it
improbable that Britain would have acted in this way if it had n
been felt that some major issue of principle was involved. It was n
that Mr Heath's statement contained anything especially secr
which had to be kept hidden from the Commonwealth countrie
They will, in any case, get to know the contents from the Europe
Governments with whom they are negotiating about their ov
future.

The principle that Britain has asserted by her gesture is that t
negotiation with the European Common Market, which has no
started in earnest in Brussels, is one in which the British Gover
ment must have complete freedom of manœuvre. It is plainly goi
to be a gruelling operation and the team of British negotiators w
determined to go into it carrying as little baggage as possib
In particular it wished to avoid the cumbersome device of tv
parallel full-dress negotiations, one with the Commonwealth

London and the other with the Common Market in Brussels, proceeding at the same time. Some of the Commonwealth countries had hoped that this type of arrangement, with the British negotiators referring contentious points to the Commonwealth directly for discussion as they arose with the Common Market, would be followed in the same way as it was in the earlier negotiations with E.F.T.A. (the Seven). Instead Britain has, it seems, been encouraging the Commonwealth Governments to equip themselves with powerful representation in Brussels itself, and to act independently of Britain in defence of their own interests. It would not be surprising if it suited Whitehall's book at the moment for the Six to become aware that the Commonwealth Governments were seeking information from *them* about Britain's exact negotiating position on this or that issue. At any rate, the last thing that is wanted is that Britain should appear portentously at the negotiating table as the leader of a rival bloc of nations in the Commonwealth. The view in London is rather that it will only be possible to conduct a speedy and successful negotiation with the Six if Britain presents herself as 'just another European country', seeking adherence to the Rome Treaty and trying to obtain sympathetic treatment for a lot of overseas territories to whom she has a number of special obligations which cannot and should not, in Europe's interest too, be broken.

The approach, in other words, is to suggest that Britain's problems in 1961 are parallel with those which France presented to the European Common Market in 1957 when she asked for special treatment for her colonies and ex-colonies. The only important difference, it is argued, is that Britain's imperial and ex-imperial baggage-train is bigger than the French. But that should not, in the British view, prevent the Commonwealth countries from claiming and obtaining some of the rights and privileges that have been freely accorded to the Associated Overseas Territories of the Six. The difficulty so far has been that the Commonwealth countries themselves have appeared to be quite indifferent to the advantages that they might gain from the adoption of this course. Indeed their initial response to the British suggestion, made at the Accra Conference of Commonwealth Finance Ministers in September, that they should apply to the Common Market for A.O.T. status was sharply hostile. Ghana, in particular, rejected the idea with passionate indignation. The whole scheme was treated as a shabby neo-colonialist trick.

More recently there have been signs that some of the Common-

wealth countries—though not Ghana—are beginning to think again. It is indeed obvious that a country such as India could use the A.O.T. principle as a device for opening the door a little to her exports of cheap manufactured goods, which are likely to be searching with increasing eagerness for export outlets during the next decade. Plainly there is little prospect that Indian exporters will be given a free run of an enlarged European Common Market on the same terms as it has been offered to the essentially primary producing countries of French Africa. But India might reasonably expect some European concessions to her trading needs if she formally put in a claim as an A.O.T. No doubt, to do so after all the oratory at Accra will prove politically difficult. But it should be possible to find some formula in the end which will be free from the verbal taint of neo-colonialism.

India and the more advanced members of the Commonwealth are an unfamiliar problem for the Common Market and cannot be made to fit into any of its ready-made categories. It is the Commonwealth countries in Africa which, on the face of it, stand to gain most directly from the acquisition of A.O.T. status—or at any rate to avoid the damage that they would otherwise suffer as a result of European tariff preferences on commodities such as cocoa given to the French West African territories and not to them. These preferences might well have the effect over the years of building up new sources of production in Africa to add to the existing burdensome surpluses of such commodities.

It would perhaps be easier to convince the African Commonwealth countries of the wisdom of applying to become Associated Overseas Territories of the European Common Market, if the meaning of A.O.T. status were more precisely defined. At the moment it is particularly difficult to do this because the whole question of the future of the European Economic Community's relationship with its overseas territories is in the melting-pot. The existing arrangements date back to 1958 and were laid down in a convention which was to run for five years only. A fresh agreement has to be worked out to replace it in 1962.[1] The European Common Market is now in fact beginning to feel its way towards a new policy on this subject. Some indication of the way in which its ideas are moving emerged at an international conference of experts in Bari, which was

[1] See 'The European Common Market and Africa' and 'The E.E.C. and the Associated African States', in *The World Today*, September 1960 and August 1961.

called by the European Commission in October to consider the future of Western Europe's relations with the under-developed world, and it is worth while reporting in some detail what happened there.

The first point that emerged from the conference was that in spite of the profound changes that have occurred in France's former African empire since 1958—including the departure of half of these newly independent States from the French Community—French sentiment is still the decisive influence on the thinking of the Six about their relations with the under-developed world. The French seem to feel intensely about their special relationship with those African States which have grown up under the French flag, and they continue to believe in France's mission of leadership in the African continent. They have also brought into the Common Market the assumption that privileged trading arrangements between the mother country (or the foster-mother countries of Europe collectively) and the ex-colonies are the natural instrument for Africa's economic development In fact, the whole Common Market attitude towards the A.O.T.s is predicated on the conviction that it is good for an under-developed country to be integrated economically, with tariff and other trade barriers abolished, into a system of highly developed countries. There is an alternative view held by many economists that such a process of integration is, on the contrary, likely to prove an effective instrument for holding back the balanced economic growth of a backward area. It is indeed arguable that large-scale trade protection by means of tariffs and import quotas, over a wide front and for a long period, is necessary if an under-developed country is to advance to economic maturity However, this particular view, which was put forward at Bari by one of the British representatives there, Mr Nicholas Kaldor of Cambridge, made no impression on the conference. Nor did the corollary suggestion that the whole notion of an Associated Overseas Territory, tied by special trading relationships with the Common Market, was misconceived. This elicited a highly emotional reaction from the Frenchmen present; indeed some of them gave the impression that they suspected that Britain was once again up to her old imperial tricks of trying to destroy France's special positions overseas.

In spite of all this there was a widespread awareness of the need for some rethinking of the Common Market's position if the 650 million in the 'associated territories' of Britain in the Common-

wealth were added to the 50 million-odd covered by the existing scheme. If this vast complex of countries were to be given the benefit of preferential arrangements and other trading privileges in the European market, the result would amount to little more than a system for discriminating against Latin America and a few other unfortunates, such as Indonesia, left out in the cold between the blocs. Such an outcome is plainly not desired—that much was made clear at Bari—but no one seems to be able to envisage a practical alternative. In parenthesis it is worth noting that the British Commonwealth countries have so far made it easier for the European Common Market to evade this issue by their own refusal to have any truck with the Associated Overseas Territories status. So long as the A.O.T. arrangement is a modest venture confined to some 50 million people mainly in Africa, it seems a manageable affair, in spite of its exclusiveness.

The most interesting and constructive idea at the Bari Conference came from M. Étienne Hirsch, the President of Euratom, who proposed that the European Common Market should forthwith *call a conference of all* African States, regardless of their former colonial allegiance, to work out a programme of development in conjunction with Western Europe—rather on the lines of the U.S.-Latin American programme at Punta del Este. He also proposed that Britain be asked to participate as a principal in such a conference, in advance of any final agreement in the negotiations for British membership of the European Common Market. M. Hirsch's suggestion seemed to have widespread support from the conference; however, it got lost, slightly mysteriously, among the 113 amendments submitted to the drafting committee and did not appear in the final communiqué.

A similar fate overtook a German proposal that the conference should specifically state that it welcomed the prospect of Britain and the Commonwealth countries associating themselves with the Common Market. The platform, under French leadership, strongly resisted this form of wording. However, the final version of the conference recommendations left ample room for any British Commonwealth countries who wished to do so to get the same terms as those already accorded to the ex-French colonies. It simply said that:

compte tenu notamment de l'entrée éventuelle de nouveaux pays membres, la Communauté Economique Européenne envisage favorablement l'association de nouveaux pays en voie de développement.

Indeed, the whole spirit of the final communiqué, issued with the full blessing of the high officials of the European Commission who were present, was extremely liberal in tone. It proposed, among other things, that the current flow of European Community aid to the A.O.T.s should be doubled, bringing it up to $300 million a year (the total voted for the whole of the first five years was $581 million) and it suggested a similar expansion of aid and investment for the under-developed world as a whole, with the European Common Market countries providing some $2,000 million out of a proposed total of $7,500 million a year. It even referred delicately to the possibility of reducing tariff preferences in general, 'if alternative arrangements could be worked out, in agreement with the associated countries, on a permanent basis giving other financial recompense of at least equivalent value'.

This was as near as the drafters of the communiqué were able to get to discussing a radically new approach to the whole problem of the 'association' of under-developed countries with Western Europe. Plainly the interests of the under-developed world as a whole would be best served by a non-discriminatory approach of this kind, which relied on direct financial aid rather than on special trading privileges accorded to one lot of countries and denied to another. However, the traditional picture of an essentially colonial world divided into three parts, with Britain, continental Europe, and the United States each taking a portion of the globe under its wing, appears still to be the accepted framework of French thinking, and it is this thinking which, so far at any rate, continues to shape the ideas of the Common Market about its relations with the under-developed countries.

ANDREW SHONFIELD

NOTE: The Associated Overseas Territories of the European Economic Community are

French Community	*Ex-French Community*
Senegal	Ivory Coast
Mauretania	Dahomey
Gabon	Upper Volta
Congo (Brazzaville)	Niger
Centrafrican Republic	Togo
Tchad	Cameroun
Madagascar	Mali

St Pierre and Miquelon
The Comoro Archipelago
The French Somali Coast
New Caledonia
The French Settlements in Oceania
The Southern and Antarctic Territories

(*Continued overleaf*)

Belgian	*Ex-Belgian*
Ruanda-Urundi	Congo (Leopoldville)

Ex-Italian (trust territory)
Somalia

Netherlands
Dutch New Guinea
Surinam (ratification pending)
Dutch West Indies (application being considered)

South Africa Faces the Future

THE Republic of South Africa came into being on 31 May this year, and although no General Election was due until 1963 it was widely predicted that the Nationalist Government would seek fresh electoral endorsement at an earlier date. It did not, therefore, come as a surprise when Dr Verwoerd announced that elections would be held on 18 October, giving as his reason the need that 'all should know a strong and stable Government is in power for the next five years.'

Dr Verwoerd stood to gain much from an immediate test of opinion and to lose more by delay. No doubt one of the most important considerations was the economic situation, for there was no guarantee that it would not worsen as the full effects of South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth made themselves felt. But there were other factors which probably influenced his decision Among his own followers, the realization of the long-cherished ideal of a Republic had enhanced his prestige, and his miraculous escape from death last year, coupled with his determination to preserve the internal *status quo* and to deal firmly with any group or groups which sought to disturb it, must have invested him with qualities of strength and resolution which would increase his popularity and standing as a national leader. There was still a great deal of bewilderment that South Africa had severed the Commonwealth connection and also a fairly widespread willingness among the White electorate to believe there was some substance in the Prime Minister's assertion that there was no room for White people in an 'Afro-Asian dominated Commonwealth'. The feeling that South Africa stood alone in the world, and the fear that South African society might fall

victim to a chain of events such as the Congo had experienced, lent support to the belief that Whites in South Africa, for their own salvation, must close their ranks against the 'Black danger' (*swart gevaar*).

The official Opposition Party (United Party) had been showing signs of increasing ineffectiveness and its policy of watered-down Nationalism was unlikely to attract new voters or to hold all the old ones. Dr Verwoerd could therefore hope for some accession of support from United Party supporters—particularly those who had voted in favour of the Republic in the 1960 referendum. The results of the General Election which showed a pronounced swing towards the Nationalists—amounting in some constituencies to 10 per cent of the electorate—confirmed this forecast, and the eighteen-year-olds, voting for the first time in a Parliamentary election, must also have helped to build up the Nationalist majority The United Party's failure to retain rural support was reflected in the loss of its last country seat (Queenstown). The composition of the new House of Assembly is as follows: National Party 105; United Party 49; Progressive Party 1; National Union 1.

The prospect of reducing the United Party's effectiveness still further must have been attractive to Dr Verwoerd. Of much more significance, however, was the chance to eliminate from the House of Assembly the lively Progressive Party—represented by a group of M.P s who prior to their breakaway from the United Party in 1959 had been among its ablest Parliamentarians, and who, since their new Progressive Party was founded, had taken the lead in offering vigorous opposition to the Government both inside and outside the House. In this aim Dr Verwoerd's success has not been quite as complete as he would wish, for although the strength of the Progressive Party in Parliament is now reduced from eleven to one (Mrs Helen Suzman, who was elected for Houghton, was the only successful Progressive Party candidate) several other Progressive candidates made a very good showing and the measure of support for the party as a whole, particularly in the Johannesburg area and in Natal, was notable.

The Progressive Party stands for a much more liberal approach to the race problem than the United Party, and it has obviously attracted most of the liberal wing of the United Party in a manner which the now almost non-existent Liberal Party was never able to do. With its powerful financial backing and considerable popular support, it is reasonable to think that in time the Progressives will

win over new adherents, but from the point of view of the Nationalist Government it is clear that the main nuisance of Parliamentary opposition has been silenced, and whatever new supporters the Progressive Party may win are probably likely to be more than balanced by further defections from the right wing of the United Party to the Nationalist camp. Nor does the Nationalist record give ground for optimism that an extra-Parliamentary group—even when it represents some 100,000 voters—will be able to influence the course of Government policy to any marked extent.

The October 1961 election was therefore a disaster for the Progressive Party—if a mitigated one. For the rebel Nationalist Mr Japie Basson (the former M.P. for Namib, in South West Africa, who came into open conflict with the Government over its elimination of the Natives' Representatives from Parliament) and for his new National Union Party, the disaster was unmitigated. In terms of an election pact with the United Party, Mr Basson was given a safe seat, but no other member of his party came near to being returned. It is possible that the association of the United Party with this dissident Afrikaner group did the U.P. more harm than good, by blurring still further the already blurred distinction between itself and the Nationalist Party.

It is clear that Dr Verwoerd intends to deal severely with any symptoms of deviation within the ranks of his own party. His intentions in this respect were made plain at the beginning of this year after there had been much discussion in the Nationalist press and among Nationalist supporters about the implementation of *apartheid* in respect of the Coloured people. In a statement issued by the Federal Council of the Nationalist Party last January, policy towards the non-Whites as a whole, and towards the Coloured people in particular, was reiterated, and any criticisms or digressions from this policy were condemned as disloyalty except where they were put forward at party congresses and officially endorsed there. In order that there should be no misunderstandings about the extent to which official party policy covered controversial issues, not only was the theory of separate development (*eiesoortige ontwikkeling*) set out, but it was further stated that the Federal Council was convinced that the Government was 'in a better position to judge' on such matters as consultations with leaders of different racial groups; mixed marriages; migratory labour; job reservation; development of Bantu areas; voting rights for non-Whites; the maintenance of law and order 'in the midst of Communistic and other incitement'

by the use of the judiciary or by stronger means; policy towards Asiatics; protection by the State of groups or churches; etc.[1] Criticism of the Government by Nationalists would obviously not be tolerated in the future.

The conflict of conscience which led to representatives of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (N.G.K.) associating themselves with the anti-*apartheid* declaration which followed the Consultation with the World Council of Churches held at Cottesloe (Johannesburg) in December 1960 prompted a further pronouncement in the Federal Council's statement that 'all churches have not yet taken decisions in this matter', followed by a homily on the moral defensibility of *apartheid*. The Consultation between representatives of the World Council of Churches and its eight member-churches in South Africa was organized after much difficulty, on the original initiative of the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, to seek reconciliation between the South African churches on the question of racial segregation which had been declared contrary to the Gospel by the World Council of Churches in 1954, and which the Archbishop of Cape Town maintained was being identified by Africans with the Christian Church. Two Dutch Reformed Churches left the World Council of Churches early this year, having failed to subscribe to the Cottesloe Declaration. Recently, two events would seem to indicate that Dr Verwoerd has succeeded in regaining united Church support: the N.G.K., like the other two Dutch Reformed Churches, has now left the World Council of Churches, and Professor A. S. Geyser of Pretoria University is being tried for heresy as a result of students' accusations that he questioned the morality of the *apartheid* doctrine.

With a majority in the new House of Assembly which falls short of two-thirds by only one seat and the prospect of scanty effective opposition, and with apparent victory over dissident groups in his own party, Dr Verwoerd can now rule the Republic from strength. The appointment of two English-speaking Cabinet Ministers, Mr A. Trollip (former Administrator of Natal) and Mr Frank Waring—both at one time United Party M.P.s—fulfils a pre-election promise that if right-wing English-speaking South Africans supported him he would give them more say in the Government. His aim is obviously to move the Republic out of the arena of English-Afrikaner political conflict and bring about a bi-partisan White attitude towards racial problems with the defence of White interests as

[1] *The Cape Argus*, 23 January 1961.

its guiding principle. In other words, among the White Sout African population, with the exception of Liberal and Progressiv elements, we can expect to see an extension of the *laager* mentalit which has for so long been characteristic of the Afrikaner's politic outlook.

To meet the danger of civil disorder the South African Defenc forces are to be reorganized and re-equipped with French an Belgian arms, and all White citizens are being encouraged to lear how to handle weapons. Support for police-sponsored pistol clut for White women has grown throughout the country and i Johannesburg it is estimated that there are now over 100,00 privately licensed weapons.

While the White population prepares to face an uncertain futur there have been few signs that the banned African political organiza tions have begun to recover from the failure of the various passiv resistance movements. The much advertised stay-at-home strik which was planned to take place on Republic Day was largely un successful, and no further national demonstrations have been hear of. There is little doubt that this can be attributed to the difficultie of 'underground' planning, to effective police activity, and to th clear indication by the Government that it will use the utmost forc to suppress any expressions of dissatisfaction. The question mus now be asked whether this kind of repression will, in time, provok a reaction against the policies of non-violence advocated by leader of the stature of Mr Luthuli, and a recourse to violence by non Whites. The continuation of the State of Emergency in Pondolan and recent reports of widespread arrests of 'criminal elements' in al parts of South Africa[1] suggest that the authorities are taking n chances on this score.

The marked upsurge of political consciousness among th Coloured population in recent months is probably likely to have a little effect on the South African Government as any other interna or external criticism has done. What of the economic outlook for th Republic?

ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Professor Benham has said, very truly, that 'nationalism, perhap the greatest curse of our age, nearly always prevails over economi considerations.'[2] Dr Verwoerd and members of his Governmen

[1] *The Times*, 6 November 1961.

[2] F. Benham, *Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries* (Oxford Universit Press for R.I.I.A.), p. 79.

have often proclaimed that their policies will be pursued regardless of economic or other sacrifice, and during the next five years there may well be an intensification of economic difficulty leading to the situation where the South African economy is in a virtual state of siege. According to the Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, 'certain branches of economic activity have already shown a decline',[1] and his optimism that this tendency will be reversed may not be widely shared. The brunt of a general recession would be carried in the financial, mining, and industrial spheres by urban and largely anti-Government sectors, but the farming community also stands to lose considerably when South African products cease to enjoy preferential treatment in the British market. There is little indication that anything comparable to Commonwealth preference can be extended to South Africa: Britain's own entry to the Common Market is complicated by these preferences, some of which may have to be sacrificed, and it is hardly likely that new concessions, upon which G.A.T.T. and the rest of the world would look with extreme disfavour, could be negotiated with the Republic of South Africa.

Although the internal political repercussions may be discounted because of its location in English-speaking Natal, the South African sugar industry—already facing the problem of over-production—has been given notice of the termination of South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement as from 31 December 1961. Even if other outlets can be found, the loss of benefits under this Agreement will be substantial and could have repercussions beyond the borders of Natal. Until now it has been possible, through the favourable prices obtained under the Agreement, to maintain domestic prices at a very low level, but if an upward adjustment is called for, not only might domestic consumption contract, but the local canning industry may find its competitive position in overseas markets seriously affected—particularly if it has also to face a loss of preferences in the British market.

There is no doubt that the Government's decision to allow Africans to purchase liquor[2] is intended as some compensation to the South African wine industry which would also be hard hit by the loss of British preference.

Ultimately, of course, a general recession would affect the whole

[1] Address to the 41st Ordinary General Meeting of stockholders of the Bank, 9 August 1961.

[2] *Liquor Amendment Act*, passed on 24 June 1961.

economy. It may be possible to keep White unemployment within reasonable bounds by excluding non-Whites from urban areas and by job reservation—i.e. the reserving of specific jobs for Whites—and thus forcing the non-White labour force to carry the burden of unemployment. This would have the dangerous corollary that men who are out of work, and near starving, would have little to lose in promoting civil disorder. Up till now, one of the main influences militating against prolonged strikes or stay-at-home demonstrations among the non-White population has been their lack of financial and food resources.

Evidence of economic malaise has not been wanting during the years of Nationalist rule: its clearest manifestation has been the decline in confidence on the part of overseas investors which degenerated into a collapse after the Sharpeville and Langa incidents and the State of Emergency last year. The net outflow of private capital over the two-year period mid-1959 to mid-1961 amounted to £141½ million and this, of course, not only meant that expansion on the basis of new investment finance from overseas was a thing of the past but also constituted a growing strain on the reserves and the balance of payments. According to the South African Reserve Bank's Annual Economic Report for 1961, private fixed investment has, in fact, 'shown no pronounced upward tendency since as far back as 1954', while the first post-war net outflow of private capital took place in 1957.

A crisis situation in South Africa's external payments position arose earlier this year, when the reserves fell to £76½ million (on 30 June 1961) and stringent measures of exchange control were introduced which not only limited the transfer of funds abroad by South Africans, but also prohibited foreigners from transferring the proceeds of sales of shares in South Africa to other countries. This was a step without precedent in South African history. Import control was tightened and customs duties on cars and luxury goods raised. Interim assistance was obtained from the International Monetary Fund, and the reserves position has gradually improved, but this cannot in itself justify expectations of an early removal of controls. If controls were lifted, it is probable that investors would hasten to remove their funds in anticipation of further restrictions, and, moreover, during the next twelve months the Government is faced with the need to find some £50 million which is due in repayment of foreign loans.

Relief from balance-of-payments strain could also be obtained

by increasing exports, and it is true that gold and other base metals and minerals are likely to contribute more to South Africa's total foreign earnings as production increases. Exports of agricultural and industrial products, however, are less promising, although strenuous efforts are being made to find new foreign markets. The problem of Commonwealth preference has already been noted, and on the African continent, where natural outlets for the South African exporter should be readily available, African objections to South Africa's race policies have resulted in dwindling markets and, in some cases, in direct economic sanctions in the form of boycotts. The fishing industry particularly has suffered from the closing of African and Asian markets.[1] There is the further difficulty of absorbing surplus capacity on the home market if trade is stagnating and unemployment grows.

In the field of public investment other problems loom large. For some years it has been the practice of the Government to finance increased investment in this sphere by fiscal means—Budget surpluses and compulsory tax levies. The development of the African reserves (Bantustans), which all authorities agree is long overdue, and which Dr Verwoerd's policy of separate development must imply if it is sincerely implemented, will call for heavy public expenditure. In a sagging economy, this may not be easy to finance.

Whether it will be possible to sustain a 'siege economy' indefinitely remains to be seen. The present external payments situation can, no doubt, be maintained through the retention of strict control and through the careful husbanding of the earnings of gold and of South Africa's other basic exports: it is probably also hoped that the new import restrictions will divert demand to local suppliers and thus offset any recessionary conditions already developing, although higher prices may be necessary to support marginal firms. The authorities on their part will give the economy all the support they can. For example, increased Government expenditure is planned to offset a serious fall-off in private building activity reflected in the fact that the value of building plans passed during the first eight months of this year was £13,100,000 less than in the corresponding period last year and only amounted to £30,300,000.[2] But this will place heavy burdens on the exchequer which is already faced with substantial outlays for defence and for the implementation of *apartheid*.

[1] Barclays Bank *Overseas Review*, October 1961, p. 7.
[2] *ibid.*, p. 11.

The prospect of an economic standstill not only destroys t
hope of an increase in the meagre living standard of the Republi
non-Whites but also threatens a gradual lowering of all existi
living standards. The Prime Minister, in a statement issued afte
recent meeting of his Economic Advisory Council, admitted th
the present tempo of expansion and development in the country
not sufficient to 'absorb completely the increasing annual additi
to the population'.[1]

If the Nationalist leaders have consciously considered t
sacrifices which their policies have obliged South Africans of
races to make, and a majority of the White electorate have unde
stood and have consequently seen fit to endorse their actions, th
apartheid can only be considered as a reflection of the extent of t
racial fears and irrational prejudices which now grip the bulk of t
White community. One has to take into account not only actual lo
but also the sacrifice of potential gain which has been the price
South Africa's thirteen-year pursuit of this ideal of *apartheid*. Wh
lies ahead cannot be prophesied with certainty, but one can scarce
be optimistic about the further consequences of policies whi
have already caused South Africa to forfeit such material benef
as capital, skill, and markets; which have prevented her from ma
ing the best use of her own resources; and which have result
in a disastrous loss of friendship, prestige, and respect in the re
of the world.

G. V. D.

[1] Barclays Bank *Overseas Review*, October 1961, p 18.